Relational Selves

Abstract

The analysis of moral reasoning requires an interdisciplinary approach. Because it is central to moral theory and ethics, it is a basic concern of philosophers; but because it deals with cognition, reasoning, and moral development (and thus, more generally, human development), it is also an important area in psychology. Our paper addresses both of these disciplines as well as intersection of gender and culture by exploring ways that empirical research can help to illuminate philosophical issues about moral reasoning and its relationship to conceptions of self. In a recent lead article for Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan argued that most research in psychology has been carried out on WEIRD subjects; Western, Educated, Industrial, Rich, and Democratic. (1) They assert that enough data exists to call into question generalizing those findings to status of universal psychological knowledge. Saying that Americans are the most individualistic people in world, they point out that Western cultures differ in cognition from non-Western ones. (2) Westerners prefer analytic thought while non-Westerners prefer holistic reasoning, and these differences give rise to different cognitive strategies employed in moral reasoning. In particular, Richard Nisbett also argues for this distinction, bringing empirical evidence to show that two cultures have different approaches to reasoning, and these match their independent and interdependent views of themselves. (3) In addition to these cultural studies, much research has been carried out on gender differences in moral reasoning, and increasingly research has also examined cultural differences specifically in moral thinking. In this paper we explore both parallels and intersections between gender and cultural differences in moral thinking. We bring together work from philosophy, psychology, anthropology, sociology, and women's and gender studies to analyze our recent empirical data that demonstrate both gender and cultural differences in moral reasoning, as well as their intersection. We support following claims about culture, moral reasoning, and concepts of self: 1) Concepts of self are tied to approaches to moral reasoning. 2) Concepts of self differ by gender and culture. 3) Moral reasoning differs by gender and culture. 4) Gender and culture intersect in formation of self-identity. We demonstrate above four points both through our empirical research and a discussion of growing body of literature in support of these claims in aforementioned disciplines. Furthermore, we believe that theoretical claims ought to be informed, at least in part, by empirical data when claims relate to aspects of human development, such as moral reasoning. Both theory and empirical research lends support to view that Western males are unique in their moral reasoning, overemphasizing independence and isolation over interdependence and connectedness. We find this in our data as American males consistently ranked lower on scales of interdependence and connectedness than American females, Balinese females and, interestingly, Balinese males. Given that American males are anomaly, it seems clear that theories of moral development should neither begin from nor be limited to American males. We propose that philosophy, particularly moral philosophy, follow lead of psychology and strive to be as inclusive as possible by including full range of human diversity and experience. For philosophers, this would mean embracing--indeed, starting from--a multicultural, feminist approach to moral theories and questions; this approach would not only be sensitive to gender and cultural bias, but it also offers an alternative model to paradigmatic rational, autonomous, independent agent of traditional moral theory. I. Conceptions of Self and Moral Reasoning Feminists have long questioned standard view of moral reasoning and concomitant conception of self. …