Altruistic Punishment Research Articles

Can authority affect the behavior of children ‘s third-party punishment?

Can authority affect the behavior of children ‘s third-party punishment?

Pain modulates brain potentials and behavioral responses to unfairness.

Pain may initially contribute to the evolution of moral decision-making as it elicits avoidance behavior. The current study aims to support this perspective by conducting a behavioral study to investigate whether pain leads to a self-oriented tendency, and an exploratory electroencephalogram (EEG) study to examine how pain affects moral decision-making. In Experiment 1, 34 participants were recruited and treated with both capsaicin (pain condition) and hand cream (control condition) in separate days. After treatment, they were asked to complete a third-party punishment task. Results showed that pain increased punishment and decreased compensation towards unfair allocations in the task. In Experiment 2, 68 participants with either pain or control treatment participated in an EEG experiment. It revealed that pain enlarged the disparity of late positive potential (LPP) between fair and unfair situations, suggesting that individuals in pain may exert more cognitive effort when facing unfair allocations. Meanwhile pain did not affect the early components P2 and the medial frontal negativity, indicating unaffected attentional or anticipatory responses towards unfairness. It demonstrates that pain can effectively modulate responses to unfairness, manifesting as a self-oriented approach with negative consequences for others. It suggests a potential evolutionary impact of pain on moral decisions.

Avoidance of altruistic punishment: Testing with a situation-selective third-party punishment game

Third-party punishment games have consistently shown that people are willing to bear personal costs to punish others who act selfishly, even as uninvolved observers. However, the traditional third-party punishment game places participants in contrived situations that mandate direct punishment decisions, potentially inflating the prevalence of such actions compared to those observed in more naturalistic settings. In light of this obligatory nature, one might speculate that if given the autonomy to step aside, people could be inclined to forgo punishment rather than penalize unfairness. The present study developed the Situation-Selective Third-Party Punishment Game (SS-TPPG), an experimental paradigm, to investigate whether avoidance of witnessing unfairness stems from a reluctance to make punitive decisions or a desire to avoid observing unfairness altogether. Three studies (total N = 810) consistently revealed that avoidance was driven by both a reluctance to witness unfair treatment and an aversion to administering punishments. Notably, participants who typically avoided observing unfair treatment were inclined to punish when forced to observe it. Furthermore, when given the opportunity to punish indirectly, participants were less likely to avoid observing unfair distributions. These results suggest that the elevated instances of direct punishment noted in the traditional third-party punishment game might be reflective of the game's structure, which constrains participants' ability to avoid witnessing unfair distributions.

Third-party punishment-like behavior in a rat model

Third-party punishment (TPP) is an altruistic behavior or sense willing to punish transgressors as a third party not directly involved in the transgression. TPP is observed worldwide, regardless of tradition and culture, and is essential for morality in human society. Moreover, even preverbal infants display TPP-like judgement, suggesting that TPP is evolutionarily conserved and innate. Thus, it is possible that non-human animals display TPP-like behavior, although TPP has been said to be human-specific. We investigated whether or not male mature Wistar rats displayed TPP-like behaviors when they witnessed deadly aggression by an unknown aggressive mouse toward another unknown victim mouse. Normally reared rats did not display TPP-like behaviors, but rats reared with extensive affectionate handling by human caretakers as beloved pets contacted the unknown aggressive mice in a gentle manner leading to reduced aggression toward the unknown victim mice, even when the aggressive mice fought back. Furthermore, the handled rats touched unknown rat pups that were drowning in water and anesthesia-induced comatose rats more frequently than control rats. These findings suggest a possibility that TPP is not in fact human-specific and innate but rather an acquired behavior that flourishes in affectionate circumstances.

Transparency and altruistic punishment in an experimental model of cooperation to corruption through economic games

This work integrates cooperation, punishment, damage to the treasury, and the transgression of norms in a single experimental model of corruption. Participants formed words with predetermined letters, receiving a reward for each word, and, if they reached a goal, an extra taken from the common fund. Manipulation in the letters made it impossible to reach the goal, so reporting exceeding it implied cheating for a benefit. Three studies model the effects of signaling, descriptive norms, and the possibility of punishing or investigating (transparency) corruption acts. 248 participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of each study. Significant differences were found in reports of words and earnings in Studies 1 and 3, but not in Study 2. The experimental model reveals the potential of transparency as an alternative of lower social cost than altruistic punishment to diminish corruption. The relevance of these results for implementing public policies was discussed.

Render help or stand by? The effect of group size on third-party punishment and its neural mechanisms

Third-party punishment (TPP) is the punishment that an individual executes on a violator as a third party or observer to maintain social norms. Many studies have provided insights into the neural mechanisms of third-party punishment in group environments. Still, only some studies have focused on the neural mechanisms of third-party punishment in different group sizes. This study used EEG analysis to explore the effects of group size on third-party punishment and its neural activity characteristics from the context of gain and loss. The results show that the punishment rate and amount of the third party in the small group size and loss context were significantly higher than that in the large group size and gain context. EEG results showed that third-party punishment in small groups induced greater P2 than in large groups. In the loss context, the third-party punishment in the large group size induced more negative LNP and activated more theta band activation than in the small group. The results showed that the motivation of the third party to seek a positive reputation in the small size exceeds the balance of its economic interests and tends to punish the violator for maintaining fair norms. The loss context plays a promoting role in this process. However, in the large size, the third-party consideration of its interests was stronger than the willingness to maintain social norms. This study provided neuroscientific evidence for third-party punishment to maintain fair norms in a group environment and further explanations from neuroscience for understanding Indirect Reciprocity Theory.

Receivers’ responses are integrated into costly third-party punishment in a way that interacts with the unfairness of allocations

Costly third-party punishment (TPP) is an effective way to enforce fairness norms and promote cooperation. Recent studies have shown that the third party considers not only the proposer’s suggested allocation but also the receiver’s response to the allocation, which was typically ignored in traditional TPP studies when making punishment decisions. However, it remains unclear whether and how the varying unfair allocations and receivers’ responses are integrated into third-party punishment. The current study addressed these issues at behavioral and electrophysiological levels by employing a modified third-party punishment task involving proposers’ highly or moderately unfair allocations and the receivers’ acceptance or rejection responses. At the behavioral level, participants punished proposers more often when receivers rejected relative to accepted unfair allocations. This effect was further modulated by the unfairness degree of allocations, indicated by a more pronounced rejection-sensitive effect when participants observed the moderately unfair offers. Electrophysiologically, when the receiver rejected the moderately unfair allocations, a stronger late-stage component P300/LPP, which was considered to be involved in allocations of attention resources, was found. Meanwhile, separated from the P300/LPP, the P200 associated with early attention capture demonstrated a rejection-sensitive effect. Together, in the costly TPP studies, the receiver is typically designated as passive and silent, and her/his responses to unfairness are conventionally ignored. However, our results indicate that except for the proposer’s distribution behavior, the receiver’s response does have an impact on third-party punishment in a way that interacts with the unfairness of allocations.

The promoting effect of the absence of second-party's punishment power on third-party punishment in maintaining social fairness norms: An EEG hyper-scanning study

Third-party punishment (TPP) plays an irreplaceable role in maintaining social fairness. Punishment power is a significant area of study within economic games. However, the impact of whether or not the second-party possesses punishment power on TPP remains unexplored. The present study utilizes the high temporal resolution of EEG and time-frequency analysis, intra-barin functional connectivity analysis, inter-brain synchronization (IBS) analysis, and granger causality analysis(GCA) to comprehensively explore the neural mechanism of TPP from the perspective of third-party individual's decision-making and IBS in the real-time social interaction. Time-frequency results found that, the absence of the punishment power activated more theta-band and alpha-band power compare to when second-party has punishment power. When second-party has no punishment power, functional connection results observed stronger functional connectivity in theta band for medium unfair offers between rTPJ and PFC. Dual-brain analysis revealed that when the second-party has no punishment power, there is a significantly higher IBS in the alpha band between the frontal and frontal-central lobes of the second-party and the parietal and parietal occipital lobes of the third-party. GCA results further showed that the direction of IBS from third-party to second-party was significantly stronger than from second-party to third-party. This study demonstrates that the absence of the second-party's punishment power promote TPP, and similar cognitive process of thinking on how to maintain social fairness enhances IBS. The current study emphasizes the influence of punishment power on TPP, broadens the research perspective and contributes crucial insights into maintain social fairness.

The motive cocktail in altruistic behaviors

Prosocial motives such as social equality and efficiency are key to altruistic behaviors. However, predicting the range of altruistic behaviors in varying contexts and individuals proves challenging if we limit ourselves to one or two motives. Here we demonstrate the numerous, interdependent motives in altruistic behaviors and the possibility to disentangle them through behavioral experimental data and computational modeling. In one laboratory experiment (N = 157) and one preregistered online replication (N = 1,258), across 100 different situations, we found that both third-party punishment and third-party helping behaviors (that is, an unaffected individual punishes the transgressor or helps the victim) aligned best with a model of seven socioeconomic motives, referred to as a motive cocktail. For instance, the inequality discounting motives imply that individuals, when confronted with costly interventions, behave as if the inequality between others barely exists. The motive cocktail model also provides a unified explanation for the differences in intervention willingness between second parties (victims) and third parties, and between punishment and helping.

Evolutionary dynamics of tax-based strong altruistic reward and punishment in a public goods game

Abstract In public goods games, punishments and rewards have been shown to be effective mechanisms for maintaining individual cooperation. However, punishments and rewards are costly to incentivize cooperation. Therefore, the generation of costly penalties and rewards has been a complex problem in promoting the development of cooperation. In real society, specialized institutions exist to punish evil people or reward good people by collecting taxes. We propose a strong altruistic punishment or reward strategy in the public goods game through this phenomenon. Through theoretical analysis and numerical calculation, we can get that tax-based strong altruistic punishment (reward) has more evolutionary advantages than traditional strong altruistic punishment (reward) in maintaining cooperation and tax-based strong altruistic reward leads to a higher level of cooperation than tax-based strong altruistic punishment.

Reinforcement learning of altruistic punishment differs between cultures and across the lifespan.

Altruistic punishment is key to establishing cooperation and maintaining social order, yet its developmental trends across cultures remain unclear. Using computational reinforcement learning models, we provided the first evidence of how social feedback dynamically influences group-biased altruistic punishment across cultures and the lifespan. Study 1 (n = 371) found that Chinese participants exhibited higher learning rates than Americans when socially incentivized to punish unfair allocations. Additionally, Chinese adults showed slower learning and less exploration when punishing ingroups than outgroups, a pattern absent in American counterparts, potentially reflecting a tendency towards ingroup favoritism that may contribute to reinforcing collectivist values. Study 2 (n = 430, aged 12-52) further showed that such ingroup favoritism develops with age. Chinese participants' learning rates for ingroup punishment decreased from adolescence into adulthood, while outgroup rates stayed constant, implying a process of cultural learning. Our findings highlight cultural and age-related variations in altruistic punishment learning, with implications for social reinforcement learning and culturally sensitive educational practices promoting fairness and altruism.

Retribution and utilitarianism as motives for children’s third-party punishment: An information-seeking approach.

Retribution and utilitarianism as motives for children’s third-party punishment: An information-seeking approach.

Acting without considering personal costs signals trustworthiness in helpers but not punishers

Third-party punishment and helping can signal trustworthiness, but the interpretation of deliberation may vary: uncalculated help signals trustworthiness, but this may not hold for punishment. Using online experiments, we measured how deliberation over personal costs and impacts to targets affected the trustworthiness of helpers and punishers. We expected that personal cost-checking punishers and helpers would be trusted less. Conversely, impact deliberation was expected to increase the perceived trustworthiness of punishers but not helpers. Replicating previous work, we found that refraining from checking the personal cost of helping signals trustworthiness (although evidence for observers trusting uncalculating over calculating helpers was mixed). This did not extend to punishment: only uncalculating non-punishers were more trustworthy than cost-checking non-punishers. Impact deliberation results were mixed: deliberation affected the trust and trustworthiness of non-helpers more than helpers and no conclusive results were found for punishment. These results show that deliberation differentially affects assessments of those who help or punish others.

Effect of cognitive empathy on group preference in third-party punishment among senior primary school children

Effect of cognitive empathy on group preference in third-party punishment among senior primary school children

The effect of third-party intervention on normative behavior of bystanders: An explanation of the social norm cueing effect

Third-party interventions play a crucial role in upholding social norms and have evolutionary implications for human societies. Nevertheless, research on the effects of third-party interventions, particularly third-party compensation, on bystanders' norm compliance remains scarce. We conducted two studies to explore how third-party interventions affect bystanders' adherence to social norms and the underlying mechanisms, focusing on the perception of social norms. Study 1 examined the effects of third-party interventions, presented as group summary information, on bystanders using the dictator game paradigm. The findings revealed that both third-party punishment and compensation positively affected bystanders' fairness, with norm perceptions serving as a mediating factor. Employing a similar paradigm to Study 1, Study 2 assessed the effect of third-party interventions conveyed through individual behavior information on bystanders. The results showed that the effect of third-party interventions on bystanders' fairness depended on how representative the interventions were perceived to be. We conclude that both third-party compensation and third-party punishment can encourage bystanders to conform to social norms by shaping their norm perceptions. The findings suggest a novel method for reinforcing social norms, potentially signaling a shift from retributive to restorative justice approaches.

Win-win or lose-lose: Children prefer the form of equality

In middle childhood, children's sense of fairness further develops, they are willing to pay a cost to maintain equality. Win-win and lose-lose are two forms of equality. Win-win equality refers to both parties maximizing benefits, while lose-lose equality means both parties incurring the maximum loss. Win-win equality allows third party upholding fairness to gain more reputational benefits without the violator being punished, embodying the principle of “benefiting oneself without harming others”. On the other hand, lose-lose equality is a more deterrent form of fairness with the violator getting punished, and the third-party might experience a situation of “effort without appreciation.” However, the specific form of equality which school-aged children prefer still requires further exploration. Therefore, adopting the dictator game paradigm of third-party punishment, we design two experiments to investigate the fairness preference of first to fourth-grade children when acting as a third party and to clarify patterns of age-related changes. Study 1 (N = 111) explored children's preferred form of fairness under advantageous inequity conditions. Study 2 (N = 122) further examined children's fairness preferences in disadvantageous inequity situations. The findings suggest that when confronted with inequitable distributions, whether rooted in disadvantageous or advantageous inequity, children display a notable tendency to utilize third-party punishment to achieve an equal allocation. Meanwhile, this tendency strengthens as they progress in grade levels. Notably, children consistently manifest a preference for win-win equality, highlighting their inclination towards mutually beneficial outcomes.

How retributive motives shape the emergence of third-party punishment across intergroup contexts.

This study examines how retributive motives-the desire to punish for the purpose of inflicting harm in the absence of future benefits-shape third-party punishment behavior across intergroup contexts. Six- to nine-year-olds (N = 151, Mage = 8.00, SDage = 1.15; 54% White, 18% mixed ethnicities, 17% Asian American; 46% female; from the USA) could punish ingroup, outgroup, or non-group transgressors by removing positive resources and allocating negative ones. Both punishments were described as retributive, yet allocating negative resources was perceived as more retributive than removing positive ones. We predicted that children would punish outgroups more so than ingroups and that this effect would be especially pronounced when punishment is perceived as particularly retributive. The results did not align with this prediction; instead, children similarly punished all agents.

Hydrocortisone reduces altruistic punishment in healthy men

Psychosocial stress modulates social cognition and behavior in humans. One potentially mediating factor is cortisol as part of the human endocrine stress response. With a double-blind, placebo-controlled between-subject study design, we tested possible dose-dependent effects of hydrocortisone (0 mg, 5 mg and 20 mg) in 85 healthy males. During a socio-economic decision-making task we measured trust, trustworthiness, sharing, punishment, and non-social risk behavior. Social value orientation (SVO) was also assessed. We observed significantly lower levels of punishment after hydrocortisone, especially in the 20 mg group. Drug-induced salivary cortisol correlated negatively with punishment behavior. None of the other facets of social behavior or the SVO were affected by hydrocortisone. Our results suggest that hydrocortisone reduces the propensity to punish unfair behavior. Future studies are needed to further disentangle the role played by various psychobiological mechanisms within the stress response as well as their complex interplay on social behavior and cognition.

Context Modulates Perceived Fairness in Altruistic Punishment: Neural Signatures from ERPs and EEG Oscillations.

Social norms and altruistic punitive behaviours are both based on the integration of information from multiple contexts. Individual behavioural performance can be altered by loss and gain contexts, which produce different mental states and subjective perceptions. In this study, we used event-related potential and time-frequency techniques to examine performance on a third-party punishment task and to explore the neural mechanisms underlying context-dependent differences in punishment decisions. The results indicated that individuals were more likely to reject unfairness in the context of loss (vs. gain) and to increase punishment as unfairness increased. In contrast, fairness appeared to cause an early increase in cognitive control signal enhancement, as indicated by the P2 amplitude and theta oscillations, and a later increase in emotional and motivational salience during decision-making in gain vs. loss contexts, as indicated by the medial frontal negativity and beta oscillations. In summary, individuals were more willing to sanction violations of social norms in the loss context than in the gain context and rejecting unfair losses induced more equity-related cognitive conflict than accepting unfair gains, highlighting the importance of context (i.e., gain vs. loss) in equity-related social decision-making processes.

Children's third-party punishment does not change depending on the prospect of future interaction.

Children pay a cost to punish third parties for unfairness. However, theoretical debates highlight that such behaviors could reflect a strategic attempt to manipulate others in future interactions. The personal deterrence hypothesis claims that punishment is motivated to deter future unfairness toward punishers. Here we tested this hypothesis with a total of n = 248 five- to 10-year-olds. In two experiments, participants witnessed that a divider shared resources either fairly or selfishly with a third party. Participants learned that the same divider (same divider condition) or a new divider (different divider condition) would subsequently decide how to share resources with the participant. If children's punishment is motivated by personal deterrence, they should punish unfairness more often in the same divider condition (vs. different divider). Conversely, if children fear retaliation from dividers, they should punish dividers less often in the same divider condition (vs. different divider). Children intervened by taking resources away from the divider (Experiment 1) or by sending a disapproving or an approving verbal message (Experiment 2). Children were more likely to punish unfair than fair allocations through material punishment and disapproving messages, while being more likely to reward fair than unfair allocations by sending approving messages. However, children did so at the same level regardless of their future divider's identity. We discuss how these results speak to a children's emerging concern with fairness and how it challenges the notion that children punish for self-oriented reasons as suggested by the personal deterrence hypothesis. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).