Abstract
This work integrates cooperation, punishment, damage to the treasury, and the transgression of norms in a single experimental model of corruption. Participants formed words with predetermined letters, receiving a reward for each word, and, if they reached a goal, an extra taken from the common fund. Manipulation in the letters made it impossible to reach the goal, so reporting exceeding it implied cheating for a benefit. Three studies model the effects of signaling, descriptive norms, and the possibility of punishing or investigating (transparency) corruption acts. 248 participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of each study. Significant differences were found in reports of words and earnings in Studies 1 and 3, but not in Study 2. The experimental model reveals the potential of transparency as an alternative of lower social cost than altruistic punishment to diminish corruption. The relevance of these results for implementing public policies was discussed.
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