Altruistic Punishment Research Articles

Social hierarchies in third-party punishment: A behavioral and ERP study

Third-party punishment refers to the punishment imposed by a party whose benefit is not directly affected by any norm violations. The present study using a modified Dictator Game explored how social statuses of the involved parties modulate punishment decisions of a third-party. Systematic manipulation of the dictators’ and recipients’ status revealed that: higher recipient status correlated with more severe punishment, but no effect of the dictator’s. We further focused on the neural underlying of this effect using ERPs. An interaction of recipient's status × fairness was observed on MFN such that only for a high-status recipient, larger amplitude was triggered by unfair offers comparing to fair offers. On LPC, the largest amplitude was observed when the offer was fair and the recipient had medium-status. These findings suggested: participants consider unfair offers proposed to high-status recipients as more norm-violating and they may evaluate the offers from the perspective of the recipient.

The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece

The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece

Obstacle to consult a psychiatrist in general hospital: Indonesian perspective

Why do individuals pay costs to punish selfish behavior, even as third-party observers? A large body of research suggests that reputation plays an important role in motivating such third-party punishment (TPP). Here we focus on a recently proposed reputation-based account (Jordan et al., 2016) that invokes costly signaling. This account proposed that “trustworthy type” individuals (who are incentivized to cooperate with others) typically experience lower costs of TPP, and thus that TPP can function as a costly signal of trustworthiness. Specifically, it was argued that some but not all individuals face incentives to cooperate, making them high-quality and trustworthy interaction partners; and, because the same mechanisms that incentivize cooperation also create benefits for using TPP to deter selfish behavior, these individuals are likely to experience reduced costs of punishing selfishness. Here, we extend this conceptual framework by providing a concrete, “from-the-ground-up” model demonstrating how this process could work in the context of repeated interactions incentivizing both cooperation and punishment. We show how individual differences in the probability of future interaction can create types that vary in whether they find cooperation payoff-maximizing (and thus make high-quality partners), as well as in their net costs of TPP – because a higher continuation probability increases the likelihood of receiving rewards from the victim of the punished transgression (thus offsetting the cost of punishing). We also provide a simple model of dispersal that demonstrates how types that vary in their continuation probabilities can stably coexist, because the payoff from remaining in one’s local environment (i.e. not dispersing) decreases with the number of others who stay. Together, this model demonstrates, from the group up, how TPP can serve as a costly signal of trustworthiness arising from exposure to repeated interactions.

The development of corporal third-party punishment

Previous research has demonstrated that toddlers are willing to punish those who harm others. This work, however, has predominantly focused on punishment in the form of resource reduction—taking away a resource or withholding access to a resource from an antisocial other. Here, in two studies, we examined whether 4- to 7-year-old children (N = 141) engage in direct, corporal punishment against antisocial others in third-party contexts. Children were given the opportunity to press buttons so that antisocial and prosocial puppets would be hit with a hammer. In Study 1, younger children (∼4-year-olds) hit the antisocial and prosocial puppets indiscriminately, whereas older children (∼7-year-olds) tended to preferentially hit the antisocial puppet. In Study 2, we tested a larger sample of 4- to 7-year-olds, and found that none of the children engaged in corporal punishment. Collapsing across both Studies 1 and 2 also indicated a null effect—children did not engage in third-party corporal punishment. We observed these findings even though children evaluated the antisocial puppet as mean and understood that pressing the hit button hurt the puppets. These findings suggest that children lack a strong desire to corporally punish third-party social wrongdoers. Our results illustrate the importance of considering different types of punishment in assessing the development of third-party punishment, and raise questions about the development of corporal third-party punishment.

第三方惩罚的神经机制：来自经颅直流电刺激的证据

第三方惩罚的神经机制：来自经颅直流电刺激的证据

Supplemental Material for Third-Party Punishment Following Observed Social Rejection

Supplemental Material for Third-Party Punishment Following Observed Social Rejection

Leading-by-example and third-party punishment: Experimental evidence

In this paper we explore how decisions in a sequential three-person game are influenced by either dynamics of roles or group composition. In the game a dictator decides how much of his endowment to transfer to the recipient. The supervisor can punish the dictator and/or transfer to the recipient after learning about the dictator’s decision. We find that transfers by a dictator are highest and stable when the group of three is fixed, no matter whether roles change or not. There is limited support of a leading-by-example effect, that is, only when both role and group composition of subjects are fixed, supervisors give more the more dictators gave, and dictators transfer more in the next period the more supervisors gave in a period. Punishment partially has a disciplining effect on dictators. Finally, we observe that subjects’ actual actions are consistent with their beliefs and expectations.

The development of egalitarian norm enforcement in childhood and adolescence

The equal division of goods is a long-existing social norm present in societies around the world. In order to ensure that the egalitarian norm is followed, people engage in costly enforcement of norm-violating behavior. Despite its importance, little is known about the emergence of this enforcement and how it develops over time. Therefore, we take the most commonly-used third-party punishment game where a third party is added to a dictator game, adapt it for children and run an experiment with 9–18 year-old children and adolescents. We show that already at 9–10 years of age, a small but non-negligible proportion of subjects are costly enforcing the egalitarian norm. We find that this behavior then strongly develops in the following years: The proportion of egalitarian norm enforcers increases, becoming the most common behavioral type with 11–12 years of age, and the punishers’ behavior fully develops until 13–14 years of age. Following those developmental changes, the enforcing behavior remains stable until adulthood. We find that some norm enforcers do not only punish selfish, but also generous deviations from the egalitarian norm. Looking at the dictators’ behavior, we observe that they increase their transfer in the direction of the egalitarian norm primarily in the same period as we observe developmental changes on the punishers’ side.

Institutional endogeneity and third-party punishment in social dilemmas

This paper studies experimentally how the endogeneity of sanctioning institutions affects the severity of punishment in social dilemmas. We allow individuals to vote on the introduction of third-party-administered sanctions, and compare situations in which the adoption of this institution is endogenously decided via majority voting to situations in which it is exogenously imposed by the experimenter. Our experimental design precludes the self-selection and signaling effects that arise when subjects can vote on the institutional setting. We find that punishment is significantly higher when the sanctioning institution is exogenous, which can be explained by a difference in the effectiveness of punishment. Subjects respond to punishment more strongly when the sanctioning institution is endogenously chosen. As a result, a given cooperation level can be reached through milder punishment when third-party sanctions are endogenous.

Soft on crime: Patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex damage allocate reduced third-party punishment to violent criminals

The human impulse to punish those who have unjustly harmed others (i.e., third-party punishment) is critical for stable, cooperative societies. Punishment selection is influenced by both harm outcome and the intent of the moral agent (i.e., the offender's knowledge of wrongdoing and desire that the prohibited consequence occur). We allocate severe punishments to those who commit violent crimes and milder punishments to those who commit non-violent crimes; and we allocate severe punishments to criminals who have malicious intent and milder punishments to criminals who lack malicious intent. Prior research has indicated that aversive, emotional responses of third-party judges may influence punishment allocation, as increased negative emotion correlates with more punitive punishments. Here, we show that patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC; a region necessary for the normal generation of emotion), compared to other neurological patients and healthy adult participants, allocate more lenient third-party punishment to criminals who commit emotionally-evocative, violent crimes. By contrast, patients with vmPFC damage did not differ from comparison participants on punishment allocation for non-emotional, non-violent crimes. These results demonstrate the necessity of the vmPFC for the integration of emotion into third-party punishment decisions, and indicate that negative emotion influences third-party punishment allocation particularly for scenarios involving physical harm to another.

Creating sanctioning norms in the lab: the influence of descriptive norms in third-party punishment

ABSTRACTThird-party punishment is a form of peer-to-peer sanctioning that is influenced by descriptive norms. The present study aims to investigate how aggregate peer punishment and the presence of a free rider who never punishes influences the formation of third-party punishment norms. Participants were exposed to social feedback indicating either low, high, or high & free rider peer punishment. Over time, participants conformed to average peer punishment leading to the emergence and persistence of different sanctioning norms in each group. The presence of one free rider significantly reduced the average punishment and increased the frequency of free riding behavior. These findings highlight the critical role of descriptive norms and suggest the presence of a ‘bad apple’ effect in third-party punishment.

Judgments in a hurry: Time pressure affects how judges assess unfairly shared losses and unfairly shared gains.

Human society has evolved to allow third parties-the court system, parents or other societal arbitrators-to punish norm violators and compensate victims. Few studies explore the effect of stress or time pressure on a third-party judge. Under time pressure, people will likely show a more instinctual reaction or judgment style. We investigated third-party punishment and compensation within the context of unfairly shared losses and gains in a dictator game under time pressure. Our results show that under no time pressure, participants were inclined to punish dictators who unfairly split windfall gains; however, participants chose to compensate victims more than punish the norm-violating dictators in the context of unfairly shared losses. With added time pressure, third-parties were disposed to inflict punishment upon the dictator in both the gain and loss contexts-punishment became the action of choice. Our results shed light on the way observed behavior and stress affect social cognition and decision making in the context of altruistic social interventions and the enforcement of social norms.

Sex Affects the Relationship Between Third Party Punishment and Cooperation

Prosocial third-party punishment (3PP) is a punitive behavior against antisocial individuals, which might explain extended cooperativeness in humans. 3PP shows sexual dimorphism, being more frequent in men than in women. We studied whether sexually dimorphic features related to sexual hormones during development (facial dimorphism and 2D:4D) influence the tendency to engage in 3PP in a sample of 511 women and 328 men. After playing a Prisoner’s Dilemma, participants had to decide whether to penalize the defection of a third player who had exploited his/her counterpart’s cooperation. In line with previous studies, we observe that men are more prone to engage in 3PP than women. We find that this sex difference is due to cooperative men being more likely to punish than cooperative women. In addition, men with higher facial masculinity are less likely to engage in 3PP, whereas no features influence 3PP in women. We discuss the possibility that sex differences in the motivations and fitness implications underlying 3PP might be driving the observed results.

Toddlers and infants expect individuals to refrain from helping an ingroup victim’s aggressor

Adults and older children are more likely to punish a wrongdoer for a moral transgression when the victim belongs to their group. Building on these results, in violation-of-expectation experiments (n = 198), we examined whether 2.5-year-old toddlers (Exps. 1 and 2) and 1-year-old infants (Exps. 3 and 4) would selectively expect an individual in a minimal group to engage in third-party punishment (TPP) for harm to an ingroup victim. We focused on an indirect form of TPP, the withholding of help. To start, children saw a wrongdoer steal a toy from a victim while a bystander watched. Next, the wrongdoer needed assistance with a task, and the bystander either helped or hindered her. The group memberships of the wrongdoer and the victim were varied relative to that of the bystander and were marked with either novel labels (Exps. 1 and 2) or novel outfits (Exps. 3 and 4). When the victim belonged to the same group as the bystander, children expected TPP: At both ages, they detected a violation when the bystander chose to help the wrongdoer. Across experiments, this effect held whether the wrongdoer belonged to the same group as the bystander and the victim or to a different group; it was eliminated when the victim belonged to a different group than the bystander, when groups were not marked, and when either no theft occurred or the wrongdoer was unaware of the theft. Toddlers and infants thus expect individuals to refrain from helping an ingroup victim's aggressor, providing further evidence for an early-emerging expectation of ingroup support.

Altruistic Punishment in the Classroom: An Update on the Tragedy of the Commons Extra Credit Question

A world-famous classroom exercise gives students the choice between 2 points (the communal option) or 6 points (the overconsumption option) of extra credit toward an assignment in their course, but if more than 10% choose 6 points, no one receives any points. In the current variation, students ( N = 795) were also given a third option—to sacrifice their own potential points to take away points from another randomly selected student who chose 6 points. Across seven course sections, 19 students chose this option based on the concept of “altruistic punishment,” with many expressing concern about the entire class losing points. Most students had a positive attitude toward the exercise, viewing that it helped them understand new material and increased their interest in psychology, believing that psychology can help solve social problems. This exercise effectively demonstrates group cooperation dilemmas.

Low-cost, high-impact altruistic punishment promotes cooperation cascades in human social networks

Theoretical models and experiments suggest that social networks may significantly impact the emergence and stability of cooperation in humans. Similarly, theoretical models and experiments have shown that punishing behavior can significantly increase cooperative behavior in individuals. However, how punishing impacts the effects of social networks on cooperation is not yet understood. Here, I examine a set of laboratory experiments in which participants choose to cooperate or defect under differing punishment arrangements. Through analysis of the experiment as a network, I evaluate how institutional arrangements affect the degree to which social networks promote cooperative behavior. The results show that cooperative behavior spreads from person-to-person in all versions of the game, but that in versions of the game with low-cost, high-impact punishment the influence both endures for more rounds and spreads further in the network. These results show that the extent to which cooperative behavior cascades is affected by the institutional arrangements that govern game play.

Rare Third-Party Punishment Promotes Cooperation in Risk-Averse Social Learning Dynamics

Third-party punishment is a common mechanism to promote cooperation in humans. Theoretical models of evolution of cooperation predict that punishment maintains cooperation if it is sufficiently frequent. On the other hand, empirical studies have found that participants frequently punishing others do not success in comparison with those not eager to punish others, suggesting that punishment is suboptimal and thus should not be frequent. That being the case, our question is what mechanism, if any, can sustain cooperation even if punishment is rare. The present study proposes that one possible mechanism is risk-averse social learning. Using the method of evolutionary game dynamics, we investigate the effect of risk attitude of individuals on the question. In our framework, individuals select a strategy based on its risk, i.e., the variance of the payoff, as well as its expected payoff; risk-averse individuals prefer to select a strategy with low variable payoff. Using the framework, we examine the evolution of cooperation in two-player social dilemma games with punishment. We study two models: cooperators and defectors compete, while defectors may be punished by an exogenous authority; and cooperators, defectors, and cooperative punishers compete, while defectors may be punished by the cooperative punishers. We find that in both models, risk-averse individuals achieve stable cooperation with significantly low frequency of punishment. We also examine three punishment variants: in each game, all defectors are punished; only one of defectors is punished; and only a defector who exploits a cooperator or a cooperative punisher is punished. We find that the first and second variants effectively promote cooperation. Comparing the first and second variants, each can be more effective than the other depending on punishment frequency.

The role of cognitive control in third-party punishment

The role of cognitive control in third-party punishment

Which is the ideal sanction for cooperation? An experimental study on different types of third-party sanctions.

Cooperation is the crux of many social problems, thus third‐party sanction, as one of the most important ways to promote cooperation, is worth studying. The present study compared the effects of third‐party punishment alone, third‐party reward alone, and the combination of third‐party reward and third‐party punishment on cooperation in the context of a public goods experiment. In addition, we explored the characteristics of third‐party sanctioning behaviors. A total of 280 students participated in the present study. The results showed that the operation of third‐party sanctions did raise the level of cooperation and changed the discrete trend of cooperation—specifically, the differences between the cooperation level of every group member and the average level of the whole group. Furthermore, when third‐party rewards and third‐party punishments were used simultaneously in the public goods game (PGG), the level of cooperation was greatly enhanced, which meant that in the context of the third party, when punishment opportunities and reward opportunities coexist, they may have a “compensatory effect.” In terms of the characteristics of sanctioning behaviors, the frequency of third‐party sanctions did not differ significantly under different conditions (third‐party punishment alone, third‐party reward alone, and a combination of third‐party reward and third‐party punishment), and neither did expenditures on third‐party sanctions, but the strategies that third parties used changed under different conditions, thus their effects on other group members’ cooperative behavior varied under different conditions. The present study provides a comprehensive picture of how third parties behave in different conditions of third‐party sanctions and how these sanctions exert influence on cooperation. Understanding these mechanisms can help us build more effective institutions.

When is altruistic punishment useful in social dilemmas?

It is not fully understood how cooperation emerges in a population of individuals with no connections or prior experience with each other. Strategy selection that is purely based on accumulated payoffs promotes free riders who put their self interests above that of any group. How could cooperation persist in these settings? Researchers have posited direct or indirect reciprocity as possible explanations but these theories fail if interactions are not repeated or reputations are ignored. Altruistic punishment may provide an answer.Punishers impose a penalty, such as a fine, on defectors. The idea is a sufficiently high enough penalty—or even the threat of a high penalty—will convince defectors that cooperation is more beneficial. The punishment is altruistic because punishers pay a cost to impose a penalty and expect nothing in return (including no future reciprocity). Empirical and human studies have shown when some individuals are punishers, and they are common, cooperation levels tend to increase. But it has never been specified exactly how large this majority of punishers must be to promote cooperation. Here we analyze cooperation, defection and punishment in a social dilemma, public goods game, and precisely identify the necessary conditions to make altruistic punishment an effective strategy for improving group cooperation levels.