Abstract
Abstract In public goods games, punishments and rewards have been shown to be effective mechanisms for maintaining individual cooperation. However, punishments and rewards are costly to incentivize cooperation. Therefore, the generation of costly penalties and rewards has been a complex problem in promoting the development of cooperation. In real society, specialized institutions exist to punish evil people or reward good people by collecting taxes. We propose a strong altruistic punishment or reward strategy in the public goods game through this phenomenon. Through theoretical analysis and numerical calculation, we can get that tax-based strong altruistic punishment (reward) has more evolutionary advantages than traditional strong altruistic punishment (reward) in maintaining cooperation and tax-based strong altruistic reward leads to a higher level of cooperation than tax-based strong altruistic punishment.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
