Theory Of The Mind Research Articles

Prefrontal cortical modulation of information flow in a large-scale model of the cortico-thalamic circuit

While generating the stream of consciousness and driving our actions in the world the brain largely relies on implicit forms of information processing. Conscious and unconscious factors are closely coupled and can be seen as complementary since unconscious processing can be sensitive to regularities within signals prior to conscious awareness, suggesting that the content of consciousness can be biased by unconscious factors. In the context of the Distributed Adaptive Control (DAC) theory of the mind, brain and body nexus [1], we previously developed different probabilistic models of perception and attention that include bottom-up and top-down processes in defining an anticipatory gate to restrict the prediction of future incoming stimuli [2]. These results suggest that unconscious information presented at the border of this anticipatory gate could lead to a re-organization of perception and cognition by modifying sensory expectations. A plausible neuronal substrate for this top-down shaping mechanism has been identified in the circuitry including prefrontal cortical areas and the thalamus by mediation of the inhibitory thalamic reticular nucleus (TRN) interposed between the thalamus and the cortex. TRN is uniquely innervated by prefrontal projections, both by large ('driving') and small ('modulatory') synaptic boutons, that extends into the sensory sectors of the nuclei [3] indicating a possible role in the regulation of the sensory information flow from the thalamus to the cortex. Building on an initial large scale model of thalamo-cortical dysrhythmia [4], the present study describes a spiking model of the cortico thalamic loops that aims at explaining how concurrent sensory inputs can be effectively gated by the activation of prefrontal projections to the TRN. The model consists of a network of pyramidal cells, interneurons, thalamic reticular and thalamocortical relay cells and includes driving and modulatory connections from the prefrontal areas to the TR nuclei. We show that inputs from the prefrontal cortex (and its homologous thalamic area) can selectively favor one of two incoming thalamic stimuli by activating neighboring TRN neurons and thus inhibiting the thalamic relay cells activated by the concurrent stimulus. The stimulus is then not sufficiently strong to be transmitted to the cortical areas. PFC top-down expectations can thus act as a filter on the thalamus (by the mediation of the RTN) to suppress irrelevant signals and maintain a coherent internal state. As a follow up we want to test the prediction that the same mechanism can drive to conscious percepts following strong expectations even in the absence of external stimuli.

Convocation Speaker Calls for ‘Century of the Mind’

Back to table of contents Previous article Next article Clinical and Research NewsFull AccessConvocation Speaker Calls for ‘Century of the Mind’Mark MoranMark MoranSearch for more papers by this authorPublished Online:12 Jun 2013https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.pn.2013.6b11AbstractWhat has long been called the “mind” can now be understood as the growth of connections between neurons that arises from individual human encounter with experience.Mind change”—a result of the threat to neuronal connections and growth of the brain posed by digital technology—may be as important a challenge in the 21st century as climate change. That’s what Susan Greenfield, C.B.E., D.Phil., told APA members during the William C. Menninger Memorial Convocation Lecture at APA’s 2013 annual meeting in San Francisco last month. Greenfield, a neuroscientist at the University of Oxford and author of a neuroscientific theory of consciousness titled The Private Life of the Brain, described her work searching for biomarkers of—and pharmacologic interventions for—neurodegenerative diseases.Susan Greenfield, C.B.E., D.Phil., tells annual meeting attendees that long hours using electronic communication devices could threaten the growth of neuronal connections by depleting opportunites for human interaction. David HathcoxShe outlined what she said is a neuroscientific theory of the mind. “The wonderful thing about being born a human being is that you are born with a full complement of neurons, but it is the growth of the connections between those neurons that accounts for the growth of the brain after birth,” Greenfield said. “You are going to be unique—no one will have a brain like yours in the 100,000 years we have stalked this planet because those connections are formed, updated, changed, and endlessly revised by the dialogue you as a human being have with the outside world. That is why we occupy more ecological niches than any other species on the planet, and it is why we are individuals, because if you have individual experiences—unlike, say the goldfish that doesn’t have a great personality—then you are going to be an individual.” But Greenfield also expressed her belief that the vast amounts of time many people—especially children and adolescents—are spending in isolated contemplation of computer screens, tablets, or smartphones may be threatening the growth of connections by depleting the opportunities for real encounters with experience. “If you are spending, as some kids are, five hours-plus a day not walking on the beach, not giving someone a hug, not looking someone in the eye,...you should expect to see some differences, and not all of them are going to be good,” she said. Greenfield, who also is the author of You and Me: The Neuroscience of Identity, said there is a “huge amount of evidence accumulating” that mind change, analogous to climate change, is happening. “We need to take this seriously,” she said.But unlike climate change—to which the human response can be only damage control—Greenfield said we can harness the power of neuroscience to make positive changes. She recalled that President George H. W. Bush proclaimed the 1990s as the “Decade of the Brain.” But she said the accomplishments of that period and since have only scratched the surface of what is possible with the expanding reach of neuroscience. “That is nothing compared to this century, and I would like to persuade you that what we should really be thinking about is the 21st century—the whole century—as the century of the mind.“For the first time in our privileged Western world, we have a longer life expectancy than at any other time,” she said. “So what are we going to do with all this time?.... That is the challenge, and that is what is so different about mind change. We have the enormous chance to truly make the 21st century the century of the individual human mind.” ■ ISSUES NewArchived

Uma nosologia para os fenômenos sobrenaturais e a construção do cérebro 'possuído' no século XIX

At the end of the twentieth century, supernatural phenomena such as so called trances and possession by spirits received a scientific classification, which includes the numerous diagnoses of the dominant psychiatry. At the end of the nineteenth century we can observe a process of scientific categorization of phenomena considered to have originated in superstition or popular imagination. In this work we show how trances and spiritual possession were studied by Franz Anton Mesmer and his followers when developing the concept of magnetism; by James Braid during the creation of his theory of hypnosis; and by Jean Martin Charcot, which marked the entry of hysteria into nosological classification. Despite the differences between these schools, we identify the use of the brain and cerebral metaphors as the foundation of theories of the mind.

An Essay on Bion's Beta Function

Among the major theorists studying the effect of the external world on the individual, none had a more ambiguous relationship to the psychic manifestations of the environment than Wilfred Bion. On the one hand his theory of the mind contained a new concept, beta elements, to depict the intrusion of the material world into the mental sphere, while on the other he radically opposed the use of sensory perception as a source for clinical insight. The author examines this dichotomy as an outgrowth of her interest in the place of external reality in psychoanalytic theory. As a result, this essay is an attempt to clarify the source for Bion's theorizing, in order to be more specific about the applicability of his concepts and his precepts.

From Sensory Order to Legal Order: Property and Freedom of Contract in the Jurisprudence of David Hume

David Hume’s theory of law and justice is a central element of his moral philosophy. Hume’s theory of the mind leads to a theory of undesigned social order based on fundamental laws of justice that arise insensibly through experience. The need to secure private property and its free exchange by the performance of promises is the original cause of the emergence of the rules of justice. Hume argues that the moral duty of obedience to authority arises from the need to maintain the rules of justice and that a ruler who violates or fails to uphold justice forfeits the right of allegiance. This paper analyses Hume’s theory and argues that it is epistemologically superior to natural rights theory and provides a powerful justification of property rights and contractual freedom that remains valid today.

Cycles in speed-working memory-G relations: Towards a developmental–differential theory of the mind

This article presents three studies, two of them longitudinal, which investigated the relations between age, processing speed, working memory (WM), and fluid intelligence (gf) from 4 to 16years of age. Structural equation modeling showed that speed was a powerful covariate of age (~−.6 to −.7) from 4 to 13years, declining thereafter (to ~−.2). WM was stably related to speed through the whole age-span studied (~−.4 to −.5). A large part (59%) of age-related changes in gf (83%) from 4 to 7years and a lower but significant part later on, especially in adolescence (~10–20% out of ~40–50%), were mediated by WM. However, with speed and age controlled, WM was almost fully commensurate with gf (~.9), from about the age of 8–9years onwards. A series of models suggested an ever present efficiency level defined by speed and control and a representational level defined by WM and gf, which are increasingly differentiated with development. All processes develop in cycles concerted by a dynamic G. Change in each process over time originated from within the processes themselves and G, in proportions varying with developmental phase. Overall, speed signified age-associated changes in processing capabilities, partly expressed in WM expansions and gf reconstructions. An overarching model is proposed integrating differential with developmental theories of human intelligence.

Resisting the Enlightenment's Instrumentalist Legacy: James, Hamilton, and Carlyle on the Mechanisation of the Human Condition

SummaryIn the early post-Enlightenment period, informed by the history of Scottish and European thought, Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881) and Sir William Hamilton (1788–1856) alerted readers to a melancholy future emerging from mechanical theories of the mind. Opposing a Lockean strand in British and French philosophy, their concerns involved predictions about, among other things, a descent into pessimism and nihilism, and the end of metaphysics and moral philosophy. Arguably influenced by Carlyle and Hamilton, William James's (1842–1910) much later Varieties of Religious Experience (1902) evinces a similar opposition to medical materialist psychology. Confronting a profound shift within Enlightenment thought, towards the increasing dominance of mechanical theories, Carlyle, Hamilton, and James were variously resisting the mechanisation of the human condition and an agency-eradicating instrumentalism. Part of that resistance involved humour and certain indications of hope for humanity that, as Carlyle put it, ‘mechanism is not always to be our hard taskmaster’. Once immensely influential, Carlyle, Hamilton, and James are presently marginalised figures. However, Jürgen Habermas's distinction between communicative and instrumental rationality suggests that what was at stake for these thinkers is of continuing relevance. Their work deserves to be explored to recover nineteenth-century Scottish philosophy's participation in a discourse of transnational status and significance.

The Placebo Effect: A Conversation With Dr Irving Kirsch.

The Placebo Effect: A Conversation With Dr Irving Kirsch.

Evaluating digital piracy intentions on behaviors

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to assess how well digital piracy self‐report intentions predict actual digital piracy behaviors in service marketing research.Design/methodology/approachStudy 1 collects 321 surveys to investigate potential measurement issues related to digital piracy intention formation. Study 2 replicates Study 1 based on a separate sample of 267 respondents, and additionally links digital piracy intentions to directly observed digital piracy behaviors across a peer‐to‐peer network.FindingsThe results first validate a strong predictive relationship between self‐report intentions and observed digital piracy behaviors (R2=0.36). Second, common method bias and measurement error do not appear to threaten the veracity of reported results. Third, a social psychological model of how digital piracy behaviors emerge is validated based upon the folk theory of the mind. Finally, a two‐dimensional conceptualization of frequency of past behaviors is identified based upon exploratory factor analysis using structural equation modeling.Research limitations/implicationsThe research reported here relies on experimental methods of measuring peer‐to‐peer network activity. Future research might consider the motivational and attitudinal antecedents to digital piracy intention formation.Practical implicationsThe results afford service marketers assurance that self‐report measures of digital piracy behavioral intentions can serve as predictive measures of future behaviors. This helps make the collection of data in this context both achievable and practical. Also, a methodological framework is identified to strengthen measurement models associated with this type of research.Originality/valueThe research provides a first effort to empirically relate behavioral intention data to unobtrusively observed digital piracy behaviors across peer‐to‐peer networks.

La evaluación psicopedagógica a la luz de la neuropsicología

La neuropsicología aporta a la evaluación psicopedagógica un modelo explicativo sobre el motivo de las dificultades de aprendizaje. El análisis de los procesos cognitivos: praxias, atención, percepción, memoria, lenguaje, teoría de mente y funciones ejecutivas reflejan el funcionamiento de las redes de procesamiento cerebral que sustentan el aprendizaje.

Searle’s Wall

In addition to his famous Chinese Room argument, John Searle has posed a more radical problem for views on which minds can be understood as programs. Even his wall, he claims, implements the WordStar program according to the standard definition of implementation because there is some “pattern of molecule movements” that is isomorphic to the formal structure of WordStar. Program implementation, Searle charges, is merely observer-relative and thus not an intrinsic feature of the world. I argue, first, that analogous charges involving other concepts (motion and meaning) lead to consequences no one accepts. Second, I show that Searle’s treatment of computation is incoherent, yielding the consequence that nothing computes anything: even our standard personal computers fail to run any programs on this account. I propose an alternative account, one that accords with the way engineers, programmers, and cognitive scientists use the concept of computation in their empirical work. This alternative interpretation provides the basis of a philosophical analysis of program implementation, one that may yet be suitable for a computational theory of the mind.

Western Psychology and Muslim Psychology in Dialogue: Comparisons Between a Qura’nic Theory of Personality and Freud’s and Jung’s Ideas

In this paper, comparisons are made between a newly developed Qura'nic theory of personality and the Freudian and Jungian theories of the mind. Notable similarities were found between the Freudian id, ego, superego and neurosis and the Qura'nic nafs ammarah besoa' (evil-commanding psyche), a'ql (intellect), al-nafs al-lawammah (the reproachful psyche) and al-nafs al-marid'a (the sick psyche), respectively. Noteworthy resemblances were detected also between the Jungian concepts collective unconscious, archetypes, Self and individuation and the Qura'nic constructs roh (spirit), al-asmaa' (the names), qalb (heart), and al-nafs al-mutmainnah (the serene psyche), respectively. These parallels, as well as the departure points, between the models are thoroughly discussed and analyzed. The comparisons performed in this paper open new avenues for dialogue between western models of the psyche and their Muslim counterparts, a dialogue that can enrich both perspectives and advance the field of psychology.

Distributed Adaptive Control: A theory of the Mind, Brain, Body Nexus

Abstract Distributed Adaptive Control (DAC) is a theory of the design principles underlying the Mind, Brain, Body Nexus (MBBN) that has been developed over the last 20 years. DAC assumes that the brain maintains stability between an embodied agent and its environment through action. It postulates that in order to act, or know how, the brain has to answer four fundamental questions: why, what, where, when. Thus the function of the brain is to continuously solve the, so called, H4W problem. The DAC theory is expressed as a robot based neural architecture organized in two complementary structures: layers and columns. The organizational layers are called: reactive, adaptive and contextual and its columnar organization defines the processing of states of the world, the self and the generation of action. Each layer is described with respect to its key hypotheses, implementation and specific benchmarks. After this overview of the key elements of DAC, the mapping of its key assumptions towards the invertebrate and mammalian brain is described. In particular, this review will focus on the systems involved in realizing the core principles underlying the reactive layer: the allostatic control of fundamental behavior systems in the vertebrate brain and the emergent non-linearity through neuronal mass action in the locust brain. The adaptive layer will be analyzed in terms of the classical conditioning paradigm and its neuronal substrate the amygdala-cerebellum-neocortex complex together with episodic memory and the formation of sense-act couplets in the hippocampus. For the contextual layer the ability of circuits in the prefrontal cortex to acquire and express contextual plans for action is described. The general overview of DAC’s explanation of MBBN is combined by examples of application scenarios in which DAC has been validated including mobile and humanoid robots, neurorehabilitation and the large-scale interactive space Ada. After 20 years of research DAC can be considered a mature theory of MBBN. It has build up a track record of explaining core aspects of mind, brain and behavior, has made testable and verified predictions at the level of behavior, physiology and anatomy, has been shown to be able to control complex real-world artefacts and has been successfully applied to brain repair and neurorehabilitation. Currently DAC is extended to capture the phenomenon of consciousness, the ultimate challenge in the study of the Mind, Brain, Body Nexus.

The Externalist Foundations of a Truly Total Turing Test

The paper begins by examining the original Turing Test (2T) and Searle's antithetical Chinese Room Argument, which is intended to refute the 2T in particular, as well as any formal or abstract procedural theory of the mind in general. In the ensuing dispute between Searle and his own critics, I argue that Searle's `internalist' strategy is unable to deflect Dennett's combined robotic-systems reply and the allied Total Turing Test (3T). Many would hold that the 3T marks the culmination of the dialectic and, in principle, constitutes a fully adequate empirical standard for judging that an artifact is intelligent on a par with human beings. However, the paper carries the debate forward by arguing that the sociolinguistic factors highlighted in externalist views in the philosophy of language indicate the need for a fundamental shift in perspective in a Truly Total Turing Test (4T). It's not enough to focus on Dennett's individual robot viewed as a system; instead, we need to focus on an ongoing system of such artifacts. Hence a 4T should evaluate the general category of cognitive organization under investigation, rather than the performance of single specimens. From this comprehensive standpoint, the question is not whether an individual instance could simulate intelligent behavior within the context of a pre-existing sociolinguistic culture developed by the human cognitive type. Instead the key issue is whether the artificial cognitive type itself is capable of producing a comparable sociolinguistic medium.

A Multiple Self Theory of the Mind

Lester (2010) has proposed a multiple self theory of the mind in formal terms, with 12 postulates and 49 corollaries (see the Appendix). The present essay presents the views of other theorists who have proposed similar ideas (Rita Carter and Shlomo Mendelovic) and some applications of a multiple self theory, including Robert Lifton's concept of the Protean Self, shifting in African American female professionals, and academic teaching personae. A perusal of most textbooks designed for courses on theories of personality reveals the influence of two themes. The first is that many psychologists believe that human behavior is determined in part, and some believe completely, by stimuli in the environment. This is evident from the inclusion of a chapter on Skinner’s learning theory which may be appropriately be described as a theory of no mind. Textbooks also usually present the ideas of Walter Mischel (1968) who argued that people behaved differently because of the different situations in which they found themselves and because of their different histories of learning. Mischel later modified this extreme view, but its influence persists today. The second is the notion that humans have a single self. Some theorists argue that this is always the case, while others argue that integrating the various components of the mind into a single self is a task for the second half of life. This view has been argued most forcefully by Baumeister (1998), who stated: “The multiplicity of selfhood is a metaphor. The unity of selfhood is a defining fact” (p. 682). In fact, Baumeister presented no facts to back up his assertion, and so it could just as appropriately be asserted that the unity of the self is a metaphor while the multiplicity of the self is a fact. A contrasting view, that the mind is made of a multiplicity of selves, was stated most clearly by Andras Angyal (1965) whose theory of the mind is, unfortunately, rarely mentioned in personality textbooks (www.panarchy.org/angyal/personality.html). Although a holistic theorist, Angyal proposed that the mind is made up of subsystems which interact, resulting in setting and shifting sets, as one after another subsystem takes over control of the mind and which sometimes conflict, resulting in symptoms of pressure, intrusion and invasion. Angyal’s presentation of his theory remained abstract, but later theorists provided illustrations of Angyal’s ideas without, however, acknowledging Angyal’s contribution. For example, Eric Berne (1961) proposed the existence of ego states (Parent, Adult, and Child) that control the mind at different times (that is, each assumes executive power temporarily) and come into conflict (leading to contamination, a situation that resembles Angyal’s concept of intrusion). The theory that mind is made up of multiple selves has been proposed most forcefully in recent years by John Rowan (1990; www.JohnRowan.org.uk) and David Lester (2010; www.drdavidlester.net). Rowan prefers to use the term subpersonalities, while Lester uses the term subselves or multiple selves. Lester’s theory is the most formal presentation, and he laid out his theory in 10 postulates and 49 corollaries. These are presented in the Appendix to this essay. Open Access: http://www.amsciepub.com/doi/abs/10.2466/02.09.28.CP.1.5

“An Incomplete Theory of the Mind”

“An Incomplete Theory of the Mind”

A THEORY OF THE MIND AS A COMPLEX SYSTEM

Five principles of skill acquisition are presented based on a review of research on human learning and expertise. Essentially these principles state that practice leads to faster and more efficient uses of knowledge. This enables faster performance and results in less demand on mental resources. In turn these outcomes enable higher level behaviours to be attempted. Ultimately skills are developed through refinement of many component processes. A theory of the mind is proposed that borrows from theories of complex adaptive systems. In this theory, the mind is conceived of as consisting of agents that compete for resources associated with processing information. The nature of this competition is similar to that observed in physical and biological systems in that agents survive or disappear depending on their usefulness. This theory is shown to be capable of explaining the five principles of skill acquisition, without these principles being explicitly built into the theory. Implications for other theories of skill acquisition are considered.

Predictive brains: forethought and the levels of explanation

A commentary on Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science by Clark, A. (in press). Behav. Brain Sci. Is any unified theory of brain function possible? Following a line of thought dating back to the early cybernetics (see, e.g., Cordeschi, 2002), Clark (in press) has proposed the action-oriented Hierarchical Predictive Coding (HPC) as the account to be pursued in the effort of gaining the “Grand Unified Theory of the Mind”—or “painting the big picture,” as Edelman (2012) put it. Such line of thought is indeed appealing, but to be effectively pursued it should be confronted with experimental findings and explanatory capabilities (Edelman, 2012). The point we are making in this note is that a brain with predictive capabilities is certainly necessary to endow the agent situated in the environment with forethought or foresight, a crucial issue to outline the unified account advocated by Clark. But the capacity for forethought is deeply entangled with the capacity for emotions and when emotions are brought into the game, cognitive functions become part of a large-scale functional brain network. However, for such complex networks a consistent view of hierarchical organization in large-scale functional networks has yet to emerge (Bressler and Menon, 2010), whilst heterarchical organization is likely to play a strategic role (Berntson et al., 2012). This raises the necessity of a multilevel approach that embraces causal relations across levels of explanation in either direction (bottom–up or top–down), endorsing mutual calibration of constructs across levels (Berntson et al., 2012). Which, in turn, calls for a revised perspective on Marr's levels of analysis framework (Marr, 1982). In the following we highlight some drawbacks of Clark's proposal in addressing the above issues.

Bayes or determinables? What does the bidirectional hierarchical model of brain functions tell us about the nature of perceptual representation?

GENERAL COMMENTARY article Front. Psychol., 15 November 2012Sec. Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology Volume 3 - 2012 | https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00500

Representing the Mind in the French Catholic Novel

The apogee of the French Catholic Novel in the first half of the twentieth century coincides with a period of unprecedented cultural interest in the workings of the mind, with a variety of artistic, scientific and philosophical ideas on consciousness prominently employed by major French writers of the period. This article explores how the Catholic Novel participates in this debate, presenting its own detailed conception of consciousness derived from theological principles, finding echoes with certain contemporary theories of the mind and contrast with others, and, in particular, coming into sharp conflict with both the existentialist and psychoanalytic models.