Theory Of The Mind Research Articles

UM CAMINHO DO MEIO ENTRE TRADIÇÃO E RADICALISMO EM COGNIÇÃO

While the cognitivist theory of the mind presents the brain as the exclusive locus of cognition, working isolated manipulating its representations, in the descriptions of radical enactivism the roles of brain, body and environment get confused in the total dynamics that characterise the embodied embedded behavior. Putting the phenomenon of learning in focus, our middle way approach finds an equilibrium between the two opposing positions: in an interactive process, where the body and the elements of the environment are in direct contact with each other, the brain encounters opportunities to give form to a behavior that is capable to reach the goal. We analyze and develop this idea with the help of an análogo between the intelligent behavior and the operation of a machine, and between learning and the construction of the machine. The first result we obtain is the identification of fundamental gaps in the cognitivist and enactivist explanations. The most interesting result, however, consists in the observation that the cognivist and enactivist projects are working on the same problem: the construction and operation of cognitive machines. Not only that, but that which missing on each of them seems to be offered by the other — which allows us to portray the two in continuity.

The Need for and Resistance to Realness in the Analyst: Making Psychoanalysis a Truly Two-Person Experience

ABSTRACTWhile Freud was often ambivalent about the clinical aspects of psychoanalysis,he remained enamored of his theory of the mind and elaborated it over the entire course of his life. Occasionally, an analyst identified himself or herself as making major additions or alternatives to Freud’s original definition, leading to separate schools of psychoanalysis. Technique, on the other hand, was often assumed to remain the same with the analyst’s role severely constricted with regard to interactive warmth and caring. Why is this? The answer lies in the perception that a treatment depending significantly on the personality and life experience of the analyst cannot be generalized but would be judged as the influence of a powerful analyst acting according to his or her individuality. Who benefits from such a distancing stance on the analyst’s part? Certainly not the patient, but definitely not the analyst. For analysts, the need to have psychoanalysis survive as a therapy that can compete as the one therapy based upon an intimate and deep experience of mutual understanding, requires that it radically change from the vision of its founder, brilliant and creative as it was when he became the first psychoanalyst and the father of psychoanalysis.

Neuronal Acts

If microperformativity is seen to spatially and temporally destabilize human scales as the dominant plane of reference, as well as to ‘emphasize biological and technological micro-agencies’ that ‘relate the invisibility of the microscopic to the incomprehensibility of the macroscopic’, there may be no better performative example than the neuron. Neurons seem to have become our latest cultural-technical fetish objects that easily jump scale, context and category, from live artistic performances like CellF or Silent Barrage that utilize the electrical spikes of cultured neurons to control the action of robots or sound synthesis to the mathematical behaviour of artificial neural networks. But strangely enough there is another kind of performativity that the neuron implies – that of economic markets. In 1952, the Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek published The Sensory Order, which put forward a neuronal theory of the mind, arguing that all sense-making, learning and memory is a product of the dynamic connections that emerge from neuronal links that take place over time. According to Hayek, the sensory order is constructed from the neuronal connections classifying information – objects external to the mind have no intrinsic properties except how the nervous system classifies these properties. In other words, ‘we live in a sensory order that is created by the central nervous system’. What then does the neuron have to do markets? The concept of the ‘performativity’ of markets implies that through its mathematical models, economics shapes social reality rather than objectively describing it. Thus this article tries to understand this economic performativity through a detour - asking what work the concept of performance can do in attempting to describe ‘living technologies’ (Takashi Ikegami) or lively systems across different scales (brains, machines, economies), whose ontological and operational order is one that challenges a basic epistemological assumption: that we can actually know the world.

Where did Freud's iceberg metaphor of mind come from?

Look at any introductory psychology book that covers psychoanalysis, and you are likely to find an image of an iceberg floating in the sea. The image serves as an illustrative metaphor for Freud's theory of the mind: Only a fragment of our ideas and feelings are conscious or "visible" to us, while the vast bulk of our mental content is unconscious or "invisible" to everyday introspection. A simple Internet search of the terms "Freud iceberg" will bring forth hundreds of examples. The problem is that Freud never mentioned the iceberg in his published writings. It is a metaphor that has become ubiquitous in (English-language) writings about Freudian theory, but that does not find its source in his work. So the question is, where did it come from? Much attention has been directed to a passage in Ernest Jones's biography of Freud. Many have taken this to mean that the Freudian iceberg metaphor derives directly from Fechner. Jones encouraged this interpretation, quoting Freud on being "open to the ideas of G. T. Fechner and following that thinker upon many important points." The iceberg metaphor of mind has another source with a solid connection to Freud: Granville Stanley Hall. Hall was one of the founders of American psychology. The mystery of the Freudian iceberg is not completely resolved, but we have made considerable progress. The mystery that remains is why Hall believed the metaphor's origin to lay somewhere in Fechner's writings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Entity Realism About Mental Representations

The concept of mental representation has long been considered to be central concept of philosophy of mind and cognitive science. But not everyone agrees. Neo-behaviorists aim to explain the mind (or some subset thereof) without positing any representations. My aim here is not to assess the merits and demerits of neo-behaviorism, but to take their challenge seriously and ask the question: What justifies the attribution of representations to an agent? Both representationalists and neo-behaviorists tend to take it for granted that the real question about representations is whether we should be realist about the theory of representationalism. This paper is an attempt to shift the emphasis from the debate concerning realism about theories to the one concerning realism about entities. My claim is that regardless of whether we are realist about representational theories of the mind, we have compelling reasons to endorse entity realism about mental representations.

Entity Realism About Mental Representations

The concept of mental representation has long been considered to be central concept of philosophy of mind and cognitive science. But not everyone agrees. Neo-behaviorists aim to explain the mind (or some subset thereof) without positing any representations. My aim here is not to assess the merits and demerits of neo-behaviorism, but to take their challenge seriously and ask the question: What justifies the attribution of representations to an agent? Both representationalists and neo-behaviorists tend to take it for granted that the real question about representations is whether we should be realist about the theory of representationalism. This paper is an attempt to shift the emphasis from the debate concerning realism about theories to the one concerning realism about entities. My claim is that regardless of whether we are realist about representational theories of the mind, we have compelling reasons to endorse entity realism about mental representations.

Analysing the Nature of Meaning in Modal Auxiliary Use in Standard Six English in Nakuru County, Kenya

The objective of the study was to describe appropriateness of modal auxiliary verbs in class six written English. The study focused on the use of English modal auxiliary verbs by class six pupils from diverse language backgrounds in Kenyan primary schools. Modal auxiliary verbs are difficult as their use entails syntactic and semantic appropriateness. As such, most pupils often find themselves unable to use this complex linguistic feature in written English. In spite of this, there is no known documentation that focuses on modal auxiliary verbs among children. It is this gap that the current study sought to fill. Forty pupils were randomly selected from four primary schools in Nakuru County. Data was elicited by means of written composition and grammar exercises. Further, it was analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively and presented in the form of graphs and tables. The Representational Theory of The Mind was used to explain the research findings. The findings revealed that modal auxiliary verbs are indeed difficult and their appropriate use present difficulties in pupils' written work. It was therefore recommended that learning of English should be meaningful. In order to enrich pupil's mental representations pupils should be exposed to a linguistically rich environment to enhance acquisition and learning. It is hoped that these findings will be of benefit to school stakeholders in ensuring that appropriate learning environment is created for pupils. Additionally, it could be a reference for researchers interested in language use at the school level.

Analysing the Nature of Meaning in Modal Auxiliary Use in Standard Six English in Nakuru County, Kenya

The objective of the study was to describe appropriateness of modal auxiliary verbs in class six written English. The study focused on the use of English modal auxiliary verbs by class six pupils from diverse language backgrounds in Kenyan primary schools. Modal auxiliary verbs are difficult as their use entails syntactic and semantic appropriateness. As such, most pupils often find themselves unable to use this complex linguistic feature in written English. In spite of this, there is no known documentation that focuses on modal auxiliary verbs among children. It is this gap that the current study sought to fill. Forty pupils were randomly selected from four primary schools in Nakuru County. Data was elicited by means of written composition and grammar exercises. Further, it was analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively and presented in the form of graphs and tables. The Representational Theory of The Mind was used to explain the research findings. The findings revealed that modal auxiliary verbs are indeed difficult and their appropriate use present difficulties in pupils' written work. It was therefore recommended that learning of English should be meaningful. In order to enrich pupil's mental representations pupils should be exposed to a linguistically rich environment to enhance acquisition and learning. It is hoped that these findings will be of benefit to school stakeholders in ensuring that appropriate learning environment is created for pupils. Additionally, it could be a reference for researchers interested in language use at the school level.

Testing the Truth of Phrenology: Knowledge Experiments in Antebellum American Cultures of Science and Health.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, many Americans visited phrenological practitioners. Some clients were true believers, who consulted phrenology to choose an occupation, select a marriage partner and raise children. But, as this article demonstrates, many others consumed phrenology as an 'experiment', testing its validity as they engaged its practice. Consumers of 'practical phrenology' subjected themselves to examinations often to test the phrenologist and his practice against their own knowledge of themselves. They also tested whether phrenology was true, according to their own beliefs about race and gender. While historians have examined phrenology as a theory of the mind, we know less about its 'users' and how gender, race and class structured their engagement. Based on extensive archival research with letters and diaries, memoirs and marginalia, as well as phrenological readings, this study reveals how a continuum of belief existed around phrenology, from total advocacy to absolute denunciation, with lots of room for acceptance and rejection in between. Phrenologists' notebooks and tools of salesmanship also show how an experimental environment emerged where phrenologists themselves embraced a culture of testing. In an era of what Katherine Pandora has described as 'epistemological contests', audiences confronted new museums, performances and theatres of natural knowledge and judged their validity. This was also true for phrenology, which benefited from a culture of contested authority. As this article reveals, curiosity, experimentation and even scepticism among users actually helped keep phrenology alive for decades.

The theory of symptom complexes, mind and madness

Kahlbaum's seminal approach to symptom complexes, as opposed to disease entities, is still relevant. Many psychopathologists have approached mental symptom complexes without prejudging them as necessary physical deficits or diseases, favouring a broader dimensional and anthropological view of mental disorders. Discussions of symptom complexes gained prominence in psychiatry in the early twentieth century - through Hoche - and in the period leading up to World War II - through Carl Schneider. Their works, alongside those of Kraepelin, Bumke, Kehrer, Jaspers and others, are reviewed in relation to the theme of symptom complexes, the mind, and mental disorders. A particular feature of symptom complexes is their relationship to aspects of the normal mind and how this affects clinical manifestations. It is further suggested that symptom complexes might offer a useful bridge between the psychic and the biological in theories of the mind.

Racial Socialization and Thwarted Mentalization: Psychoanalytic Reflections from the Lived Experience of James Baldwin’s America

Racial Socialization and Thwarted Mentalization: Psychoanalytic Reflections from the Lived Experience of James Baldwin’s America Beverly J. Stoute (bio) “No one is born hating another person because of the color of his skin or his background or his religion.” —Nelson Mandela James Baldwin, with eloquence and depth, articulated the lived experience of being Black in America. He understood the defensive psychological forces operative in binding aggression and hate in racial attitudes at a time when psychoanalysts were dissecting race and culture out of our theory of the mind, and struggling to understand racist thinking. We had not yet conceptualized othering as a psychodynamic process, or the relative importance of dignity as a construct. The social sciences came to the conversation on race and racism before the fields of psychiatry and psychoanalysis, and even now, we have a long way to go in understanding racism on a psychological level and elucidating how our unconscious racial attitudes affect health care delivery and practice in the field of mental health. Ta-Nehisi Coates’ publication of the acclaimed Between the World and Me (2015), a letter to his son in homage to James Baldwin, reminds us of the necessity for dialogue made stark by the ongoing public outcry after the shooting of Trayvon Martin (2012) and numerous unarmed Black men, including a mental health worker, by police officers (Grimm, 2016). These deaths haunt us as a society and return us to the conversation on race and racial socialization spearheaded by James Baldwin early in his career. Published initially in The Progressive in 1962 for the anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation, James Baldwin’s letter to his nephew entitled “My Dungeon Shook: Letter to My Nephew on the One Hundredth Anniversary of the Emancipation” was reprinted as the first chapter in his acclaimed work, The Fire Next Time. The May 17th, 1963 issue of Time magazine [End Page 335] with Baldwin’s picture on the cover, published three months before the March on Washington, contained a review of The Fire Next Time. This jumped it to the top of the nonfiction bestseller list, winning Baldwin international acclaim. The reviewer wrote, “In the US today there is not another writer—black or white—who expresses with such poignancy and abrasiveness the dark realities of the racial ferment of the North and South” (Chaliapin, 1963, p. 26). Today in 2019 that can still be said. Baldwin’s letter to his nephew in The Fire Next Time, though a literary source, still has contemporary relevance to the timely discussion of how our perception of racial difference and our unconscious race fantasies impact us daily, even as clinicians. As a child and adolescent psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, I will speak to my understanding of James Baldwin, and position his letter to his nephew in a developmental context of what African American parents have communicated for generations in what I will call a story of the trans-generational transmission of trauma, and the trans-generational transmission of dignity and defense in the lived experience of racial socialization in America. Drawing on a developmental perspective, I will review certain orienting data on race awareness and racial socialization not taught in most training programs in psychiatry or psychoanalysis before addressing what we, as clinicians, can learn from a re-examination of Baldwin’s work. I will demonstrate using clinical examples the invaluable importance of psychodynamic understanding in deconstructing how we process racial difference in treatment situations. The awareness of and curiosity about racial difference begins early and occurs spontaneously in the course of development. Studies demonstrate that infants as young as three months of age have a preference for faces of their own race, while infants at six months can recognize racial difference (Katz, 1976, 1982). By the age of three, children develop a sense of “outsiders”—people who are different from them (Fishbein, 1992, 2002). Mary Ellen Goodman’s classic research on Race Awareness in Children (1952) demonstrated that preschool age children of three and four years were clearly aware of race—making the connection to appearance and color but not yet to the concept of race as a social construct. [End Page 336] Kenneth and Maime Clark’s (1953) landmark...

Social cognition impairments in Parkinson's disease

Parkinson's disease is the second most common neurodegenerative disease of the elderly caused by the neurodegenerative process in different parts of the brain, which resulted in motor and non-motor symptoms. Investigation of non-motor symptoms of Parkinson's disease is increasingly rising for the last years. Social cognition is a special type of cognitive process, which provides people interaction in the society and their impairment also can be observed in Parkinson's disease. Social cognitive functions include many aspects: the theory of the mind, morality, personality changes and behavioral disorders. Each of these aspects is based on different neurophysiological, neurochemical and neuroanatomical substrates. This article is an effort to get closer to understanding of the changes, which occur in the brain of a patient with Parkinson's disease.

Voice, Focalization, and Disembodiment in P. C. Jersild and C. F. Ramuz

This essay deals with the possibility of using disembodied narrative voice and focalization in literary texts. I start with an overview of narratological approaches to the question, and I bring in newer cognitive aspects, such as the theories of the mind and post-human theories. I then proceed to a close reading of three literary works which are arguably interesting cases of disembodied voice and disembodied focalization. The three works are: P. C. Jersild’s novel A Living Soul from 1980, C. F. Ramuz’s short story “Scène dans la forêt” from 1947, and his novel Terror in the Mountain from 1927. My analyses show that it is hard to achieve a complete disembodiment. Jersild’s novel highlights, for instance, the need for a voice in a material sense and a focalization of a human type even in the case when a naked brain is supposed to be the narrator. In Ramuz’s texts, the human component seems to be discarded in some cases at the enunciation level, especially when nature takes over the function of the narrator. But even then, the way in which nature functions as narrator is humanlike, since language, focalization, and a communicative context are employed. What is undisputed is that the ways in which the classical conventions of human narrative voice and focalization are subverted can lead to innovative works which test readers’ imaginations and narrative competencies.

Architecture cognitive et comportements

Cognitive Machinery and Behaviors. We present a functional model based on the articulation of three information processing systems that aim to model the sensorimotor cycle realized by the cognitive system of Man. To establish this bioinspired model, we use the formalism of information processing systems introduced in the 1950s by John Von Neumann, Norbert Wiener and Alan Turing, to characterize the cooperation of a set of heterogeneous systems in system of systems. This theoretical work uses the different studies conducted in Artificial Intelligence (connectionist models and symbolic models), in Cognitive Psychology (models describing decision-making in limited rationality) and in Neurobiology (experimental models on free will) to propose a systemic and extended approach of the human cognitive apparatus. Moreover, this modeling is based on the hypothesis according to which the conscious mechanisms emerge automatically from an unconscious activity, and from its computational counterpart, namely the possibility to make a symbolic logic emerge from the activity of a connectionist mechanism. The architecture that we have named IPSEL (Information Processing Systems with Emergent Logic), while it can not be considered as a theory of the mind, has the usefulness of being able to explain some empirical observations that we also present. Finally, the implications and limitations of such a model and the research that is being carried out to present its usefulness and likelihood as a model of the human cognitive system as part of the questions of trust in the decisions provided by automatic system.

Freud on Ambiguity: Judaism, Christianity, and the Reversal of Truth in Moses and Monotheism

I. Introduction From the very inception of psychoanalysis, Freud's theory of the mind was severely criticized for its ahistorical nature.1 In the early days of the Frankfurt School, for example, Freud's essentialism was regarded as conservative and archaic. The psychic structures in psychoanalysis were decisively problematic: the unconscious, the Oedipus complex, libido and aggressiveness, the content of the needs, the inner drama of the ego, the superego, and the id were eternal forms, universal in nature.2 Put in historical terms, Freud's psychoanalysis suggested a linear progression of history in Comtean style and form, in which history was forced onto a…

Elizabeth Hamilton's Scottish Associationism: Early Nineteenth-Century Philosophy of Mind

AbstractThis article compares early nineteenth-century English and Scottish theories of the mind and the way that it develops to findings in today's developmental psychology and neuroscience through a close observation of the work of Elizabeth Hamilton (1756–1816). Hamilton was a Scottish writer and philosopher who produced three pedagogical works in her lifetime, consisting of her carefully formulated philosophy of mind and practical suggestions to caretakers and educators. Although Hamilton has received relatively little attention in modern philosophical literature, her understanding of the mind and the way it develops—based on her nuanced understanding of associationism and Scottish faculty psychology—is overwhelmingly supported by empirical findings today. In addition to utilizing Hamilton's work for the sake of understanding early nineteenth-century philosophy of mind, I argue that a large portion of Hamilton's work should be used to inform future research programs, early caregiving guides, and educational methods.

Abschlussbewegungen: Goethe, Freud, and Spectral Forms of Life

Abschlussbewegungen:Goethe, Freud, and Spectral Forms of Life Bryan Klausmeyer On June 21, 1831—less than a year before his death on March 22, 1832—Goethe writes to his friend and fellow botanist E. H. F. Meyer, "Daß ich nahe am Ende meiner Laufbahn noch von dem Strudel der Spiraltendenz ergriffen werden sollte, war auch ein wunderlich Geschick" (LA 1.4:251; That I, at the end of my life, should still be seized by the vortex of the spiral tendency, was also a wondrous fate).1 Here Goethe alludes to his discovery late in life of a "Spiraltendenz" (spiral tendency) said to inhere in all plants, a claim that he first put forth in his late essay "Über die Spiraltendenz der Vegetation" (1830–31; "The Spiral Tendency of Vegetation"). In the introduction to that text he asserts: "Wir mußten annehmen: es walte in der Vegetation eine allgemeine Spiraltendenz, wodurch, in Verbindung mit dem vertikalen Streben, aller Bau, jede Bildung der Pflanzen, nach dem Gesetze der Metamorphose vollbracht wird" (FA 24:777; We must assume that a universal spiral tendency presides in vegetation through which, in connection with vertical striving, every structure, every formation of plants, is realized according to the laws of metamorphosis). Although Goethe insists that his new theory of the spiral tendency ought to be understood as conforming to and buttressing his first published treatise on plant metamorphosis from 1790, his letters, notes, and journal entries attest to the profound difficulties he encountered in bringing this later discovery into harmony with his earlier botanical theory. In light of this unacknowledged problematic in his published scientific writings, I would like to begin this article by delving further into Goethe's fascination with the spiral in order to show how his revisions to the theory of metamorphosis some forty years later call into question the viability of key aspects of his morphological method. More specifically, while numerous scholars have persuasively argued that Goethe's initial treatise on the metamorphosis of plants is grounded in a method of "anschauende Urteilskraft" (intuitive judgment), which depends on the morphologist's ability to unite the "Geistes-Augen" (eyes of the mind) with the "Augen des Leibes" (FA 24:432; eyes of the body),2 scant attention has been paid to the problems introduced by Goethe's later theory of the spiral tendency, which resists such ocular dissection. This is because the spiral tendency appears as an uncanny force at the threshold of perception; rather than attaining a determinate shape or form, it continually eludes representation, manifesting itself as a monster, specter, and even as an abyssal "Strudel" (vortex) within the field of vision. [End Page 163] Second, I argue that the problem of perception introduced by the spiral tendency can only be understood in relation to Goethe's belief that the latter is not opposed to, but closely associated with, the possibility of death, an assertion that undermines the teleological and vitalist assumptions inherent in his earlier theory of metamorphosis. On the basis of Goethe's view of the spiral tendency as a force toward death, which imbues the latter with an economy of motion to which he lends aesthetic dignity, I will conclude by analyzing the compelling correspondences between Goethe's idea of the spiral tendency and Sigmund Freud's conception of life in Jenseits des Lustprinzips (1920; Beyond the Pleasure Principle). Taking as his starting point the claim that the lifespan of an organism can be regarded as an "Umwege zum Tode" (detour to death), Freud substantially revised his previous neuroeconomic theories of the mind by introducing into psychoanalytic discourse his new theory of the "Triebe" (drives) as a counterpart to prevailing biological ideas. At the same time, Freud's metapsychology—like Goethe's morphology—also raises questions of representability in a radical way by drawing attention to the limits of discursive knowledge in relation to observation and intuition. Through this comparison it will be shown how Goethe and Freud not only conceive of life in relation to death, but also how both proceed methodologically by way of numerous detours—Umwege—into the contemporaneous discourses of the sciences of life, and thereby transgress the boundaries between the human...

Rules, perception and emotion: When do institutions determine behaviour?

AbstractThis paper seeks to answer the question of what psychological preconditions must exist for institutions to determine behaviour and order our societies. We defend the notion that institutional theory may gain from such a contribution. We introduce a new theory of the mind as a network structure within which the psychological process operates to integrate insights from cognitive and affective psychology into institutional theory. We discover that institutions must be expressed asrulesin mental networks which guide thinking and behaviour, be embedded within a cognitive apparatus such that they are called to mind byperceptionto so guide thinking and behaviour and be anchored toemotionsuch that they are endowed with urgency in order for them to have a hold on individual behaviour. From this theory we derive definite predictions, as well as policy insights.

Creational Problems for Soul-Emergence from Matter: Philosophical and Theological Concerns

Summary Discussions on soul origins are perceived as antiquated at best. However, there is a recent resurgence of interest in the nature and origins of the mind. This is due in part to the recent developments on the nature of “emergent” properties and/or substances in the contemporary literature on the philosophy of mind. As a contribution to this discussion, I examine the two most prominent theories of mental origins (e. g., Timothy O’Connor and William Hasker) and find that each encounter some noteworthy problems. With these in mind, I recommend that some form of Creationism deserves our attention. It provides a solution to the various philosophical and theological concerns associated with the previously mentioned emergence theories of the mind. Finally, I lay out a more satisfying theory of the soul’s creation in a way that accounts for the benefits of emergentism.

Dual Process Theory of Thought and Default Mode Network: A Possible Neural Foundation of Fast Thinking.

The notion of default mode network (DMN) and the dual process theory of thought, topics within different cognitive neuroscience and psychology subfields, have attracted considerable attention and been extensively studied in the past decade. The former originated from experimental evidence on the brain function obtained when an individual is not involved in a specific task, and recent research suggests that the DMN plays a role in mental and neurological disorders (Buckner et al., 2008). A distinction is made according to the psychology of thinking in the dual process theory of thought between fast, effortless associative processes and slow, deliberative ones (Kahneman, 2011). This theory has been exploited both theoretically, to better understand human thought, and in many applications of behavior modification (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). This paper proposes that an amalgamation of the aspects of these two topics could be of mutual benefit to scientists within the respective fields. The discovery of the DMN has stimulated several hypotheses regarding the neural basis of the self and the theory of the mind. However, with few exceptions, these hypotheses lack reference to current research on thought processes like reasoning and decision-making. A role of the DMN in the organization and expression of preplanned, reflexive behaviors characteristics of fast thinking has been mentioned by Raichle (2015). Moreover, a link between fast and slow processes and the activity of neural circuits including the DMN, has been proposed in the framework of the Predictive And Reactive Control Systems (PARCS) theory (Tops et al., 2014). More recently, the contribution of the DMN to automated processing has been also suggested (Vatansever et al., 2017). In contrast, the dual process theory of thought is the most shared explanation of how thoughts arise but does not adequately address the neural basis of thought, although an attempt has been made to determine the relationship between ego depletion and biological parameters (Elkins-Brown et al., 2016). Thus, in our opinion the DMN may provide a neural foundation for the associative, fast, and effortless form of thinking elucidated by the dual process theory.