Bayes or determinables? What does the bidirectional hierarchical model of brain functions tell us about the nature of perceptual representation?

Bence Nanay

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00500

Abstract

GENERAL COMMENTARY article Front. Psychol., 15 November 2012Sec. Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology Volume 3 - 2012 | https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00500

Highlights

Clark’s argument in this paper proceeds in two steps: (A) It uses empirical data to support a theoretical model of the mind, the “bidirectional hierarchical model of brain functions” whereby “a cascade of top-down processing generates low-level states from high-level causes” (p. 25)
My aim is to argue that even if we accept that the empirical data Clark considers does support the “bidirectional hierarchical model of brain functions,”
Clark makes three strong philosophical claims about how we should revise our philosophical theories of the mind in general and the concept of representation in particular in the light of the empirical evidence that supports the “bidirectional hierarchical model of brain functions”: (a) The “bidirectional hierarchical model of brain functions” shows that the distinction between perception and cognition is blurred

Summary

Introduction

Clark’s argument in this paper proceeds in two steps: (A) It uses empirical data to support a theoretical model of the mind, the “bidirectional hierarchical model of brain functions” whereby “a cascade of top-down processing generates low-level states from high-level causes” My aim is to argue that even if we accept that the empirical data Clark considers does support the “bidirectional hierarchical model of brain functions,”

Results

Conclusion