Linking perception and cognition

Arnon Cahen,Michela C Tacca

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00144

Arnon Cahen, Michela C Tacca

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00144

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Abstract

Linking perception and cognition

Highlights

Given that perception is the input to cognition, the two systems must be able to “talk” to each other; at the very least, information carried by perception must be of a form adequate to be “taken in” by our various cognitive systems
The central questions of this Research Topic surround the nature of their “communication.” In particular, we ask: what kinds of structural relations must hold between perceptual and cognitive representations for such communication to be possible? To what extent, if at all, is it a “dialog?” And, what mechanisms mediate the transitions between the two systems? As the papers here included exemplify, all these questions are open to exploration from within a variety of different disciplines and perspectives
The question on the structural relation between perception and cognition is addressed by Tacca (2011) who argues that there are important structural similarities between early vision and higher cognitive systems underlying active empirical thought—in particular, she argues that both involve systematic representations

Summary

Introduction

Given that perception is the input to cognition, the two systems must be able to “talk” to each other; at the very least, information carried by perception must be of a form adequate to be “taken in” by our various cognitive systems. The central questions of this Research Topic surround the nature of their “communication.” In particular, we ask: what kinds of structural relations must hold between perceptual and cognitive representations for such communication to be possible? The question on the structural relation between perception and cognition is addressed by Tacca (2011) who argues that there are important structural similarities between early vision and higher cognitive systems underlying active empirical thought—in particular, she argues that both involve systematic representations.

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