Target Proposition Research Articles

The censor's burden

AbstractCensorship involves, inter alia, adopting a certain type of epistemic policy. While much has been written on the harms and benefits of free expression and the associated rights thereof, the epistemic preconditions of justified censorship are relatively underexplored. In this paper, I argue that examining intrapersonal norms of how we ought to treat evidence that might come to us over time can shed light on interpersonal norms of evidence generation and sharing that are relevant in the context of censorship. The upshot is that justified censorship requires the censor to meet a very high epistemic burden regarding the target proposition(s)—importantly, one that exceeds knowledge.

Misinformation and higher-order evidence

This paper uses computational methods to simultaneously investigate the epistemological effects of misinformation on communities of rational agents, while also contributing to the philosophical debate on ‘higher-order’ evidence (i.e. evidence that bears on the quality and/or import of one’s evidence). Modelling communities as networks of individuals, each with a degree of belief in a given target proposition, it simulates the introduction of unreliable mis- and disinformants, and records the epistemological consequences for these communities. First, using small, artificial networks, it compares the effects, when agents who are aware of the prevalence of mis- or disinformation in their communities, either deny the import of this higher-order evidence, or attempt to accommodate it by distrusting the information in their environment. Second, deploying simulations on a large(r) real-world network, it observes the impact of increasing levels of misinformation on trusting agents, as well as of more minimal, but structurally targeted, unreliability. Comparing the two information processing strategies in an artificial context, it finds that there is a (familiar) trade-off between accuracy (in arriving at a correct consensus) and efficiency (in doing so in a timely manner). And in a more realistic setting, community confidence in the truth is seen to be depressed in the presence of even minimal levels of misinformation.

Dualism about undercutting defeat

AbstractMost philosophers agree that the distinction between rebutting and undercutting defeaters is sound. Recently, however, there has been much debate over the nature of and relationship between rebutting and undercutting defeaters. Among the things that have been argued about is whether undercutting defeat, in contrast to rebutting defeat, require higher‐order commitment, i.e., a belief regarding the link between the source of justification and the target proposition. This paper examines the debate and argues that whether or not undercutting defeaters require higher‐order commitments to this effect depends on the relevant defeatee at issue. A belief might fail to be rational in at least two ways—either by failing to correctly respond to one's reasons or by failing to be coherent with one's other attitudes. According to dualism about rationality these failings reflect two genuine and distinct kinds of rationality: substantive and structural rationality. In line with this view, the paper suggests that we should make a parallel distinction between substantive and structural undercutting defeaters. An advantage of classifying undercutting defeaters in this way is that it helps to disentangle the current debate. Another interesting result is that the proposed distinction lends further support to dualism about rationality.

Epistemic Explanations: A Theory of Telic Normativity, and What it Explains

<i>Epistemic Explanations: A Theory of Telic Normativity, and What it Explains</i>

Corroboration

AbstractCorroborating evidence supports a proposition that is already supported by other initial evidence. It bolsters or confirms the original body of evidence. Corroboration has striking psychological and epistemic force: It potently affects how people do and should assess the target proposition. This essay investigates the distinctive powers of corroborating evidence. Corroboration does not simply increase the quantifiable probability of the adjudicated claim. Drawing on the relevant alternatives framework, I argue that corroboration winnows remaining uneliminated error possibilities. This illuminates the independence, weight, and non-fungibility of corroborating evidence. I compare corroborating evidence to prudential safeguards, like fire doors, that forfend against non-epistemic harms. I thereby sketch a general, non-quantificational model of risk management. Finally, I turn to legal corroboration requirements and the epistemic significance of corroboration for legal proof.

A semantics of face emoji in discourse

This paper presents an analysis of face emoji (disc-shaped pictograms with stylized facial expressions) that accompany written text. We propose that there is a use of face emoji in which they comment on a target proposition expressed by the accompanying text, as opposed to making an independent contribution to discourse. Focusing on positively valenced and negatively valenced emoji (which we gloss as happy and unhappy, respectively), we argue that the emoji comment on how the target proposition bears on a contextually provided discourse value endorsed by the author. Discourse values embody what an author desires, aspires to, wishes for, or hopes for. Our analysis derives a range of non-trivial generalizations, including (i) ordering restrictions with regards to the placement of emoji and text, (ii) cases of apparent mixed emotions, and (iii) cases where the lexical content of the accompanying text influences the acceptability of a face emoji.

Epistemic Closure, Necessary Truths, and Safety

AbstractAccording to the safety account of knowledge, one knows that p only if one's belief could not easily have been false. An important issue for the account is whether we should only examine the belief in the target proposition when evaluating whether a belief is safe or not. In this paper, it is argued that if we only examine the belief in the target proposition, then the account fails to account for why beliefs in necessary truths could fall short of knowledge. But, if we also examine beliefs in other relevant propositions, then the account fails to preserve epistemic closure. Therefore, the safety account cannot find a safe path between epistemic closure and necessary truths.

ENSAIO SOBRE UM PONTO DE VISTA EPISTÊMICO NÃO INDIVIDUALISTA ACERCA DA REFLEXÃO

ABSTRACT This essay aims to motivate an epistemic non-individualistic conception of reflection. The proposal is non-individualistic because (a) it addresses more than individual metacognitive performance and (b) it refers to a situation in which two or more people are in dialogical disagreement about the same subject matter or target proposition; (c) their dispute is based on conversational space and they are entitled to expect one another to be engaged in attempts at truth, avoidance of error, and understanding. I call this proposal a Dialectical account of Reflection (DaR). According to (DaR), reflection is a conscious and intentional intellectual operation through which an individual becomes aware of the contents of disputed beliefs in a dialogical or interpersonal exchange, involving both her own beliefs and the beliefs of her interlocutors. In (DaR), reflection produces the epistemic good of avoiding epistemic vices and promoting epistemic moderation.

Knowledge and Asymmetric Loss

This paper offers a novel account of practical factor effects on knowledge attributions that is consistent with the denial of contextualism, relativism and pragmatic encroachemt. The account goes as follows. Knowledge depends on factors like safety, reliability or probability. In many cases, it is uncertain just how safe, how reliably formed or how probable the target proposition is. This means that we have to estimate these quantities in order to form knowledge judgements. Such estimates of uncertain quantities are independently known to be affected by pragmatic factors. When overestimation is costlier than underestimation, for instance, we tend to underestimate the relevant quantity to avoid greater losses. On the suggested account, high stakes and other pragmatic factors induce such “asymmetric loss functions” on quantities like safety, reliability and probability. This skews our estimates of these quantities and thereby our judgements about knowledge. The resulting theory is an error-theory, but one that rationlizes the error in question.

A Dilemma for Globalized Safety

The safety condition is supposed to be a necessary condition on knowledge which helps to eliminate epistemic luck. It has been argued that the condition should be globalized to a set of propositions rather than the target proposition believed to account for why not all beliefs in necessary truths are safe. A remaining issue is which propositions are relevant when evaluating whether the target belief is safe or not. In the literature, solutions have been proposed to determine the relevance of propositions. This paper examines a case of luckily true belief—thus a case of ignorance—and a case of knowledge. It argues that no solution in the literature offers a correct verdict in either case. Therefore, the strategy to globalize safety remains unsatisfactory.

Justified Group Belief, Group Knowledge and Being in a Position to Know

AbstractJennifer Lackey has recently presented a new and lucid analysis of the notion of justified group belief, i.e. a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a group to justifiedly believe some proposition. In this paper, however, I argue that the analysans she proposes is too narrow: one of the conditions she takes to be necessary for justified group belief is not necessary. To substantiate this claim, I present a potential counterexample to Lackey's analysis where a group knows and thus justifiedly believes some proposition but there is no single group member who actually believes that proposition. I close by defending the example against the objection that the group in question does not know but is at most in a position to know the target proposition.

Belief, Credence and Statistical Evidence

AbstractAccording to the Rational Threshold View, a rational agent believes p if and only if her credence in p is equal to or greater than a certain threshold. One of the most serious challenges for this view is the problem of statistical evidence: statistical evidence is often not sufficient to make an outright belief rational, no matter how probable the target proposition is given such evidence. This indicates that rational belief is not as sensitive to statistical evidence as rational credence. The aim of this article is twofold. First, we argue that, in addition to playing a decisive role in rationalizing outright belief, non‐statistical evidence also plays a preponderant role in rationalizing credence. More precisely, when both types of evidence are present in a context, non‐statistical evidence should receive a heavier weight than statistical evidence in determining rational credence. Second, based on this result, we argue that a modified version of the Rational Threshold View can avoid the problem of statistical evidence. We conclude by suggesting a possible explanation of the varying sensitivity to different types of evidence for belief and credence based on the respective aims of these attitudes.

Being neutral: Agnosticism, inquiry and the suspension of judgment

AbstractEpistemologists often claim that in addition to belief and disbelief there is a third, neutral, doxastic attitude. Various terms are used: ‘suspending judgment’, ‘withholding’, ‘agnosticism’. It is also common to claim that the factors relevant to the justification of these attitudes are epistemic in the narrow sense of being factors that bear on the strength or weakness of one's epistemic position with respect to the target proposition. This paper addresses two challenges to such traditionalism about doxastic attitudes. The first concerns the relevance of non‐epistemic factors we might call “future‐comparative” – e.g., that you'll have more decisive evidence on whether p tomorrow – to the justification of suspending judgment. The second, from Jane Friedman, is to explain the point of the neutral attitude without appealing to inquiry and thus taking goal‐related factors, which are not epistemic, such as the value of the goal or the prospects for finding means to achieve it, to bear on the justification of the neutral attitude. My defense of traditionalism relies on distinguishing three ways of being neutral on a question: agnosticism, inquiry and suspension of judgment. Traditionalism is saved because, of these, agnosticism alone is a genuine doxastic attitude.

Characterisation for &amp;lt;i&amp;gt;Radioelements&amp;lt;/i&amp;gt; over an Escarpment Feature(S): A Case Study of the Duku-Tarasa Gwandu Ridge Area of Birnin Kebbi NW Nigeria

The paper presents results of radiometric investigations of an area (Duku-Tarasa) near the capital city of the State of Birnin Kebbi, NW Nigeria. The area of study is about 440 m × 420 m and encloses an Escarpment Feature/Structure on a sedimentary rock generally referred to as the Gwandu Formation. The Gwandu Formation (though not described in the paper) consists of continental lacustrine sediments and is the youngest Palaeogene Formation present in the Sokoto sector of the larger Iullemmeden Basin. The study measured, along some selected profiles across this escarpment feature, radiometric signatures using a Sim-Max G411 portable field gamma-ray spectrometer (giving counts for U, Th and K relative to the background values over the area), the ground total-field magnetic data (using the proton precession magnetometer) along those profiles and collected some (5) rock samples for flame photometry and AAS analyses towards the target proposition. Activity concentration levels due to potassium (K), uranium (U) and thorium (Th) were measured in the area along the five established profiles spaced at 50 metres. The results from these measurements and analyses were displayed (in Tables/histograms and gray level maps/images of concentrations of Uranium, Thorium and Potassium prospects) and interpreted (dismissing the magnetic data as seemingly passive as no filter was applied to the mapped data).

MASTERING MARY

AbstractI make three claims about the interactions between concept mastery and the knowledge argument. First, I argue that, contra Ball (2013), the concept mastery response to the knowledge argument does not suffer from the heterogeneity of concept mastery. Second, I argue that, when doing metaphysics by relating propositions on the basis of whether a hypothetical agent who knew a base collection could infer a target proposition, it is legitimate to rely on propositions that are not contained in the base, as long as those propositions are required for mastery of relevant concepts. One upshot is that, when checking whether the physical truths a priori entail the consciousness truths, it is fair game to rely on substantive truths about consciousness. Third, I argue that the only version of the knowledge argument that has any hope of succeeding against physicalism completely lacks the argument’s driving intuition: that Mary learns something new when she emerges from the black and white room.

Fake Barns and Our Epistemological Theorizing

Pure virtue epistemology faces the fake barn challenge. This paper explains how it can be met. Thus, it is argued that the thought experiment contains a hidden ambiguity concerning the visual ability typically ascribed to, or denied, fake barn subjects. Disambiguation shows fake barn subjects to have limited knowledge of the target proposition (e.g. that there is a barn ahead). This accords with a pure virtue-theoretic conception of knowledge that predicts and explains all the intuitionselicited by the thought experiment. As a result, the relationship between knowledge, luck and ability is illuminated, and our epistemological theorizing improved.

Quantum computaton from a quantum logical perspective

It is well-known that Shor's factorization algorithm, Simon's period-finding algorithm, and Deutsch's original XOR algorithm can all be formulated as solutions to a hidden subgroup problem. Here the salient features of the information-processing in the three algorithms are presented from a different perspective, in terms of the way in which the algorithms exploit the non-Boolean quantum logic represented by the projective geometry of Hilbert space. From this quantum logical perspective, the XOR algorithm appears directly as a special case of Simon's algorithm, and all three algorithms can be seen as exploiting the non-Boolean logic represented by the subspace structure of Hilbert space in a similar way. Essentially, a global property of a function (such as a period, or a disjunctive property) is encoded as a subspace in Hilbert space representing a quantum proposition, which can then be efficiently distinguished from alternative propositions, corresponding to alternative global properties, by a measurement (or sequence of measurements) that identifies the target proposition as the proposition represented by the subspace containing the final state produced by the algorithm.

Framing as Path Dependence

A framing effect occurs when an agent's choices are not invariant under changes in the way a decision problem is presented, e.g. changes in the way options are described (violation of description invariance) or preferences are elicited (violation of procedure invariance). Here we identify those rationality violations that underlie framing effects. We attribute to the agent a sequential decision process in which a “target” proposition and several “background” propositions are considered. We suggest that the agent exhibits a framing effect if and only if two conditions are met. First, different presentations of the decision problem lead the agent to consider the propositions in a different order (the empirical condition). Second, different such “decision paths” lead to different decisions on the target proposition (the logical condition). The second condition holds when the agent's initial dispositions on the propositions are “implicitly inconsistent,” which may be caused by violations of “deductive closure.” Our account is consistent with some observations made by psychologists and provides a unified framework for explaining violations of description and procedure invariance.

Contrastive knowledge

We describe the three place relation of contrastive knowledge, which holds between a person, a target proposition, and a contrasting proposition. The person knows that p rather than that q. We argue for three claims about this relation. (a) Many common sense and philosophical ascriptions of knowledge can be understood in terms of it. (b) Its application is subject to fewer complications than non-contrastive knowledge is. (c) It applies over a wide range of human and nonhuman cases.

The application of evidential belief function in the integration of regional geochemical and geological data over the Ife-Ilesha goldfield, Nigeria

There are several methods available for the integration of geological, geophysical and even remotely sensed data sets. Several published reports have discussed the successful application of these integration techniques, including geologically orientated geographical information systems (GIS), to non-renewable resource exploration. Many geoscience data sets often have only partial coverage, and in most cases have different spatial resolution. These shortcomings plague statistical integration schemes employed in resource evaluation. In this paper, the evidential belief function approach is examined and applied to the integration of geological and geochemical data sets over the Ife-Ilesha goldfield, southwest Nigeria. In using this approach, nine maps of trace element concentrations (whole rock) and that of the bedrock geology of the test area were digitised. The characteristic grid values of the digitised maps were converted to degrees of belief, with a Au bearing mineral deposit as the target proposition. These resulting spatial data sets were pooled using the Dempster-Shafer combination rule. The resulting maps define portions of the study area with known auriferous mineral occurrences and even outline areas of past mining operations. There are additional areas with high interest that are not linked with known mineralisation and could therefore represent viable exploration targets. The Dempster-Shafer method of evidential reasoning appears to be suitable in identifying areas of known Au mineralisation in the test area. One of the major difficulties of this method is that the evidential belief function depends on the exploration target, which can only be defined, at present, by the interpreter's intuitive and qualitative knowledge of the environmental proposition being explored.