Abstract
The safety condition is supposed to be a necessary condition on knowledge which helps to eliminate epistemic luck. It has been argued that the condition should be globalized to a set of propositions rather than the target proposition believed to account for why not all beliefs in necessary truths are safe. A remaining issue is which propositions are relevant when evaluating whether the target belief is safe or not. In the literature, solutions have been proposed to determine the relevance of propositions. This paper examines a case of luckily true belief—thus a case of ignorance—and a case of knowledge. It argues that no solution in the literature offers a correct verdict in either case. Therefore, the strategy to globalize safety remains unsatisfactory.
Highlights
The idea behind the safety condition is that in order to know one’s belief could not have been false
If the basis of the belief is individuated in such a way, i.e., Novak’s testimony, that Roger’s belief that Novak believes/knows that ~ BIV6 in similar cases is formed on the same basis as that in the actual case, we should think that the students’ belief that Stella believes/knows that Modern-day Homo sapiens evolved from Homo erectus in similar cases is formed on the same basis as that in the actual case, i.e., Stella’s testimony
Given that they could have falsely believed that Stella believes/knows that Modern-day Homo sapiens evolved from Homo erectus, the students’ target belief is unsafe and does not count as knowledge which contradicts our intuition concerning CREATIONIST TEACHER
Summary
The idea behind the safety condition is that in order to know one’s belief could not have been false. B. Zhao evaluating whether the target belief is safe or not, we should take beliefs in some other relevant propositions in similar cases into consideration. Zhao evaluating whether the target belief is safe or not, we should take beliefs in some other relevant propositions in similar cases into consideration What results from this suggestion is a globalized version of the safety condition (Ball, 2016; Blome-Tillmann, 2017; Grundmann, 2020; Hirvelä, 2019; Manley, 2007; Pritchard, 2009, 2012a, 2013, 2016; Williamson, 2000, 2009). It is argued that no solution to the problem of the relevance of propositions offers a correct verdict in either case They constitute a dilemma for the safety theorists
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