The Inescapability of Gettier Problems

Abstract

Gettier problems arise in the theory of knowledge when it is only by chance that a justified true belief is true. Since the belief might easily have been false in these cases, it is normally concluded that they are not instances of knowledge.' The moral drawn in the thirty years since Gettier published his famous paper is that eitherjustified true belief (JTB) is not sufficient for knowledge, in which case knowledge must have an 'extra' component in addition to JTB, or else justification must be reconceived to make it sufficient for knowledge. I shall argue that given the common and reasonable assumption that the relation between justification and truth is close but not inviolable, it is not possible for either move to avoid Gettier counter-examples. What is more, it makes no difference if the component of knowledge in addition to true belief is identified as something other than justification, e.g., warrant or wellfoundedness. I conclude that Gettier problems are inescapable for virtually every analysis of knowledge which at least maintains that knowledge is true belief plus something else. Notice first that Gettier problems arise for both internalist and externalist notions ofjustification. On internalist theories the grounds for justification are accessible to the consciousness of the believer, and Gettier problems arise when there is nothing wrong with the internally accessible aspects of the cognitive situation, but there is a mishap in something inaccessible to the believer. Since justification does not guarantee truth, it is possible for there to be a break in the connection between justification and truth, but for that connection to be regained by chance. The original 'Smith owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' case is an example of this sort. Here we are to imagine that Smith comes to you bragging about his new Ford, shows you the car and the bill of sale, and generally gives you lots of evidence that he owns a Ford. Basing what you think on the evidence, you believe the proposition 'Smith owns a Ford', and from that you infer its disjunction with 'Brown is in Barcelona', where Brown is an acquaintance and you have no reason at all to think he is in Barcelona. It turns out that Smith is lying and owns no Ford, but Brown is