Knowledge and Asymmetric Loss

Alexander Dinges

doi:10.1007/s13164-021-00596-9

Abstract

This paper offers a novel account of practical factor effects on knowledge attributions that is consistent with the denial of contextualism, relativism and pragmatic encroachemt. The account goes as follows. Knowledge depends on factors like safety, reliability or probability. In many cases, it is uncertain just how safe, how reliably formed or how probable the target proposition is. This means that we have to estimate these quantities in order to form knowledge judgements. Such estimates of uncertain quantities are independently known to be affected by pragmatic factors. When overestimation is costlier than underestimation, for instance, we tend to underestimate the relevant quantity to avoid greater losses. On the suggested account, high stakes and other pragmatic factors induce such “asymmetric loss functions” on quantities like safety, reliability and probability. This skews our estimates of these quantities and thereby our judgements about knowledge. The resulting theory is an error-theory, but one that rationlizes the error in question.

Highlights

Intuitions and experimental studies suggest that our knowledge ascribing practice is sensitive to pragmatic factors such as what is at stake
Extant accounts include revisionary accounts based on contextualism (e.g. Cohen 2008; DeRose 2009), relativism (e.g. MacFarlane 2014) or pragmatic encroachment on belief or knowledge (e.g. Hawthorne 2004; Stanley 2005; Weatherson 2005; Fantl and McGrath 2009) and conservative accounts that trade instead on phenomena like conversational implicatures (e.g. Rysiew 2001; Brown 2006), psychological
I have offered a novel account of stakes effects on knowledge ascriptions

Summary

Introduction

Intuitions and experimental studies suggest that our knowledge ascribing practice is sensitive to pragmatic factors such as what is at stake. This seems puzzling given familiar analyses of knowledge. These analyses refer to parameters such as justification, evidence, probability, safety, sensitivity, etc. Why are knowledge ascriptions sensitive to this factor?. Cohen 2008; DeRose 2009), relativism (e.g. MacFarlane 2014) or pragmatic encroachment on belief or knowledge A. Dinges effects of stakes on belief (e.g. Nagel 2008; Gao 2019; Dinges 2020) or heuristic shortcuts we use in ascribing knowledge Dinges effects of stakes on belief (e.g. Nagel 2008; Gao 2019; Dinges 2020) or heuristic shortcuts we use in ascribing knowledge (e.g. Gerken 2017)

Objectives

Methods

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Discussion

Conclusion