3D printing (3DP) has garnered significant attention from industries, prompting traditional manufacturers to adopt 3DP to sustainably facilitate increased product variety. Observing manufacturers’ two adoption strategies, ordering parts and collaboratively printing 3DP parts, in a real-world setting, we utilize a wholesale price contract and a Nash Bargaining contract to describe these two strategies and then develop a supply-chain model including a 3DP supplier (Supplier) and a traditional manufacturer (Manufacturer). Further, we employ backward induction to solve the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for the model to reveal differences between these two strategies and the impact of 3DP’s improved resource efficiency. According to equilibrium outcomes, analytical results show that first, as long as the unit cost of each 3DP part is not overly high and 3DP’s resource efficiency is not extremely low, the Manufacturer is willing to implement 3DP to increase product variety. Second, a rise in the resource efficiency can create a “win-win” scenario for the Manufacturer and the Supplier. Third, supply-chain collaboration can be achieved when the Manufacturer’s and the Supplier’s bargaining powers approach equality. Interestingly, a Nash bargaining contract can incentivize the manufacturer to substitute a base product with a variety of products, a change facilitated by an increase in the retail price of this base product. The managerial implication of this research is that enhanced resource efficiency can lead to less environmental pollution in the collaboration model by resulting in the sale of lower quantities of the base product, which would otherwise consume more resources and generate greater environmental pollution.
Read full abstract