Strike Capability Research Articles

The last Soviet offensive in the Cold War: emergence and development of the campaign against NATO euromissiles, 1979–1983

Ever since NATO existed, the Kremlin was keen to eliminate it. In 1966–68, there appeared to be a window of opportunity which, however, was closed when the USSR crushed Czechoslovak reform communism. From 1969 onward, Brezhnev sought ‘political détente’ with the West to initiate a process of ‘military détente’ intended to allow for a Soviet first strike capability against Western Europe. The campaign designed to promote this policy by generating public pressure in Western countries gained momentum only when NATO decided to counter crucial SS-20 armament. Massive anti-NATO ‘peace’ opposition resulted, but failed to achieve its purpose. The stage was set for the breakdown of the Soviet empire.

Transnational Armed Conflict: A “Principled” Approach to the Regulation of Counter-Terror Combat Operations

Transnational armed conflicts have become a reality. The increasing sophistication of terrorist organizations, their increasingly transnational nature, and their development of military strike capabilities, push and will continue to push States to resort to combat power as a means to defend against this threat. Relying on the factual fiction that the acts of such terrorists must be attributable to the States from which they launch their operations, or on the legal fiction that the use of military combat power to respond to such threats is in reality just extraterritorial law enforcement, fails to acknowledge the essential nature of such operations. Because these operations invoke the authority of the LOAC, they should and must be treated as armed conflicts.LOAC principles must be identified and must be broad enough to provide the authority necessary to bring the transnational enemy to submission while ensuring that that authority does not override fundamental humanitarian protections for victims of war: This Article proposes three essential pillars of this regulatory foundation: military necessity, targeting (object/distinction and proportionality), and humane treatment. These principles provide the balance between authority and obligation that is so essential for the effective and disciplined application of combat power Like the treatment of internal armed conflict, these pillars can form a foundation for a more comprehensive treatment of regulatory analysis, encompassing other issues such as command responsibility, criminal liability, access to judicial review, perfidy and treachery, and medical obligations.

Portable electro-optic device for performing serviceability check on IR guided missiles

AbstractElectro-optically guided weapons are the most potent and widely used munitions on land-based, aerial and ship-borne platforms because of their proven precision strike capability. Two such guided weapon categories include the IR guided surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles and laser guided bombs and missiles. The efficacy of the mission is critically dependent on the successful deployment of the weapon. This not only necessitates that periodic functionality check be carried out on these weapons, it should also be possible to perform functionality check also known as serviceability check even after they are strapped on to the launch platform. Serviceability check in the strap-on condition ensures a much higher hit probability. This paper presents the design and development of a portable electro-optic device that generates IR signatures in 3–5-µm band having the desired amplitude and spectral shape to match the IR signatures of target aircraft. A prototype was built using the proposed concept. The prototype was characterized in terms of its output amplitude and wavelength spectrum. The prototype was used to perform serviceability check on IR seekers of foreign origin. Test results are presented in the paper.

Counterproliferation and US Nuclear Strategy

The Bush administration took office with a strong agenda to and revitalize US nuclear posture. In a speech to National Defense University in May 2001, President G. W Bush said he would change size, composition, character of our nuclear in a way that reflects reality that Cold War over. He said his goal was to move quickly to reduce nuclear forces and that he was committed to achieving a credible deterrent with lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs.'This mainly been understood to relate to Russia, which administration says no longer an contingency for US nuclear planning.2 Officials often describe this shift as most significant in US nuclear policy since beginning of Cold War. As a result, nuclear posture review completed at end of 2001 continued drawdown of nuclear that was initiated in 199 1 by implementing force structure decisions made in 1992 strategic arms reduction treaty (START II) agreement, 1994 nuclear posture review, and 1997 Helsinki framework. This included a retirement of Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missile and four ballistic missile submarines and a trimming of remaining warheads to a START Ill-like force level of roughly 5400 warheads, of which no more than 2200 could be operationally deployed strategic warheads. Today, nearly two decades after Cold War ended, we're still in that drawdown phase of 1990s. Yet Russia still main focus of US nuclear planning due to sheer size of its nuclear arsenal and retreat from democracy.Other components of change, however, were not drivers for nuclear cuts or a reduction of role of nuclear weapons, but for an expanded role against other adversaries. One of these was China, which 2001 nuclear posture review determined is a country that could be involved in an immediate or potential contingency that setting requirements for [US] nuclear strike capabilities due to the combination of China's still developing strategic objectives and its ongoing modernization of its nuclear and nonnuclear forces. 3 And in February 2006, quadrennial defense review determined that China has greatest potential to compete militarily with United States among major emerging powers. 4 As a result of this strategic perspective, nuclear planning against China increased, with majority of US ballistic missile submarines patrolling in Pacific instead of Atlantic, and long-range bombers conducting periodic forward deployments to Guam much like they did during Cold War.The third component of concerned proliferators, regional states that are seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Whereas strategic nuclear planning during Cold War was focused on Soviet Union, China, and their allies, discovery of Iraq's extensive WMD program in 19 91 and North Korea's nuclear weapons program resulted in a broadening of US nuclear weapons policy and doctrine against regional proliferated themselves. Essentially overnight, declaratory policy for what and where US nuclear might be employed ballooned to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and facilities. At times, radiological and high-explosive weapons and ballistic missiles have also been on list. Military planners worked long hours to translate new language into an expanded list of potential targets and new strike plans.Up until mid-1990s, this development was substantial but timid and often denied by officials because of emphasis at time on securing international support for an indefinite extension of nonproliferation treaty. Broadening nuclear planning and targeting non-nuclear members of nonproliferation treaty could derail effort, but once treaty was extended policy gradually became more overt. …

The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Russian Federation

Nuclear weapons and strategic strike capability are the highest priority of the Russian Federation. Russia is deploying both advanced new strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and new types of nuclear weapons. Russian military leaders have openly stated that Russia has deliberately lowered the nuclear use threshold and talk about the use of nuclear weapons in regional and local wars. This is attributed to weakness in conventional forces. However, a number of respected Russian military analysts argue that the real motive is to increase political clout against the United States and NATO. Russia has formally adopted a nuclear escalation doctrine in which the introduction of nuclear weapons into a conventional conflict is characterized as “deescalation” of the conflict. Unlike NATO's “flexible response” doctrine of the 1960s—the nearest parallel to current Russian thinking—there is a dangerous assumption that the use of few nuclear weapons will end a conflict with a Russian victory. Failure to view Russia realistically could endanger U.S. national security in the future.

The Future of the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent

The United States must maintain an effective nuclear deterrent because, without it, the U.S. could be destroyed as an industrial civilization, and our conventional forces could be defeated by a state with grossly inferior conventional capability but powerful weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Both Russia and China have the nuclear potential to destroy the U.S. (and our allies) and are modernizing their forces with the objective of targeting the U.S. missile defenses and conventional strike capabilities, while critically important elements of deterrence and national power simply cannot substitute for nuclear deterrence. In light of the emerging “strategic partnership” between Russia and China and their emphasis on nuclear weapons, it would be foolish indeed to size U.S. strategic nuclear forces as if the only threat we face is that of rogue states and discard the requirement that the U.S. nuclear deterrent be “second to none.”

Automatic multicast IPsec by using a proactive IPsec discovery protocol and a group key management

Internet protocol based networking is gaining ground in armed forces, leading to a concept described by the NATO as network centric capabilities (NCC). The goal is to enable state-of-the-art, affordable and powerful electronic information services to the troops. A tighter connection of the forces is expected to further enhance the joined strike capabilities. Providing secure information exchange within groups of armed forces is one aspect of the NCC concept. Such group communication is enabled by the multicast feature of the IP technology. Security requirements are met by using the IP security (IPsec) architecture. IPsec enables secure communication between secure private networks via an unsecured public text network. While secure unicast transmission with IPsec is common, only few achievements have been made to secure multicast transmissions. The protection of multicast data traffic of a group in an automated way is described in this document. We utilize an automatic detection of IPsec devices and an efficient key management protocol to reach our aim.

Japan Debates Preparing for Future Preemptive Strikes against North Korea

Abstract North Korea's ballistic missile tests in July 2006 and its subsequent nuclear test in October have heightened Japan's threat perceptions of North Korea. Tokyo has sought to address the threat through the nuclear nonproliferation regime and international arms control law. However, inadequate solutions from Tokyo's perspective have led to Japanese discussions of acquiring a military strike capability that potentially could preempt a North Korean missile attack. We review the North Korean missile and nuclear tests, as well as the international response before turning to the domestic legal and political constraints to Japan's acquisition of offensive strike capabilities. Finally, we explore some of the practical difficulties for Japan in conducting such a military application, as well as the implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance.

The U.S. Military's Manpower Crisis

THREE HUNDRED forty-five million dollars can, roughly speaking, buy one F-22 Raptor-the U.S. military's new stealth fighter plane-or pay the average annual cost of 3,000 soldiers (although it would cost far more to equip, maintain, and deploy either the fighter or the troops). The soldiers are a better investment. Yet U.S. military personnel, pundits, and policymakers have been downplaying the importance of ground forces since 1991. Even today, in the face of ongoing, manpower-intensive counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Bush admin istration is emphasizing long-range strike capabilities over land forces. The recently released 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and the presi dent's budget proposal for fiscal year 2007 both reaffirm this priority. The administration has maintained this emphasis despite the fact that the long-term neglect of U.S. ground forces has caused serious problems in the Iraqi and Afghan campaigns. If not corrected, moreover, this ne glect will cause even worse problems in the future. War is fundamentally a human activity, and attempts to remove humans from its center-as recent trends and current programs do-are likely to lead to disaster.

Guidance Systems of Fighter Aircraft

Mission performance of a fighter aircraft is crucial for survival and strike capabilities in todays' aerial warfare scenario. The guidance functions of such an aircraft play a vital role in meeting the requirements and accomplishing the mission success. This paper presents the requirements of precision guidance for various missions of a fighter aircraft. The concept of guidance system as a pilot-in-loop system is pivotal in understanding and designing such a system. Methodologies of designing such a system are described.

Mixed Initiative Command and Control of Autonomous Air Vehicles

Future military air operations will include multiple classes of unmanned air vehicles with both sensing and strike capabilities. The increased complexity of the associated command and control required for planning and execution of multi-target missions for these unmanned platforms was addressed by DARPA’s Mixed-Initiative Control of Automa-teams (MICA) Program. Under the MICA Program, the Draper Team developed and implemented a hierarchical architecture for mixed initiative command and control of multiple teams of autonomous air vehicles prosecuting large numbers of targets simultaneously. Our approach achieved dynamic replanning of the teams’ missions in response to a continuously evolving target set and knowledge of the enemy air defense threat environment.

GLOBAL STRIKE CAPABILITIES: THE BALLISTIC MISSILE OPTION

Today the United States faces an unpredictable security environment characterized by regional powers and non-state actors, such as vast terrorist networks, who wield increasingly lethal weapons. To address this security environment, the George W. Bush administration has endorsed the ‘transformation’ of US military forces. This article focuses on one transformational goal, namely the development of long-range precision strike capabilities, and examines the feasibility and desirability of using existing ballistic missiles as conventional global strike assets. While some of the futuristic and stealthy long-range technologies currently touted by defense planners might fulfill their promise and could someday be deployed, conventional ballistic missiles could offer an efficient global strike capability much sooner, one that would complement other existing global strike capabilities as research and development on more futuristic platforms continues. Thus, by combining existing capabilities, advanced technologies and new, flexible concepts of operations, the United States can deliver tomorrow's capability today.

Integrated Vehicle Comparison of Turbo-Ramjet Engine and Pulsed Detonation Engine

The pulsed detonation engine (PDE) is a unique propulsion system that uses the pressure rise associated with detonations to efficiently provide thrust. A study was conducted under the direction of the NASA Langley Research Center to identify the flight applications that provide the greatest potential benefits when incorporating a PDE propulsion system. The study was conducted in three phases. The first two phases progressively screened a large matrix of possible applications down to three applications for a more in-depth, advanced design analysis. The three applications best suited to the PDE were (1) a supersonic tactical aircraft, (2) a supersonic strike missile, and (3) a hypersonic single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) vehicle. The supersonic tactical aircraft is the focus of this paper. The supersonic, tactical aircraft is envisioned as a Mach 3.5 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft with possible strike capability. The high speed was selected based on the perceived high-speed fuel efficiency benefits of the PDE. Relative to a turbo-ramjet powered vehicle, the study identified an 11% to 21% takeoff gross weight (TOGW) benefit to the PDE on the baseline 700 n.mi. radius mission depending on the assumptions used for PDE performance and mission requirements. The TOGW benefits predicted were a result of the PDE lower cruise specific fuel consumption (SFC) and lower vehicle supersonic drag. The lower vehicle drag resulted from better aft vehicle shaping, which was a result of better distribution of the PDE cross-sectional area. The reduction in TOGW and fuel usage produced an estimated 4% reduction in life cycle cost for the PDE vehicle. The study also showed that the simplicity of the PDE enables concurrent engineering development of the vehicle and engine.

TMD ROCKING REGIONAL STABILITY

Abstract The convertabililty of theater missile defense (TMD) systems technology makes TMD more offensive than defensive. The US is most active in TMD projects due to its available resources for TMD and its crisis management strategy questing for TMD. By joining US TMD projects, Japan is attempting to develop a pre-emptive strike capability against North Korea and Taiwan is trying to consolidate its defense relations with the US. South Korea could also get a ride on US TMD, but the short distance between Seoul and Demilitarized Zone makes TMD inefficient. China, Russia and North Korea have no TMD resources at present. The strategies of China and Russia are based on retailiation which costs less than TMD. TMD exacerbates strategic suspicions between China and the US-Japan Alliance and makes security cooperation difficult. Taiwan's participation in US TMD projects would aggravate tensions in the Taiwan Strait because the deployment of TMD could strengthen the political confidence for public independence. TM...

Interactive Naval Developments of Three Northeast Asian States

This article discusses the dynamics of naval developments by three Northeast Asian states and how this might affect regional stability. It argues that China's naval force modernization cannot be adequately explained without looking at its regional context. It notes further that China's modernization programme is a response to the more advanced arms modernizations being implemented by its two neighbours, Taiwan and Japan. The article concludes by arguing that China's build-up of its naval and air forces is occurring within an emerging arms race in Northeast Asia. Unlike Europe, the Asia-Pacific in the post-Cold War era faces a regional security environment characterized by uncertainty and complexity. Instead of experiencing a general decline in both inter-state political tension and arms build-up like Europe, local rivalries and new evolving power balances in the Asia-Pacific are coming out into the open, given the removal of superpower restraints imposed during the Cold War. The local origins of these regional conflicts and power balances were tangential to the Cold War, and thus the termination of the Cold War has made little impact on them. Furthermore, the lowering of superpower concern and engagement in the Asia-Pacific has given more leverage to local powers to reshape the geopolitical environment of their region.1 In the face of this uncertain security environment, regional states are acquiring a broad range of modern military systems which are trans forming their strike capabilities.2 The level of the arms build-up may not be as intense as in Europe during the Cold War, and no state has yet acquired the capability to impose its military hegemony. But there are

Time Pressure and War Initiation: Some Linkages

AbstractThis article examines the linkages by which time pressure influences national decision makers to initiate wars. It is argued that time pressure matters most significantly as an intervening variable at the decision-maker level in conjunction with system and subsystem level variables, such as changes in relative strike capability and alliance relationships, and state level variables like military strategy and doctrine. Most studies treat time pressure as having relevance during an acute crisis; in this article, time pressure is viewed as having an intermediate-term significance, that is, prior to the escalation phase or during the early phase of a crisis. It is shown that independent variables such as relative capability, alliance relationships and military doctrines are most likely to be associated with war initiation when they are mediated by time pressure. The article also distinguishes between immediate time pressure—that occurs during the escalation phase of a crisis—and intermediate time pressure, which can happen prior to, and at the onset phase of a crisis.

THE NEW JERSEY — TOMAHAWK STORY: FROM RETIREMENT TO RENAISSANCE —A NEW STRIKE WARFARE CAPABILITY

ABSTRACTThe enormity of the task of reactivating a forty year old battleship, the USS New Jersey, for the fourth time, outfitting her with new technology surface warfare and strike capabilities, improved self defense weapons and modernized communications installations at minimal cost during a fifteen month industrial period is described in this paper. Challenges involved included the Tomahawk weapons system design modifications necessary to enhance the capabilities of the not yet operational eight missile Spruance class destroyer baseline configuration to a thirty‐two missile battleship suite. Incorporation of the Tomahawk system brings to this venerable dreadnought the capability of operating offensively with battle forces in the highest threat areas and conducting offensive operations against surface ships and targets ashore, using Tomahawk land attack and antiship missiles (ASM). The revitalized New Jersey also provides self‐defense against ASM and attacking aircraft at short range. The design of her combat system remains in consonance with the original attributes of the ship's design—sur‐vivable, dependable, and redundant.This paper examines the adaptation of the Tomahawk weapons system for installation in New Jersey. The design modifications have been particularly critical, since the baseline system is currently under development in USS Merrill. Urgent Navy requirements dictated that the battleship‐Tomahawk effort overtake and lead the baseline development in Merrill. Emphasis in this paper is placed upon the discussion of planning, implementation, problems encountered, and the advanced capabilities surrounding New Jersey as a result of installing the Tomahawk Weapons System.Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of the potential operational utilization of New Jersey in the strike warfare role that was lost to the surface Navy in World War II, when aircraft carriers supplanted battleships as the Navy's main striking arm.

A Counterforce/Countervalue Scenario- or How Much Destructive Capability is Enough?

Military forces and weapon systems - unless they are determined only for political reasons or internally di rected - must be capable of being reduced to a military relationship between on the one hand alternative tar get options and on the other hand the capability they have to threaten or destroy. This applies to the Theatre Nuclear Forces as well as to the NATO decision of December 1979. Consequently, the question of the necessity for reactive armament - in German language the so-called "Nachrüstung" - can also be investigated by a comparison between (already) existing potential, enemy first strike and/or defence capabilities and alternative target options. To make the question more real by ap plying it to NATO's decision concerning reactive armament in the area of Long Range Theatre Nuclear For ces (LRTNF), we should ask: Without the planned increase in Euro-strategic systems, is NATO faced with the situation of an "atomic deterrent deficit", and conversely does the prospect exist for WTO of a nuclear offensive war with a calculable risk and acceptable consequences?

A Systems Approach to Shipboard HF Communications

ABSTRACTThe subject of this paper deals with High Frequency Shipboard communications, past, present and future. An in‐depth analysis is provided which serves to isolate the performance limitations of electrical noise, inter‐modulation distortion, harmonic distortions and to break the corruption down to its component contributions. Solutions for resolutions of each of the contributing factors is offered in an intergrated fashion resulting in a preferred system which combines the best available attributes of existing equipment with that which is presently under development.The system is examined as to flexibility and applicability to various ship sizes and missions. The examination delves into the sets of combinations of transmitters, receivers, multicouplers, antennas and antenna diplexing schemes which yield optimal results.An in‐depth look at the total High Frequency communications effort aboard ship is analyzed from the standpoint of system implementation, hardware interpretation, and human utilization. Cost and technical “trade‐offs” are examined as to impact on the ship as a combat system, from the standpoint of surviveability and acquisition versus life‐cycle costing.The Fleet needs of the future are analyzed with concentration on higher density and closer spaced communications channels commensurate with the larger more agile needs that are projected. The strike capability of tomorrow's Navy cannot be limited by communications but rather the communications system must be an integrated portion and as advanced and flexible as the rest of the weapons systems.The objective is to finally achieve a communications system which is adequate for both long and short range. A desirable, however, not presently achieved goal is a higher radiated power, higher receive sensitivity system. This must all ***e accomplished with minimal frequency management for the larger, more complex systems and done at competitive cost and higher statistical reliability.

Stability and Deterrence Through Strategic Nuclear Arms

A quantitative simulation is carried out in order to test the political outcome of ABM and MIRVs. Technical variables serve as input: number of ICBMs, of ABMs, hit probabilities, etc. Strategic positions result as output: mutual second strike capability, effective defense of one power only, etc. The conclusion is that MIRVs, especially in com bination with ABMs, represent an extreme threat to equilibrium.