Counterproliferation and US Nuclear Strategy

Abstract

The Bush administration took office with a strong agenda to and revitalize US nuclear posture. In a speech to National Defense University in May 2001, President G. W Bush said he would change size, composition, character of our nuclear in a way that reflects reality that Cold War over. He said his goal was to move quickly to reduce nuclear forces and that he was committed to achieving a credible deterrent with lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs.'This mainly been understood to relate to Russia, which administration says no longer an contingency for US nuclear planning.2 Officials often describe this shift as most significant in US nuclear policy since beginning of Cold War. As a result, nuclear posture review completed at end of 2001 continued drawdown of nuclear that was initiated in 199 1 by implementing force structure decisions made in 1992 strategic arms reduction treaty (START II) agreement, 1994 nuclear posture review, and 1997 Helsinki framework. This included a retirement of Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missile and four ballistic missile submarines and a trimming of remaining warheads to a START Ill-like force level of roughly 5400 warheads, of which no more than 2200 could be operationally deployed strategic warheads. Today, nearly two decades after Cold War ended, we're still in that drawdown phase of 1990s. Yet Russia still main focus of US nuclear planning due to sheer size of its nuclear arsenal and retreat from democracy.Other components of change, however, were not drivers for nuclear cuts or a reduction of role of nuclear weapons, but for an expanded role against other adversaries. One of these was China, which 2001 nuclear posture review determined is a country that could be involved in an immediate or potential contingency that setting requirements for [US] nuclear strike capabilities due to the combination of China's still developing strategic objectives and its ongoing modernization of its nuclear and nonnuclear forces. 3 And in February 2006, quadrennial defense review determined that China has greatest potential to compete militarily with United States among major emerging powers. 4 As a result of this strategic perspective, nuclear planning against China increased, with majority of US ballistic missile submarines patrolling in Pacific instead of Atlantic, and long-range bombers conducting periodic forward deployments to Guam much like they did during Cold War.The third component of concerned proliferators, regional states that are seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Whereas strategic nuclear planning during Cold War was focused on Soviet Union, China, and their allies, discovery of Iraq's extensive WMD program in 19 91 and North Korea's nuclear weapons program resulted in a broadening of US nuclear weapons policy and doctrine against regional proliferated themselves. Essentially overnight, declaratory policy for what and where US nuclear might be employed ballooned to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and facilities. At times, radiological and high-explosive weapons and ballistic missiles have also been on list. Military planners worked long hours to translate new language into an expanded list of potential targets and new strike plans.Up until mid-1990s, this development was substantial but timid and often denied by officials because of emphasis at time on securing international support for an indefinite extension of nonproliferation treaty. Broadening nuclear planning and targeting non-nuclear members of nonproliferation treaty could derail effort, but once treaty was extended policy gradually became more overt. …