Strategic Competition Research Articles

The new EU energy security reality and its impact on the wider Black Sea region

This brief in-depth research “The new EU energy security reality and its impact on the wider Black Sea region” on a security Studies was organized by David Aghmashenebeli National Defence Academy of Georgia, Germany. Its goal is to support the security of the Wider Black Sea Region energy supply chains. The purpose of this project is to answer to the main question: Will EU energy security impact the south-eastern flank of the Euro-Atlantic space. Russia's war in Ukraine has created new problems that are not addressed by outdated security programs and old-fashioned traditional defence approaches. That the war in Ukraine is not the cause of a future conflict against the world order is not a new point of view, furthermore, the war in Ukraine is one of the results of the already existing conflict. It is a real possibility that the Kremlin will continue its aggressive foreign policy towards its neighbours and neighbours of neighbours in order to consolidate global power and "legitimacy". The eternal war in the region exposed the EU’s economic weaknesses in energy exports and supply chains. Military professionals believe that whoever controls the east of the Euro-Atlantic space and/or dominates the Black Sea, can easily project power on the European continent, Central Europe, the Mediterranean, the North/South Caucasus and the Middle East. Russia eternal war has shown us more dependence, weaponization, interference and more vulnerability of the EU Countries; Security is no longer based on the previously established rules. In the near future It’s unlikely that relations between the EU and Russia will be based on beneficial energy relations. The European Union is moving beyond the binary dependency that binds international actors, creating a new reality in which the inclusiveness of energy security extends to several different areas, diversification will be critical for the EU. Supply chains are complicated and messy, it’s implausible to make positive changes overnight. Taking into account Russia sharp growth in military spending, its ability to integrate state resources and masses and it’s "great propensity for risk" makes Russia both a “capable and unpredictable actor”. Russia's blackmail to use nuclear weapons indicates that Kremlin is losing the war due to lack of ammunition and low technological capabilities and in the short term wants to take this war into a protracted or frozen conflict phase. According to the analysis of the processes of the recent past, the stability of the region cannot be successful and effective only with the support of NATO member states on EU's eastern flank. NATO, EU and their partners should have an emergency and long-term assistance strategy for the parties. From the lesson learnt in the last 30+ years on international cooperation issues it is vital that in the next 10-30 years the Euro-Atlantic and regional countries (except Russia) in the region, must counter challenges with collective deterrence of cooperation. Actively promoting stability is possible through the existence of the theory of Russian deterrence. Stability should be achieved by promoting collective deterrence and integration of Russia; a strategy of emergency and long-term assistance not only for alliance members, but also for partners, plus collective deterrence equals fixing and integration of Russia. Speeches and workshops used in editing this paper, Organized by the Research and Policy Analysis Department (RPA) project of Strategic Competition Seminar Series-FY23 SCSS of George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) at Workshop I held in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, 20-24 February 2023 entitled “Alternative Ukrainian Future Trajectories: Implications for Russia and the West” and Workshop II held in Berlin, Germany on 16 May 2023“ (A summary of FY23 SCSS#8 hybrid seminar entitled “What if? Russian Variables, Inflection Points and Game Changers?” at SCSS Workshop II) have been very supportive in the preparation of the paper. For the EU and its partners in the region to support the most desirable outcomes and mitigate the worst considering all scenarios discussed in the paper includes following key take-aways: 1. Relationships and cooperation matter 2. Security guarantees matter

Strengthening the EU’s defence cooperation

In an expeditiously changing world, security challenges have become more intricate, multifaceted and complex. The 21st century is an epoch of strategic competition and multisided relations. The influence and rate of occurrence of hybrid security threats are constantly rising and deepening. World is in era of transition, characterized by creating new dynamics by emerging players along with significant shift of geopolitical and economic power, and currently, global attention is drawn to the Russian aggression against Ukraine, which is the consequent catalyst for the EU states, obligating them to take more responsibility and improve security and defence. Russia does not use force only to dominate on Ukraine, but this war aims to reverse and strike down western dominance - it is a big threat-economically, militarily, and politically. In an international competition, other powers are challenging the European countries’ ability to protect their interests and values that was the motivation for the idea of collective security building called "strategic sovereignty". For this reason, both defence and security fields are essentially important for the European Union. The EU leaders have long been trying to improve common defence policy - the European Union External Action Service in 2011, and later in 2016, the EU Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker called for a common defence fund, a “European headquarters.“ In March 2022, the EU council approved the Strategic Compass. The Compass gives the European Union an ambitious plan of action for strengthening the EU's security and defence policy by 2030 (EU, 2022. French President Emmanuel Macron urged Europe to invest in its own collective security framework in the face of Russian military moves on the bloc’s doorstep - "Europe needs to finally build its own collective security framework on our continent." We argue about the prospects of collective security and the fact that it may now be time for the EU member States to take the necessary decisions.

China-US Strategic Competition in the Lower Mekong Region and Vietnam’s Position

Recently, both China and the United States of America (US) have started focusing more on settling influence in the Lower Mekong region in the general context of global China-US competition. Although they have different connecting approaches, both superpowers focus on establishing and maintaining their influence in the strategic geo-political area in Southeast Asia and Asia. Their activities in the Lower Mekong region are more noticeable since the 2010s when Xi Jinping came to power in China and the US conducted the “Pivot to Asia” and “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” policies. Their competition therefore raises difficult tasks for Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam (CLMTV) to keep neutrality, and protect their national sovereignty and the regional sustainable development. As the China-US competition in the Lower Mekong region is remarkable and profoundly influential to the development of regional countries, both academic scholars and policy makers pay attention to this subject. This paper focuses on evaluating the recent competition between China and the US in CLMTV and Vietnam’s adaptations to maintain its sovereignty, security and neutrality in the great-power competition, especially since Vietnam established a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with both China (2008) and the US (2023).

The Сoncept of International Discourse Power in China’s Foreign Policy Ideology

As China’s material power strengthens and US-China strategic competition deepens, the concept of international discourse power is becoming increasingly important in China’s foreign policy ideology. Beijing assumes that China’s increased material power has not been translated into international discourse power; in the context of developing US-Chinese rivalry, China is at a disadvantage in terms of its international discourse power, and the persistence of Western “discourse hegemony” in the world is holding back further development of China and the implementation of its national interests. According to many Chinese scholars, the essence of the struggle for international discourse power is the desire to dominate the world order, including its creation, maintenance and revision. Possession of discourse power allows a country to influence the world political and economic order and values, determine the international agenda and thereby acquire greater economic and geopolitical power, as well as occupy leading role in global governance. Increased influence on the world arena is seen in Beijing as closely linked to the strengthening of international discourse power. The article reconstructs the genesis and development of the concept of international discourse power in the Chinese official and academic fields, identifies independence in the Chinese theoretical understanding of this concept and the high applied significance of its research as aimed at finding ways to shape China’s discourse power. The article focuses on the main provisions, logic and argumentation of Chinese scholars in the process of their conceptualization of the phenomenon of international discourse power.

China's Identity Positioning and Diplomacy among Developing Countries

In the contemporary era characterized by the collective rise of emerging nations with China at the forefront, significant shifts in the power structure of the international system have emerged. An urgent concern is how China should position itself and delineate friend from foe in order to garner international support from a vast array of developing countries. China's intricate national circumstances and the profound transformations in the global environment present formidable obstacles to defining its national and international identity. Historically, China has positioned itself as the "largest developing country." However, given its significantly larger scale compared to other developing countries within the global community, disagreements from developed nations regarding China's classification as a developing country have surfaced, leading to economic frictions between China and other countries. Concurrently, China's efforts to secure international support primarily from developing countries have been impeded by certain nations adopting counter-strategies within the backdrop of Sino-American strategic competition, inadvertently imposing substantial economic costs on China and even posing direct threats to its core interests. Therefore, basing its actions on a sound sense of righteousness and benefits, accurately positioning China within the international system and distinguishing between friends and adversaries is a prerequisite for conducting diplomatic work. This approach can potentially mitigate the costs of China's rise, enhance its strategic credibility, and facilitate the acquisition of broader international support. In future diplomatic endeavors, China should persist in safeguarding and advancing the interests of the vast community of developing countries, adhering to a diplomatic layout grounded in the prioritization of relationships with developing countries. This approach will underscore China's commitment to international justice and facilitate the transformation of its identity into that of a "responsible major power," thereby reshaping its perspectives on the international order in this new era.

One year since Russia invaded Ukraine

On February 24th 2022, the conflict in Ukraine became a war with global impact. The Russian army’s rapid entry into eastern Ukraine also hastened the breakdown of what remained of the post-Cold War order in Europe. Security architecture paradigms have changed dramatically at both global and European levels. US–China strategic competition, global resource markets and even Ukraine's institutional construction have all been shaken by the war. As the conflict continues to escalate on the ground, this CIDOB Nota Internacional analyses its impact in the geopolitical, economic, technological and migration fields. With no path to resolution in sight, the threat of a long war or a frozen conflict is the worst-case scenario for both Ukraine and Europe.

GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE INITIATIVES «BELT AND ROAD» AND «PGII» AS THE NEWEST ASPECT OF THE POLITICAL RIVALRY BETWEEN THE PRC AND THE USA

The development and implementation of infrastructure initiatives of the People's Republic of China («Belt and Road Initiative») and the United States of America («Blue Dot Network», «Build Back Better World» and the current «Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment») in the context of strategic development and the growing political confrontation between the two states were considered. A comprehensive understanding of the purpose and features of these initiatives is formed, as the basic infrastructure development projects are aimed at strengthening the geopolitical positions of the People's Republic of China and the United States and, in the distant future, their political and economic dominance. Key details supporting the thesis of growing competition and confrontation between these states are highlighted. The influence of the Belt and Road initiative on the formation of a competitive strategy by the United States regarding the growing influence of China and the expansion of understanding the modern dynamics and characteristics of Sino-American strategic competition are studied. It is proved that the US leadership is implementing its own infrastructure initiatives for equal competition with China and limiting the latter at the foreign policy and foreign economic level. Different types of sources and materials of a political and economic nature are used and analyzed. Each phenomenon that directly affects the development of infrastructure initiatives of the People's Republic of China and the United States, including its positive and negative sides, is identified, and the principles by which the Belt and Road and Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment" projects are functioning are compared, which allowed to objectively compare them, evaluate their effectiveness and find out the difference in implementation approaches.

‘Gray Zone’ Strategy as a Theory of Success for Revisionist Powers: Cases of Russia and Iran

The Russian and Iranian approach to warfare has gained significant traction as both revisionist actors have managed to play a ‘weaker hand’ effectively against their stronger rivals. Over the years, Moscow and Tehran have encapsulated a theory of success that entails creating asymmetric advantages and developing a competitive edge over their rivals. Their strategic approach is based on the assumption that undermining opponents with conventional forces is not an option and that strategic success requires the development of asymmetric capabilities. These revisionist actors have become increasingly proficient in carefully calibrating their long-term competition with militarily and economically stronger adversaries. This well-refined modus operandi is labeled as a hybrid warfare or a ‘gray zone’ strategy. These two concepts, although often used synonymously, noticeably differ from one to another. Russia’s decision to expand its influence and challenge the international order by the unconcealed use of military power starkly differs from Iran’s gradualist approach that seeks to incrementally alter the regional security landscape. The immense political, economic, and military costs that Moscow has already incurred during the Ukraine conflict would further validate the value of Iran’s strategic culture. It will display the primacy of ‘gray zone’ tactics over the open resort to conventional military force. In other words, the failure of Russia’s conventional forces in Ukraine will reinforce the merits of ‘gray zone’ activities in a modern-day conflict rather than signal their potential demise. More importantly, it will caution other revisionist actors against open engagement in conventional military operations, hence encouraging them to employ ‘gray zone’ tactics in pursuit of their strategic interests. Moreover, in the era of strategic competition, ‘gray zone’ tactics will remain as a strong instrument for undermining adversaries without risking the outbreak of a full-scale conflict. In this period of enhanced rivalry among great powers, when costs of escalation may incur catastrophic consequences for all stakeholders, countries such as Russia and Iran would have a powerful incentive to exploit their competitive advantage designed to employ ‘gray zone’ tactics against militarily and economically stronger adversaries. To this end, the relevance of ‘gray zone’ activities, as the revisionist actors’ primary strategic tool and the basis of their theory of success is unlikely to recede in the foreseeable future.

Comparative study of two selected eastern port operational performance in Nigeria: Case of Rivers and Delta ports

Purpose: The main purpose of this paper is to compare the operational performance of two selected eastern ports in Nigeria: Rivers and Delta ports. Methodology: The paper uses secondary data from the Nigeria Port Authority (NPA) Portal from 2008 to 2013. The paper employs multiple regression models to analyze the data using SPSS and Statgraphics software packages. Results: The results show that Rivers port has a higher operational efficiency than Delta port, with an R-squared value of 81.34% and 79.47%, respectively. The results also reveal a significant relationship between cargo throughput and some independent variables, such as vessel traffic, turnaround time, berth occupancy, and number of employees. Theoretical contribution: The paper contributes to the existing literature on port performance measurement and improvement by applying multiple regression models to assess the operational efficiency of two Nigerian ports. The paper also provides empirical evidence on the factors affecting port performance in a developing country context. Practical implications: The paper has practical implications for port authorities, maritime agencies, shipping companies, and the government. The paper suggests some policy recommendations to enhance the operational performance of the eastern ports, such as improving port infrastructure, pricing policy, and strategic competition.

Strategic Competition and Crisis Wargame: Integrating a Dynamic Reputation Model to Enhance the Strategic Competition and Crisis Wargame for the Center for Army Analysis

The Center for Army Analysis (CAA) developed the Strategic Competition and Crisis (SC2) Wargame to address shortcomings in the U.S. Army’s strategic planning during competition and crisis. This capstone enhanced the SC2 Wargame over the course of two years. Last year, the capstone developed a dynamic, perspective-based reputation model designed for integration into SC2. This year, the capstone integrated the model to produce a more efficient, objective-focused wargame that optimizes strategic learning for senior military leaders. Building off the work from the previous year, this capstone combined tools from the Systems Decision Process with the theoretical framework within the Defense and Strategic Studies Department to create and implement an improved product. Analysis of the original framework of the game uncovered three improvement areas that address each component of gameplay: strategy-focused player guidebooks, a realistic negotiations-pairing process, and real-time feedback through a Player Dashboard.

Deliberating a development-international finance-security nexus in great-power strategic competition

Deliberating a development-international finance-security nexus in great-power strategic competition

To fight or not? product introduction and channel selection in the presence of a platform’s private label

Platform retailers’ private labels have recently flourished, threatening the business of traditional national brand (NB) sellers. To fight against these platforms, some NB sellers introduce new products as low-quality substitutes through marketplace channels or exclusive channels. This raises a question: Considering the existence of a platform’s private label, how does an NB seller’s fight/no-fight strategy affect the co-opetition relationship between the two players? In this paper, we construct a game-theoretic model to explore the optimal response strategy of the NB seller. Our study shows that the interaction between the expansion effect and the cannibalization effect can lead to outcomes in which the no-fight strategy benefits the NB seller and the fight strategy benefits the platform. We find that for the NB seller, introducing a new low-quality product through a marketplace channel may be more profitable than doing so through an exclusive channel, particularly when the expansion effect is large and the quality difference is small. We also find that new product introduction as a fight strategy may cause a win–win situation for the NB seller and the platform when done through a marketplace channel with a large expansion effect. An intriguing result of the extension is that the NB seller may switch from the marketplace channel to the exclusive channel as the operating cost in the exclusive channel increases. This work provides valuable managerial insights for NB sellers in response to strategic competition with platforms’ private labels.

Irregular warfare in strategic competition

ABSTRACT After two decades of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US military has shifted to preparing for large-scale combat operations. However, it would be a mistake to discard hard-earned lessons from these conflicts. Despite contemporary advances in technology and important differences between current US competitors and the Soviet Union, irregular warfare will play a prominent role in the new era of strategic competition. It was a prominent form of US-Soviet competition during the Cold War, is already used extensively by the United States and its competitors and remains attractive given concerns about escalation between nuclear-armed powers. Given the continued relevance of irregular warfare, we focus on two main lessons from the US experience. First, since irregular warfare is about influencing populations and achieving political goals without large-scale combat operations, influencing and working alongside the partner is the primary mission. The second lesson follows directly from the first; if irregular warfare is ultimately about achieving policy goals with an economy of military force, IW is a team sport requiring joint and interagency collaboration to be effectively implemented.

US-China Strategic Competition Amidst the Paradox of Decoupling

Propelled by its remarkable economic growth, China has emerged as a significant player in the global arena, challenging the traditional dominance of the United States. Leveraging its economic prowess, China has strategically advanced its interests not only in the Indo-Pacific context but also on a global scale. This strategy has prompted the United States, starting with the Trump administration, to transition from engagement to comprehensive containment, aiming to counter China's influence and uphold American leadership. This shift signifies a new era, resembling a modern-day Cold War, distinct from the previous engagement-oriented policies. Intriguingly, amidst the calls within Washington to decouple the US economy from that of China, trade and investment data hint at a nuanced revival of bilateral ties between these global superpowers, prompting a re-evaluation of conventional wisdom. Despite the strong rhetoric advocating decoupling, its tangible implementation remains uncertain. Economic indicators suggest a trend toward recoupling, underscoring the intricate interplay between strategic competition and economic interdependence. This complexity generates a paradoxical situation in the new Cold War era, in which intense strategic rivalry and crucial economic cooperation coexist.

A Cognitive Discourse Study of the US’s Cognition of China in Sino-American Strategic Competition

A Cognitive Discourse Study of the US’s Cognition of China in Sino-American Strategic Competition

Fiji’s Foreign Relations, 2006–23

ABSTRACT From the time he assumed control over Fiji after the 2006 coup, military commander and self-appointed prime minister Frank Bainimarama was determined to assert Fiji’s independent stance in foreign policy. This was especially so after 2009, when he established an authoritarian state ruled by decree. He forged new diplomatic relations with Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, South Korea, the United Arab Emirates, and Ethiopia, and emphasized Fiji’s good relations with China. Frosty relations with Australia and New Zealand warmed after the 2014 election despite Bainimarama’s unsuccessful attempt to replace the Pacific Islands Forum with his own regional organization. He became briefly prominent in UN circles as chair of COP23 in Bonn, where he publicized the fateful impact of climate change on the Pacific Islands. By 2022 the strategic rivalry between China and the United States and its allies had come to overshadow Fiji on the regional diplomatic scene. Bainimarama was defeated at the election of 2022.

Counter Threat Finance for Strategic Competition

In strategic competition, malign state and non-state actor networks pose significant threats to key national security interests. To understand and combat these networks, counter threat finance, a tool historically used to address narcotics and terrorist financing, can be applied against state actors who use money to gain influence and increase power. Kevin D Stringer, Madison Urban and Andrew Mackay argue for expanding the authority and application of counter threat finance to address state adversaries, and highlight how this is an integral element of a nascent whole-of-nation economic statecraft strategy and an essential step towards gaining the edge in strategic competition.◼

China’s Central Role in the Globalization and Slowbalization Trends

Abstract China has played a central role in the previous phase of hiper-globalization but also in the ongoing phase of slowbalization, characterized by the decreasing size of global value chains which started after the global financial crisis in 2008. More recently, US-China strategic competition is contributing to the slowbalization process, especially in the technology space. Against such backdrop, China is reducing its dependence on the outside world, betting on technological self-reliance and working hard to build its own ecosystem. However, such trend does not mean isolation; on the contrary, China actively shapes its unique form of globalization by creating its own neighbourhood or area of economic influence. A prominent example of this effort is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims at increasing China’s soft – and possibly hard – power with a hub and spoke approach.

Navigating Geopolitical Change in Northeast Asia: A Realist Approach to Analyze the Matrix Scenario of US‐China Conflict and US–North Korea Relations

This article examines the intricate dynamics of US‐China and US–North Korea relations, focusing on the strategic competition between the United States and China. Drawing upon the realist theories of Kissinger and Mearsheimer, the study delves into how various intensities of US‐China conflict might influence North Korea's strategic value and the prospects for improved US–North Korea relations. The research underscores that escalating US‐China competition could reshape the geopolitical landscape in Northeast Asia, paving the way for new strategic alignments and partnerships. Four distinct scenarios are presented, each reflecting a different intensity of US‐China conflict and the ensuing reactions from both North Korea and the USA. The analysis suggests that the most probable scenario entails an intensifying US‐China rivalry, which correspondingly elevates North Korea's strategic significance. Such a turn of events would necessitate a shift in US strategy – from isolating North Korea to forging more favorable geopolitical conditions. Potential strategies might include reducing North Korea's reliance on China, disrupting the alignment between China, Russia, and North Korea, or even contemplating the integration of Pyongyang into the US security framework. These strategic adjustments could reshape the power dynamics and address regional challenges in Northeast Asia, promoting peace and stability and safeguarding the nation's core interests.

How China Perceives European Strategic Autonomy: Asymmetric Expectations and Pragmatic Engagement

Abstract Intensified strategic competition between China and the US and the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine conflict have polarised international attention on the promotion and prospects for European strategic autonomy (ESA). This change in the international and regional environment raises an important question: How does ESA affect China–EU relations? Answering it requires clarification of the main impacts of ESA promotion on China–EU relations. These include: the EU’s reduced dependence on key materials and technologies from certain countries, and the formulation and expression, in line with core EU interests, of an independent stance and policies on China; China’s adjustment of its European Strategy; and persistent external pressure from the United States. Starting from its particular interests, the EU has, to some extent, independently assessed and accordingly refined its relations with China, having pursued cooperation in global public welfare governance and other areas of similarly low ideological significance, and pragmatically explored ways of moderating competition and enhancing cooperation with China. Fields highly sensitive to geopolitical influence, or which involve key technologies and globally important supply chains, are those wherein China is treated as a competitor. Upon analysis, it can be concluded that the EU’s most consistent approach to its goals of strategic autonomy is that of maintaining an alliance with the United States while avoiding full dependence on it, and competing with China in key areas that allow leeway for practical cooperation.