How China Perceives European Strategic Autonomy: Asymmetric Expectations and Pragmatic Engagement

Abstract

Abstract Intensified strategic competition between China and the US and the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine conflict have polarised international attention on the promotion and prospects for European strategic autonomy (ESA). This change in the international and regional environment raises an important question: How does ESA affect China–EU relations? Answering it requires clarification of the main impacts of ESA promotion on China–EU relations. These include: the EU’s reduced dependence on key materials and technologies from certain countries, and the formulation and expression, in line with core EU interests, of an independent stance and policies on China; China’s adjustment of its European Strategy; and persistent external pressure from the United States. Starting from its particular interests, the EU has, to some extent, independently assessed and accordingly refined its relations with China, having pursued cooperation in global public welfare governance and other areas of similarly low ideological significance, and pragmatically explored ways of moderating competition and enhancing cooperation with China. Fields highly sensitive to geopolitical influence, or which involve key technologies and globally important supply chains, are those wherein China is treated as a competitor. Upon analysis, it can be concluded that the EU’s most consistent approach to its goals of strategic autonomy is that of maintaining an alliance with the United States while avoiding full dependence on it, and competing with China in key areas that allow leeway for practical cooperation.