Abstract
The Russian and Iranian approach to warfare has gained significant traction as both revisionist actors have managed to play a ‘weaker hand’ effectively against their stronger rivals. Over the years, Moscow and Tehran have encapsulated a theory of success that entails creating asymmetric advantages and developing a competitive edge over their rivals. Their strategic approach is based on the assumption that undermining opponents with conventional forces is not an option and that strategic success requires the development of asymmetric capabilities. These revisionist actors have become increasingly proficient in carefully calibrating their long-term competition with militarily and economically stronger adversaries. This well-refined modus operandi is labeled as a hybrid warfare or a ‘gray zone’ strategy. These two concepts, although often used synonymously, noticeably differ from one to another. Russia’s decision to expand its influence and challenge the international order by the unconcealed use of military power starkly differs from Iran’s gradualist approach that seeks to incrementally alter the regional security landscape. The immense political, economic, and military costs that Moscow has already incurred during the Ukraine conflict would further validate the value of Iran’s strategic culture. It will display the primacy of ‘gray zone’ tactics over the open resort to conventional military force. In other words, the failure of Russia’s conventional forces in Ukraine will reinforce the merits of ‘gray zone’ activities in a modern-day conflict rather than signal their potential demise. More importantly, it will caution other revisionist actors against open engagement in conventional military operations, hence encouraging them to employ ‘gray zone’ tactics in pursuit of their strategic interests. Moreover, in the era of strategic competition, ‘gray zone’ tactics will remain as a strong instrument for undermining adversaries without risking the outbreak of a full-scale conflict. In this period of enhanced rivalry among great powers, when costs of escalation may incur catastrophic consequences for all stakeholders, countries such as Russia and Iran would have a powerful incentive to exploit their competitive advantage designed to employ ‘gray zone’ tactics against militarily and economically stronger adversaries. To this end, the relevance of ‘gray zone’ activities, as the revisionist actors’ primary strategic tool and the basis of their theory of success is unlikely to recede in the foreseeable future.
Published Version
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