Stable Deterrence Research Articles

Proliferation, Deterrence, and the Likelihood of Nuclear War

Two arguments have traditionally been made about the effects of proliferation on the likelihood of nuclear war. One argument claims that proliferation increases the likelihood of nuclear war; the other claims that proliferation reduces the likelihood of nuclear war. This article shows that, in fact, both of these arguments are logical and probably true some of the time. The key factor that decides when one argument is more valid than the other is the degree to which nuclear powers can deter other nuclear powers. Because the conditions necessary for stable deterrence can vary systematically, it is possible to define when proliferation is a threat and when it is an asset. Moreover, using these principles, the article analyzes the effect of previous cases of proliferation on the likelihood of war, and shows how a compromise policy for dealing with proliferation can best be determined.

The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946-1976

Preface 1. The nuclear question 2. The failure of liberal diplomacy 3. The origins of strategy 4. The foundations of stable deterrence 5. the rise and fall of nuclear war 6. The great fight: the Cuban missile crisis 7. The first step: the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 8. Fencers on a tightrope.

Unsafe at any Speed: A Critique of “Stable Deterrence” Doctrine

Unsafe at any Speed: A Critique of “Stable Deterrence” Doctrine

The Classical Balance of Power Theory

The paper attempts to formulate an axiomatic model of the classical balance of power system using the fundamental notion that a stable bal ance of power implies the absence of a predomin nant actor or coalition. It is shown that the basic motivation for participating in such a system is security in a world where each nation fears the prospect of being on the losing side. Under condi tions of perfect information, such a system will only be stable when exact equality of power can be maintained, if necessary by suitable alignments with previously neutral nations. Under conditions of uncertainty, the desirable goal would be stable deterrence which may imply an attempt to gain power superior to one's opponent. In both situa tions, a stable equilibrium may be attained only under fairly restricted conditions. The most suc cessful operation would be similar to the 'holder of the balance' case. A 'multipolar' system is more likely to be stable.

On Achieving Stable Mutual Deterrence

Abstract In this paper it is established that there are strong, stabilizing mechanisms in an “arms race” based on mutual deterrence, despite ambiguous capabilities of ballistic missiles and despite time delays or errors inherent in intelligence estimates. It is shown analytically that the introduction of multiple-warhead technology (MIRV) does not lead to an ever-spiraling arms race. However, it can dramatically increase the number of boosters required by each party. The analysis is also applied to strategic confrontations involving more than two major powers, and it is shown that the stable solutions in these cases can require vastly increased force levels. Perturbation of two-party mutual deterrence by a relatively small third party is also analyzed. It is shown that an ABM defense of only retaliatory missile forces may well be less escalatory and less expensive than the alternative of increasing the land-based missile forces. The paper also examines “ambiguous” ABM, i.e., defenses deployed to optionall...

Technological change and stable deterrence

the argument to show that the hopes of a stable military environment are illusory and that the race is the feasible alternative. On the other hand, those who find any danger of nuclear war unacceptable use the argument to prove that disarmament is the solution; that arms control only is untenable, since stable deterrence is at best a temporary and fragile palliative or perhaps a first step toward real disarmament. Proponents of control generally grant that technological change is destabilizing, but they argue that stabilized deterrence is desirable as long as it lasts. The argument itself is rarely questioned. If one gives one's imagination free rein, it is obvious that technological change can be destabilizing. I will present here a case

Signals, Ambiguity, and Strategic Force Structure

In this paper we consider some problems that arise when a nation attempts to implement a strategy of stable deterrence over time. The problems arise when a nation's planners make strategic inferences based on an adversary's ambiguous signals of intent and action. A necessary condition for inferring an opponent's strategic objectives is good technical intelligence. We explore some alternative intelligence models and their effect on national response. It appears that even small improvements in the content and timing of intelligence information received by a nation pursuing stable deterrence would help constrain a noncooperative adversary and open new channels of communication.

Stable Deterrence and Its Limits

HERE WAS A HAPPY TIME, not too long ago, when the major dialogue on national arms policy was between the armers and the disarmers. The issue, at least in much of the public's mind, was whether the nation ought to pursue a policy of negotiated comprehensive disarmament or one of national preparedness. There were those who believed that all arms races must eventuate in war, and those who believed that military superiority was the best guarantee of peace. But in recent years, this easy dichotomy has given way to a far more complicated picture. Both the armers and the disarmers have become increasingly sophisticated, and as a result have divided into a welter of sub-factions, each advocating a national security policy differing only slightly from that of its neighbor on the arms policy continuum. Though this fragmentation has led to a disconcerting muddying of the polemic waters, it must be viewed as a healthy and encouraging development. And even if one can hardly contend that the vast verbal and intellectual gap between the tough and the soft has been completely bridged, we are certainly moving in that direction. As a consequence, it is now more possible to engage in vigorous and meaningful discourse rather than to restrict ourselves to the vacuous and loaded exchanges of soft-on-communism or warmonger.

Stable Deterrence and Its Limits

Stable Deterrence and Its Limits