Abstract

Abstract In this paper it is established that there are strong, stabilizing mechanisms in an “arms race” based on mutual deterrence, despite ambiguous capabilities of ballistic missiles and despite time delays or errors inherent in intelligence estimates. It is shown analytically that the introduction of multiple-warhead technology (MIRV) does not lead to an ever-spiraling arms race. However, it can dramatically increase the number of boosters required by each party. The analysis is also applied to strategic confrontations involving more than two major powers, and it is shown that the stable solutions in these cases can require vastly increased force levels. Perturbation of two-party mutual deterrence by a relatively small third party is also analyzed. It is shown that an ABM defense of only retaliatory missile forces may well be less escalatory and less expensive than the alternative of increasing the land-based missile forces. The paper also examines “ambiguous” ABM, i.e., defenses deployed to optionall...

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