Sort Of Evidence Research Articles

How Could We Know When a Robot was a Moral Patient?

There is growing interest in machine ethics in the question of whether and under what circumstances an artificial intelligence would deserve moral consideration. This paper explores a particular type of moral status that the author terms psychological moral patiency, focusing on the epistemological question of what sort of evidence might lead us to reasonably conclude that a given artificial system qualified as having this status. The paper surveys five possible criteria that might be applied: intuitive judgments, assessments of intelligence, the presence of desires and autonomous behavior, evidence of sentience, and behavioral equivalence. The author suggests that despite its limitations, the latter approach offers the best way forward, and defends a variant of that, termed the cognitive equivalence strategy. In short, this holds that an artificial system should be considered a psychological moral patient to the extent that it possesses cognitive mechanisms shared with other beings such as nonhuman animals whom we also consider to be psychological moral patients.

Demonstrating public value to funders and other stakeholders—the journey of ELIXIR, a virtual and distributed research infrastructure for life science data

AbstractOpen Science is a founding principle of ELIXIR, a pan‐European research infrastructure for life science data, with 21 Member countries plus the European Molecular Biology Laboratory. The mission of ELIXIR is to coordinate bioinformatics resources so that they form a single, integrated and pan‐European infrastructure, which can be used freely by academic and private‐sector researchers across the globe. As a recipient of public and charitable funding, ELIXIR must demonstrate its value, and the need to produce evidence in support of this is intensifying. Our practice‐led journey towards demonstrating public value is articulated around five main challenges and, for each, we present our pragmatic approach for tackling it. We begin by showing how we are working towards demystifying what research infrastructures do. We then shed light on the sort of evidence our funders and other stakeholders are asking us for, how this evidence varies in nature and scope, and our tactics to satisfy them. We follow‐on by providing our thoughts on possible barriers and solutions to embedding impact evaluation in our activities. Finally, we provide lessons learned, which we believe are sufficiently transferable and will be inspirational to other research infrastructures as they embark on their own journeys to demonstrate public value.

Assessing the role of evidence of mechanisms in causal extrapolation

Extrapolation of causal claims from study populations to other populations of interest is a problematic issue. The standard approach in experimental research, which prioritises randomized controlled trials and statistical evidence, is not devoid of difficulties. Granted that, it has been defended that evidence of mechanisms is indispensable for causal extrapolation. We argue, contrarily, that this sort of evidence is not indispensable. Nonetheless, we also think that occasionally it may be helpful. In order to clarify its relevance, we introduce a distinction between a positive and a negative role of evidence of mechanisms. Our conclusion is that the former is highly questionable, but the latter may be a trustworthy resource for causal extrapolation.

Evidence and Knowledge from Computer Simulation

Can computer simulation results be evidence for hypotheses about real-world systems and phenomena? If so, what sort of evidence? Can we gain genuinely new knowledge of the world via simulation? I argue that evidence from computer simulation is aptly characterized as higher-order evidence: it is evidence that other evidence regarding a hypothesis about the world has been collected. Insofar as particular epistemic agents do not have this other evidence, it is possible that they will gain genuinely new knowledge of the world via simulation. I illustrate with examples inspired by uses of simulation in meteorology and astrophysics.

Decision-theoretic and risk-based approaches to naked statistical evidence: some consequences and challenges

Abstract In the debate about the legal value of naked statistical evidence, Di Bello argues that (1) the likelihood ratio of such evidence is unknown, (2) the decision-theoretic considerations indicate that a conviction based on such evidence is unacceptable when expected utility maximization is combined with fairness constraints, and (3) the risk of mistaken conviction based on such evidence cannot be evaluated and is potentially too high. We argue that Di Bello’s argument for (1) works in a rather narrow context, and that (1) is not exactly in line with the way expert witnesses are required to formulate their opinions. Consequently, Di Bello’s argument for (2), which assumes (1), does not apply uniformly to all convictions based on naked evidence. Moreover, if Di Bello’s analysis is correct, it applies also to eyewitness testimony, given empirical results about its quality, and so the distinctions drawn by DiBello cut across the distinction between naked statistical evidence and other types of evidence. Finally, if we weaken the rather strong requirement of precise measurability of the risk of mistaken conviction, to the availability of reasonable but imprecise and fallible estimates, many field and empirical studies show that often the risk of mistaken conviction based on naked statistical evidence can be estimated to a similar extent as the risk of mistaken conviction based on any other sort of evidence.

The Likelihood Ratio Measure and the Logicality Requirement

What sort of evidence can confer the strongest support to a hypothesis? A natural answer is that the evidence entails the hypothesis. Roush (Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence, and Science, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2005) claims that the likelihood ratio measure of degree of incremental support can deliver this intuitively natural result, and regards it as unifying “[the] account of induction and deduction in the only way that makes sense” (p. 163). In this paper, we highlight a difficulty in the treatment of this case, and question the great significance that is attached to this measure and its alleged capacity to accommodate the logicality requirement. We contrast the likelihood ratio measure with other measures (such as the Kemeny–Oppenheim measure and the difference measure), and argue that problems still emerge in light of tensions with plausible requirements for confirmation measures more generally.

Two-Sided Red Herrings

A surprising amount of debate leading up to the Supreme Court’s decision in American Express, and the commentary following this landmark ruling, attempt to trivialize and marginalize the modern economic learning on multi-sided platforms. Despite these efforts the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court ultimately embraced the economic literature on these business models. This article debunks five red herrings that have been floated in the debate: (1) the two sides are just complements, nothing new there; (2) everything is two-sided, or who’s to know what’s two-sided; (3) as industries mature two-sidedness goes away; (4) markets must be one sided since the services to the two sides aren’t interchangeable; and (5) two-sided analysis “devastates” antitrust law. The Supreme Court’s decision has raised a host of interesting issues, including how to deal with two-sided platform businesses that look different from American Express’s credit-card platform and what sort of evidence is necessary or sufficient in markets with platform businesses to establish competitive effects. Like any Supreme Court decision, not every word was chosen as carefully as it might have been, and clarifications will be needed going forward. The large and evolving literature on two-sided platforms will prove helpful to sort that out and we anticipate that the courts will embrace this constructive approach.

Using Haplotypes to Reconstruct Ancient Population Dynamics; a User Guide for Historians

Recently, the analysis of haplotypes has garnered a lot of attention in both popular media, from companies such as 23andMe, and in scientific journal publications. Haplotypes, which can be thought of as DNA patterns in the chromosome, may remain unchanged for centuries and are therefore a promising new method for tracing lineages. This method could provide valuable new insights into population dynamics, specifically regarding ancient populations. However, a crucial issue is that historians are not trained to evaluate this sort of evidence, yet many publications in prestigious journals such as Nature and Science are making historical claims based on haplotype analysis. When analyzing this data, a few key assumptions must be made. Of particular concern are logical circularities in hypothesis generation and in sampling strategy. This is to say, that the hypotheses are often not based on "scientific" data, but are instead drawn from often outdated historical assumptions. These same assumptions then drive a sampling strategy that guide the study to a conclusion in line with the hypothesis. What is the professional historian to do? Proposed is a common-sense user guide for a non-specialist to evaluate the quality of the data and claims made with it. Several case studies will be examined from this perspective that show both the strengths and weaknesses of this new source of historical and archaeological evidence.

Reconciling Expectations with Reality: The Real ID Act's Corroboration Exception for Otherwise Credible Asylum Applicants

The international community finds itself today in the throes of the largest refugee crisis since World War II. As millions of refugees continue to flee violence and persecution at home, the immediate concern is humanitarian, but in the long-term, the important question becomes: What are our obligations to those who cannot return home? U.S. asylum law is designed not only to offer shelter to legitimate refugees, but also to protect the country from those who seek asylum under false pretenses. Lawmakers and policymakers have struggled to calibrate corroboration requirements for asylum claims with the reality that many legitimate asylum seekers may not be able to obtain such corroboration. Prior to Congress’s passage of the REAL ID Act (“REAL ID”) in 2005, no single standard governed the circumstances in which an immigration judge (IJ) could require an asylum applicant to provide extrinsic evidence to corroborate credible testimony. Though REAL ID established that asylum applicants usually must provide corroborating evidence whenever an IJ decides to require it, Congress created an exception for otherwise credible applicants who do not have such evidence and cannot reasonably obtain it. The circuits disagree, however, as to whether IJs must tell asylum applicants, before a decision is rendered, if they will be required to provide corroborating evidence and what sort of evidence they will need to provide. This Note argues that 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) reveals an unambiguous congressional intent to require an IJ to give asylum applicants advance notice of the evidence deemed necessary to corroborate otherwise credible testimony. It further contends that this advance notice must specify the type of corroboration expected, in order to give applicants who cannot reasonably obtain corroborating evidence a meaningful opportunity to avail themselves of the corroboration exception.

No More Quid Pro Quo: Abandoning the Personal Benefit Requirement in Insider Trading Law

A circuit split between the Second Circuit’s 2014 decision, United States v. Newman, and the Ninth Circuit’s 2015 decision, United States v. Salman, illustrates problems in insider trading law dating back over thirty years to the Supreme Court’s decision in Dirks v. SEC. Dirks held that when a corporate insider provides information to an outside party who then trades on the information, it must be shown that the insider received some form of a personal benefit for providing the information in order to impute liability. The courts in Newman and Salman disagreed on the sort of evidence that suffices to prove such a personal benefit. As this question is set to be decided by the Supreme Court, these cases provide an apt opportunity for reexamining the law of insider trading. Although it might be argued that, for both moral and efficiency reasons, the courts in Newman and Salman reached the right outcome, the analysis in both decisions was strained as a result of the personal benefit requirement first articulated in Dirks. As this Note discusses, this split demonstrates that proof of a personal benefit as an element of insider trading in tipper/tippee cases should not be required, as it creates unnecessarily subjective inquiries into the relationship between the tipper and tippee, resulting in confusion in the boundaries of permissible trading activity. Because insider trading walks a fine line between behavior that should be encouraged (the use of information for legitimate business purposes) and discouraged (exploiting information obtained by virtue of an inside position for personal gain), it is important to more clearly define the bounds of insider trading activity. In place of requiring proof of a personal benefit, this Note argues that a wholly new statutory approach to insider trading is warranted and offers an alternative statutory proposal that may serve as a starting point for a discussion of adopting legislation.

Evidence, Explanation, and the Pursuit of Truth in Literature and Law

My focus is evidence. I understand this concept to be the marshalling of facts (data, etc.) in support of some position. This might be a district attorney presenting evidence to a jury that O. J. is guilty, or a literary critic arguing that Hamlet suffered from an Oedipus complex. But what is the logical connection between the relevant facts and the position they are being used to defend? How are we to distinguish successful cases of the marshalling of evidence – good arguments – from unsuccessful cases – weak arguments? I defend what I take to be a very commonsensical and pedagogically useful theory of [good] evidence. I argue that this view, inference to the best explanation, captures most, if not all, appeals to evidence in everyday contexts, as well as quite specialized domains like science, detective reasoning, and criminal and civil evidence. It also nicely encapsulates the sort of evidence that jurists and critics marshal in defense of particular readings of legal and literary texts. Appeals to evidence in the complicated worlds of teenage romance, detective fiction, criminal law, literary interpretation, and constitutional law all nicely fit the structure and evaluative methodology of inference to the best explanation. But only the diagnoses of lipstick stains, murder victims and bloody gloves can be held to the standards of correspondence and metaphysical realism. Literary and constitutional texts can be explained, and can be better or worse explained, but the truth or falsity of these interpretations is firmly in the realm of the coherence theory.

Cognitive Penetration and Predictive Coding: A Commentary on Lupyan.

The main aim of Lupyan’s paper (this volume) is to claim that perception is cognitively penetrated and that this is consistent with the idea of perception as predictive coding. In these remarks I will focus on what Lupyan says about whether perception is cognitively penetrated, and set aside his remarks about epistemology. I have argued (2012) that perception can be cognitively penetrated and so I am sympathetic to Lupyan’s overall aim of showing that perception is cognitively penetrable. However, I will be critical of some of Lupyan’s reasoning in arguing for this position. I will also call for clarification of that reasoning. First, I will discuss what is meant by cognitive penetration and, in light of this, the sort of evidence that can be used to establish its existence. Second, I will question whether Lupyan establishes that all cases of cross-modal effects are cases of cognitive penetration. In doing so, I will suggest a form of cognitive penetration that has heretofore not been posited, and give an example of how one might test for its existence. Third, I will question whether Lupyan puts forward convincing evidence that categorical knowledge and language affect perception in a way that conclusively shows that cognitive penetration occurs. Fourth, I will closely examine Lupyan’s reply to the argument against cognitive penetration from illusion. I show that his reply is not adequate and that he misses a more straightforward reply that one could give. Fifth, I briefly concur with the remarks that Lupyan makes about the role of attention with respect to cognitive penetration. And finally, sixth, I spell out exactly what I think the relationship is between the thesis that predictive coding is the correct model of perception and the thesis that there is cognitive penetration.

Freak Observers and the Simulation Argument

AbstractThe simulation hypothesis claims that the whole observable universe, including us, is a computer simulation implemented by technologically advanced beings for an unknown purpose. The simulation argument (as I reconstruct it) is an argument for this hypothesis with moderately plausible premises. I develop two lines of objection to the simulation argument. The first takes the form of a structurally similar argument for a conflicting conclusion, the claim that I am a so‐called freak observer, formed spontaneously in a quantum or thermodynamic fluctuation rather than through ordinary processes of evolution and growth. The second rejects the basic line of reasoning of both arguments: the sort of evidence they cite is not capable of supporting either the claim that I am a simulant or the claim that I am a freak observer. The evidence that simulants or freak observers exist is not a reason to think that I am one of them.

Evidence-based policy: What sort of evidence do governments need?

AbstractVery few would dispute the proposition that evidence about the effects of different policy options should inform policy decisions. However, there is less agreement on the nature of the evidence needed. In addition, there may be problems in evaluating that evidence. This is particularly the case when experts offer conflicting advice. This article presents the position held by Professor Nevile that in giving policy advice to the government, it is almost always desirable to draw on a range of different policy instruments. While theoretical input is usually important, it is even more important that theory does not lose contact with the real world. Factual descriptions of the real world and the use of a theoretical toolkit containing more than one theory are essential in achieving this goal. These principles are illustrated by a discussion of a particular category of policy advice – the evaluation of government programmes.

From Game Theoretical Accounts of Cooperation to Meta-Ethical Choices

Evolutionary game theory is ethically neutral: its assumption of ‘rationality’ has nothing to do with selfishness but is in fact entirely compatible with altruism. If altruism has an evolutionary explanation then this fact is of no theological relevance: in particular it is not any sort of evidence of a divine plan etc.

The G-Spot Discovered? Comments on Ostrzenski's Article

In a recent issue of this journal Ostrzenski [1] claimed to have discovered the anatomical basis of the G‐spot. Before commenting on the specifics of this claim, it is important to very briefly review just what the G‐spot is claimed to be and what sort of evidence would be required to substantiate its existence. The G‐spot is said to be a highly sensitive area on or under the anterior vaginal wall, an area that, when stimulated, results in feelings and sensations of sexual arousal and pleasure [2].

Robustness and sensitivity of weighting and aggregation in constructing composite indices

A composite index is a combination of various sources of information known as indicators, measured in or of a system in order to provide a summary of the system that is itself not directly measurable. For the index to be useful and meaningful, its construction requires careful consideration of several important aspects of the potentially disparate and multiple indicators that help convey its meaning. In general there are five key steps that should be considered when constructing a composite index, one of which is how the indicators should be weighted and aggregated to form the index. This step is critical in index construction, yet there seems to be no documented evidence about making objective weighting and aggregation choices in constructing indices so that they are robust. This sort of evidence would be particularly helpful for deciding whether any of the existing indices for assessing stream health would suffice for assessing the health of a given set of stream data or whether developing a new index is warranted. Thus we designed a simulation study to test the robustness and sensitivity of the weighting and aggregation choices in four existing stream health indices. The four indices mainly differed in their choices of standardization and weighting and aggregation techniques. The three main general conclusions about these existing approaches are the recommendation to use bootstrapping to approximate the distribution of the stream health index; the standardization technique employed should use all of the available indicators; and the use of reference (or pristine) sites as a standardization tool is not essential. Since the study is based on artificial data, the findings should be applicable and relevant to indices in other fields of study such as economics, social sciences, finance and medicine.

Public health evaluation: epistemological challenges to evidence production and use

In public health, as in other fields, there has been much discussion about the type of evidence we need for decision making. In particular, there has been much debate about how the production of trials can be increased. However, this is not the only challenge and perhaps not even the main one. A better understanding is needed of why trials are not conducted, and what sort of evidence is used in their place. More generally, researchers need a better understanding of the ways in which other forms of evidence than trials are informative to decision makers.

Possible Worlds Theory and the Fantasy Universe of Finnegans Wake

The acute experimentalism of Finnegans Wake has always created a great deal of uncertainty and even controversy about its fictional, generic, and semantic operation. Is it a representation of a dream, a night world, or some other plane of unreality, or does it offer a narrative, either a relatively realistic one or a version of biblical or mythic or other collective stories? How can one adjudicate questions like this—on the basis of what sort of evidence? This article tackles the problem of how one might sort out the nature of the fictional world or worlds conveyed by the text’s complicated language by turning to a development in the field of narratology called “Possible Worlds“ theory. The theories of Marie-Laure Ryan, among others, offer us tools and criteria for understanding how readers achieve access to fictional worlds like the ones found in Book I, Chapter 1 of Finnegans Wake .

Daoist Criticisms of Confucian Sacrificial Rites

Various passages in the Laozi and the Zhuangzi, the two most important texts of “philosophical Daoism,” critically mock Confucian sacrificial rites. Perhaps the best known of these criticisms refers to a practice involving straw dogs (Laozi 5, Zhuangzi 14). This article will attempt to expose the philosophical dimensions of these passages that show, in my reading, how Daoist philosophy looks at such sacrificial rituals as a sort of evidence of the Confucian misconceptions of time, of death and life, and of cosmic and social order.