Abstract
The main aim of Lupyan’s paper (this volume) is to claim that perception is cognitively penetrated and that this is consistent with the idea of perception as predictive coding. In these remarks I will focus on what Lupyan says about whether perception is cognitively penetrated, and set aside his remarks about epistemology. I have argued (2012) that perception can be cognitively penetrated and so I am sympathetic to Lupyan’s overall aim of showing that perception is cognitively penetrable. However, I will be critical of some of Lupyan’s reasoning in arguing for this position. I will also call for clarification of that reasoning. First, I will discuss what is meant by cognitive penetration and, in light of this, the sort of evidence that can be used to establish its existence. Second, I will question whether Lupyan establishes that all cases of cross-modal effects are cases of cognitive penetration. In doing so, I will suggest a form of cognitive penetration that has heretofore not been posited, and give an example of how one might test for its existence. Third, I will question whether Lupyan puts forward convincing evidence that categorical knowledge and language affect perception in a way that conclusively shows that cognitive penetration occurs. Fourth, I will closely examine Lupyan’s reply to the argument against cognitive penetration from illusion. I show that his reply is not adequate and that he misses a more straightforward reply that one could give. Fifth, I briefly concur with the remarks that Lupyan makes about the role of attention with respect to cognitive penetration. And finally, sixth, I spell out exactly what I think the relationship is between the thesis that predictive coding is the correct model of perception and the thesis that there is cognitive penetration.
Highlights
The main aim of Lupyan’s paper is to claim that perception is cognitively penetrated and that this is consistent with the idea of perception as predictive coding
I will question whether Lupyan establishes that all cases of cross-modal effects are cases of cognitive penetration
If Lupyan is interested in establishing the falsehood of Pylyshyn’s thesis that early vision is not cognitively penetrated, he has not explained why he thinks that evidence about the nature of perceptual experience could help one determine this, given that on the predictive coding model of perception, perceptual experience is determined by both early visual processing together with higher-level states
Summary
What is cognitive penetration? Lupyan says that he accepts Pylyshyn’s (1999) definition of cognitive penetration: a perceptual system is cognitively penetrable if Bthe function it computes is sensitive, in a semantically coherent way, to the organism’s goals and beliefs, that is, it can be altered in a way that bears some logical relation to what the person knows^ (1999: 343). That is generated by high-level and low-level processing, including cognitive states and processes If this is the model of visual experience that Lupyan would subscribe to whilst holding the predictive coding model of perception (I say this in the conditional form for he is not explicit about it) he cannot hold that it is early visual processing that determines the nature of visual experience. If Lupyan is interested in establishing the falsehood of Pylyshyn’s thesis that early vision is not cognitively penetrated, he has not explained why he thinks that evidence about the nature of perceptual experience could help one determine this, given that on the predictive coding model of perception, perceptual experience is determined by both early visual processing together with higher-level (including cognitive) states. I suspect that Lupyan is concerned about whether perceptual experience is cognitively penetrated by cognition, and so he should not follow Pylyshyn and use his definition of cognitive penetration
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
