Socratic Ignorance Research Articles

Linguistic Blindness and Ironic Vision in The Egoist

<7RONY has often been treated as a device leading towards the subjective assertion of self. Yet this focus is an incomplete one, stressing the corrosive aspect of Socratic wit, while ignoring the equally essential Socratic ignorance and dialectic. These latter factors imply an inherent limitation on the scope of knowledge of any individual subject and the consequent necessity to be involved with and rely on other subjects. It is this latter sort of irony that is particularly operative in the novels of George Meredith, which display an acute awareness both of the intersubjective nature of knowledge and of the linguistic detours through which alone such knowledge can be attained. The Egoist is a striking instance of Meredith's ironic view of human relationships, which permeates his entire work with a concern about the barriers to fully realized discourse. Meredith criticism has traditionally relied on external factors to organize his texts-most often biographical information or Meredith's own fragmentary theorizing.' Like recourse to the Essay on Comedy, however, these approaches can unduly constrict the achievement of his novels to fit an often didactic and narrowly

Socratic Ignorance and Authenticity

Socratic Ignorance and Authenticity

Essential Thinking in Kierkegaard's Critique of Proofs for the Existence of God

Previous articleNext article No AccessEssential Thinking in Kierkegaard's Critique of Proofs for the Existence of GodCharles J. KellyCharles J. Kelly Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Religion Volume 59, Number 2Apr., 1979 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/486682 Views: 2Total views on this site Copyright 1979 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

SOCRATIC IGNORANCE: An Essay on Platonic Self‐Knowledge

Philosophical BooksVolume 7, Issue 3 p. 2-3 SOCRATIC IGNORANCE: An Essay on Platonic Self-Knowledge First published: October 1966 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.1966.tb02627.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume7, Issue3October 1966Pages 2-3 RelatedInformation