Simple Plurality Research Articles

Causal relationship between endometrial cancer and risk of breast cancer: A 2-sample Mendelian randomization study.

Several studies have confirmed the important role of endometrial cancer (EC) in the development and progression of breast cancer (BC), and this study will explore the causal relationship between EC and BC by 2-sample Mendelian randomization analysis. Pooled data from published genome-wide association studies were used to assess the association between EC and BC risk in women using 5 methods, namely, inverse variance weighting (IVW), MR-Egger, weighted median (WME), simple multimaximetry (SM) and weighted multimaximetry (WM) with the EC-associated genetic loci as the instrumental variables (IV) and sensitivity analyses were used to assess the robustness of the results. The statistical results showed a causal association between EC and BC (IVW: OR = 1.07, 95% CI = 1.01-1.32, P = .02; MR-Egger: OR = 1.21, 95% CI = 0.71-1.51, P = .11; weighted median: OR = 1.05, 95% CI = 0.97-1.31, P = .19; simple plurality method: OR = 0.98, 95% CI = 0.81-1.15, P = .78; weighted plurality method: OR = 0.98, 95% CI = 0.81-1.14, P = .75), and the results of the sensitivity analyses showed that there was no significant heterogeneity or multiplicity, and the results were stable. EC is associated with an increased risk of developing BC. The results of this MR analysis can be used as a guideline for screening for BC in women with EC and to help raise awareness of screening for early detection and treatment.

A Condorcet Jury Theorem for Large Poisson Elections with Multiple Alternatives

Herein, we prove a Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) for large elections with multiple alternatives. Voters have common interests that depend on an unknown state of nature. Each voter receives an imprecise private signal about the state of nature and then submits one vote (simple plurality rule). We also assume that this is a Poisson voting game with population uncertainty. The question is whether the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently so that the correct alternative is elected with probability tending to one when the number of voters tends to infinity. The previous literature shows that the CJT holds for large elections with two alternatives, but there is also an example of a large election with three alternatives that has an inefficient equilibrium. We show that there always exists an efficient equilibrium, independent of the number of alternatives. Under certain circumstances (informative types), it is unique in elections with two alternatives. The existence of inefficient equilibria in elections with more than two alternatives is generic.

Adjudicating distributive disagreement

This paper examines different mechanisms for adjudicating disagreement about distributive justice. It begins with a case where individuals have deeply conflicting convictions about distributive justice and must make a social choice regarding the distribution of goods. Four mechanisms of social choice are considered: social contract formation, Borda count vote, simple plurality vote, and minimax bargaining. I develop an agent-based model which examines which mechanisms lead to the greatest degree of satisfying justice-based preferences over the course iterated social choices. Agents are ascribed two kinds of motivations: they wish to realize justice and to receive a greater package of goods. Each agent seeks to realize her ideal distribution, and the failure to do so leaves agents “disappointed,” resulting in their trading off the pursuit of gains in justice in favor of gains in self-interest. Mechanisms are assessed using the metric of how many agents remain interested in justice over the course of iterated adjudication. The mechanisms are also examined under some non-ideal conditions, such as the presence of power asymmetries or strategic behavior. Several significant results are addressed: social contract formation and simple plurality voting are robust under the conditions considered, bargaining is a highly ineffective means of adjudicating distributive disagreement, and lastly allowing for concessions in justice for gains in self-interest proves to be a crucial mechanism for ensuring the stability of resolutions.

Power‐Sharing in the World's Largest Democracy: Informal Consociationalism in India (and Its Decline?)

AbstractIndia is one of the most diverse countries of the world but operates with a majoritarian Westminster constitution and simple plurality electoral system, albeit also with a federal structure. It was eventually coded as consociational by Arend Lijphart (1996) but this coding was questioned by authors such as Wilkinson (2000) and Adeney (2002). This article assesses the nature of both de jure and de facto power‐sharing in India over its 70 years of independence and tracks the evolution of de jure and de facto power‐sharing in relation to four dimensions of diversity: religion, caste, territory and language. It questions whether the electoral success of Hindu nationalism and the increasing acceptance of ethnic majoritarianism has reduced the degree of power‐sharing in India.

A Quiet Coup: Balkanizing the U.S. by Eliminating the Electoral College

There are calls for US presidential elections to be changed. The existing Electoral College system, a method that has been in effect in every presidential election since the 1804 approval of the Twelfth Amendment to the US Constitution, is seen by those seeking change as an unjust way for selecting US presidents. Many Democrats remain enraged by the fact that Hillary Clinton received more votes than Donald Trump in 2016 but was not elected president due to the Electoral College’s state-by-state electoral system. A movement is taking place in some state legislatures to adopt a system called the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact [the Compact]. This is a key part of a strategy drafted in 2006 and not yet operative but gaining state signatories. At this point in May 2019 all the current 15 state signatories to the Compact represent states with Democratic-controlled legislatures. The District of Columbia has also voted to join the Compact, bringing the total count to 16. The Investors Business Daily published an analysis of the worst run and best run states from a fiscal perspective. The worst run states included Illinois, California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Connecticut, Hawaii, New Mexico, New York, and Rhode Island. Each of these states is a signatory to the national popular vote Compact. The best run states included South Dakota, Tennessee, Nebraska, Florida, Utah, Alaska, Oklahoma, Wyoming, New Hampshire, and Montana. With the exception of New Hampshire they are all “Red” states. None is a signatory to the Compact. The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact is an attempt at a “quiet coup” seeking permanent voting control of the office of the US Presidency. As such it offers a perfect recipe for the balkanization of America, contradicting the wisdom of those such as James Madison, one of our Founding Fathers who played a critical role in the formation of our Constitution. Madison recognized the inevitable factionalism of competing interests and diverse cultures in America. The Compact seeks to effectively amend the US Constitution de facto while pretending otherwise. The advocates launched a strategy through the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact knowing they could not gain the required approval of three-fourths of US states to create a national vote simple majority or plurality amendment to the US Constitution in place of the Twelfth Amendment’s Electoral College system.

Strategyproof judgment aggregation under partial information

We introduce a model of judgment aggregation in which individuals do not necessarily have full information regarding the judgments held by their peers. This intuitively limits an individual’s ability to strategically manipulate the aggregation process. Our results confirm this basic intuition. Specifically, we show that known impossibility results concerning the existence of reasonable strategyproof judgment aggregation rules break down once we abandon the classical assumption of full information. For instance, the simple plurality rule is strategyproof in case individuals do not have any information about their peers, while the well-known premise-based rule can be rendered strategyproof by withholding only a negligible amount of information.

Modelling Cognitive Bias in Crowdsourcing Systems

Crowdsourcing is the process of obtaining input or enlisting the services of a crowd of people with the aim of finding the best solution to a proposed problem. The method with which the collected input is aggregated affects the outcome of the crowdsourcing process. In this paper, we introduce a modelling framework through which we compare several aggregation methods for crowdsourcing systems. The work reveals a surprising result where confidence-related approaches lack in performance when compared to other approaches such as simple plurality voting or approaches which consider respondent competence. This inadequacy stems from a psychological phenomenon brought forth by David Dunning and Justin Kruger related to people’s bias in assessing their own cognitive abilities.

Dhritarashtra’s embrace: big and small parties in Kerala and Tamil Nadu

ABSTRACTWhy do we find more parties from Tamil Nadu in the Lok Sabha compared to Kerala and why are there more parties in the legislative assembly in Kerala compared to Tamil Nadu? This incongruence is puzzling since elections to both levels of government, federal and state, are based on the single-member simple plurality electoral system and the territorial boundaries of the state, and therefore the societal environment remains constant. This article argues that this incongruence is not merely the product of the federal parliamentary structure of the polity, electoral rules, and socio-economic factors but because of what parties do. This article gives agency to parties and brings party strategy to the centre of the analysis.

Ensemble Classifiers for Predicting HIV-1 Resistance from Three Rule-Based Genotypic Resistance Interpretation Systems.

Resistance to antiretrovirals (ARVs) is a major problem faced by HIV-infected individuals. Different rule-based algorithms were developed to infer HIV-1 susceptibility to antiretrovirals from genotypic data. However, there is discordance between them, resulting in difficulties for clinical decisions about which treatment to use. Here, we developed ensemble classifiers integrating three interpretation algorithms: Agence Nationale de Recherche sur le SIDA (ANRS), Rega, and the genotypic resistance interpretation system from Stanford HIV Drug Resistance Database (HIVdb). Three approaches were applied to develop a classifier with a single resistance profile: stacked generalization, a simple plurality vote scheme and the selection of the interpretation system with the best performance. The strategies were compared with the Friedman's test and the performance of the classifiers was evaluated using the F-measure, sensitivity and specificity values. We found that the three strategies had similar performances for the selected antiretrovirals. For some cases, the stacking technique with naïve Bayes as the learning algorithm showed a statistically superior F-measure. This study demonstrates that ensemble classifiers can be an alternative tool for clinical decision-making since they provide a single resistance profile from the most commonly used resistance interpretation systems.

A Model of Split-ticket Voting with Uncertainty

This paper models an on-year election in which the presidential and legislative elections are held simultaneously. The president is elected by plurality rule and each legislator is elected in single member districts by simple plurality rule. Policy outcomes are a function of not only which party holds the presidency but which party gets the majority of seats in the legislature. Parties are uncertain about the ideal points of the voters. With this model, we show that first, there are some ticket-splitters in every equilibrium, and second, there exists an equilibrium in which moderate voters split their votes between presidential and legislative elections. In addition, when we apply the equilibrium strategy into two-period election, we find this model also explains the midterm loss phenomena.

The Comparative Effects of Electoral Laws on Voter Rationality: Plurality versus Proportional Election Rules

Electoral rules inherently structure the development of not only a political party system, but also create incentives and disincentives for individuals to participate in politics. Few scholars study the interaction between various electoral arrangements and how they encourage or discourage voting based on the characteristics of individuals. This research uses the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems to investigate the relationship between plurality and proportional electoral arrangements, on the one hand, and how they influence levels of political knowledge, sophistication, and the likelihood to vote, on the other hand. The countries studied are the United States which uses simple plurality rules, Australia which employs the alternative vote with compulsory voting, and Ireland which uses the single transferable vote. We find that plurality electoral arrangements result in consistently lower levels of political knowledge and voter sophistication. Furthermore, low levels of knowledge but not sophistication reduce turnout in plurality systems. These decreased turnout levels are greatest among individuals with the lowest levels of political knowledge, where individuals experience the highest burdens of voting. Strikingly, turnout among the highest educated citizens in the United States is still lower than participation by the least educated in Ireland.

A generalized approach for producing, quantifying, and validating citizen science data from wildlife images.

Citizen science has the potential to expand the scope and scale of research in ecology and conservation, but many professional researchers remain skeptical of data produced by nonexperts. We devised an approach for producing accurate, reliable data from untrained, nonexpert volunteers. On the citizen science website www.snapshotserengeti.org, more than 28,000 volunteers classified 1.51 million images taken in a large‐scale camera‐trap survey in Serengeti National Park, Tanzania. Each image was circulated to, on average, 27 volunteers, and their classifications were aggregated using a simple plurality algorithm. We validated the aggregated answers against a data set of 3829 images verified by experts and calculated 3 certainty metrics—level of agreement among classifications (evenness), fraction of classifications supporting the aggregated answer (fraction support), and fraction of classifiers who reported “nothing here” for an image that was ultimately classified as containing an animal (fraction blank)—to measure confidence that an aggregated answer was correct. Overall, aggregated volunteer answers agreed with the expert‐verified data on 98% of images, but accuracy differed by species commonness such that rare species had higher rates of false positives and false negatives. Easily calculated analysis of variance and post‐hoc Tukey tests indicated that the certainty metrics were significant indicators of whether each image was correctly classified or classifiable. Thus, the certainty metrics can be used to identify images for expert review. Bootstrapping analyses further indicated that 90% of images were correctly classified with just 5 volunteers per image. Species classifications based on the plurality vote of multiple citizen scientists can provide a reliable foundation for large‐scale monitoring of African wildlife.

ZNAČAJ KULTURNE KOMPETENTNOSTI ZA SOCIJALNI RAD

U radu su date problematizacija i analiza značaja kulturne kompetentnosti za socijalni rad, odnosno za praksu socijalnih radnika. Predstavljeni su koncepti i programi multikulturalizma i interkulturalizma kao šireg društvenog konteksta, a posebna pažnja posvećena je konceptu duboke kulture, kao i fenomenu interkulturnog učenja kao preduslovu za kulturno kompetentne prakse. Zatim se razmatraju sami fenomeni kulturne kompetentnosti i kulturno kompetentnih praksi, uz detaljno bavljenje potrebom za obrazovanjem (i postojanjem) kulturno kompetentnog socijalnog radnika.

Voting with Limited Information and Many Alternatives

The traditional axiomatic approach to voting is motivated by the problem of reconciling differences in subjective preferences. In contrast, an important line of work in the theory of voting has considered a different kind of scenario, also fundamental to voting, in which there is a genuinely “best” outcome that voters would agree on if they only had enough information. This type of scenario has its roots in the classical Condorcet jury theorem; it includes cases such as jurors in a criminal trial who all want to reach the correct verdict but disagree in their inferences from the available evidence, or a corporate board of directors who all want to improve the company's revenue but who have different information that favors different options. This style of voting leads to a natural set of questions: each voter has a private signal that provides probabilistic information about which option is best, and a central question is whether a simple plurality voting system, which tabulates votes for different options, can cause the group decision to arrive at the correct option. We show that plurality voting is powerful enough to achieve this: there is a way for voters to map their signals into votes for options in such a way that---with sufficiently many voters---the correct option receives the greatest number of votes with high probability. We show further, however, that any process for achieving this is inherently expensive in the number of voters it requires: succeeding in identifying the correct option with probability at least $1 - \eta$ requires $\Omega(n^3 \epsilon^{-2} \log \eta^{-1})$ voters, where $n$ is the number of options and $\epsilon$ is a distributional measure of the minimum difference between the options.

Inefficient committees: small elections with three alternatives

We consider small committees which have to elect one of three alternatives using the simple plurality rule. Committee members have common, state-dependent preferences and receive imprecise private signals about the state of nature prior to the election. We are interested in whether the committee decision is efficient, that is whether the probability with which the committee elects the correct alternative is higher than the probability with which one single individual alone—on behalf of the others—would. It has been shown that there exists a unique efficient equilibrium in elections with two alternatives. We show that this result does not extend to elections with more alternatives. Multiple equilibria may exist for the same committee, and there may be both efficient and inefficient ones. Informative voting may or may not be an equilibrium. Also contrary to two-alternative elections, there exist responsive equilibria in which voters vote ‘against’ their signal. As a consequence, only two alternatives receive positive expected vote shares and the outcome is inefficient.

Picking a loser? A social choice perspective on the Danish government formation of 1975

All democratic systems are theoretically open to so-called election inversions, i.e., instances wherein a majority of the decision makers prefer one alternative but where the actual outcome is another. The paper examines the complex 1975 Danish government formation process, which involved five rounds of negotiations and at least five competing alternatives. We demonstrate that in terms of party preferences the final outcome was not the Condorcet winner but rather one that could have been beaten by at least three other government alternatives in head-to-head comparisons. The Danish procedural system of “negative” parliamentarism combined with simple plurality rule to produce the electoral inversion.

Picking a Loser? A Social Choice Perspective on the Danish Government Formation of 1975

All democratic systems are theoretically open to so-called election in-versions, i.e., instances wherein a majority of the decision makers prefer one alternative but where the actual outcome is another. The paper examines the complex 1975 Danish government formation process, which involved five rounds of negotiations and at least five competing alternatives. We demonstrate that in terms of party preferences the final outcome was not the Condorcet winner but rather one that could have been beaten by at least three other government alternatives in head-to-head comparisons. The Danish procedural system of negative parliamentarism combined with simple plurality rule to produce the electoral inversion.

A Globally-Variant Locally-Constant Model for Fusion of Labels from Multiple Diverse Experts without Using Reference Labels

Researchers have shown that fusion of categorical labels from multiple experts—humans or machine classifiers—improves the accuracy and generalizability of the overall classification system. Simple plurality is a popular technique for performing this fusion, but it gives equal importance to labels from all experts, who may not be equally reliable or consistent across the dataset. Estimation of expert reliability without knowing the reference labels is, however, a challenging problem. Most previous works deal with these challenges by modeling expert reliability as constant over the entire data (feature) space. This paper presents a model based on the consideration that in dealing with real-world data, expert reliability is variable over the complete feature space but constant over local clusters of homogeneous instances. This model jointly learns a classifier and expert reliability parameters without assuming knowledge of the reference labels using the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm. Classification experiments on simulated data, data from the UCI Machine Learning Repository, and two emotional speech classification datasets show the benefits of the proposed model. Using a metric based on the Jensen-Shannon divergence, we empirically show that the proposed model gives greater benefit for datasets where expert reliability is highly variable over the feature space.

Voting systems in parallel and the benefits for small parties

In simple plurality voting systems smaller parties facing resource constraints may struggle to field candidates, particularly when the number of electoral districts is large. In the absence of a strong coordinating party organization, the pattern of contestation may also be sub-optimal – the small party fields candidates where support is minimal, ignoring other electoral districts where voters would support the party if it had stood a candidate. This article considers how and whether the separate operation of an Additional Member voting system running parallel to a simple plurality system assists smaller parties by providing low-cost information about the spatial distribution of voter support. Using aggregate voting data collected at the London ward level for both simple plurality local council elections and the separate mixed-member proportional system used to elect the Greater London Assembly we test whether the Green Party demonstrated an ability to modify and optimize its pattern of contestation. There appears to be little evidence of either a contagion or learning effect in respect of the location of Green candidates, suggesting that a free but valuable data source is unexploited.

On a Three-Alternative Condorcet Jury Theorem

We investigate whether the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in a large election with three alternatives. The environment is the same as in the Condorcet Jury Theorem (Condorcet (1785)). Voters have common preferences that depend on the unknown state of nature, and they receive imprecise private signals about the state of nature prior to voting. With two alternatives and strategic voters, the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in elections with two alternatives (e.g., Myerson (1998)). We show that there always exists an efficient equilibrium under the simple plurality rule when there are three alternatives as well. We characterize the set of inefficient equilibria with two alterna- tives and the condition under which they exist. There is only one type of inefficient equilibrium with two alternatives. In this equilibrium, voters vote unresponsively because they all vote for the same alternative. Under the same condition, the same type of equilibrium exists with three alternatives. However, we show that the number and types of coordination failures increase with three alternatives, and that this leads to the existence of other types of inefficient equilibria as well, including those in which voters vote informatively.