The Comparative Effects of Electoral Laws on Voter Rationality: Plurality versus Proportional Election Rules

Abstract

Electoral rules inherently structure the development of not only a political party system, but also create incentives and disincentives for individuals to participate in politics. Few scholars study the interaction between various electoral arrangements and how they encourage or discourage voting based on the characteristics of individuals. This research uses the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems to investigate the relationship between plurality and proportional electoral arrangements, on the one hand, and how they influence levels of political knowledge, sophistication, and the likelihood to vote, on the other hand. The countries studied are the United States which uses simple plurality rules, Australia which employs the alternative vote with compulsory voting, and Ireland which uses the single transferable vote. We find that plurality electoral arrangements result in consistently lower levels of political knowledge and voter sophistication. Furthermore, low levels of knowledge but not sophistication reduce turnout in plurality systems. These decreased turnout levels are greatest among individuals with the lowest levels of political knowledge, where individuals experience the highest burdens of voting. Strikingly, turnout among the highest educated citizens in the United States is still lower than participation by the least educated in Ireland.