Senior Military Leaders Research Articles

Simulating autonomous drone behaviors in an anti-access area denial (A2AD) environment

Army senior military leaders are invested in acquiring modernized aerial platforms and equipment to augment the US Army’s ability to overcome Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) threats imposed by modern Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS). A prominent element of this modernization effort is the employment of autonomous drones to defeat IADS threats while minimizing risk to Army Soldiers. This research utilizes a framework for classifying the levels of autonomous capability along three dimensions: the ability to act alone, the ability to cooperate, and the ability to adapt. A virtual combat model, created using the Advanced Framework for Simulation, Integration, and Modeling (AFSIM), simulates the engagement between an enemy IADS and a friendly formation comprised of autonomous drones, attack helicopters, and a Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF) capability. A designed experiment evaluates drone performance with varying levels of autonomy. The experimental results reveal that low levels of autonomy yield a 20.74% increase in survivability and a 5.52% increase in lethality.

Emerging technology and the cult of the offensive

ABSTRACT Military organizations are generally defined by a “cult of the offensive.” For cyberspace, this gives rise to an empirical puzzle, at least in the United States. What accounts for the early restraint and skepticism about cyber offense publicly expressed by many US military cyber leaders? In this article, I explore the US military’s approach to cyberspace as a theory-developing case study. I examine more than a decade of public discourse among senior military leaders about when and how the military should employ cyber force. I argue that, in the formative years of US military cyber organization, the military’s predisposition to the offense was challenged by other cultural and institutional influences, especially from the signals intelligence and strategic nuclear communities. Moreover, this influence shaped the public discourse even after US military cyber organizations gained greater autonomy and turned toward more objectively offensive strategies. This suggests implications for theory and policy.

Strategic Competition and Crisis Wargame: Integrating a Dynamic Reputation Model to Enhance the Strategic Competition and Crisis Wargame for the Center for Army Analysis

The Center for Army Analysis (CAA) developed the Strategic Competition and Crisis (SC2) Wargame to address shortcomings in the U.S. Army’s strategic planning during competition and crisis. This capstone enhanced the SC2 Wargame over the course of two years. Last year, the capstone developed a dynamic, perspective-based reputation model designed for integration into SC2. This year, the capstone integrated the model to produce a more efficient, objective-focused wargame that optimizes strategic learning for senior military leaders. Building off the work from the previous year, this capstone combined tools from the Systems Decision Process with the theoretical framework within the Defense and Strategic Studies Department to create and implement an improved product. Analysis of the original framework of the game uncovered three improvement areas that address each component of gameplay: strategy-focused player guidebooks, a realistic negotiations-pairing process, and real-time feedback through a Player Dashboard.

Exploratory Study upon Military Leadership in the 21st Century. What Are Skills and Knowledge Required for Leadership Success?

Within the context of increasingly digital work, it appeared interesting to look at how military leaders and their leadership style will have to adapt to remain “up-to-speed” with current challenges. It is qualitative research based on interviews with military and civilian experts. Four interviews have been conducted, but there would be the potential to interview many more experts and look deeper into the matter. Within the context of digitalised military leadership, the importance of communication and mutual trust has been underscored by the experts. They agreed that leaders nowadays must embrace digital developments and include them in their leadership styles. The civilian world can learn from the military when it comes to leadership approaches, which is happening at the time of publication of this article with practical examples (senior military leaders assigned to lead the pandemic task force in some countries). Overall, the outcome of the research is that a relevant and resilient military leadership style in the 21st century resembles the elements of the situational leadership style developed by Hersey-Blanchard.

Endgames: Military Response to Protest in Arab Autocracies

Endgames: Military Response to Protest in Arab Autocracies

The Will to Fight: Combat, Morale, and the Experience of National Army Soldiers during the Greek Civil War, 1946–1949

Abstract Why do soldiers fight? How do they deal with the exigencies of warfare? What methods are used by military establishments to control their rank and file and motivate them? This article addresses these questions by analysing the experience of national army soldiers during the Greek Civil War (1946–1949). The research on the Greek National Army has been dominated by top-down studies that focus on issues such as tactics, logistics and the role of senior military leaders. Accordingly, the perspective and experiences of ordinary soldiers have been largely overlooked. As a result we know very little about the factors that led soldiers to take an active part in combat, their understanding of the war and how they tried to cope with the exigencies of warfare. The article fills this gap by shifting the focus to the rank and file of the Greek National Army. It explores their everyday lives, discusses the methods used by the army to shore up morale and motivate the rank and file and analyse the soldiers’ responses to these efforts. In doing so, it contributes new insights into the experiences of soldiers and the conduct of the Civil War.

War Crime Pardons and Presidential (Self-) Restraint

In 2019, then-President Trump pardoned three military officers for battlefield misconduct that could have been charged as war crimes. These were the first such pardons in American history and left many current and former members of the Armed Forces bewildered: these officers had all been charged by their military chains-of-command after sufficient evidence indicated culpability, and in two of the cases, military juries (“panels”) consisting of high-ranking officials with combat experience had convicted the officers and sentenced them to hefty federal prison terms. The granting of clemency under these circumstances has proven fraught with consequences – consequences adversely affecting the relationship between the president as commander-in-chief and the senior military leaders who cautioned against such extrajudicial mercy. Nevertheless, the president’s authority to do so, under Article II of the Constitution, is nearly without limit, and no other statute, case law precedent, or other formal restriction prevents him from doing so. This article approaches the problem from an assumption that neither the Constitution itself will be amended to carve out such crimes from the president’s reach, nor that Congress will amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice or the War Crimes Statute to chip away at this power by enacting administrative conditions on its exercise. Rather, this article suggests that the most likely and practical tool to prevent such pardons in the future is the reasonable, prudential exercise of restraint by the commander-in-chief. Several contingent factors, based on the possible timing of the pardon in relation to where the case is in the military justice process, are identified as a framework for exercising this prudential restraint notwithstanding the Constitutional authority to ignore it.

Decoding the Samba spy scandal:false spies, counterintelligence and military intelligence in India

ABSTRACT This article explores the Samba spy scandal to understand Indian counterintelligence and inter-agency intelligence coordination. The scandal publicly emerged in 1979 when dozens of Indian military intelligence officers were arrested for being Pakistani spies. The article examines the accused men’s confessions of selling information to Pakistan’s Field Intelligence Unit and how later they said the admissions were false and provided under torture. Then it describes senior intelligence and military leaders airing their suspicions that the men were innocent as well as a significant statement from a Pakistani spy a decade later. However, a 2014 Supreme Court ruling officially ‘stamped’ the men spies without any hope for clearing their names. The article analyses primary sources, interviews, news articles and court rulings, concluding that the scandal reveals poor Indian military counterintelligence and a lack of inter-agency cooperation.

Negotiation Process Between Israel and Syria During the Administration of Y. Rabin

The article is devoted to the study of the Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations. The process had several stages, but the period 1992-1995 can be considered as the most effective. It was during Yitzhak Rabin administration that Israel managed to sign peace agreements with Jordan and the PLO, as well as to build a full-fledged negotiation process with Syria, which has traditionally held the most intransigent stance towards Israel. Studying the evolution of the Israeli-Syrian negotiating process allows us to determine the real intentions and positions of the parties, as well as to sum up the role of the United States as a mediator. The research is based on the memoirs of American politicians and diplomats (B. Clinton, C. Warren, D. Ross, D. Kurtser), who were directly involved in the Israeli-Syrian dialogue, as well as members of the Israeli negotiating group (I. Rabinovich, U. Sagie, U. Savir). In general, the stage of negotiations can be divided into two stages: meetings at the level of ambassadors to discuss the general terms of the agreement and negotiations on security issues with the participation of senior military leaders. At the initial stage, the main issue for Syria was Israel's withdrawal from the Golan Heights and the restoration of the border before June 1967. For the Israeli side, the priority issue was security guarantees. It was after the decision had been made to focus on security principles that included both pillars that historic progress was achieved. For the first time in the history of the two states, such a compromise was formalized in an unofficial document, which remains the only bilateral agreement between the sides. The analysis of the stage based on memoirs of those who took part in negotiations allows to answer the question that is on the agenda nowadays: was H. Assad ready to sign an agreement with Israel or he pursued other goals during the peace process.

Assessing Civil-Military Relations and the January 6th Capitol Insurrection

The events of January 6, 2021, when violent rioters attacked the Capitol building in Washington in order to disrupt validation of the 2020 presidential election, forced an unprecedented reckoning with the state of American politics. Members of Congress struggled to account for the rhetoric that gave rise to the event; law enforcement grappled with the challenge of holding accountable those who perpetrated the violence; and journalistic outlets wrestled with reporting a complex web of conspiracy theories and disinformation that gave rise to the insurrection. But for senior military leaders, the question was how to explain the troubling presence of active duty servicemembers and veterans in the first attack on the American seat of government in two centuries. The result is a profound and urgent discussion in U.S. civil-military relations.

Carriers and Amphibs: Shibboleths of Sea Power

This article argues that American naval force packages built around aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships no longer serve maritime security interests as effectively as in the past. It further claims that the current commitment in the published maritime strategy of the United States to the twin shibboleths of “carriers and amphibs” comes from a variety of attitudes held by senior decision makers and military leaders. This commitment betrays both cultural misunderstanding or even ignorance of seapower—“sea blindness”—as well as less than rational attachments to two operational capabilities that served the United States well in the past, but in doing so engendered emotional commitments that are little grounded in the facts.

An Assessment of Student Moral Development at the National Defense University: Implications for Ethics Education and Moral Development for Senior Government and Military Leaders

ABSTRACT Senior service colleges provide professional education to prepare military and government civilians for public service at the senior levels of strategy and policy. Inclusive in the program of study is ethics education, since various constituents expect their leaders to act in an ethical manner and to incorporate ethics and values in decision-making, policy, and strategy. In order to develop the most effective professional ethics education, the National Defense University assessed students in a pre- and post-test format using the Defining Issues Test Version 2 to determine their patterns of moral judgment at the beginning and the conclusion of the program. This article discusses the theoretical background, existing research, results, and implications of the study. Key findings include military students aligning with the Maintaining Norms schema; civilian students aligning with the Postconventional schema; and no significant changes as a result of the program. The article concludes with recommendations for ethics education for military and public service professionals. This research helps fill a void of empirical data on the moral development of military and public servants.

Battlespace Next(TM)

Changes in the geopolitical landscape and increasing technological complexity have prompted the U.S. Military to coin the terms Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) and Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) as over-arching strategy to frame the complexity of warfare across both traditional and emerging warfighting domains. Teaching new concepts associated with these terms requires both innovation as well as distinct education and training tools in order to realize the cultural change advocated by senior military leaders. Battlespace NextTM (BSN) is a serious game designed to teach concepts integral to MDO and initiate discussion on military strategy while conserving time, money, and manpower. BSN, a Collectable Card Game (CCG), is engineered to provide an engaging learning tool that educates on capabilities in a multi-domain conflict. This paper proposes an extensible game framework for modeling and reasoning about MDO concepts and presents our empirical feedback from over 120 military play testers evaluating a moderate to difficult version of the game. Results reveal the game teaches MDO concepts and delivers an engaging, hands-on learning experience. Specifically, we provide evidence it improved military readiness in seven areas of MDO in at least 62% of participants and 76% of respondents reported they enjoyed playing the game.

Military Realism and Doctrinal Innovation in Kennedy's Army: A New Perspective on Military Innovation

AbstractThis article introduces a new theory of military innovation, military realism, which argues that senior military leaders spearhead major changes in military doctrine when existing doctrinal mission priorities and theories of victory do not address the most dangerous threats. What I call the military realist perspective drives this doctrinal innovation. Through a case study of change and continuity in US Army doctrine under President Kennedy, this article challenges bureaucratic, military cultural, and civilian realist theories of military innovation. Military realism provides a powerful explanation of a hard case, while the other theories struggle with what should be an easy case.

Change Agents for the SOF Enterprise: Design Considerations for SOF Leadership Confronting Complex Environments

The military design movement in the past generation has generated much discussion on why, how, and when to apply design thinking in military organizations. Further, there is significant debate on how design and traditional linear planning ought to integrate and compliment within a military enterprise confronting a complex, adaptive environment. Although there are multiple design schools, programs, as well as methodologies available across the U.S. Department of Defense and internationally in other militaries, the lack of research and materials for military senior leaders is of paramount concern. For Special Operations leadership in particular, design requires different consideration when set in the context of SOF unique missions as well as the composition of SOF forces in larger Coalition and Joint activities. This article provides some of the leading design theory tailored specifically for senior military leaders to provide deeper appreciation of how to foster design activities, innovation, and operational planning integration within complex Special Operations contexts.

Elite Military Cues and Public Opinion About the Use of Military Force

Do military endorsements influence Americans’ political and foreign policy views? We find that senior military officers have the ability to nudge public attitudes under certain conditions. Through a series of large, survey-based experiments, with nearly 12,000 completed interviews from national samples, we find that participants respond to survey questions in predictable ways depending on whether they have been prompted with information about the views of senior military leaders on the very same questions. When told that senior military leaders oppose particular interventions abroad, public opposition to that intervention increases; endorsements of support boost public support but by a smaller magnitude. Subsequent causal mediation analysis suggests that military opinion influences public opinion primarily through its impact on a mission’s perceived legitimacy and, to a lesser degree, it’s perceived likelihood of success.

Expanding Command Responsibility Beyond War: The Application of the Doctrine of Command Responsibility to Human Rights Law

The doctrine of command responsibility has been an effective and enduring tool in the International Humanitarian Law effort to punish war crimes. In a reversal of the traditional direction of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law convergence, the doctrine of command responsibility has grown well beyond its role only in humanitarian law to reach areas outside of armed conflicts and outside of traditional armed forces. Command responsibility first expanded from its traditional role during international armed conflicts to a seemingly natural role in non-international armed conflicts. Later, Courts began to apply the doctrine of command responsibility to hold civilians responsible for war crimes of subordinates if they have a superior-subordinate relationship similar to senior military commanders. Recently, courts have expanded command responsibility to hold senior military and civilian leaders accountable not for war crimes, but for serious human rights violations. Commanders have been held responsible for human rights violations occurring outside traditional armed conflict situations. This paper will explore the development and expansion of the war crimes notion of command responsibility to address human rights violations during and even outside of armed conflict. Specifically, the article will discuss how the doctrine is currently being used in various U.S. forums including civil, criminal and administrative proceedings to hold leaders accountable for human rights violations during armed conflicts. This transition, for being a war crimes tool to a human rights tool, is the next significant advancement of the doctrine of command responsibility.

On Resignation

Arguments in favor of the topmost senior officers exercising “principled resignation” in opposition to policies, decisions, or orders that they find immoral, unethical, or disastrous for the country weaken the military profession and endanger American national security. A member of the Joint Chiefs, a combatant commander, or a topmost war commander who “resigns” would be injecting themselves improperly into a policy role, opposing civilian authority, and undermining civilian control of the military. The act would be politicizing for the military and likely fail to change what the officer opposes. Most importantly, their act of personal conscience would poison civil–military relations long into the future; civilian trust in military subordinates not to undermine support for policies and decisions with the public and other political leaders would decline. Even more than today, they would choose their senior military leaders for compatibility and agreement above other traits.

A qualitative study investigating the ethical decision making process: A proposed model

We describe the results of a qualitative research study involving senior military and civilian leaders of the Department of Defense. We followed a grounded theory approach in proposing an inductive model which integrates the theories of ethics, decision making, and leadership with the experiences and formal training of our respondents. Our model accomplishes two purposes. First, it illustrates the complex nature of the intervening steps between moral awareness and ethical/unethical decision outcomes. Second, it depicts a process for developing ethical decision making expertise. The proposed model is intended to stimulate educators, training and development professionals, and practicing leaders to design and implement programs to develop ethical leader decision making.

Reassuring the reluctant warriors: U.S. civil-military relations and multilateral intervention

In Reassuring the Reluctant Warriors, Stefano Recchia, a lecturer in international relations at Cambridge University, investigates the role civil-military relations played in US efforts to gain the support of international organizations for the use of force. His central hypothesis is there is no clear threat to US national security and policymakers consequently disagree about the merits of intervention, a determined military leadership can veto the use of American force (51). In short, Recchia argues senior military leaders at the apex of political-military decision-making can effectively veto policy when civilian policymakers are divided and the national interest is less than vital. In such scenarios, the military may demand the government obtain the support of international organizations as a condition of the military's backing of the intervention. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Recchia argues further the military's demand for an international organization mandate is also linked to the military's preference for such resolutions to state explicitly that US intervention forces will hand over control to multinational follow-on forces. The existence of such a provision in the planning phase of the operation will not only facilitate the planning process itself with the inclusion of the assumption of the presence of multinational stabilization forces, but will also fulfill the military's post Weinberger-Powell Doctrine desire for a clear exit strategy before giving its assent to the use of force. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) would usually be the first choice to endorse the intervention given its unique status as the organization the Charter of the United Nations authorizes to approve the use of force, but the approval of other regional organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Organization of American States (OAS) may also suffice. Reassuring the Reluctant Warriors is remarkable on many levels. First, its four case studies: Haiti (1993-94), Bosnia (1992-95), Kosovo (1998-99), and Iraq (2002-03) are extraordinarily well researched. Recchia conducted over 100 interviews with primary participants in the cases to include US secretaries of state and defense, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, national security advisers, US ambassadors to the UN, NATO, and the European Union, and many more with individuals holding positions a tier or two below the principals. The breadth and depth of the interviews enabled Recchia to include many insights from these key participants' in the deeply sourced text, some of which directly supported his hypothesis. The case studies alone, which include many of these comments, merit acquiring the book. Second, Recchia illustrates (literally--with useful figures) the factors influencing the military's viewpoint, their methods for exerting policy influence, and specific conditions that will make the military's insistence to acquire international organization approval more or less likely. Third, through the development of his primary and alternative hypotheses, he provides readers a rich review of the various factors, conditions, and theory that explains why international organization approval is or is not sought as well as methods employed to acquire approval. …