Abstract
ABSTRACT Military organizations are generally defined by a “cult of the offensive.” For cyberspace, this gives rise to an empirical puzzle, at least in the United States. What accounts for the early restraint and skepticism about cyber offense publicly expressed by many US military cyber leaders? In this article, I explore the US military’s approach to cyberspace as a theory-developing case study. I examine more than a decade of public discourse among senior military leaders about when and how the military should employ cyber force. I argue that, in the formative years of US military cyber organization, the military’s predisposition to the offense was challenged by other cultural and institutional influences, especially from the signals intelligence and strategic nuclear communities. Moreover, this influence shaped the public discourse even after US military cyber organizations gained greater autonomy and turned toward more objectively offensive strategies. This suggests implications for theory and policy.
Published Version
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