Endgames: Military Response to Protest in Arab Autocracies

Abstract

Contemporary study of the Arab world covers a variety of topics including economic development, energy security, demographic changes, gender inequality, ethnic and sectarian divisions, and regional conflicts. Civilian-military relations, however, have not been adequately analyzed despite the significant impact this relation has on domestic stability and national and regional security. Hicham Bou Nassif’s study, Endgames: Military Response to Protest in Arab Autocracies, is a welcome effort to fill this void.The central question Bou Nassif seeks to answer is: “Why was the military reaction to the upheavals in several Arab countries that started in 2011 (so-called Arab Spring) strikingly dissimilar?” (4). He rightly argues that no transition from autocracy to democracy is possible if the armed forces remain cohesive and loyal to the political establishment. Tyranny can and does last for years and decades when the coercive apparatus is committed to the status quo. Stated differently, military defection shifts the correlation of forces in favor of widespread civilian uprisings against autocrats and protests can reach and sustain critical mass only if the military refuses to defend the ruling regimes.Against this background, Bou Nassif argues that civil-military relations in autocracies where leaders fear being overthrown by officers center upon “coup-proofing,” in other words, a set of measures governments take to prevent putsches. Yet, in prioritizing regime survival over national security autocrats weaken the military forces’ capabilities to defend their countries against foreign enemies. Historically, the survival of Arab military leaders depended far more on coup prevention than on optimizing the armed forces’ capabilities.In explaining his argument, Bou Nassif highlights the fact that in any country armed forces are not unified actors and often have conflicting interests and perspectives. The book’s first chapter details the “vertical cleavages,” namely, intergenerational dynamics in the officer corps, and, the “horizontal cleavages,” that is, intragenerational dynamics in the officer corps. These interlocking cleavages raise a key question—how can military leaders articulate and execute a coup-proof strategy? The analysis suggests four tools: (1) ideology and fostering shared aversions; (2) promoting the material interests of the military elite; (3) counterbalancing; and (4) divide-and-rule tactics. These tools are not mutually exclusive and various combination of them are usually utilized.In the third chapter Bou Nassif examines this coup-proofing strategy in Egypt under President Gamal Abdel Nasser and in Syria under the Baʿath Party from early 1950s to 1970s. The main takeaway is that Egyptian and Syrian military leaders were determined to prevent any military coup against their regimes and implemented different combinations of the tools mentioned in the previous chapter. Bou Nassif then follows the two countries into the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century in Egypt under presidents Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak and in Syria under presidents Hafez al-Asad and Bashar al-Asad. The analysis suggests that in both Egypt and Syria senior military commanders benefitted financially from allegiance to the political leaders. This accumulated wealth at the hands of military commanders, however, created a gap between them and the younger officers because money never trickled down. This large gap explains how the Egyptian and Syrian military forces responded to the 2011 political upheavals.Bou Nassif addresses the differences between the Egyptian and Syrian armies’ responses to the 2011 popular uprisings. The Egyptian military did not fight to keep President Mubarak in power and, more or less, accepted a temporary regime change. Bou Nassif provides two possible explanations: (1) senior military leaders resented President Mubarak’s efforts to groom his son, Gamal, to succeed him; or (2) the United States, Egypt’s closest international ally, exerted pressure on the military not to crack down on the popular protests. On the other hand, a significant segment of the Syrian military has maintained its loyalty to President Asad and kept fighting against his opponents. The strong sectarian identity in the Syrian society and policy is the driving force behind this loyalty. Both Hafez and Bashar al-Asad used sectarianism instrumentally to unify ʿAlawi ranks around them.Tunisia and Libya are the focus of chapter 5. Unlike Egypt and Syria, the military was not central to the independence of Tunisia. Lacking the legitimacy Al-Habib Bourguiba enjoyed, Zein Al-Abidin Ben Ali counted on the ruling party, which he transformed into an intelligence network devoid of ideological commitment. He also relied on the interior ministry and the sprawling network of security organizations it controlled. Eventually, Ben Ali was unable to count on the military to kill civilians in order to save his rule and keep him in power. In neighboring Libya, on the other hand, Muʾammar al-Qaddafi ethnically stacked the special units in the armed forces, pitted them against regular troops stationed in the eastern regions, promoted the material interests of his favorite generals, and fostered paramilitary forces and intelligence agencies to counterbalance the military. These privileged units were ready to kill civilians and defend the regime in 2011, but the rest of the armed forces were not equally motivated and instead chose to defect and melt into the population. This disparity within the security apparatus and armed forces provides a strong explanation as to the nature of the ongoing civil war in Libya.Endgames: Military Response to Protest in Arab Autocracies provides a thorough theoretical analysis of civilian-military relations in the Arab world and how military regimes have sought to consolidate their power. It also analyzes and compares how the Egyptian, Syrian, Tunisian, and Libyan armed forces have responded to popular uprisings since 2011. Given space limitation, the volume does not address civil-military relations in other Arab countries such as Iraq, Yemen, Jordan, the other North African countries, or the Gulf Cooperation Council states. It would also be interesting to compare civilian-military relations in the Arab world with those in the non-Arab Middle Eastern powers, like Iran, Israel, and Turkey. The book also does not pay enough attention to the role played by regional and international actors in supporting or opposing military leaders. Finally, the analysis does not address how proponents of democratic transformation in the Arab world should counter these “coup-proofing” strategies articulated and implemented by several military and civilian leaders in the Arab world.Arab militaries are major players in the contemporary politics of the Arab world. For decades the dynamics of the interactions between military and civilian elites and their relations with other centers of powers within their societies have been overlooked and inadequately studied. This book is a welcome contribution to fill this gap.