The Last Shah: America, Iran, and the Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty; The Fall of Reza Shah: The Abdication, Exile, and Death of Modern Iran’s Founder

Abstract

The Pahlavi period (1925–79) is among the most important eras in Iranian history. It witnessed the birth of the modern Iranian nation-state, the formation of modern Iranian political and civil society, and Iran’s rise as a regional power. Yet the era’s significance is matched by its controversy, as the legacies of Reza Shah (r. 1925–41) and Mohammed Reza Shah (r. 1941–79) as both modernizers and autocrats continue to divide scholars amidst Iran’s post-revolutionary historiography.Two new books from historians Saul Bakhash and Ray Takeyh add to the era’s scholarship, honing in on the key question of how each ruler’s relationship with a foreign power—in Reza Shah’s case, Great Britain, in that of his son, the United States—created the circumstances in which they governed Iran while also contributing to their dramatic falls from power.Bakhash’s slender and deeply researched book, The Fall of Reza Shah, recounts the end of Reza Shah’s reign, the circumstances surrounding his abdication following the August 1941 Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran, his life in exile, and his death in 1944. The book’s comparatively narrow focus allows for Bakhash to submerge his account in minute details, offering a rich narrative of the end of Reza Shah’s rule.He is particularly sensitive toward the shah’s relationship with Great Britain and the particularities of British decision-making in 1941, when British officials such as Ambassador Reader Bullard exercised considerable power inside the country. The German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 “dramatically altered Britain’s calculus on Iran” (32); thereafter, Bullard became convinced that Reza Shah ought to be removed, arguing that he was an unpopular and inconsistent autocrat. Bakhash concludes that Bullard, together with Oriental advisor Ann Lambton, was a prime mover behind getting Reza Shah off the throne and that the decision to remove him “was made not in London but in Tehran” (57).British influence over the monarch continued once Reza Shah agreed to abdicate. Bullard and others determined that the ousted shah should remain within British territories, kept away from Muslim areas, and watched closely lest he serve as a focus for German wartime intrigue. Reza Shah and his nineteen family members were forced to relocate to Mauritius against their wishes. The shah “intensely disliked” (79) his captivity on the island, and British policy softened in 1942, due in part to the need to keep the new shah, Reza Shah’s eldest son, Mohammed Reza, content in Tehran. The exiled Pahlavi family was moved to South Africa, where Reza Shah, now comparatively comfortable, lived for two years until his death from a heart attack in June 1944.Bakhash tells a compact story, deviating occasionally to explore the minutiae of Reza Shah’s life post-abdication. The Last Shah, by comparison, is a sweeping narrative account of the decades that followed Reza Shah’s abdication. Ray Takeyh draws from an array of American, Iranian, and translated Soviet sources to detail the rise and fall of Reza Shah’s son and titular last shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Though not technically a biography, Takeyh maintains a consistent focus on the second Pahlavi and covers key episodes of his reign, from his ascendance to the throne during the wartime occupation, the nationalization crisis and coup of 1953 that cemented his role as Iran’s leader, and the halcyon days of his reign from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s, when he ruled as an absolute dictator. Takeyh’s final chapters are devoted to the revolution of 1978–79, with particular emphasis on US policy toward Iran and American views of the shah’s government.Takeyh contends that the second Pahlavi remains a misunderstood figure forty years after his abdication and death. Often depicted as a “dilettante,” Mohammed Reza Shah was in reality “an ambitious leader” who believed Iran would prosper “only if it was led by a modernizing autocrat supported by a cadre of technocrats” (2). The support of “great men” was crucial to the shah’s early success, and Takeyh highlights the contributions of statesmen such as Mohammed Ali Foroughi, Ahmed Qavam, Hajj Ali Razmara, and Asadollah ‘Alam. “A remarkable set of Iranian politicians reclaimed their nation’s independence” (53) after the shock of the war-time occupation and then assisted the shah in accelerating Iran’s prewar modernization while also establishing an authoritarian Pahlavi government that would endure until the Islamic Revolution. Takeyh concludes that the shah’s method of governance became unsustainable only when he jettisoned the support of these figures and attempted to rule as a true autocrat, a style “ill-suited for his personality” (118).Apart from the role played by the shah’s councilors, Takeyh devotes a considerable part of his book to analyzing the monarch’s relationship with the United States. Rather than dictate the shah’s policy or orchestrate events inside Iran, the United States appears either passive or confused over the complex state of Iranian politics. Takeyh contends that the famous coup of August 1953 “was more an Iranian plot than an American one” (116). While US officials like Robert Komer and Ambassador William Sullivan produced cogent analysis warning of Iran’s internal instability, such reports were ignored by presidential administrations more interested in propping up the shah as an ally in the Cold War.Both books find much to admire in their subjects, despite each Pahlavi monarch’s controversial legacy. Bakhash champions Reza Shah as the leader who transformed a “bankrupt” and chaotic country into a modern nation-state. He notes Reza Shah’s discipline and ascetic lifestyle. Takeyh admires Mohammed Reza Shah’s modernizing drive and his desire to reform Iran, delivering prosperity to the millions left behind by his father’s more haphazard approach and the shock of the wartime occupation.With praise of each ruler’s qualities comes equal attention to their faults. Reza Shah, as Bakhash notes, “was by temperament an autocrat,” whose military background conditioned him to rule with an iron fist (20). His modernization campaign, while delivering needed reforms and improvements to the country, was inherently contradictory: his advisors aimed to free Iran “of Western influence, even as they based their reforms on the model of the West” (19–20).Takeyh, meanwhile, repeatedly emphasizes Mohammed Reza’s indecision and tendency to vacillate during moments of crisis. Heavily influenced by the legacy of his father, the second Pahlavi wanted power “not for its own sake, but to realize his vision for modernizing Iran.” The autocracy he constructed to accomplish this goal was not conducive to his personality: “He became . . . a dictator with a dangerously passive streak” (117–18).Bakhash’s narrow focus precludes more than a cursory examination of Reza Shah’s reign or his significance to Iran’s modern history. While he alludes to the shah’s controversial role as the nation’s modern founder, Bakhash does not examine this question in detail, though a book focused on the shah’s abdication and exile naturally creates the desire for such a discourse. The chapter structure is at times fragmentary, as Bakhash explores tangential issues such as Bullard’s correspondence with the Foreign Office before August 1941 or the “quixotic” quest to replace Reza Shah with the heir to the Qajar dynasty.Takeyh’s engaging narrative is occasionally undermined by claims at odds with established scholarship. His account of the 1953 coup minimizes the importance of foreign actors. He contends that a coup against the government of Mohammed Mosaddeq was inevitable and would have occurred without foreign involvement; a claim that ignores the abortive efforts in April 1953, the disorder among Mosaddeq’s opponents, and the unwillingness of the shah to participate in a coup operation until US pressure coerced his cooperation in July 1953.Takeyh’s contention that the shah raised the price of oil virtually single-handedly in the early 1970s ignores the immense scholarship on the period’s “oil revolution,” a drama in which the shah played a role, though not a hegemonic one. While Takeyh’s desire to characterize the shah as an independent leader and not an “American stooge” is commendable, at times he pushes this characterization too far, missing the importance of US military and financial support for the Pahlavi regime, particularly in the period immediately following the coup.Neither Takeyh nor Bakhash deviate too far from the traditional approach to Pahlavi history. Both emphasize the shahs’ roles in modernizing Iran, instituting major reforms, advancing economic development, and lifting ordinary Iranians out of poverty. Both also note each shah’s weaknesses, authoritarianism, and ultimate failure to retain power in the face of domestic and foreign pressure. These are common themes in scholarship and in existing biographies of Reza Shah and Mohammed Reza Shah. Yet both make valuable contributions: Bakhash meticulously breaks down the British role in Reza Shah’s ouster, while Takeyh expands the scope of the late Pahlavi period to include the shah’s courtiers, arguing for a broader approach to the study of Pahlavi governance. Both leave unanswered questions, particularly regarding the relative popularity of each monarch on the eve of their falls from power. Was Reza Shah really as unpopular as Reader Bullard contended? Did Mohammed Reza Shah retain the support of average Iranians, even as he struggled against revolutionary crowds, illness, and his habitual indecision? Both authors add to existing scholarship, but leave the door open to additional research, proving that the controversies of this critical period, and the rulers who defined it, remain prevalent decades later.