Putin’s War in Syria: Russian Foreign Policy and the Price of America’s Absence

Abstract

Putin’s war in Ukraine has brought a lot of changes to our lives, and International Relations studies were not an exception: after February 2022, a number of research projects became irretrievably outdated as they could no longer describe the new reality and those changes taking place in the world. In this regard, Putin’s War in Syria: Russian Foreign Policy and the Price of America’s Absence by Anna Borshchevskaya is a striking exception. In spite of the fact that her book was written well before February 2022 and does not reflect the changes that have taken place in Russian approaches to the Syrian conflict since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, this study still allows us to understand the drivers of these transformations. In her book, the author provides us with a comprehensive and very detailed analysis of the multilayered complex of factors shaping Russian foreign policy not only in Syria but also in the Middle East. In fact, this book is the first study undertaking a deep and large-scale analysis of Russian participation in the Syrian war within a broader regional, international, and historical context. It goes without saying that there were earlier attempts to tell the story of Russia in Syria by other authors. However, those works did not provide such a comprehensive approach. At the same time, while talking about a complex issue, Borshchevskaya’s book is written in simple and clear language. It will be of interest to academics, researchers, and policymakers as well as to a wider audience. It can be of particular interest as an introduction to the problem for those who are just beginning to study the issue of the Russian involvement in Syria.In addition to the comprehensive nature of the study, which demonstrates, among other things, the deep historical roots of Russian foreign policy in the Middle East, one of the main advantages of the book is that, while clearly reflecting the American view of the subject, it expounds on it with a “Russian accent.” The author’s knowledge of the Russian language (together with a deep understanding of Russia’s political culture) allowed Borshchevskaya to use a wide range of sources and literature in Russian, giving her readers an opportunity to understand how people from Moscow look at the Syrian issue.Borshchevskaya’s key conclusions add value as well. Firstly, Borshchevskaya identifies Russia’s long-term strategic approaches to Syria and the Middle East. This, in turn, debunks the notion that Russia is a declining power that is only capable of acting opportunistically (which is a misleading and widespread argument). Secondly, the book clearly demonstrates the complex set of interests that led Moscow to Syria, going beyond the regular statements that Russia’s military deployment was solely about power projection. Borshchevskaya is one of the first scholars to focus on Russia’s economic interests in Syria, linking them with the broader dynamics of developing hydrocarbon resources in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thirdly, Borshchevskaya clearly shows how the imperial and Soviet experiences allowed Moscow to avoid the same mistakes and the risks that the USSR faced when sending troops to Afghanistan in the 1980s. Finally, she formulates one important axiom: Russia’s successes in Syria were not always determined by Russia’s own abilities but by the fact that the United States decided to distance itself from the Middle East.In general, after reading the book, the reader has a clear understanding that Russia’s involvement in the Syrian conflict was a rare development in the post-Soviet era. For the first time since 1992, when it ended its military support to the government in Afghanistan, Moscow had entered an armed conflict outside the borders of the former Soviet Union as a full-fledged partner. By doing so, Russia has managed not only to ensure the survival of the government of President Bashar al-Asad but also to change the course of the war in his favor. So far, however, Russia has failed to find a smooth exit strategy.Russia’s key goals for a post-conflict Syria have remained unchanged since the beginning of its military involvement in 2015: a guaranteed economic, military, and political presence for Russia in Syria, while Damascus maintains control over domestic governance—unlike the regime in Afghanistan in the 1980s and early 1990s. At the same time, Russia is relatively flexible about the other aspects of a post-conflict Syria and is unwilling to get involved in the deep political reconstruction of the state. Asad is dependent on Moscow but he is not a puppet. Balancing between Iran and Russia, he has kept a great degree of independence. His regime is completely unwilling to change and believes that concessions to the opposition are unnecessary. It also tells Russia that a military solution is the only way to win the war. This regime’s stubbornness has resulted in the failure of several Russian political initiatives, including attempts to prevent the regime’s purges of opposition and ex-members of anti-government armed groups, who agreed to stop fighting and remained in the areas the Asad regime regained after the beginning of Russia’s military operations.What really worries Russia, and presents a challenge to the achievement of its principal goals in Syria, is the involvement of regional actors in the conflict. Unlike Western countries, they are present on the ground. Neither Russia’s partner, Iran, nor opposition backers such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia are ready to fully support Moscow’s goals. Russia and Iran have been compelled to be partners in Syria. Both are extremely interested in saving the regime and its institutions but for different reasons.Russia is playing a difficult game in Syria. Asad is willing to accept its military support but he has also made it clear that he would rather see his country completely destroyed than compromise with the opposition. His intransigence guarantees that the armed rebellion against him will continue, and he has set Syria on the path to a generations-long conflict. Asad’s inflexibility has not caused Russia to reduce its commitment to his regime, but it clearly illustrates the limits of its influence in the country. Nevertheless, Russia plans to stay in Syria for a long time. The fact that the regime has effectively now won the civil war does not guarantee Moscow a comfortable presence in post-conflict Syria. It was military assistance to the regime that provided Russia with effective leverage on Damascus. In the transition to a post-conflict situation, the significance of the military factor will steadily decrease, giving way to financial and economic aspects of cooperation. It is doubtful whether Russia’s broken economy will have the resources to launch a reconstruction process, especially when its own economy is still coping with the post-pandemic economic effects and fighting in the Ukraine. It is notable that Russia is not in a hurry to state its readiness to financially participate in the reconstruction of post-war Syria on its own.Having limited economic resources to assist in Syria’s reconstruction, Russia instead tries to maintain its influence in Damascus by playing an active role in shaping the political process to settle the conflict. It now focuses its diplomatic efforts on working with those countries that have a voice in Syria, such as Iran and Turkey. However, neither Iran nor Turkey is ready to play a secondary role in the conflict settlement process, which makes the achievement of Russia’s final goals in Syria even more challenging.Unfortunately, Borshchevskaya’s book is still not without certain drawbacks, which in many ways are an extension of its virtues. The ambitious task of a comprehensive analysis of the Russian presence in Syria, putting it in the context of Russian history, as well as regional and international politics, can hardly be accomplished within the format the author has chosen. In order to demonstrate the deep motives of Moscow, Anna turns to Russian history, the history of Moscow’s centuries-old presence in the Middle East, as well as to the peculiarities of Russian domestic politics, the dynamics of the great power competition, and the interaction of regional players. In other words, she signed up for a task that can only be done by a team of authors, each of whom has expertise on a particular issue. To her credit, it should be noted that the goal was largely achieved. Her book provides a fairly complete description of the main trends that determined Russia’s behavior in the Syrian conflict. However, at times, the reader is left with the feeling that certain parts of the narrative are either stated superficially (simplified?) or omitted altogether for the sake of condensing the narrative into a single volume. The book would have benefited significantly had the author set a more limited scope for herself. For example, the study would not have lost much if Borshchevskaya had omitted a brief retelling of Russian history from Rurik to the 1917 October Revolution, which included contradictory statements (for example, that an independent Russian state emerged only in the 1470s [8]). Instead, more attention could have been given, for example, to the Soviet legacy, which is generally limited in the book to the history of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. At the same time, the author could have found additional confirmation of her idea that “Moscow derived a key lesson from the Soviet experience . . . that it could not affect real change in the country. Therefore, it never even tried to attempt it in Syria” (170), if she considered in more detail the Soviet experiences in Yemen and Egypt during the twentieth century.For the sake of the scale of the narrative, such topics as the impact of Russian “successes” in Syria on Moscow’s ambitions in other parts of the MENA region (Libya, Egypt, Sudan) as well as the dynamics of Russia’s relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in the light of the Syrian conflict were undeservedly overlooked or not properly considered. In the case of the GCC member states, Anna, for some reason, limits her study to the initial period of the Russian military presence in Syria and focuses exclusively on Saudi Arabia and Qatar. On the other hand, it would also have been helpful to read more about Russian-Syrian relations in the early years of the Syrian war (before the 2015 Russian military deployment). In the book, Borshchevskaya looks at the period 2011 to 2015 primarily in terms of interaction between Moscow and Western countries, while Russia was actively negotiating with Damascus, seeking to influence Bashar al-Asad’s behavior, and restoring (not very successfully) lost contacts with pro-Russian forces among the Syrian elite.Some of Borshchevskaya’s statements in the book were controversial and require separate discussion and confirmation. Thus, in the historical part of the work, the statement “Novgorod chose instead to focus on trade as its vehicle for growth and development” (9) does not correspond to the reality (as well as the statement on the republican nature of its government). In reality, medieval Novgorod put great emphasis on its military and territorial expansion. Mentioning this fact would allow the author to confirm her thesis more strongly about expansionism as a historical feature of Russian foreign policy. When considering the modern history of the Russian presence in the Middle East and Syria, the author should have explained in more detail her argument that Andropov was a role model for Putin (a very unusual reading of Putin’s behavioral patterns), as well as the book’s excessive emphasis on the importance of Yevgeny Primakov for the formulation of Russian foreign policy. In spite of the attempts by some Western researchers (fortunately, not by the author of the book) to make Primakov a kind of a gray cardinal of the Russian court responsible for the Middle Eastern (and not only) vector of Russian foreign policy, in Russia itself his figure is viewed somewhat differently: Yevgeny, although he was a prominent thinker, still primarily acted as a master of shuttle diplomacy and negotiator, who only expressed the ideas of his masters in the Kremlin. In other words, what is perceived in the West as Primakov’s initiatives were very often an expression of the collective view of the Russian elite (or some part of it).Finally, the author could have used her knowledge of Russian to greater advantage. Unfortunately, she was more focused on the use of English resources, although even here the list of literature is far from being complete: for example, the lack of references to the works of Raymond Hinnebusch, including his coedited volume, The War for Syria (London: Routledge, 2018), was surprising. The bulk of Russian resources used by the author were newspaper and magazine articles. Unjustifiably little attention is paid to the primary sources and works of leading Russian experts on the Middle East such as Vladimir Vasiliev, Vitaly Naumkin, Kirill Semenov, Leonid Isaev, Anton Mardasov, Nikolai Surkov, Vasily Kuznetsov, Igor Matveev, Irina Zvyagelskaya, and others. Had Borshchevskaya engaged with the work of these Russian experts it would have not only added academic weight to her work, but she would also have discovered additional material with which to confirm her conclusions.At the same time, all the above-mentioned criticisms should not be taken as an attempt to undermine the importance of this very timely book. Instead, they are offered to sharpen the quality of Borshchevskaya’s future works. Anna’s book undoubtedly deserves attention. It is a unique work that can help a wider audience to better understand the intricacies of the Syrian conflict, Russia’s foreign policy, and, most importantly, the role that Syria and the Middle East continue to play for the United States, despite America’s attempt to detach itself from them.