Sectarian Identity Research Articles

The Attitude of Young Sunnī Muslims in Britain Towards Religious Authority

The absence of one single religious authority for the whole Muslim community in Britain results in the emergence of various religious authorities due to ethnic and sectarian differences. Muslim communities in Britain have generally been ghettoized around ethnic and sectarian identities, and thus establishing mosque and religious authority accordingly. This paper investigates what the sources of religious authority for British born young Sunnī Muslims are. The data was gathered via an ethnographic research made in Leeds, one of the most cosmopolitan cities of Britain, interviewing young Sunnī British Muslims who are between 18 and 30 years old. The main aim of this study is to reflect on how and where these young Muslims get religious advice for their daily religious lives. This paper presents the preferences of the informants in seeking religious authority in the context of Britain. It is particularly significant to discover the orientation of British born Muslims from that aspect. Based on the preferences of young Sunnī Muslims in searching religious authority in Leeds, this paper initially introduces four mosque imāms, who lie at the centre of religious authority for ordinary Muslims. By dealing with them, I expose the role of mosque imāms in the life of Sunnī Muslims in Britain. The types of the questions raised by the mosque attendees and their methods in approaching the imāms are reported while each imām’s profile is examined. Then, I focus on two famous figures who issue religious rulings and have a special importance in the religious lives of Muslims in Leeds. Finally, the Internet is examined as a virtual platform in seeking religious authority for ordinary Muslims living in Britain. Thus, this study offers two main results: From different sectarian orientations, such as Deobandī, Barēlwī and Jamāʿat-i Islāmī, they generally admit that following a school of law (Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, and Ḥanbalī) in current is essential for a lay person. Therefore, the tendency among them in seeking religious guidance initially starts from local mosque imāms, and then widened with more expert ʿulamāʾ repudiated across their ethnic and sectarian oriented communities.

To Hope or Not to Hope: Liberalism, Neoliberalism, and Learning from Lebanon’s 2022 Election

This Rapid Communication examines Lebanon’s 2022 Parliamentary election in the context of other recent elections in consociational and populist regimes. The Lebanese electorate is now divided both by sectarian identity and by a pro- versus anti-establishment cleavage. This second cleavage makes Lebanon look more like other electoral authoritarian regimes. In light of scholarly work that ties electoral authoritarianism to late-stage neoliberalism, Lebanon’s recent election prompts renewed attention to the neo-liberal assumptions embedded in its and other consociational systems.

The Karapapaks and their shifting loyalties on the imperial borderlands during the nineteenth century

The Karapapaks were one of the less known native Turkish ethnic groups of the Transcaucasia, who overwhelmingly took refuge in the Ottoman and Qajar Empires in the late 1820s, after the expansion of Tsarist Russia into their homelands. This paper analyses how the literature regarding Karapapak movements and society was overwhelmingly shaped by selective, essentialist, and anachronistic approaches by some historians in Turkey and Iran. While the former determined that they were a loyal pro-Ottoman and pro-Sunni Karapapak society, the latter constructed an opposing pro-Iranian and pro-Shiite narrative. This paper deconstructs both approaches, and asserts that the collective ethnic and sectarian identities of this society played a secondary role in regards to influencing their cross-border movements. This paper argues that the approach of the current literature cannot explain this borderland society’s perpetual, multiple and multi-directional cross-border movement. Instead, the Karapapaks often manoeuvred the frontiers of the empires, and defected to another empire when it was necessary to, first and foremost, satisfy the needs of their own society, over those of any imperial allies.

“Sunni” Veneration of the Twelve Imams in Khotan


 
 
 Over a century ago European explorers in Eastern Turkestan (southern Xinjiang) made a remarkable discovery: the Sunni inhabitants of Khotan were engaged in elaborate veneration of the Shiʿi twelve Imams, whom they believed to be buried at various holy sites in the Khotan region. This paper investigates Khotan’s net work of holy sites and the narratives that were attached to them, from the sixteenth century to the present. While the political landscape of the present may sometimes make the Sunni-Shiʿi divide appear natural, the case of Eastern Turkestan, which had its own, idiosyncratic approach to sectarian identity, reminds us that the maintenance of such a Sunni-Shiʿi consensus on sectarian designation was dependent on networks of knowledge reproduction that did not embrace the entirety of the Muslim world. Pre-Islamic sacred geographies, the power of locally networked holy sites, the phenomenon of textual appropriation, and a popular and eclectic manuscript tradition overwhelmed weak sectarian distinctions, bringing Muslim followers of the Hanafi legal tradition to pray at the purported tombs of Twelver Imams.
 
 

Ebû İshâk el-Cûzcânî’nin Kûfe Ehline Yönelik Cerhlerinin Mezhep Taassubu Bağlamında Değerlendirilmesi

Cerh-ta’dil faaliyetlerinde beşerî zaafların yanısıra mezheb taassubundan kaynaklanan olumsuzluklar, ricâl tenkidinin geçerliliği ve güvenilirliğini ilk dönemlerden itibaren tartışmaya açmıştır. Bu noktada ricâl tenkidinin olgunlaşıp cerh ve tadil faaliyetlerinin sistematik bir yapı kazandığı, özellikle duafâ literatürünün oluştuğu hicrî III. asrın araştırılması, alandaki tartışmalara katkı sağlamak adına önem arz etmektedir. Bu makale, hicrî III. asırda bid’at ehline yönelik aşırı tenkitleriyle dikkat çeken cerh-ta’dil âlimlerinden Ebû İshâk el-Cûzcânî’nin (öl. 259/873) , “Ahvâlu’r-ricâl” adlı eserinden hareketle, bid’at ehlinin rivayeti karşısındaki tutumu etrafında Şiî eğilimli Kûfeli râvilere yönelik cerhlerinin mezhep taassubu açısından değerlendirilmesini amaçlamaktadır. Cûzcânî, eserinde geniş bir yer tutan ve teşeyyü ile itham edilen Kûfeli râvilere yönelik tenkitlerinde mezhebî taassubla hareket ettiği ve müteşeddit olduğu şeklinde eleştirilmiştir. Özellikle hakkındaki Nâsibîlik ithamı, Kûfeli râvilere karşı taassup beslediği iddiasına neden olmuştur. Ancak, Cûzcânî’nin sadece müteşeyyî râvilere yönelik değil, diğer bid’at fırkalara mensup râvilere karşı da aşırı tenkitlerinin olması, cerhlerinin taassubtan ziyade hadis uydurma hareketindeki rolleri nedeniyle bid’at ehline ve onların rivayetlerine karşı olumsuz tavrından kaynaklandığı anlaşılmıştır.

Who Are We? Square Politics and the Collective Self-Understanding of the Indignados in Spain and Greece—Reflections and Legacies

ABSTRACT As occupations of squares in Spain spread across Europe, the Spanish Indignados gave rise to a transnational movement of ordinary citizens united in their anger against the banks, corruption, the electoral system, the global financial system, and the press. In this article, we reflect upon the legacies of the Spanish and Greek Indignados and show how their collective self-understanding—that is, a sense of a “us”—is formed and articulated very differently in Spain and Greece through square politics. We argue that it is the dramaturgy of political protest that fundamentally constructs and shapes the collective self-understanding of the Indignados in Spain and Greece. We will see that while in Spain there is a clearer sense of a shared political project and a shared identity, in Greece social movement actors were divided by their particular agendas and sectarian identities, which resulted in different articulations of their collective identity.

Çatışma Çözümleri ve Uzlaşma Süreçlerinde Kimlik: Suriye’de Mezhepsel Kimlikler ve Çatışma Sonrası Suriye

Suriye çatışma çalışmaları literatüründe yer bulan önemli örneklerden birisidir. Suriye’deki olayların çok sayıda sebebi mevcut olsa da mezhepsel kimlikler, bu kimliklerle bağlantılı gelişen materyal kazanımlar ve bunun etrafında şekillenen bir çatışma döngüsü göze çarpmaktadır. Suriye’deki şiddet sona erdiğinde ya da farklı bir biçime dönüştüğünde çatışma öncesi ve sırasında olduğu gibi çatışma sonrası süreçlerde de kimlik vurgusu ve mezhepsel kimlikler, siyasi ve toplumsal hayatta yer bulmaya devam edecektir. Bu nedenle çatışma sonrası çözüm ve uzlaşma gibi süreçlerinin gerçekleştirilmesi ve bu süreçlerde kimliklerin ve kimlik dönüşümlerinin dikkate alınması gerekmektedir. Ülkede kimliklerin araçsallaştırılarak çatışma unsuru haline getirilmesinin önüne geçilmesi önem arz etmektedir. Bu süreçler ülkede hakiki anlamda barışın gelmesi ve şiddetin tekrarlanmaması için gereklidir. Çatışma çözümleri ve uzlaşma literatüründe somut çözümlerle beraber kimlik dönüşümlerinin gerçekleştirilmesi en çok bahsedilen konulardan birisidir. Bu süreçler uygun şekillerde gerçekleştirilmezlerse şiddetin belli dönemlerde tekrar eden döngüsel bir niteliğe bürünmesi sık rastlanan bir durumdur. Çalışmada Suriye’deki mezhepsel kimlikler, çatışma sonrası beklenen çözüm ve uzlaşma süreçlerinde kimliğin yeri ve kimlik dönüşümleri ile olası toplumsal uzlaşma yaklaşımlarından bahsedilecektir.

Endgames: Military Response to Protest in Arab Autocracies

Endgames: Military Response to Protest in Arab Autocracies

The Claim that Muqātil b. Sulaymān is a Shīʿīte/Zaydī and His Narrations in Shīʿīte Sources

Mukâtil b. Süleymân’ın (ö. 150/767) tefsiri, günümüze ulaşan en eski tefsir olması nedeniyle oldukça önemlidir. Bu tefsirin önemi ne kadar tartışılmaz ise müellifin mezhebî kimliği bir o kadar tartışmalıdır. Müellifin mezhebî aidiyeti bu tefsirinin kaynak olma değeri ile yakından ilgilidir. Zira Mukâtil hakkındaki değerlendirmeler, “yalancılık” ile “tefsirde otorite olduğu” şeklinde iki uç noktada seyretmektedir. Çağdaş dönemde bazı araştırmacılar, müellifin mezhebî kimliği üzerindeki bu tartışmaları, Sünnî tefsir geleneğinde Mukâtil’in “sakıncalı” olarak görüldüğüne ve bu durumun müellifin tefsirinin görmezden gelinmesine sebep olduğuna kadar götürmüştür. Gerçekten de Mukâtil’e dair atıfların Taberî ve İbn Ebî Hâtim gibi rivayetleri derleyen ilk dönem tefsirlerinde ya hiç yer almadığı ya da çok az yer aldığı bir gerçektir. Dolayısı ile söz konusu araştırmacılar, problemi yalnızca Mukâtil’in mezhebi kimliği meselesi olmaktan çıkarmakta ve tefsir geleneğinde onun tefsirinin ideolojik sâiklere kurban edildiğini öne sürmüşlerdir. Mukâtil’in mezhebi kimliğine gelince onun Müşebbihe, Mürcie veya Şîa/Zeydiyye’ye nispet edildiğine dair farklı görüşler bulunmaktadır. Bu çalışma özellikle Mukâtil’in Şiî/Zeydî olduğu iddiası üzerine yoğunlaşmaktadır. Mukâtil’in Şiî/Zeydî olduğu iddiası ilk defa Şîa’ya eğilimiyle meşhur İbnü’n-Nedîm (ö. 385/995) tarafından öne sürülmüştür. Şiî ricâl âlimi el-Keşşî (III-IV. /IX-X. yüzyıl) ve Ebû Ca‘fer et-Tûsî (ö. 460/1067) de onun Şiî/Zeydî olduğunu savunmuştur. Ayrıca Ebû Ca‘fer et-Tûsî, Mukâtil’in Muhammed el-Bâkır (ö. 114/733) ve Ca‘fer-i Sâdık’ın (ö. 148/765) ashabından olduğunu vurgulamışlardır. Sünnî gelenekte daha çok teşbih inancıyla suçlanan Mukâtil, çağdaş dönemde tefsirinin muhakkiki Abdullah Mahmud Şehhâte (d. 1951) başta olmak üzere Muhammed Ebu Zehre (ö. 1974) gibi isimler tarafından da Şiî/Zeydî olarak tavsif edilmiştir. Yine Louis Massignon (ö. 1962) ve Montgomery Watt (ö. 2006) gibi oryantalistler tarafından da Mukâtil ile Zeydiyye arasında bir ilişki kurulmuştur. Bu araştırmamızın iki temel amacı bulunmaktadır: Birincisi, müellifin kendi tefsiri üzerinden onun Şiî/Zeydî olmadığına dair ikna edici bazı tespitlerde bulunmaktır. İkincisi ise Mukâtil’in başta tefsir ve hadis kaynakları olmak üzere Şiî gelenekteki yerine ve etkisine dair bazı değerlendirmelerde bulunmaktır. Burada özellikle Şîa’nın temel tefsir ve hadis kaynaklarında Mukâtil’den gelen rivayetlere yer verilip verilmediği, yer verildiyse bunun ne ölçüde olduğu tespit edilmeye çalışılacak ve bu rivayetlerin müellifin elimizdeki mevcut eserleri ile mukayesesi yapılacaktır. Bu sayede Şiî kaynaklarda Mukâtil’e nispet edilen rivayetlerin onun kendi kaynaklarında ve özellikle Salebî gibi ondan çokça istifade eden müfessirlerin eserlerinde bulunup bulunmadığı irdelenecektir. Ayrıca bu Şiî kaynaklarda Mukâtil’e nispet edilen rivayetlerin muhteva analizi de yapılacaktır. Neticede bu çalışmada, bazı Sünnî ve Şiî müellifler tarafından Şiî/Zeydî olduğu öne sürülen hicrî II. asrın önde gelen müfessirlerinden Mukâtil’in mezhebi aidiyeti, Şiî kaynaklar üzerinden değerlendirilmektedir.

POLARIZATION OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AS AN OUTCOME OF SECTARIAN CONFLICT IN GILGIT BALTISTAN

This paper aims to understand the institutional polarization in educational sector caused by sectarian conflicts and to explain the divided sectarian fabrics in Gilgit Baltistan. Quantitative method has been used. Data has been collected through two separate structured questionnaires from faculty and students from schools, colleges and university. All the three sects in Gilgit have private separate educational institutions found significant with sectarian conflict (P-V=.000). Moreover, Parents do not prefer to send their children to schools owned by other than their sects, also tested and found significant with sectarian conflict (P=.000<0.05). Additionally, Sectarian based educational institutions will further increase the gaps among all sects. Chi-Square test applied and found significant (P=.005<0.05). Private educational institutions have maintained their sectarian identity has been proved with sectarian conflict having a P-value of (P=0.001<0.05). The divisions are based on the creed of students and staff favor those belong to their sect in educational institutions of Gilgit city has a very strong association with sectarian conflict proved and the P-value is (P=0.001<0.05). A curriculum and plural system should be developed to minimize the negative effects of sectarian conflict in the region. Keywords: Sectarian conflicts, Educational institutions, Polarization, youth, Gilgit-Baltistan.

Vanity of the Bonfires? Eleventh Night Bonfires and Loyalist Influence After Negotiated Settlement in Northern Ireland

ABSTRACT Cultural events can mask latent potential for a resurgence of violence following negotiated settlement, building sectarian identities and support through otherwise-legitimate forms of expression. This article examines this phenomenon in Northern Ireland, investigating how Loyalists utilize Eleventh Night bonfires. It is argued that, in becoming more professional in construction and more sectarian in imagery, bonfires build and maintain paramilitary power, generate political capital within Unionism, and reinforce boundaries between groups. Bonfires are a key part of the culture war which has developed in Northern Ireland, raising vital questions about the role of culture following negotiated settlement in deeply-divided societies more broadly.

Economic Aid, Marginalization, and Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland

Economic aid and peacebuilding efforts to transform the Northern Ireland conflict impact grassroots, civil society organizations (CSOs) and vulnerable people of concern. Brexit is an example of how democracies privilege white, cisgender, heterosexual, able-bodied voices, exclude marginalized voices from peacebuilding efforts, and maintain structural violence that exacerbates sectarian identity conflicts. A qualitative methodology was used to interview 120 participants who shared their experiences of grassroots peacebuilding efforts to transform the Northern Ireland conflict. Findings revealed that community audits are critical to inclusion of local needs, and helped to assess what escalates conflict, British job cuts create needs that overwhelm CSOs and youth who feel hopeless are attracted to sectarian paramilitary groups. They reject peace and trigger further conflict as a result.

Angels Associated with Israel in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Angelology and Sectarian Identity at Qumran, written by Matthew L. Walsh

Angels Associated with Israel in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Angelology and Sectarian Identity at Qumran, written by Matthew L. Walsh

Beyond Lebanon’s Power-Sharing

Lebanon’s Ta’if Agreement, although implemented as a tool for conflict reconstruction, did not build a sustainable peace, nor has it created the base for democratic and economic development. Rather, it perpetuates elites’ interests at the expense of an ever-poorer population, while crystallizing fragmentation along sectarian identities, thus increasing the security dilemma. New literature on Lebanon’s power-sharing system is questioning how to build cross-sectarian cooperation and trust in Lebanon and, in doing so, is widely looking at the potential peacebuilding of civil society initiatives. The central point of the paper is that thinking about conflict transformation in Lebanon requires investigating the relation between power-sharing and civil society within a perspective of creating inclusive institutional mechanisms for the latter.

Sectarian Identity and Mobilization Amongst the Druze: How Do Sectarian Minorities Respond to Religious Terrorism?

ABSTRACT Taking its point of departure in the sectarian dynamics in the Middle East, namely the Sunni–Shiʿa schism that is taking the largest share in the current debates, this article studies sectarian identity and religious terrorism against the Druze minority during Syria’s sect-coded civil war. It argues that while religion can act as a mobilizational tool and marker of group solidarity amongst Druze as well as amongst Sunni and Shiʿa, the Druze did not instrumentalize sectarian identity to implement their geopolitical agenda. Rather, for far too long the Druze used sectarian identity as a defense mechanism to unite against violent motifs and actions by the sectarian “other.” The latter, for our purposes, happens to be Sunni jihadist groups such as Daesh (The Islamic State or ISIS) and Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN). Further, Druze is not a tabshiri sect. Put it another way, it is a sectarian minority that prevents conversions. Therefore, for the Druze, sectarian identity had always been a marker of group solidarity only. This article brings to the fore the response of sectarian minorities to religious terrorism following the Arab Uprisings era, and stresses that sectarian mobilization has parallel means but not always similar ends.

Tarihsel ve Çağdaş Yönleriyle Heterodoks Dinî Bir Kimlik Olarak Deizm

Deism from the beginning has positioned itself as a heterodox religious identity contrary to orthodoxy. In this regard, it is the review of established classical theological presuppositions regarding the following headings: conception of God; God-world relationship; religion-science relationship; ethical considerations regarding the problem of evil, etc. In these contexts, deism could be seen as a sort of religious self-criticism. As arose in British philosophical-theological circles, deism sounds to have resisted some conventional Christian presuppositions as put forward by E. Herbert of Cherbury, the father of English deism, in the forthcoming articles: “There is a supreme God. This sovereign deity should be worshipped. Virtue arises from the piety created by this worship. As the man is filled with wickedness, he needs repentance, which means communication with this sovereign Being. There is reward or punishment in the life to come.” In the course of time, different kinds of deisms turned up, ranging from accepting God as a sublime creator alone and rejecting revelation, i.e., institutional religion, to those accepting religion on the condition that it should be compatible with reason. Samuel Clarke mentions the arguments of different kinds of deists and skillfully criticizes them. Historical and contemporary deism have the following in common: “The compromise between truth of revelation and truth of reason; saving knowledge versus saving faith; rejection of institutional structures; glorification of reason and human nature; ethical rationality.” With this doctrinal backdrop, hot debates on deism in Turkey have recently gotten new dimensions. Figures showing the rise of deism in recent years under an Islamist political rule makes the case all the more thought-provoking. The visibility of religion in the public sphere has increased, and the rate of religiosity would also be expected to increase. However, the result is quite the opposite. There is a widespread and remarkable secularization in conservative circles. After they got the political power and economic welfare, which enabled them to attain worldly glory, they have gradually left religious glory behind and glorified profanity. In this case, deism seems to take the form of secularized orthodoxy. Deists in Turkey, rather than rejecting revealed religion they want it to be compatible with reason, to demythologize it from supernatural narratives, and to find a way of getting rid of fanatical elements in the religion. They want to replace religious institutional authority with the authority of reason, which rests itself on innate ideas and a priori truths. They claim ethical rationality, which means ethical truths are accessible through reasoning. My study tackles some statistical data specifically signifying why youngsters tend to claim to be deists. Some surveys among high school students have been included in the study and due evaluations have been made. It seems sectarian identities, radical voices, authoritative religious language, blockades to freedom of speech, a dichotomy between religious and scientific facts in the curricula and mythological religious language are among the reasons counted by the youngster to reject conventional religion and embrace deism. The mainstream theological tradition of Islam is quite familiar with deistic claims. The discussions on deism will finally bring the enlightened minds together with the reasonable religious line.

The Development of Nūrbakhshī Sufi Order in Gilgit-Baltistan

Islam came to Gilgit-Baltistan with various invaders and missionaries from adjacent neighbouring regions but there is a lack of historical and archaeological evidence for the presence of Islam in the region before the late fourteenth century CE. The Kubravī-Hamadānī Sufi order laid the foundation of Islam in Gilgit-Baltistan. This legacy was further carried on by the Nūrbakhshī Sufi order, which is the focus of the present study. This Sufi order, independent of Shī‘īs and Sunnis, was founded in the fifteenth century by Mīr Nūrbakhsh, who tried to overcome the schism of the Muslim community by reconciling the teachings of Sunnis and Shī‘īs. The paper examines the origin and development of the Nūrbakhshī order through centuries in Gilgit-Baltistan, after briefly discussing its history in Persia and Kashmir. The Nūrbakhshī order retains its centuries-old sectarian identity despite hundred-year massive missionary efforts of both Shī‘īs and Sunnis.

Understanding “Sectarianism”: Sunni-Shiʿa Relations in the Modern Arab World

Understanding “Sectarianism”: Sunni-Shiʿa Relations in the Modern Arab World

Self-Minoritization

Abstract This article looks at the process through which the Ibadi Mzabi community in the Algerian desert “minoritized” itself during the colonial period, leading into the 1948 elections to represent the Mzab Valley on the newly created Algerian Assembly. This representation legally and effectively incorporated the Mzab into French Algeria and ended its special status as a French protectorate. Mzabi self-minoritization, Ghazal argues, was a process of performative differentiation based on a sectarian identity. It was initiated by the colonized and negotiated with the colonizer, emerging at the intersection of colonialism and the institutionalization of political representation in colonial Algeria. Ghazal defines this process as self-minoritization to attribute a proactive role for, and more agency to, the colonized in claiming a “minority” identity and negotiating a special status within the colonial order.

Brave New World Order: The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq and the Rise of Iraqi Shī‘ī Identity Politics

ABSTRACT This article uses the history of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the largest Shī‘ī Islamist organization within the exiled Iraqi opposition movement, as a case study to delineate how the meaning, function, and salience of sectarian identities are affected by political and social changes at the local, regional, and international level. To this end, this work identifies and explains a discursive shift observed in SCIRI’s publications produced during its tenure as an Iraqi opposition group. Whereas SCIRI’s publications during the Iran-Iraq War emphasized that its brand of Islamic government would represent all Iraqis regardless of their religious or ethnic affiliation, following the war’s conclusion the Council strove to portray its leaders as the primary defenders of Shī‘ī interests in Iraq and focused near exclusively on the need to protect the rights of Iraq Shī‘ī. It argues that several key developments account for the Supreme Council’s adoption of a Shī‘ī-centric political stance during the 1990s, namely: the internationalization and unification of the Iraqi opposition movement in the aftermath of the 1991 March Uprisings and the post-Cold War environment within which the exiled Iraqi opposition was operating. When considered collectively, beyond demonstrating the contingency and complexity of the advent of Shī‘ī identity politics within Iraqi opposition circles throughout the 1990s, these findings suggest the importance of taking into consideration larger, global trends as contributing factors when conceptualizing how subnational forms of identification acquire heighted social and political salience.