Scientific Realism Research Articles

Citizen Science and The University of Queensland Seismograph Stations (UQSS)—A Study of Seismic T Waves in S-W Pacific Ocean

Seismologists listen to Earth’s noise as it rips apart (faulting), exudes (volcanoes) and swallows (subducts) large volumes of rock. Your mobile phone is most likely detecting such noise, right now! This paper is about one such specific noise, the T wave. It summarises an early and successful piece of citizen science, performed within The University of Queensland Seismograph Stations (UQSS) observatory, in cooperation with colleagues at CSIRO. It was designed to encourage young STEM students from Brisbane high schools to engage in “real” research, back in 1995. Bear in mind, this is a time period when science is changing considerably from analog to digital media and operational recording methods. The citizen science students used a pre-prepared decadal collection (1980–1990) of T waves, derived from the Brisbane seismograph (BRS) observatory data catalogue. BRS has been operating since 1937 and is part of the global World-Wide Seismograph Station Network (WWSSN). Fortunately, seismology is a very collaborative field. There is a lot of data analysis involved in the science of recording earthquake signals, with auxiliary definitive catalogues, observers logbooks, housing of the recordings themselves (analog and digital) and the software mediums that change over time. It equally tests housekeeping proficiency, where a maze of record-keeping problems can be encountered in a longitudinal data collection study such as this. Having completed the project report, Earthquake generated T phases on BRS Seismograph (Brisbane, Q’ld) a predictor for Tasman Sea Tsunamis? their (analog) results sat in a cupboard until recently. The project was re-analysed in 2022 for a higher-degree student, discovering a timely climate change implication for the study. The original research question has now been amplified with a brief literature review. We observe that currently in Australia, university and government earth science observatories have diminished, and in their place, public seismic networks (PSN) have evolved, either in backyard sheds or school science labs. We now additionally propose here that the level of expertise required ideally fits the role of advancing citizen science, for a real science advantage. This is already a topical citizen disaster preparedness action area, and we propose that it has applications as a possible educational strategy for citizen engagement in today’s climate emergency. In addition, we are hopeful that other researchers in oceanography will read this paper and decide to explore the ocean’s temperature rise phenomenon through the eyes of seismological observers.

Do Kuhnians have to be anti-realists? Towards a realist reconception of Kuhn’s historiography

It is quite unequivocal that Kuhn was committed to (some version of) naturalism; that he defended, especially in his later work, the autonomy of scientific rationality; and that he rejected the correspondence theory of truth, i.e., the traditional realistic conception of the world’s mind-independence. In this paper, I argue that these three philosophical perspectives form an uneasy triangle, for while it is possible to coherently defend each of them separately or two of them combined, holding all three leads to incoherence. Hence, the only option is to reject one of them in a way that is both compatible with Kuhnian historiography and philosophically fruitful. My purpose in this paper is not exegetical. My ambition is to sketch a coherent philosophical framework which does justice to Kuhn’s historiographical model for scientific change and avoids the philosophical costs of relativism and anti-naturalism. In particular, I argue in favor of the following interconnected positions: (1) Given the role of anomalies in Kuhn’s historiographical model, the latter satisfies the two fundamental conditions for acknowledging the mind-independence of the world: the ‘irreducibility condition’ and the ‘objectivity condition’, (2) Kuhn’s rejection of the notion of an ‘Archimedean platform’ does not entail that the truth-value of beliefs doesn’t play a role in the explanation of their change, (3) Adopting scientific realism is the only way to defend the autonomy of scientific rationality within a naturalistic philosophical framework. However, adopting realism leads to a liberal rather than an eliminative version of naturalism.

Scientific Realism and Anti-Realism Through the Lens of Sunnī Divine Action Models

ABSTRACT Scientific realism and anti-realism, in various forms, frame many philosophical discussions about what constitutes a successful scientific theory. This paper explores this within an Islamic framework by examining the Sunnī theological tradition's various divine action models (DAMs) for their possible impact upon the theological reception of scientific realism and anti-realism, concluding that the tradition would be committed to an agnostic stance on the question. This enables the tradition to remain relevant to a broad spectrum of future scientific developments and changing intellectual currents.

Shades of Structural Realism in Post-classical Islamic Thought

ABSTRACT What does Islamic theology have to say about the philosophy of science? The writings of post-classical Muslim thinkers offer a wealth of understudied material relevant to conceptualizing the ontological status, scope, and character of scientific inquiry and theorization. The Islamic tradition developed nuanced metaphysical and epistemological insights on unobservables, universals, and causality. Muslim astronomers developed sophisticated responses to perceived deficiencies in the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic model. In the contemporary debate between scientific realism and anti-realism, structural realism is a much-discussed middle ground which suggests a return to many of these insights. This challenges popular discourse on the relation between religion and science.

The Use of Philosophy of Science in the Creationism-Evolution Debate: An Ashʿarī Perspective

ABSTRACT This article critically reviews how creationists or antievolutionists are using discussions in philosophy of science to undermine the efficacy of evolution to defuse the tension between evolution and religion. They include (1) the scientific realism debate, (2) the distinction between historical and experimental sciences, (3) the problem of induction, and (4) the definitional problem of species. It then discusses how using these specific arguments to undermine evolution is misplaced when looked at from an Ashʿarī perspective, a Sunnī school of theology. In doing so, it reveals the multiple ways that theology and philosophy of science are interacting with one another in the ongoing creationism-evolutionism debates.

Empirical tests of scientific realism: A quantitative framework

AbstractThe scientific realism debate in philosophy of science raises some intriguing methodological issues. Scientific realism posits a link between a scientific theory's observational and referential success. This opens the possibility of testing the thesis empirically, by searching for evidence of such a link in the record of theories put forward in the history of science. Many realist philosophers working today propose case study methodology as a way of carrying out such a test. This article argues that a qualitative method such as case study methodology is not adequate for this purpose, for two reasons: to test scientific realism is to pose an effects‐of‐causes question, and observational and referential success are quantities that theories possess to a greater or lesser degree. The article concludes that an empirical test of scientific realism requires a quantitative method.

The context of science fiction in the pre-service teachers’ chemistry education

Abstract Context-based teaching and learning has a long tradition in science, especially chemistry. Audiovisual media (movies and series) can be used to provide context, and it can help overcome many students’ negative attitudes toward real science. An example of audiovisual media in which a science context can be presented is science fiction (abbreviated Sci-Fi). The purpose of this study was to investigate how the Sci-Fi context influences pre-service teachers’ attitudes and perceptions regarding the use of Sci-Fi for teaching and learning science, with a focus on chemistry, as a result of a 15-week novel elective Sci-Fi course for pre-service teachers. The main instruments used were online questionnaires, a final exam, and a rubric-based presentation evaluation form. The results of our study show that the majority of pre-service teachers consider the Sci-Fi context to be a very interesting context for science education, especially chemistry, and a useful tool for promoting students’ interest in science. Students believe that it is important to incorporate the Sci-Fi context into chemistry instruction at all levels. Our results suggest that the Sci-Fi context is useful to students as an alternative learning method that can be used to improve student learning outcomes.

Some reflections on Mitchell’s pragmatist variant of scientific realism

This article aims at discussing an interesting variant of scientific realism recently proposed and defended by Sandra Mitchell (forthcoming), namely an affordances-based and pragmatist variant of scientific realism. We firstly place Mitchell’s proposal in the context of the current state of the debate over scientific realism. Secondly, we summarize the salient features of Mitchell’s proposal. Thirdly, we point out some aspects of that proposal that might require some further refinement and clarification in order to make it less prone to criticisms by both realists and antirealists. More precisely, in this paper we address the following issues: 1) whether Mitchell’s proposal can be classified as a genuine form of scientific realism; 2) whether the fact that in Mitchell’s proposal figure some variants of the no miracle argument is in tension with some other of its features.

DETERMINANTS OF OUTCOME OF AYURVEDA STUDIES AND ANUBANDHA CHATUSHTAYA - A REVIEW

Anubandha Chatushtaya is an essential part of any writing. It is about the four factors, which were considered while making a scripture for an expected outcome. It is supposed that these factors first appeared with this terminology in Vedanta textbooks. The theme of a treatise, its objective, the target audience, and their interrelationships, are the four determinants of writing/outcome of literature. According to Vedanta, a competent learner learned from qualified teachers with the help of authentic treatises in a good manner and reaches the goal, of liberation (Moksha). Likewise in Ayurveda, a capable student well versed with authentic knowledge of Ayurveda and skilled through experience will become a qualified Physician. The real science is safe in the hands of such expert Physicians. From the very first chapter of Charaka Samhita itself, it emphasised the need of maintaining real physicians as well as avoiding quacks and little learned. It is to preserve the value of science and real practice. Some of the Ayurveda classical textbooks have descriptions of the factors of Anubandha Chatushtaya. But the term Anubandha Chatushtaya is not used for these factors. Therefore, we explored ancient Ayurveda literature for the descriptions regarding factors of Anubandha Chatushtaya. The descriptions of the qualities of students, teachers, textbooks, the learning methods, and the definition and utility of Ayurveda are some of them we found. Moreover, we found that these factors with utmost perfection are necessary for the prosperity of Ayurveda.

Scientific realism and quantum theory: on the status of the ‘unobservables’

ABSTRACT Scientific realism does not view theoretical terms as mere instruments of experimental predictions; it grants referential status to natural kind terms with 'epistemic access' and view scientific theories and terms as corresponding to physical phenomena and entities which exist independently of observation, and as thereby being the source of objective -approximate and not absolute- knowledge of the physical realm. As a result, scientific realism is accused of ontologising the unobservables. Against this charge, scientific realism posits the idea of the dialectical relation between theoretical terms referring to the unobservables and scientific methods. The second argument made by realism is the ‘no miracle’ thesis. These arguments stand challenged by the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The aim of the paper is to examine the relevance of the two arguments of scientific realism in countering the idea that the existence of quantum states in the microphysical world renders realism obsolete.

The contributions of scientific realism and critical realism to realist evaluation

ABSTRACT Realist evaluation has gained prominence in the field of evaluation in recent years. Its theory-driven approach to explaining how and why programmes work or not makes it attractive to many novices, early career researchers, and organizations implementing various programmes globally and relevant to policymakers and programme implementers. While realist evaluation seeks to be pragmatic, adopting principles and methods that can be used to help focus an evaluation, its deep ontological and epistemological foundations make its application in real-life situations challenging. In this paper, we seek to unpack the key tenets scaffolding the practical application of realist evaluation. Although Pawson and Tilley foreground realist evaluation in applied scientific realism, we argue that an amalgam of scientific and critical realist principles underpins realist evaluation. We unpack these principles and illustrate how they fit into each other to provide a cogent theoretical foundation for realist evaluation.

QBism, phenomenology, and contextual quantum realism

A critique of phenomenological interpretation of quantum Bayesianism (QBism) is offered, in particular, the position of M. Bitbol and L. de La Tremblay, which removes remnants of scientific realism from QBism and adopts a radically phenomenological first person point of view. It is shown that phenomenological view of quantum mechanics cannot explain cognition of quantum reality and behavior of real quantum systems, because the ultimate reality for phenomenology is autonomous phenomena, which, in fact, do not exist. Our proposed contextual quantum realism (CQR) does not invert, as the mentioned authors do, but rejects, the traditional relation between experience and reality. By reinterpreting QBism, our CQR removes remnants of phenomenology from it, but in such a way as not to fall into the other extreme – metaphysical realism.

On No-Miracles and the Base-Rate Fallacy

AbstractHowson (2000) contends that the No-Miracles argument fails as an argument in support of scientific realism because it commits the base-rate fallacy. Psillos (2009) has defended the argument by appealing to cases that involve conditional probabilities but where base-rate information can properly be ignored. I show that Psillos’s defense of the No-Miracles argument is inadequate and that the prospects for a purely probabilistic formulation of the argument are dim. I end by considering whether interpreting the argument as an inference to the best explanation might better serve the scientific realist, concluding that such an approach would limit the realist’s ability to effectively counter the Pessimistic Induction.

ORIGIN OF LIFE UNRAVELLED

A clear meaning of "Life" is even more important for these two than the "Origin of Life," which is crucial to "Evolution" itself as an emergent property of matter where biology transcends computation. The idea of panspermia as a metaphysical proposition is in fact a scientific reality when one considers ‘Jyotish’ (Vedic Astrology). In the present study, it is established that the rationale behind the subject of Jyotish (A Vedānga) is astronomy, and its life side is astrobiology, the study of how electromagnetism interacts with matter to describe “life” as an emergent property of matter. The current study of panspermia focuses on the two most important aspects of advanced complex life on earth: the Cambrian explosion and the emergence of an even more complex and intricate human brain which refutes Darwin's Theory of Evolution and Natural Selection. Solar disturbances and their particle emissions are the most likely link between biological and extra-terrestrial events in both the Origin and Evolution of Life.

Fawn birthdays: From opportunistically sampled fawn rescue data to true wildlife demographic parameters

Abstract Spring mowing in May and June is one of the main causes of mortality of roe deer fawns in agricultural regions. Knowing the exact birth distribution of fawns is important to guide farmers in their pre‐mowing precautions to avoid fawn deaths. Wildlife volunteers searching fields prior to mowing can act as citizen scientists by producing data sets of rescued fawns and their approximate age at find. However, due to weather‐dependent searches, the corresponding birth distributions can be highly skewed. We simulated virtual field data to examine the shortcomings of such data sources and introduced two algorithms for reconstructing reliable birth distribution parameters (mean and standard deviation) based on skewed samples. We found that weather‐dependent search data biased the calculated means and standard deviations by up to 14 and 5 days, respectively. However, the use of the proposed advanced algorithms (Grid Search and Machine Learning) resulted in better estimates of the sample means and standard deviations by reducing the root‐mean‐square error by 65% and 80% respectively. Furthermore, the Grid Search algorithm was able to capture birth distribution parameters based on real citizen science data in Bavaria, Germany, from 2021, which are close to the results of more systematic samples of the same year. The simulation exercise highlighted the shortcomings and discrepancies of using non‐probabilistic samples, for example on the occasion of mowing activities, to study demographic parameters compared to the true simulated distribution. Yet, the proposed algorithms can address these drawbacks and potentially turn citizen science data into an important data source for wildlife studies. This could ultimately help reduce wildlife losses during the mowing season by better knowing the distribution of births in a region.

Structural Realism and Agnosticism about Objects

Among scientific realists and anti-realists, there is a well-known, perennial dispute about the reality and knowability of unobservable objects. This dispute is also present among structural realists, who all agree that science gives us genuine knowledge of structure at the unobservable level (however that structure may be understood). Ontic structural realists reduce or eliminate the ontological role of objects, while epistemic structural realists argue that objects do or might exist but are unknowable. In part because ontic structural realism has some evidence from quantum mechanics and the consequent underdetermination of the metaphysics of objects in its favor, the majority of contemporary structural realists adopt that view. In contrast, I argue that epistemic structural realism is a highly compelling view, particularly in the form that remains agnostic about unobservable objects. This view can remain consistent with the empirical data from quantum mechanics, can give a satisfactory account of the metaphysics of structure, and can distinguish itself from other extant versions of realism. I provide two arguments in favor of agnosticism about objects, the first of which argues that suspending belief is consistent with the impetus of naturalized metaphysics, and the second of which argues that agnosticism about objects is a rational response to reflection on the limits and aims of science. Thus, I show that agnostic epistemic structural realism is a defensible and compelling view in the philosophy of science that demands more attention in the literature.

Is the maximum entropy production just a heuristic principle? Metaphysics on natural determination

The Maximum Entropy Production Principle (MEPP) stands out as an overarching principle that rules life phenomena in Nature. However, its explanatory power beyond heuristics remains controversial. On the one hand, the MEPP has been successfully applied principally to non-living systems far from thermodynamic equilibrium. On the other hand, the underlying assumptions to lay the MEPP’s theoretical foundations and range of applicability increase the possibilities of conflicting interpretations. More interestingly, from a metaphysical stance, the MEPP’s philosophical status is hotly debated: does the MEPP passively translate physical information into macroscopic predictions or actively select the physical solution in multistable systems, granting the connection between scientific models and reality? This paper deals directly with this dilemma by discussing natural determination from three angles: (1) Heuristics help natural philosophers to build an ontology. (2) The MEPP’s ontological status may stem from its selection of new forms of causation beyond physicalism. (3) The MEPP’s ontology ultimately depends on the much-discussed question of the ontology of probabilities in an information-theoretic approach and the ontology of macrostates according to the Boltzmannian definition of entropy.

Identifying bird species by their calls in Soundscapes

In many real data science problems, it is common to encounter a domain mismatch between the training and testing datasets, which means that solutions designed for one may not transfer well to the other due to their differences. An example of such was in the BirdCLEF2021 Kaggle competition, where participants had to identify all bird species that could be heard in audio recordings. Thus, multi-label classifiers, capable of coping with domain mismatch, were required. In addition, classifiers needed to be resilient to a long-tailed (imbalanced) class distribution and weak labels. Throughout the competition, a diverse range of solutions based on convolutional neural networks were proposed. However, it is unclear how different solution components contribute to overall performance. In this work, we contextualise the problem with respect to the previously existing literature, analysing and discussing the choices made by the different participants. We also propose a modular solution architecture to empirically quantify the effects of different architectures. The results of this study provide insights into which components worked well for this challenge.

Regulative idealization: A Kantian approach to idealized models

Scientific models typically contain idealizations, or assumptions that are known not to be true. Philosophers have long questioned the nature of idealizations: Are they heuristic tools that will be abandoned? Or rather fictional representations of reality? And how can we reconcile them with realism about knowledge of nature? Immanuel Kant developed an account of scientific investigation that can inspire a new approach to the contemporary debate. Kant argued that scientific investigation is possible only if guided by ideal assumptions—what he calls “regulative ideas”. These ideas are not true of objects of nature, and yet they are not heuristic tools or fictional representations. They are necessary rules governing the construction and assessment of scientific explanations. In this paper, I suggest that some idealizations can be interpreted as having necessary regulative value and as being compatible with scientific realism. I first analyze the puzzle of the nature of idealization and present the main approaches to this topic in the literature. Second, I reconsider the puzzle vis-à-vis a restricted, Kantian definition of idealization and a novel characterization of the relation between idealization and truth. Finally, I discuss in detail an example of idealization (the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium) along the suggested Kantian lines.

Towards a moderate realist foundation for ontological knowledge organization systems: The question of the naturalness of classifications

Several authors emphasise the need for a change in classification theory due to the influence of a dogmatic and monistic ontology supported by an outdated essentialism. These claims tend to focus on the fallibility of knowledge, the need for a pluralistic view, and the theoretical burden of observations. Regardless of the legitimacy of these concerns, there is the risk, when not moderate, to fall into the opposite relativistic extreme. Based on a narrative review of the literature, we aim to reflectively discuss the theoretical foundations that can serve as a basis for a realist position supporting pluralistic ontological classifications. The goal is to show that, against rather conventional solutions, objective scientific-based approaches to natural classifications are presented to be viable, allowing a proper distinction between ontological and taxonomic questions. Supported by critical scientific realism, we consider that such an approach is suitable for the development of ontological Knowledge Organisation Systems (KOSs). We believe that ontological perspectivism can provide the necessary adaptation to the different granularities of reality.