Scientific Realism Research Articles

Veritistic Teleological Epistemology, the Bad Lot, and Epistemic Risk Consistency

AbstractThis paper connects veritistic teleological epistemology, VTE, with the epistemological dimension of the scientific realism debate. VTE sees our epistemic activities as a tradeoff between believing truths and avoiding error. I argue that van Fraassen’s epistemology is not suited to give a justification for a crucial presupposition of his Bad Lot objection to inference to the best explanation (IBE), the presupposition that believing that p is linked to p being more likely to be true. This makes him vulnerable to a counterargument, tailored after Musgrave’s defense of IBE, which would result in a stalemate between them about presuppositions of rationality. I will, however, show that switching to VTE can justify van Fraassen’s presupposition. This leads to a dismissal of common IBE arguments for realism as presented by Boyd and Musgrave, but I also argue that a more cautious version of realism can be rescued from the Bad Lot objection. Finally, I raise some worries about epistemic risk-attitude consistency for constructive empiricists and develop an alternative anti-realist position.1

Resolving Debates about Scientific Realism: The Challenge from Stances

Abstract Epistemic stances are collections of attitudes, values, aims, and policies relevant to assessing evidence, eventuating in belief or agnosticism regarding the output of scientific investigations. If, in some cases, conflicting stances promoting scientific realism and antirealism, respectively, are rationally permissible, this would seem to undermine the possibility of resolving certain debates between realists and antirealists. In this article I reply to two concerns about this conception of stances, to the effect that: (1) a stance underlying realism is, in fact, rationally obligatory for realists, given certain natural assumptions; and (2) this sort of permissivism would validate pseudoscience and science denialism.

A Scrutiny of Scientific Realism: The No-Miracles Argument and the Pessimistic Meta-Induction

The historical debate of scientific realism portrays a monumental sign of science-a way of critiquing philosophy. At first sight, this centrepiece of scientific realism could line up against the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic meta-induction because, by means of the no-miracles assumption, fundamental theories in science would be the fine manifestation of reality as well as are most likely to be the truth. Nonetheless, a means to an end of the pessimistic meta-induction arguably states the anti-realistic position-since scientific speculations are not always plausible to be the ultimate truth vis-à-vis mature hypotheses of science in history. By and large, I have herein put forward a systemic meaning for realism: an inspection of unseen objects in the world, which are broken free from the human mind. However, I will demonstrate the no-miracles argument in the vicinity of realism, whilst the pessimistic meta-induction lies towards anti-realism. In the bargain, I will examine structural realism in response to this scientific dichotomy. Briefly, this research article is, apparently, bound-up with a very limited account of relevancies; ergo, it would be recommended to further research on this controversy.

Are There Experimental Arguments Independent of Theories? In Defense of a Hackingian Approach to the Scientific Realism Debate

ABSTRACT This paper defends a Hackingian approach to the scientific realism debate by arguing against mainstream realists’ and antirealists’ common claim that no experimental arguments for the reality of posited entities can be theory-independent. Opposing this claim, I argue that some experimental arguments can warrant belief in the existence of entities without depending on the truth of the theories that posit the entities and describe their properties and the theories that explain the interactions between the entities and the experimental devices. To achieve this goal, I investigate Hacking’s case of electron spraying, the famous experiment of positioning atoms by means of a scanning tunnelling microscope, and some novel experiments that use Ashkin’s optical tweezers. By introducing the distinction between theoretical properties and ontic properties, I argue that we can build up some theory-independent criteria of reality on the basis of ontic properties. Manipulability is an ontic property and the manipulation criterion is thus a theory-independent one, which should be reexamined and used for those experimental cases along a local approach to the realism debate. Resisting the mainstream realists’ and antirealists’ objections, I contend that some experiments using optical tweezers can warrant belief in the existence of the experimented entities without depending on theories.

Learning to Live with a Circle: Reflective Equilibrium and the Received View of the Scientific Realism Debate

The Scientific Realism Debate (SRD) has been accused of going around in circles without reaching a consensus, so that several scholars have advocated its dissolution in favor of reformed projects that are eliminativist towards the distinctively philosophical aims and methods. In this paper, after outlining the project that SRD-participants have been involved in for some time now—which we call the Received View—we discuss two dissolution-proposals: sociological externalism and localism. We argue that these projects are incomplete and that, even when judged in themselves, they cannot flourish without the ‘traditional’ philosophical reflection they wish to get rid of. However, although not substitutes for the Received View, those projects have some insightful features. These are assigned their proper place in the dialectics of SRD, which is shown to be an instance of the method of reflective equilibrium (MRE). Lastly—based on Michael DePaul’s work—we provide a response to the well-known concern that MRE is epistemically circular, by claiming that MRE is the only rational method of inquiry. Overall, our goal is ‘therapeutic’: we try to mitigate the anxiety caused by simultaneously believing that SRD is circular and suspecting that there is a good way out of the circle that we just haven’t found yet. For, having dismissed the suspicion that there might be a good trick to dissolve the circle, one may learn to live in it and be more calm in carrying on with what one has.

Effect of Feature Selection on the Accuracy of Machine Learning Model

In real life data science problems, it’s almost rare that all the features in the dataset are useful for building a model. In machine learning, feature selection is the process of selecting a subset of relevant features or attributes for constructing a model. Removing irrelevant and redundant features and, selecting relevant features will improve the accuracy of a machine learning model. Furthermore, adding unnecessary variables to a model increases the overall complexity of the model. Our experiment indicates that the accuracy of a classification model is highly affected by the process of feature selection. We train three algorithms (K-Nearest Neighbors, Decision Tree, Multi-layer Perceptron) by selecting all the features and we got accuracies 49%, 84% and 71% accordingly. After doing some feature selection without any logical changes in models code the accuracy scores jumped to 82%, 86% and 78% accordingly which is quite impressive.

Contribution of real estate science to SDG Goal 6：Access to and sustainable management of safe water and sanitation

Contribution of real estate science to SDG Goal 6：Access to and sustainable management of safe water and sanitation

Can NASA uncover the scientific reality of UAPs? (Unidentified Aeronautical Phenomena)?

On September 14, 2023, an expert research group made up of a team of NASA scientists released their final report on "unidentified aeronautical phenomena (UAPs)," which include unidentified flying objects (UFOs) and natural phenomena. General impressions regarding this report are stated.

‘But, is it supposed to be a straight line?’ Scaffolding students’ experiences with pressure sensors and material resistance in a high school biology classroom

ABSTRACT This case study examines how material resistance (limitations posed by the physical world) and graph interpretation intersected during a high school biology investigation using digital sensors. We use an extended episode from a small group to illustrate how, in an inquiry-based unit, measuring near the resolution limit of a sensor caused scaling issues in graphs. Qualitative videotape analysis focuses on both the students’ attempts to make sense of a perceived lack of variation in the collected data and the teacher's and classroom researchers’ misinterpretation of the students’ difficulties with graph interpretation. We suggest that these educators, though experienced, could have benefited from additional strategies to help them recognise and respond to graph interpretation issues introduced by digital representations of real-world data, and that the students could have benefited from explicit prompts to discuss the limitations of their equipment. We describe several implications for researchers, teachers, and curriculum developers interested in implementing inquiry-based biology investigations using sensor data. We argue that students should be supported to recognise that encountering unexpected results from their investigations and working to understand what these results have to say about the real world is an important and valid part of the practice of real science.

Structural realism and theory classification

AbstractOntic structural realism constitutes a promising take on scientific realism, one that avoids the well‐known issues that realist stances have with underdetermination and theory change. In its most radical versions, ontic structural realism proposes a type of eliminativism about theoretical entities, ascribing ontological commitment only to the structures, and not to the objects appearing in our theories. More moderate versions of ontic structural realism have also been proposed, allowing for ‘thin’ objects in the ontology. This work connects these takes on structural realism with the independent notion that there are two categorically different kinds of scientific theories, namely those that deal with interactions and those that deal with structural constraints – what are known as interaction and framework theories, respectively. By taking this classification seriously, one can arrive at a selective version of ontic structural realism which is better adapted to our scientific knowledge, in which eliminativist ontic structural realism constitutes a natural fit to framework theories, whereas the moderate version is connected to interaction theories.

Natural Historical Attitude: Objectivity Before Truth Book Review: Turner D. Making Prehistory: Historical Science and the Scientific Realism Debate. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Derek Turner believes that a proper interpretation of Arthur Fine’s natural ontological attitude can help to reveal the nature of the difference between «historical» (geology, archeology, forensics) and «empirical» (physics, chemistry) sciences. From his point of view, the apparent asymmetry between these sciences is a consequence of different understanding of the possibilities to «manipulate» the objects of study and the role played by background theories. In our opinion, Turner’s concept is a good example of how profound and inviting the instrumentalistic concept of science could be. First, it is «reflexive» in the sense that it constrained other instrumentalist theories (B. Fraassen’s constructive empiricism deeply flawed). And secondly, it is «constructive» – the emphasis that «the strength of arguments for or against scientific realism can vary depending on the scientific context» quite unexpectedly leads to the fact that «ideographic / nomothetic division is not very helpful», and to the fact that «epistemic disadvantage, but the same epistemic status». Reflections on the book: Turner D. Making Prehistory: Historical Science and the Scientific Realism Debate. Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Making Progress Through Disagreement: Meeting Residents Where They Are on Climate Change

Abstract While Americans do not agree about climate change, what to do to overcome this disagreement is a topic of debate. Climate communications researchers warn that messaging must overcome the challenges of communicating scientific information to lay audiences, the uncertainty of scientific predictions, and the massive scale of climate change to be effective at mobilizing a population. Such work focuses on “top-down” communication of what the scientific reality of climate change requires of citizens: how to get them in line with what needs to happen to prevent catastrophic change. In this article, I document how nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based climate organizations (CBOs) make progress on climate action by dialoguing with their constituents and building on preexisting community connections. I argue that, instead of focusing on achieving climate consensus, these organizations rely on narratives around the local experience of environmental disruption to mobilize communities.

교육행정학 이론발달의 과학철학 쟁점과 관련 논점 탐구: 과학적 실재론을 중심으로

교육행정학 이론발달의 과학철학 쟁점과 관련 논점 탐구: 과학적 실재론을 중심으로

Pengembangan Model Inovasi dan Kreativitas Keilmuan Pendidikan Islam Anak Usia Dini

One of the important tasks of the study program is to carry out educational innovation and creativity. This research was conducted to find a model for developing scientific innovation and creativity in the study program. The research method used is field research in which the data is identified through interviews, documentation, and observation. The results of the research are First, PIAUD Study Program students realize the importance of scientific innovation and creativity in early childhood education because it is based on the scientific reality of early childhood education that requires creativity, the demands of institutional work that want creative graduates, and scientific opportunities in early childhood education that have market opportunities. good to develop. Second, the model for developing scientific innovation and creativity in early childhood education is carried out through intensive collaboration between lecturers and students which is realized by institutional mentoring of lecturers with the PIAUD Studio community which is established and developed according to students' interests and talents in the scientific field of early childhood education. With this model, PIAUD Study Program students have good creativity and innovation as evidenced by various achievements at the national level in innovation and creativity competitions for early childhood education students.

Emergence, Continuity, and Scientific Realism

Scientific realism postulates that science aims for truth in both the domains of the observable and the unobservable, and is capable of achieving this aim, at least approximately. From the realist perspective our current scientific theories are on the right path to their aim, encapsulating a significant degree of theoretical truth. A key argument supporting this viewpoint is the continuity observed between successive scientific theories, interpreted as the preservation of truth. However, we contend that this continuity argument is problematic in significant cases. Features of older theoretical schemes frequently do not persist in subsequent theories but emerge as limiting cases with restricted applicability domains and fine-grained structures that differ from what the older theories deemed possible. The alterations accompanying theory replacement are often more drastic than what is assumed by realist intuition, justifying skepticism about continuity serving as an indicator of theoretical truth preservation. We propose an argument wherein continuity is instead viewed as a consequence of empirical success preservation.

Haptic realism for neuroscience

Recent work in philosophy of science has shown how the challenges posed by extremely complex systems require that scientists employ a range of modelling strategies, leading to partial perspectives that make apparently conflicting claims about the target (Mitchell 2009b, Longino 2013). The brain is of course extremely complex, and the same arguments apply here. In this paper I present a variety of perspectivism called haptic realism. This account foregrounds the process by which the instrumental goals of neuroscience shape the way that objects of investigation are probed experimentally and conceptualised through modelling. Because such models do not aim to represent their targets exactly as they are, but in ways that are most useful for the investigators, the models should not be interpreted as literal descriptions of neural systems. Scientific realism traditionally involves a semantic commitment to interpreting theories and models as literal descriptions of human-independent nature. Haptic realism makes a significant departure from this tradition. Haptic realism also calls us to reassess the ontological commitments and knowledge claims of neuroscientific models and theories.

Eye Movement Tracking Using Opencv Python

In this study, we made a simple, low-cost algorithm for tracking eye movements and eye blinks in real-time and non-real-time. Several methods are being used right now. Show parts of the face, like the eyes or the whole face. For this reason, open-source libraries like OpenCV enable high-level programming to implement reliable and accurate detection algorithms like Haar Cascade. Since everything is processed in real-time, payment must be made quickly. Pay attention to how hardware, like a computer, can only use a certain amount of resources (processing power). The system has been proven to work by tests with 15 people of different ages and backgrounds. These tests are done to see how the user and the device work together and ensure everything works correctly. The In the tests done, the system worked between 80% and 100% of the time. The results showed that Haar Cascade had a significant effect by Detection of faces in 100% of cases, while the eyes and pupil where they overlap (light and shade) is less effective. In addition to looking at how well the Through these activities, the demo application also showed that user restrictions shouldn't stop people from enjoying and using a certain type of technology. The program was written in C++, and the OpenCV library makes it work on Windows. This system has many uses in the real world and science. By looking at the data from this algorithm from afar, for example, it can tell if someone has an eye disease or is tired. It can also help people who have physical or mental problems

Sloppy Models, Renormalization Group Realism, and the Success of Science

AbstractThe “sloppy models” program originated in systems biology, but has seen applications across a range of fields. Sloppy models are dependent on a large number of parameters, but highly insensitive to the vast majority of parameter combinations. Sloppy models proponents claim that the program may explain the success of science. I argue that the sloppy models program can at best provide a very partial explanation. Drawing a parallel with renormalization group realism, I argue that it would only give us grounds for a minimal kind of scientific realism. Nonetheless, the program can offer certain epistemic virtues.

Reality of Sharia Banking System (Study of Islamic Economic Development In Indonesia)

A discussion of Islamic economics has previously been introduced in the fields of science and society. In the midst of numerous traditional social and economic systems based on secular materialism, Islamic economics is a reality that continues to demonstrate its excellence. Islamic economics is likewise a scientific reality that consistently distinguishes itself from social science constellations founded on atheism and even secularism. Islamic economics is a new force within these two streams that is developing into a mature, independent system and discourse in scientific thinking. Its existence is a culmination of long-lasting intellectual attempts in the history of the Muslims as well as a reaction to the inequity of the contemporary socio-economic system.

Sociocultural Foundations of the Criminal Law Paradigm

The paper raises the question of the possibility of applying a paradigmatic approach to social knowledge in a way similar to natural science. And if such an approach is applicable, then the problem lies in allocation of paradigms, in particular, in relation to criminal law. Scientific knowledge, of which criminal law knowledge is a part, should be considered in unity with the ideological foundations of society. As far as the worldview changes, so do the socio-cultural foundations of scientific knowledge. The ideological basis determines the necessary connection between natural science and social cognition. The position is substantiated, according to which the paradigm in the social sciences should not depend on discoveries, as in natural science, but on changes occurring in the very structure of human thinking. The division of paradigms into classical and non-classical is taken as a basis, which corresponds to scientific attitudes, namely, realism and constructivism. This methodology allowed us to associate ontological types of legal understanding with realism, which are based on metaphysical entities (God, reason, cosmos, nature), and with constructivism — a modern postmodern type of legal understanding that does not appeal to ontology. Considering the key concept of a crime through the prism of the designated paradigms (classical and non-classical), the author shows how, along with the evolution of attitudes towards a person, the view of the goals and objectives of criminal law changes, how the classical paradigm (the paradigm of responsibility) changes to the non-classical paradigm (the paradigm of security). Both of these paradigms determine the vector of development of criminal law and criminal policy formed as the result of development of the concept of man and society.