Rival Factions Research Articles

Belfast United: Encouraging Cross-Community Relations through Sport in Northern Ireland

Northern Ireland is a society which has a long history of community division. It is often claimed that sport has the capacity to serve as a medium for reconciliation between rival factions. Evidence suggests to the contrary that, in its native cultural setting, sport can reflect and even exaggerate existing divisions and this tends to be the case in Northern Ireland. Belfast United is a sport based community relations programme which carefully and deliberately manipulates the conditions under which sport is played in an attempt to promote better understanding between selected groups of young Protestants and Catholics living in Belfast. The highlight of the programme involves a residential experience and playing tour in the United States. Detailed evaluations reveal that, in the short term, exercises such as this can have a significant impression on the attitudes of the participants towards those affiliated with different religious traditions. The long term impact of Belfast United is almost impossible to gauge. The paper concludes by offering a series of principles which, after further research, may be adapted as a basis for good practice in the area of sport and community relations.

Elizabethan Civic Pageantry in Henry VI

At the point in Henry VI Part One where the private quarrel between Somerset and York is about to turn into open conflict marking the start of the Wars of the Roses, their respective supporters Vernon and Basset ask the king to arbitrate between wearing either red or white roses as badges of dynastic superiority. Henry spurns their dispute as frivolous, however, and demonstrates his point by casually plucking the closest rose to hand. He calls upon the rival factions instead to unite against the French and then departs with his counsellors, leaving Warwick to soothe York by explaining that Henry was trying to be conciliatory and really intended no show of partiality by his choice. York cuts short an angry outburst and exits with everybody except Exeter, who remains on stage to interpret as any 'simple man' would the dangers implied by Henry's performance and York's reaction. The interplay among characters at this crucial moment in Shakespeare's historical trilogy—Vernon and Basset presenting rival political claims under apparently trivial guises, Henry replying unwittingly in a symbolic act, Warwick and York watching and judging both performances, and Exeter commenting on all—recalls the typical dramatic relationship among stage-performers, actor-watchers, and general spectators of Elizabethan civic pageantry.

The Aouzou Strip Dispute—A Legal Analysis

The outbreak of further hostilities between Chad and Libya in August 1987 was occasioned by a dispute concerning sovereignty over the so-called Aouzou Strip in northern Chad. The extent of Libyan involvement in Chad is motivated to a large degree by this territorial claim. This dispute must be distinguished from Libya's wider ambitions for Arab unity or its involvement in Chad's civil war, although it would appear true to say that Libya was thereby seeking to consolidate its hold on the Aouzou Strip. Documentary evidence exists to support the contention that a genuine territorial claim exists. In addition, it is interesting to note that, while Libya appeared to have resigned itself to the victory of President Habre's forces in the civil war and the defeat and expulsion of its forces from the rest of Chad in the early part of 1987, the capture of Aouzou by Habre's forces in August 1987 resulted in an ongoing military response brought to a tentative conclusion in September 1987 by the OAU. Colonel Gadafi has been reported as saying that, if Chad ceded the Aouzou Strip, he would regard the war as over and would never again interfere in Chad's internal affairs. Moreover, Colonel Gadafi's support for the rival factions in Chad has wavered according to their position on the question of the Aouzou Strip. The purpose of this short article is to analyse Libya's territorial claim to the disputed territory.

Rhetoric of the conspiracy theory: Arguments in national front propaganda

Recent criticism in National Front publications of conspiracy theories involving Jews must be seen in their ‘argumentative context’. In fact, such rhetoric can be used for purely tactical purposes, in this case in the power struggle between two rival factions of the National Front. Furthermore, pro‐Zionism is not necessarily contradictory to antisemitism since it can reflect a desire to see Jews leave for Israel. Antisemitism remains a continuing influence among extreme right groups despite the fact that there seems to be no political advantage in such a stance.

Josephus on Parthian Babylonia (Antiquities XVIII, 310-379)

Book XVIII of Josephus' Jewish Antiquities concludes with an account of two incidents in the history of the Jews in Babylonia during the first century C.E. The first incident is the rise to power of two Jewish brothers from Nehardea who eventually rule (part of) Babylonia with the consent of the Parthian king. The second incident is a massacre of the Jews in Seleucia on the Tigris. The first part of the article attempts to identify the rival factions in Seleucia whose conflict, according to the Antiquities, was the background of the massacre. It is argued that this conflict was between the old Greco-Macedonian families and hellenized, wealthy Babylonians who had been admitted to citizenship in the po/is of Seleucia. The second part of the article argues that the sequential relation between the two incidents in the Antiquities is secondary and unhistorical. In reality the two incidents were simultaneous.

British Food Journal Volume 88 Issue 4 1986

An odd‐sounding expression recently introduced into the language, derived from the passage of events, Privatization, introduced as a rescue operation for sections of public and nationalised industry to hand them over to private enterprise to avoid their destruction and smothering by the unholy wedlock of trade unionism and weak, inefficient management. It frequently met with the opposition of unions and sections of staff. Efforts have been made to sabotage the take‐over and operation of the services by private firms, occasionally making them impossible to operate. This elementary operation was expected to achieve even greater success in the sections taken over and reduced the room for destructive manoeuvring by ajitator, much of which was caused independent of the unions. In the public services some of the antics between rival factions bordered on the ludicrous.

English Bordeaux in conflict: the execution of Pierre Vigier de la Rouselle and its aftermath, 1312–24

As capital of English Gascony, Bordeaux was critical to the maintenance of Plantagenet authority in the duchy. Unfortunately for those kings, conditions tended to undermine the fragile power they did have over the wealthy rity. First, the independent-minded, affluent ruling class had for years established themselves in rival factions; at the same time ducal officials had to try to retain their goodwill at the same time as they sought to curb their lawlessness. Second, in the later years of Edward I's reign, the French occupied and governed Bordeaux and much of the rest of the duchy as a consequence of their victory over the English in a relatively minor war. With the resumption of Plantagenet rule over Bordeaux shortly before the accession of Edward II, ducal control was very tenuous indeed, as rival factions now fought each other ostensibly over their English or French sympathies. The problem is clearly illustrated in the case of a Francophilic citizen of Bordeaux, Pierre Vigier de la Rouselle, an ex-ducal official executed for his public criticism of the Gascon government. Following his death and the confiscation of his property, Vigier's heirs and sons appealed for redress to the Parlement of Paris, the royal court of Edward II's Capetian overlord. The suit, dragging on there for at least twelve years, demonstrated how weak and inept the English authority was. As the French implicated both ducal officials and pro-English citizens of Bordeaux in the crime, the embarrassed Edward and his Gascon officials sought unsuccessfully to intimidate the appellants, fix culpability on scapegoats, and generally to deny any wrong-doing. Though sources provide no indication that the case ever concluded, it seems apparent that in the dispute over Vigier's death the importence of the English in their own ducal capital was only too clear.

General Prem Survives on a Conservative Line

THOSE WHO HAVE CLOSELY OBSERVED the way Thailand's Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond and some of his cabinet ministers conducted the affairs of state in the past two years agree that his first government faced real administrative and economic problems. The year 1981 was a turbulent year for General Prem, including a cabinet reshuffle, an abortive coup, rifts within the army, and the threat of a noconfidence debate from the Parliamentary opposition. Critics branded Prem as weak and indecisive. He was forced to make cabinet changes twice, one at the beginning and again at the end of the year, resulting in what are called the Prem II and Prem III governments. Nevertheless, Prem survived the year, and his personal integrity, his ability to compromise interests among rival military factions and among political parties in his coalition government, and his fatherly style of leadership contributed to his success. His loyalty to the monarchy was beyond doubt, and all his virtues, rare among government leaders, earned him reciprocal strong support from the Palace. The ability of the Prem government to overcome both political and economic crises resulted from his adopting a conservative line that was acceptable to Thai society. The Prem government has been less subject to criticism on foreign policy than on domestic policy. Prem exerted enormous efforts to encourage the formation of a coalition government among the three major Khmer political factions opposed to Vietnamese military occupation of Kampuchea. His policy on Kampuchea has been consistent since he came to power-to maintain a close link with China and to pursue increasing support from its ASEAN allies and the United States.

Perspective from Khao-I-Dang refugee camp.

I am the physician on duty tonight in this hospital of 900 beds, and, as such, I am charged with overall responsibility for most of the inmates. Fortunately, there is a skeleton crew on duty over in surgery, where some 35 wounded were brought in today from a skirmish out on the border of Makmun (now razed) about 20 km away. We do not know for certain who was wounded by whom, whose shells and bullets have wreaked this havoc, but, as always, rumours are rife : It was the Viets shelling the camp (but God knows for what reason); was a battle between the Khmer Serai and the Khmer Rouge; was an internecine power struggle between rival factions over some lucrative gold or smuggling trade; or It was the Thai military that attacked. When faced with this unnecessary carnage, who of us cares what the reasons for the attack are ? There lies a woman dying from a major wound in her thorax; there is no more to do. There is a man who is now legless from walking into a landmine outside the camp. As I write this, there is a sudden flurry of small-arms fire and the unpleasantly loud crump of 79s. These noises come from about 400 yards away, where a column of refugees, fleeing from the battle of today and the beastliness of life in Kampuchea, has encountered a patrol of the Thai military, whose task is to prevent any more refugees from entering this camp.* And in this miniature scenario the whole frightful problem can be crystallised.

Party Unity: Appearance and Reality

V. 0. Key states the standard criteria by which nominating conventions have to be judged successful. convention provides a means for the contending factions and within a party to consult and agree upon the terms on which they will work in the presidential campaign. The resulting of exerts a formidable power throughout the nation.1 The concert of interests referred to by V. 0. Key represents one end of a continuum or dimension that ranges from complete disunity to perfect harmony. There may be various steps or levels between the two extremes, each with its distinctive consequences. For example, the willingness of rival factions to come together at the convention-even though the of is less than complete-may mobilize the support of attentive partisans whose media exposure to convention events often constitutes their first act of participation in the presidential election campaign. The behavior of candidates, party leaders, and their supporters constitutes an important cue to followers outside. Repudiation of the nominee by the losing faction, a divisive floor

South Africa's Strategic Vulnerabilities: The ‘Citadel Assumption’

In assessing the patterns of conflict in southern Africa, it is commonplace to stress the theme of South Africa's overwhelming strengths against the threat of black nationalist forces. Most observers support this thesis of South African invulnerability by citing the country's enormous mineral resources, impressive military capabilities, continuing strategic importance and economic links with the west. Leonard Thompson (in Thompson and Butler, 1975: 408) ably summarized this popular view, citing other noteworthy domestic and international variables to buttress the point:In resisting “terrorists” South Africa's government has the ardent support of four million Whites who consider their very survival is at stake. South Africa has a far more powerful industrial base and far more formidable military equipment than any government that has been overthrown by guerrilla forces. It has the capacity to produce atomic weapons; the terrain in the vicinity of its borders is treeless or sparsely wooded savanna, which affords guerrillas scant opportunity for concealment. Moreover, the South African revolutionaries in exile are divided into rival factions; the capacity of Black African states to launch military expeditions against the Republic is limited by domestic economic and political weaknesses, interstate rivalries, and serious logistic problems; and neither the Soviet Union nor the People's Republic of China seems prepared to make a major commitment in southern Africa in the near future. Consequently, although guerrilla groups launched across South Africa's land frontiers may become a continual irritant to the regime, they do not seem likely to be able to overthrow it.

South Africa's Strategic Vulnerabilities: The 'Citadel Assumption' Reconsidered

In assessing the patterns of conflict in southern Africa, it is commonplace to stress the theme of South Africa's overwhelming strengths against the threat of black nationalist forces. Most observers support this thesis of South African invulnerability by citing the country's enormous mineral resources, impressive military capabilities, continuing strategic importance and economic links with the west. Leonard Thompson (in Thompson and Butler, 1975: 408) ably summarized this popular view, citing other noteworthy domestic and international variables to buttress the point: In resisting terrorists South Africa's government has the ardent support of four million Whites who consider their very survival is at stake. South Africa has a far more powerful industrial base and far more formidable military equipment than any government that has been overthrown by guerrilla forces. It has the capacity to produce atomic weapons; the terrain in the vicinity of its borders is treeless or sparsely wooded savanna, which affords guerrillas scant opportunity for concealment. Moreover, the South African revolutionaries in exile are divided into rival factions; the capacity of Black African states to launch military expeditions against the Republic is limited by domestic economic and political weaknesses, interstate rivalries, and serious logistic problems; and neither the Soviet Union nor the People's Republic of China seems prepared to make a major commitment in southern Africa in the near future. Consequently, although guerrilla groups launched across South Africa's land frontiers may become a continual irritant to the regime, they do not seem likely to be able to overthrow it.

The Reorientation of French Socialism, 1888–90

Historians are in general agreement that French socialism experienced a major reorientation at the end of the 1880's and the beginning of the 1890's. In 1888 the French socialist movement consisted of several diminutive and poorly organized factions, which could not claim, either singly or collectively, a significant national following despite nearly a decade of organizing and propagandizing. Yet by 1893 socialists were able to elect some forty deputies to the Chamber of Deputies, and in the previous year scored numerous victories in municipal elections. Electorally impotent in the 1880's, socialists became a serious force in national political life with the victories of 1893. Nearly simultaneously, the stalemate among rival factions was broken as schism in the ranks of both Possibilists and Blanquists permitted the Guesdists to emerge as the dominant organization. Finally, these years were marked by the appearance of a pragmatic, reformist socialism most clearly evident in the new moderation of the Guesdists and the rise of the Independent Socialists.

THE POLITICS OF UGANDA AS A ONE-PARTY STATE 1969–1970

WITHIN UGANDA there was in 1969 and 1970 a tendency, among both those who supported President Milton Obote and those who opposed him, to suggest that no significant political activity was taking place. Obote's supporters argued that the Uganda Peoples Congress was a united party leading the majority of the people in the 'Move to the Left'. Obote's opponents on the contrary saw Uganda as a police state, in which any form of opposition to Obote, whether from within or outside the UPC, was impossible. In practice neither characterization bears any significant resemblance to the truth. It is the aim of this article to outline some evidence indicating that there was serious political conflict at the highest level, during the brief but highly important period when Uganda had a de facto one-party state. Uganda achieved independence in 1962 with an uneasy coalition government based on the Uganda People's Congress lead by Obote and the Kabaka Yekka movement (loosely translated as 'Support Only the King'), a traditionalist, locally based party in Buganda.1 A second nation-wide party, the Democratic Party, which drew much of its strength from being identified as a party for Catholics, formed an opposition in parliament. Within two years so many of the Kabaka Yekka and Democratic Party MPs had crossed the floor, that the UPC was able with a comfortable majority to form a government on its own. However the UPC was not in as strong a position as it appeared to be. The party was split into rival factions most notably around John Kakonge and Grace Ibingira, while the Baganda traditionalists resented both the fact that a referendum had resulted in the return of the 'Lost Counties' from their kingdom of Buganda to their traditional rival, Bunyoro, and that KY had been excluded from the government. The tensions cumulated in early 1966 in an attempt to remove Obote, first by getting parliament to request the suspension of the Deputy Commander of the Army, Colonel Amin, while charges against him of corruption and gold smuggling were investigated. In the debate on the motion charges were

The Hindu Mahasabha and the Indian National Congress, 1915 to 1926

In1926, when it contested the general elections to the Imperial and Provincial Legislatures for the first time, the Indian National Congress was embroiled in a protracted struggle between rival factions for control of the Congress organisation. Electoral rivalries exacerbated existing factionalism and highlighted the often contradictory aims, methods and interests pursued by competing groups within the loose framework of the nationalist movement. If the non-cooperation campaign of 1920–21 had witnessed a national awakening and initiated a more aggressive phase in the history of Indian nationalism, the unity imposed upon the Congress proved fragile and temporary. The curious alliance of forces which had adhered to the Congress in the more confident days of the movement and which were mixed so promiscuously with the survivors of the old Congress, exposed the organisation and its leadership to greater strain in sustaining the united front once the impulse of the agitation had subsided and provincial, regional and sectarian forces began to re-assert themselves with a vengeance. The price of a tenuous unity in 1920 was increased competition and disruption within the Congress throughout the decade; a whirlpool of differences which, to many contemporaries in the thick of events, threatened to overwhelm it.

IS THE CHINESE "BAREFOOT DOCTOR" EXPORTABLE TO RURAL IRAN ?

The barefoot doctor in China has been regarded as successful due to his willingness to serve the community. The barefoot doctor is trained for short didactic periods followed by practical experience in the village under a physician or nurses supervision. The program emphasizes disease prevention and health education as well as screening to treat only minor problems. Barefoot doctors are trained according to the relative importance of different diseases in each region while they continue their normal occupation. Iran has similarly trained barefoot doctors but has encountered cultural and political dynamics problems. When VHW (village health workers) were chosen they were usually a relative of the village headman rather than a worker chosen by the villagers themselves. In addition women who could play an important role in maternal and child health and family planning were generally not allowed to leave the village for training. Iranian barefoot doctors favored curative medicine using injections rather than preventive medicine. However rival factions in the village distrusted the VHW believing the barefoot doctor would poison them. The Chinese barefoot doctor is not easily transportable to Iran due to village social structure rural medical assumptions and problems of organizing cooperative health delivery.

Sources of Conflict Over Priorities of the Protestant Church

Theor-etical approaches to internal conflict over priorities in the Presbyterian church are tested using surveys of laymen, ministers, and seminary seniors. Conflicts are greatest over the type and importance of church mission and outreach; there is little conflict over congregational life, religious education, or spiritual nurture. Path analysis shows that theological factors are intervening variables between all background variables and attitudes about church priorities. Orthodoxy and ethicalism act independently and in opposite directions. It is concluded that the conflict is largely theological, explained partly in terms of church-sect tension and partly by conflicting theological orientations in the denomination. Although conflict within the Christian church has been ever present, at times it has intensified when crucial debates came to focus. In recent years the conflict within American Protestantism has been intensifying with a heated debate about the priorities of the church and its proper role in society. The issue of church priorities has been the most important conflict in American Protestantism in the past decade. In the 1960s a complex of events and movements intensified feelings on the question. Prodded by the civil rights movement and the new youth culture, many church leaders have called for new emphasis on Christian social involvement, and this new call has ushered in the conflict about the proper functions and priorities of the church. Several American denominations are preoccupied with internal conflict in the early 1 970s, for viewpoints have crystallized and rival factions have organized themselves within them. This article discusses the conflict in one denomination, the United Presbyterian church in the U.S.A. Among Presbyterians the debate about church priorities has been growing since the middle 1960s. Many denominational leaders and ministers have strongly urged a more effective social witness, especially to combat the evils of racism in America. In opposition to them, a group of Presbyterian businessmen organized the Presbyterian Lay Committee in 1965, dedicated to moving the denomination away from social concerns and back to personal evangelism, maintenance of scripturetaught moral standards, and religious nurture of individuals. It strongly argues that any social action should be done by Christian individuals, not by organized church bodies. The church should leave social, economic, and political issues to individual Christians with competence in such matters. During the past several years the factions in the United Presbyterian church have battled over mission hudgets, church union, reorganization of denominational boards, and other issues. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO

Private interests and the origins of American involvement in Samoa, 1872–1877

first place. The treaty concluded by Meade at Pago Pago in 1872 was of course evidently influenced by private interests but the exact connexion between these interests and official action remains obscure. Even more mys terious is the motivation behind the appointment of Albert B. Steinberger as a State Department Special Agent to Samoa. The immediate background of the affair may be quickly traversed. Conflict between rival factions in Samoa led in the 1870s to extensive arms purchases and in turn to massive land sales, a situation which invited com mercial exploitation and big power intervention.2 A commercial stake on the part of the United States in particular was established through land speculation and the prospect of a steamship line linking the islands with San Francisco. William H. Webb, an influential New York shipowner, hoped to secure a national subsidy for his line, and James B. M. Stewart, who had begun purchasing land in Samoa in 1871, planned the develop ment of a great Pacific entrepot under American control.3 In August 1871 Webb sent a trader who knew Samoa, Captain Edgar Wakeman, to the islands to examine harbour facilities and general commercial prospects. A month later Wakeman recommended Pago Pago harbour on the island

Political Historiography in Restoration France

The publication in 1814 of De la monarchie franpaise, by M. le Comte de Montlosier, was to inaugurate a debate over the development of French history which made the period of the Bourbon Restoration, and especially the first six years of it, one of the most seminal in French historiography. The history of the writing and publication of the book are in themselves illustrations of the turbulent course of French affairs during the early nineteenth century. At the beginning of his consulship, Napoleon was eager to have a national history which would integrate the ancien regime, the Revolution, and the re-establishment of order by himself into a single narrative framework, so as to provide a perspective on history which could be shared by all the rival factions in the nation. Not expecting much assistance in this matter from the members of the Institut, he turned to the party of counter-revolutionaries, in the hope of finding there an historian capable of linking the old and new regimes in comprehensive unity. In this search, he hit upon the Comte de Montlosier, an ex-emigre, an ex-deputy of the Second Estate in the StatesGeneral, a violent defender of privilege, and a noted anti-revolutionary. That Napoleon could expect a conciliatory history from the pen of such a staunch reactionary is indeed surprising; nevertheless, in 1804 Montlosier was directed to compose a history describing, first, the ancient state of France and its institutions; second, the manner in which the revolution had arisen from this state of affairs; third, the tentative efforts made to combat it; and fourth, the success obtained by the first consul in this respect. The book was to be completed in a few months' time, in order to celebrate the final triumph of Napoleon the re-establishment of the hereditary monarchy. Montlosier applied himself to the task, but his labors took considerably more than the allotted time. In fact, Napoleon had to celebrate the next stage of his restoration without the publication of the national history which was designed to justify it. Eventually, in 1807, the work was finished and submitted to the examining commission. The work must have brought great disappointment to the Emperor, for there was no element of reconciliation in it. Montlosier expressed in no uncertain terms his unshakable convic-

Parties and Politics in the Philippines

To understand present-day Philippine politics, one must consider the evolution of the country's political structure since late Spanish and early American colonial times. Briefly, the nationwide two-party system of today, under whose aegis contests are held for all types of elective office from barrio lieutenant (village head) to the presidency of the Republic, evolved out of an earlier pattern of purely local politics. In 1898, when American colonial rule was imposed, each municipality had its wealthy and educated Filipino families whose rivalry for prestige and influence extended back into the Spanish colonial period. During the latter part of that period members of these leading families (the principales), who in many towns had grouped themselves loosely into rival factions, had been allowed to compete for election to the post of gobernadorcillo (municipal mayor) by an electoral college chosen by lot among their own number. This pattern remained unchanged during the first few years of American rule. Initially, property and literacy requirements under the new regime restricted the franchise to essentially the same local elite who had held municipal offices in late Spanish times, and local politics continued in the old way. During late Spanish and early American years, electioneering could be confined to the poblacion-the market town and principal barrio of the municipality which serves as the seat of municipal government and contains the homes of most of the wealthier citizens, i.e., those most likely to vote under the restricted franchise of the early period. But as the American period progressed, the arena of political campaigning became larger and political organization grew more complicated. This was the result of two innovations, both of which stemmed from the American decision to prepare the Philippines for eventual independence by entrusting Filipinos, as early as possible, with the operation of a wide variety of representative institutions of government. One change was the increase in the size of electorate through the reduction of voting qualifications; the other was the extension of the elective principle to higher levels of government. The gradual reduction and final abandonment of property qualifications for voting, the elimination of the cedula (poll tax) and the liberalization and growing non-enforcement of literacy requirements meant that more peasants in the outlying barrios began to cast votes and, concomitantly, that the poblacion candidates were forced to cultivate the barrios. This