Kabul Regime Research Articles

Fear of predicament of the Afghans- A Transformation of life in Nadia Hashimi’s When The Moon is Low

Nadia Hashimi is a pediatrician and an outstanding novelist. Her clear and lucid style achieved the clear manipulation of ideas and words gives a comprehensive picture of Afghan reality to a larger audience outside the country. In her novel When The Moon is Low she deals with the problems face by the Afghans in Taliban’s regimes and their migrating experience. This study focus on the crisis faces by the Afghans in the name of violence, suffering due to the incredible power of the Taliban regime. Due to their hazardous violence, many Afghans wish to flew from their country. It also exposes the realistic pictures of the Taliban regime in Kabul, which affects the Afghans.

«Афганский филиал» ИГИЛ как угроза Центральной Азии

The neighborhood with Afghanistan creates many serious security challenges for the post-Soviet states of the Central Asian region. This is not only due to the general turbulence associated with the collapse of the American-backed regime in Kabul and the rise to power of the radical Islamist movement. The growing activity of the local branch of the transnational jihadist network “Islamic State – Khorasan Province” (ISIL, ISIS, IS – the terrorist organization banned in Russia) gives particular urgency to the danger emanating from the Afghan land. The activities of this extremist group are not limited to terrorist attacks against representatives of the current Afghan authorities. The terrorists acting under the banner of ISIS are actively conducting propaganda activities aimed at the population of the post-Soviet countries of Central Asia (primarily Uzbekistan and Tajikistan), recruiting supporters and undermining the socio-political situation. The article examines the main directions of such activities of the supporters of the “Khorasan project” and expresses thoughts on ways to counteract this danger.

Recognition of the Strategic Situation of US-China Relations after the U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Focusing on Policy Implications for Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula

Purpose: The re-occupation of Afghanistan by the U.S. troops and the Taliban gives many lessons to the security of the Korean Peninsula. As shown in Vietnam Communization, the poor Taliban troops beat the rich troops of the U.S.-backed Kabul regime, which lacks a will to fight and strategy. The purpose of this study is to discover the implications of the Biden administration s withdrawal from Afghanistan with a neoliberal perspective and its implications for security and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. Method: This paper analyzes the US withdrawal from Afghanistan with the theory of Radall Schweller s neoclassical realism and explains political implications toward the Korean Peninsula. This paper will examine four major domestic factors in neoclassical realism focus on nationalism, military ability to mobilize, the influence of domestic interest groups, and nationalism and ideology. It suggests four implications over security and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula by using the theory of the Neo-classical realism s perspective. Results: First, the withdrawal of the U.S. from Afghanistan can be seen as an expression of shrinking nationalism stemming from the U.S. priority that has emerged since the Trump era. Second, the continued burden of the war due to the worsening financial situation in the U.S. due to COVID-19 and the fatigue of the accumulated war was a cause for the US to withdraw from Afghanistan. Third, to win the votes of the white middle class in the Midwest of the United States, known as Trump s supporters, President Biden decided to withdraw from the need to rebuild the middle class. Fourth, the U.S. Biden administration decided to withdraw troops to focus on checking China, an authoritarian regime, based on value diplomacy that values democracy and human rights. Conclusion: As the Biden administration put more weight on checking China, the declaration of the end of the war pushed by the Moon Jae-in administration has been put on the back burner. The end-of-war declaration pushed by the South Korean government is opposed by the U.S. government as it weakens the justification for the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea that is a strategic hub for checking China. The Biden administration is implementing a policy to actively intervene in human rights issues in China and North Korea, focusing on value diplomacy, and is tightening sanctions against those involved, worsening the atmosphere of dialogue for negotiations. South Korea needs quiet diplomacy to promote the peace process. The U.S. sanctions on North Korea are creating an atmosphere and cause for North Korea to provoke more militarily in the future, raising the need to maintain a military response posture to South Korea and the US.

The Taliban’s Takeover of Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Non‐traditional Security Challenges

AbstractThe Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan has brought both opportunities and challenges for Pakistan. As Islamabad is relieved by India's exit from Afghanistan, it continues to worry more about the spill‐over of the situation in Afghanistan into Pakistan. Among key non‐traditional security challenges are extremism, terrorism, refugees and drug trafficking and Islamabad continues to express serious concerns on how the new development in Afghanistan can pose a serious threat to Pakistan's peace and security. With a friendly regime in Kabul, however, Pakistan has an opportunity to handle these challenges through a mix of bilateral and multilateral options. By examining historical and contemporary dynamics, this article assesses the seriousness of non‐traditional security threats vis‐à‐vis Afghanistan for Pakistan. Islamabad's immediate non‐traditional security concerns focus on how the new developments in Afghanistan will possibly influence religious extremism and terrorism at home. Finally, the article outlines policy recommendations for Pakistan's engagement in the Taliban‐led Afghanistan.

“Аль-Каида” и “Талибан”: амбивалентное партнерство

The nature of the Taliban–al-Qaeda relationship has long been a major controversy among experts. Some argue that the Taliban and al-Qaeda are synonymous in many respects and that their ideology and objectives are closely intertwined. Some believe that this is a relationship of convenience or necessity for both groups, while others insist on deeper personal and ideological ties. Given this public discourse, the author analyzes the ambivalent relationship between al-Qaeda and the Taliban over the past 25 years, which has always been of business nature (comprehensive assistance in exchange for sanctuary), but never a political alliance. Al-Qaeda’s globalist plans to create a mythical caliphate have always contradicted the Taliban’s modest goals: to restore order in the country by pacifying corrupt warlords, to form an efficient government that enforces Sharia law, and to achieve international recognition. At the initial stage, the al-Qaeda leadership did not comply with the restrictions imposed on them by the Taliban and behaved independently, which resulted in foreign intervention and the loss of power. The author concludes that the strategic goals of al-Qaeda posed a direct threat to the nationally oriented goals of the Taliban. However, in the 2000s, the Taliban’s ties to al-Qaeda were important for spreading the insurgency in Afghanistan, although al-Qaeda’s military contribution on the battlefield was very modest. The author focuses on the weakening of opportunities and the degradation of the influence of al-Qaeda under powerful pressure from the coalition forces, the Afghan and Pakistani governments. In recent years, al-Qaeda, amid the victories of the Taliban, has begun to rebuild its positions in Afghanistan. The article shows the dependence of the al-Qaeda leadership, which has nowhere to hide, on the new regime in Kabul, which allows the Taliban to better control the militants of this terrorist organization.

China and Afghanistan: the State of Relations after the Withdrawal of U.S. Troops

The article describes the state and directions of Sino-Afghan relations after the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan in August 2021. To substantiate a number of points, it provides information about Sino-Afghan relations under the former, republican government of the country. The Chinese stance on establishing ties with the Taliban who seized power in Afghanistan on August 15, 2021 is analyzed, its motivation and main provisions, including non-interference in the internal affairs, rejection of the financial sanctions against the new regime, etc., are described. It is pointed out that China's main interests in Afghanistan are, firstly, to ensure the security of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the PRC, which for decades has been the target of Uyghur separatists from Afghanistan (the ETIM movement). And, secondarily, with the prospects for developing the country's enormous, valuable natural resources, as well as using its geographical location to create an infrastructure system in Central and South Asia. The current state of economic cooperation between China and the new Afghan authorities is described, and its goals and difficulties are revealed. The reasons for China's restrained political behavior in Afghanistan with an explicit focus on the economic aspect of bilateral dialogue are also discussed. The issue of Beijing's diplomatic recognition of the new Kabul regime is raised and it is noted that it will not be rapid due to the risk of reputational losses for China and the ambiguous perception of the Taliban in the world. It concludes with the question of what China can expect if Afghanistan's economic development is not a priority for the Taliban authorities and China's strive to cooperation is not adequately responded to? It concludes that, despite circumstances favoring the PRC's entry into Afghanistan's political and economic landscape, conditions for a close bilateral partnership with the Taliban are not yet ripe due to its riskiness and prognostic uncertainty.

War, refugees and regional implications: The impact of Afghan refugees on local society of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan

The migration of Afghan refugees into Pakistan started in the wake of Saur (Red) Revolution in 1978, as a result of reforms introduced by the communist regime in Kabul, Afghanistan. However the large influx of refugees to Pakistan took place soon after the invasion of Soviet Union in 1979. Pakistan provided asylum for the approximately 4.2 million refugees. They were settled in 386 camps mostly in rural as well as in urban areas of the country. But the most populous province that has large number of Afghan refugees was Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) (that time N.W.F.P), which has long border (Durand line) with Afghanistan, and also has cultural, religious, and linguistics ties. This large number of immigrants generated grave consequences for Pakistan, especially for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. They have affected the socio-economic and political life of the province. The main objective of the study was to find out the socio-economic impact of Afghan Refugees living for more than three decades in the host society of KP. An empirical and analytical methodological approach was adopted for this study. To conclude the findings, the research reveals that that Afghan Refugees have not only affected the social set-up but also the economy of the local host society by introducing various type of social evils like begging, drugs culture, Kalashnikov culture (AK-47), Galemjum culture (prostitution) and corruption.

Implications of the Enigmatic Rise of Taliban: A Historical Perspective

The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 1994 was the opening of a new chapter in the current Afghan history while Afghanistan's socio-political environment was in disorder. The emergence of the Taliban was a new phenomenon, and no one expected that an ordinary militia would become a strong power in Afghanistan. Taliban was a highly secret force that had neither formal structure nor any formal membership. It was also believed that the Taliban were Pakistan protege. Their rise to power in Afghanistan had a profound impact on Pakistan's society. Violence, drug trade, corruption and soared with the rise of the Taliban. Pakistan aimed in the militia support a friendly regime in Kabul and strategic equilibrium in the region. However, the Taliban harsh policies against women and Human Rights violations invoked international criticism. Taliban had no economic vision except for revenue from the drug trade and smuggling of goods via the Durand Line. Their policies had serious implications for the region and the globe. The Taliban support and provision of sanctuaries to Al-Qaida invited international sanctions. The September 11 Terrorist attack on US soil ultimately turned into the fall of the Taliban.

The Myth of the “Afghan Trap”: Zbigniew Brzezinski and Afghanistan, 1978–1979

In an interview with French magazine Le Nouvel Observateur in January 1998, former U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski recounted that “according to the official version of history, CIA aid to the mujahideen began during 1980, that is, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But the reality, kept secret until now, is quite different: Indeed, it was on July 3, 1979, that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul.” This admission—corroborating previous disclosures by the CIA’s Charles Cogan and Robert Gates—was quite innocuous on its own, but Brzezinski was further quoted alleging that “on that day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid would lead to a Soviet military intervention.” He admitted that the administration had “knowingly increased the probability” that the Soviets would intervene militarily, and maintained that he had no regrets as the “secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap.” He added that on the “day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, in essence: ‘We now have the opportunity of giving the USSR its Vietnam War,’” and boasted that “for almost ten years, Moscow had to wage an unbearable war for the regime, a conflict that led to the demoralization and ultimately the breakup of the Soviet empire.”1

Afghanistan: Finding Peace Amidst Chaos

The stop-start Afghanistan peace process has suffred set-backs due to volatile conditions of the two major parties involved – the Kabul regime and the Taliban insurgency –particularly internal instability of both the actors. Kabul's tenuous hold on much of its territory and struggle to balance its survival and legitimacy; and Taliban's leadership struggles after the loss of its two leaders in a short period of time have ceated major challanges. The role of foreign militants and groups, especially those Afghan militants who have attached themselves to the self-styled Da'ish (ISIS) caliphate, is also instrumental. The challenges that Kabul government faces both in legitimacy and cohesion which largely stem from its reliance on foreign forces underlines the difficulties on the path to any meaningful settlement. Peace talks have been badly undermined by the attempts of the two groups to strengthen their bargaining position and the resultant bad faith in the relations.

Pakistan

Pakistan

Decision-Making and the Soviet War in Afghanistan: From Intervention to Withdrawal

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan sparked acute Cold War tensions. The war soon became an undesirable distraction and burden for Soviet leaders, who did not expect to spend most of the 1980s propping up a client regime in Kabul. Drawing on archival sources and interviews, this article traces Soviet decision-making from the intervention in late 1979 to the final withdrawal in early 1989. The article shows that the supporters of the Soviet intervention believed that Soviet military and economic aid efforts were making progress and should not be aborted early. They warned that a premature withdrawal would undermine Soviet prestige in the Third World. Before Mikhail Gorbachev came to power and to some extent afterward, the supporters of intervention were usually able to silence or sideline their critics through deft political maneuvering.

Afghanistan's post-Taliban transition: the state of state-building after war

This paper assesses the effectiveness of the 'post-conflict' political transition process that created the Kabul regime. Specifically, this paper will review and critique the Bonn Agreement and Process--the major driver for Afghanistan's post-conflict transition: assess the current situation in Afghanistan, and examine prospects for Afghan democratization, development and stability. It will identify the oppportunities and obstacles generated from Afghanistan's transition for peace, stability and nation building after three decades of state failure.

Beyond the Steppe: Projecting Power into the New Central Asia

The US and the West generally should not retreat from the strategic windfall that accompanied Operation Enduring Freedom. The prestige of American power remains liked to the survival of the Karzai regime in Kabul. In addition, there are vital geopolitical reasons, including, especially, energy concerns, that reinforce Western stakes in Central Asia. Indications at this time are that locals are quite receptive to the new Western military presence and also to the import of more concrete security structures. The threat from Islamic extremism seems to be in retreat. This trend is likely to continue if Western governments actively engage, rather than alienate. NIS governments on issues of human rights. Some specific recommendations include the following: employ regional structures where possible, upgrade Partnership for Peace (PfP) relationships, favor the northern tier states to leverage progress on human rights among the southern tier states, send NIS peacekeepers into Afghanistan, and combat drug cultivation with market incentives. It is also important to focus narrowly on developing the Fergana Valley as the strategic center of all of Central Asia, to avoid antagonizing Moscow, and to maintain a visible, but strictly limited military presence in the NIS.

Antonio Giustozzi. War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan 1978-1992. First published by C. Hurst & Co. London. Printed in India, 2000, 320 p.

This book mainly deals with the evolution of military and political tactics during the period concerned. The author believes that while the mutual relationship of political, social and military aspects of the Afghan Resistance has been analysed satisfactorily, the same has not been done with regard to the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. Therefore, he is willing to pay attention to the military aspects of this period. The book is divided into four parts. In Part One, he deals with the Limits of So...

The India-Pakistan Dispute over Jammu and Kashmir and the United States

The audacious and devastating attacks by Islamic militants on the World Trade Center (WTC) and the Pentagon in the United States on September 11, 2001 constitute a watershed event in modern world history whose repercussions are still being felt everywhere. The subsequent attempts by the United States to build a global coalition against terrorism and the military action that it initiated in Afghanistan which saw the collapse of the Taliban regime in Kabul had far-reaching implications for the geopolitics of the region and far beyond. This paper, however, seeks to focus on the American decision to convert Pakistan yet again into a 'frontline state', this time in its fight against international terrorism, and the implications of this partnership for India-Pakistan relations, particularly their dispute over Jammu and Kashmir (hereafter 'Kashmir').

Afghanistan in 1996: Year of the Taliban

At the end of 1995, the Taliban, a movement of Islamic students, mullahs, Pushtun tribesmen, and ex-mujahidin with the backing of Pakistan, had been repulsed for the second time from the gates of Kabul by the forces of the Kabul regime under their famed commander, Ahmed Shah Mas'ud. At the end of 1996, through their occupation of the three eastern provinces and Kabul itself in September, they had perhaps decisively tipped the scale in the Afghan civil war. The Taliban's successes gave them threequarters of the territory of Afghanistan but led in turn to an alliance of their two main opponents, Uzbek General Abdul Rashid Dostam and Ahmed Shah Mas'ud's largely Tajik forces. The year marked the revival of the United Nation's mediation efforts under a new special representative. There was also a renewal of U.S. interest in the Afghan situation, coupled with alarm in Russia and the Central Asian states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as the war drew closer to their borders.

The Decline of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan

The collapse of the Najibullah regime in Kabul in April 1992 not only ended the communist era in Afghanistan but also heralded the end of Pashtun dominance in Afghan politics. Indeed, for many commentators as well as politicians this change in ethnic relations was more significant than the defeat of communism. After briefly discussing the history of ethnic relations in Afghanistan, this essay will describe the decline of the Pashtuns in Afghan politics since April 1992, examine the causes of the decline, and speculate about the future of the nation's ethnic relations.

Moscow and the Gulf War: Decisions and Consequences

The cooperation of the two superpowers during the Gulf crisis of 1990-1 confirmed how far they had moved from rivalry to reconciliation. Although the two were not always in complete agreement on tactics, Moscow's partnership was essential to the successful reversal of Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait. It was also the most dramatic manifestation of Mikhail Gorbachev's 'new thinking' operating in the Third World. In 1987 he had signalled his determination to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan, but that move had been prompted by a number of objectives for example, stopping what he had referred to at the Twenty-Seventh Congress of the Communist Party in February 1986 as the country's 'bleeding wound,'1 redirecting domestic attention to the restructuring of Soviet society, and improving relations with the United States, China, and key Muslim countries. His actions during the Gulf crisis, however, were driven by but one consideration his determination to consolidate the Soviet Union's already transformed relationship with the United States. Moreover, in Afghanistan, the Soviet withdrawal was the disappointing end of a three-year-long search for an alternative that would have permitted Moscow to hold on to its puppet regime in Kabul, in the hope that President Najibullah would find some way of remaining in power;

The Changing Interests of the Regional Powers and the Resolution of the Afghan Conflict

T he conflict in Afghanistan is extremely complex. Involving numerous Afghan components and intense regional rivalries, it had a very salient Cold War dimension during the 1980s. At each level, it involves multiple actors with diverse objectives. Furthermore, the conflict's domestic, regional, and global dimensions continuously interact with each other, resulting in its great complexity. In this article I am concerned with the interaction of the interests of regional powers and their impact on the resolution of the Afghan conflict. There is a consensus among scholars and policymakers that Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia are the major regional powers with substantial interest and sustained involvement in the Afghan conflict. Although India was supportive of the communist regime in Kabul, she never had the kind of influence in the conflict that Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia have enjoyed. Similarly, although Turkey and Uzbekistan have become relevant to the Afghan conflict during the past two years, their influence is still rather insignificant. Thus, I will focus on the interactions of Iranian, Pakistani, and Saudi interests. As far as the involvement of regional powers is concerned, three phases are identifiable in the development of the Afghan conflict. Phase one began with the Soviet invasion in December 1979 and ended with the 1988 signing of the Geneva Accords, which provided the framework for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Phase two started with the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet forces in mid-1988 and ended with the collapse of Najibullah's regime in April 1992. Phase three began with the Mujahideen's as-