Moral Hope:Aquinas and Cajetan on Magnanimity1 Nicholas Austin S.J. It is lamentable that the concept of magnanimity has largely retired from active service in our moral discourse. Anodyne labels such as "self-esteem," and even old expressions for vices, like "ambition" and "pride," often act as quasi-virtue terms; "magnanimity," with its deep genealogy, languishes. Yet one may well hesitate to recall magnanimity to active duty. Today we are unclear what magnanimity is, and the vague idea we have of it leaves us unsure of its ethical credentials. Aristotle's classic portrayal of this virtue of greatness gives the impression of an elitist, aristocratic ideal.2 The magnanimous man has a high opinion of his greatness. He is conscious of the rewards, especially those of status and wealth, that are due to him. From his perch of isolated independence, he looks down on his many inferiors. John Casey opines, "it goes without saying that [Aristotle's magnanimous man] is directly opposed to Christian humility."3 Even Alasdair MacIntyre, one of the best-known advocates for the retrieval of Aristotelian virtue, consistently complains that Aristotle's magnanimous man is guilty of "an illusion of self-sufficiency … all too characteristic of [End Page 817] the rich and powerful in many times and places."4 Magnanimity's few champions today often turn to Thomas Aquinas to answer the charge of moral elitism.5 Aquinas brilliantly places the apparently opposed virtues of magnanimity and humility in mutually interpretive dialectic.6 These two habits work in contrariwise directions: humility tempers the will for an arduous good; magnanimity fosters it. Yet they meet in the rational mean, since both rest on self-knowledge, whether of weakness or worth.7 The marriage of this unlikely couple corrects both the self-effacement that masquerades as humility and the presumptuous pride with which magnanimity is easily confused. "Humble magnanimity," therefore, names a dynamic tension between contrasting moral qualities that cannot rightly be conceived without each other. To ready magnanimity for a return to vigorous duty, however, requires more than its reconciliation with humility. Still required is a cogent account of what exactly magnanimity is, and why today we should acknowledge it as a virtue. In this essay, I seek to show that magnanimity is both intelligible and attractive when understood as a quality of moral hope. To analyze magnanimity, I work from the principle that Aquinas lays down when he defines virtue in the Summa theologiae [ST]: "The complete concept of [End Page 818] anything is gathered from all its causes."8 I have argued elsewhere that this principle entails a fruitful "causal" approach to delineating the contours of a specific virtue by identifying its causal principles (material, formal, final, and efficient).9 I therefore offer a definition by identifying what the virtue is about (matter), what work the virtue does in this sphere (mode), which persons bear it (subject), what target it is directed toward (object), and what brings it about (efficient cause). At its core, I argue, is the well-ordered hope for excellent moral agency. In my argument I draw generously, and perhaps controversially, from significant figures in the Thomist tradition, especially Thomas de Vio Cajetan († 1534).10 I find the turn to tradition necessary because of an especially intractable problem I encountered in my attempt to causally analyze the virtue of great-heartedness. The aporia concerns magnanimity's very object: to what great things does the virtue of greatness tend? The classical sources are marked by a disconcerting ambivalence on this question.11 Even in Aquinas, magnanimity can seem shockingly Janus-faced, appearing first as an Aristotelian orientation to great honor and then as a Ciceronian aspiration to great moral achievement.12 It is unclear which of these two dispositions is more essential, how they are related, and even whether they are mutually compatible. A promising resolution, both to the theoretical problem about magnanimity's nature and to the hermeneutical question of how to read the text, lies in Cajetan's "very luminous commentary"13 on Aquinas's first article on magnanimity in ST. My own account of magnanimity's twofold object follows Cajetan's analysis but also raises—and attempts...
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