Defending Shame: Its Formative Power in Paul’s Letters

Abstract

Te-Li Lau’s Defending Shame is a wise and timely essay on the role of shame in moral formation. His aim is not only historical but also pastoral: to position Pauline shame as the remedy to our current “fractured understanding of shame” (p. 1). “What we need,” Lau contends, “is not the extirpation of shame but a nuanced understanding of the complexity of shame that leads to human flourishing. The apostle Paul can help us point the way” (pp. 5–6).In ch. 1, Lau establishes his understanding of shame as “the painful emotion that arises from an awareness that one has fallen short of some standard, ideal, or goal” (p. 29). In so doing, he makes several critical observations. First, modern distinctions between guilt (a productive negative emotion) and shame (a destructive negative emotion) are misguided. The boundaries between these two concepts are fuzzy (pp. 22–24). Second, conceptual distinctions in the shame lexicon of one language—for example, the distinction in English between the occurrent experience of shame (a negative emotion) and dispositional shame (an inhibition that restrains one from pursuing certain deleterious actions)—may not be present in another. Thus, Greeks and Romans “used the same lexeme (αἰσχύνη, αἰδώς, pudor) for the dispositional and the occurrent understanding of shame” (p. 25). Third, then, an accurate assessment of shame must be context specific and culturally sensitive (p. 29).In ch. 2, Lau examines “Greco-Roman Backgrounds” of shame. While the shame lexicon of these authors is vast, Lau focuses on two terms, αἰδώς and αἰσχύνη. A diachronic survey of αἰδώς and αἰσχύνη suggests that “both embody prospective and retrospective aspects of shame, and both can denote a sense of shame or the occurrent experience of shame itself” (p. 55). He notes that “shame plays a major role in the Greco-Roman system of moral formation” in three ways (p. 57). First, prospective shame, the disposition to avoid what is destructive to the self and society, is indispensable to moral formation (p. 57). Second, retrospective shame, provocation to feel ashamed as a consequence of illicit actions, is necessary for eliciting remorse. Such shaming refutation, however, does not stand alone but is accompanied “with praise and gentle admonition so that the individual is not overwhelmed with grief and anger” (p. 58). Finally, Aristotelian and Stoic moral psychology suggests that shame is “a self-conscious moral emotion” designed to direct human cognition, emotion, and desire toward virtuous ends (p. 59).In ch. 3, Lau turns to the “Jewish Backgrounds” of shame. Herein he examines the shame lexicon of the Hebrew Bible, in particular, חפר,כלם , and בושׁ. Lau anchors the “Jewish” concept of shame in Gen 3 (pp. 63–67) and then examines the operations of prospective and retrospective shame in the context of covenantal life (pp. 67–84). Shame plays an essential role in both the divine-human relationship—prospectively discouraging behaviors that are sure to bring about covenantal curses, while retrospectively calling those under the curses to repentance—as well as human relationships within the covenant community—prospectively stigmatizing socially deviant behaviors, while retrospectively punishing offenders in the hope that they might be restored and reintegrated into the community.Chapters 4–6 treat the role of shame in select Pauline. In ch. 4, Lau examines Paul’s use of retrospective shame in Galatians and 1 Corinthians. The situation in these letters is dire: the Galatians have turned to “another gospel,” while the Corinthians are plagued by social divisions and ethical complacency. Paul thus shames his addressees for failing to evaluate their situations through the divine perspective. His shaming refutations are designed to inflict pain on his audience so that they might change course and adopt the mind of Christ. Yet Paul does not wield shame haphazardly, Lau argues (p. 122). For instance, in Galatians, he uses shame as a pedagogical prod to guide the audience to his central plea, “become as I am” (4:12; p. 106). Likewise, in 1 Corinthians, Paul introduces shame as a device he uses “to admonish” the audience “as beloved children” (1 Cor 4:14; reading νουθετέω as the goal of ἐντρέπω, p. 111). Indeed, therein resides “the paradigm of Paul’s shaming rhetoric” in 1 Corinthians (p. 118).In ch. 5, Lau turns to prospective shame in Philippians and Philemon. Paul’s aim, in Philippians, is to inculcate a Christic phronēsis (Phil 2:5–11), and he deploys honor and shame discourse to that end: first, to ensure that the Philippians make every effort to pursue actions that are honorable before the God of Jesus Christ (p. 137); second, to unite the Philippians in agreement over what is honorable and shameful (p. 138); and third, “to construct a Christian conscience or sense of shame that sees the entirety of life from the perspective of Christ” (p. 139). In Philemon, Paul’s use of prospective shame is more direct. However, according to Lau, Paul wants more than mere compliance: he “wants Philemon to do the right thing for the right reasons” (p. 146, his emphasis). That is, Paul wants to persuade Philemon to act in alignment with the will of God (p. 147).In ch. 6, Lau synthesizes the results of the previous two chapters to provide “a coherent understanding regarding Paul’s use of shame” (p. 149). The first half of the chapter treats five facets of Pauline shame: (1) Paul’s shame lexicon, (2) the centrality of the cross in Pauline honor and shame, (3) Paul’s assumption that shame is both the objective consequence of sin and the subjective experience of the sinner; (4) the overlapping roles of shame and conscience in moral judgments, and (5) Paul’s use of shame to elicit repentance and restoration (pp. 151–57). The second half of the chapter summarizes and examines how shame operates in Pauline moral formation. Prospective shame is dispositional. It may entail “the occurrent experience of shame concerning a prospective blow to one’s honor” (e.g., Philemon), but this need not be the case (e.g., Philippians; p. 157). Retrospective shame, by contrast, always aims to elicit a “painful occurrent experience of shame” (p. 160). Paul reserves it for dire circumstances (Galatians, 1 Corinthians). Ultimately, the efficacy of Pauline shame relies on the transformative power of the Holy Spirit (pp. 167–70).In ch. 7, Lau sets his study of Pauline shame in dialogue with John Braithwaite’s reintegrative shaming theory (RTS) and Confucian shame. RTS, as Lau notes, shares common features with Pauline shame. For example, Braithwaite distinguishes between disintegrative shaming (DS), the act of shaming an offender without and any limit or plan to restore them, and reintegrative shaming (RS), the act of shaming an offender with set limits, a communitarian framework, and a plan to restore them (p. 179). Lau observes a similar distinction in Paul between αἰσχύνη (DS) and ἐντροπή (RS; pp. 183–85). Equally illuminating is Lau’s discussion of shame in Confucian thought. He notes, “there are 113 prototypical terms for shame in the Chinese language, divided into six clusters of meaning” (p. 189). Like Paul, Confucius “considers shame to function like a conscience or internal regulatory apparatus” (p. 192), so that “cultivating a proper sense of shame” becomes an integral element of moral formation (pp. 195–96). Of course, Pauline shame differs from RTS and Confucian shame in significant ways (pp. 186–88, 197–99). Yet Lau demonstrates how both approaches help to clarify aspects of Pauline shame, even as they remind us that “the function and reception of shame is highly context sensitive” (p. 202).In the final chapter, “Contemporary Challenges,” Lau addresses major obstacles to the roll of shame in moral formation. The first challenge, “Guilt, Not Shame, is the Preferred Moral Emotion,” is problematic for several reasons. For example, it assumes that modern notions of shame and guilt are transcultural, when, in fact, Paul’s shame lexicon “collapse[s] our contemporary understanding of shame and guilt into a single concept” (p. 208). Moreover, the modern penchant for guilt, which focuses on the action (“I did that horrible thing”), instead of shame, which focuses on identity (“I did that horrible thing,” p. 213), “leaves us with a neutered program for moral progress” (p. 214). The second challenge, “Evocation of Shame Is Manipulative, Even Coercive,” falters because it conflates coercion, manipulation, and persuasion. Whereas coercion and manipulation seek to lead others astray and to negate their freedom to choose, persuasion never seeks to lead others astray, always remains transparent, and always respects their freedom to choose (p. 218). Pauline shame relies on persuasion, never manipulation or coercion (pp. 219–21). The final challenge Lau addresses is the claim that “Shame Is Toxic and Destructive.” Pauline shame, however, recognizes that our sense of shame may not be calibrated to the divine perspective. Thus, its aim is not the destruction of self-esteem as such, but “a faulty self-esteem” (p. 223). Pauline shame is careful, communitarian, restricted in time and tempo, and calibrated toward restoration (pp. 225–30).Lau’s interdisciplinary approach to shame makes a number of important contributions. His assessment of shame as a moral emotion grounded in ancient philosophical discourse provides a persuasive lens for evaluating shaming rhetoric in Paul. One suspects that his approach will influence further scholarship. Lau also exposes serious flaws in popular binaries between guilt and shame as well as persuasively argues that the solution to our “fractured understanding of shame” is not the elimination of shame, as if that were possible, but shame rightly calibrated. He makes the case that Pauline shame has the potential to rescue shame from a myriad of misunderstandings. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, given the tone of the book, Lau makes a powerful pastoral case for the indispensable role of shame in Christian formation. His book is a must-read for pastors and counselors alike.Of course, no book is without its issues. While I question certain aspects of Lau’s exegesis, along with the decision to restrict “Jewish backgrounds” to the Hebrew Bible (surely shame features in Philo, Josephus, and the Dead Sea Scrolls, for example), I prefer to conclude this review not with critique but a question: Do modern churches, especially in the West, foster the kind of “communitarianism and interdependency” (p. 200) that are prerequisite for Pauline shame? In fact, Lau claims, “a successful shaming program in one context may fail miserably in another” (p. 201). Thus, while Pauline shame may provide an “authoritative” guide to modern churches, how it informs our use of shame is a broader hermeneutical question that cannot be solved at the level of exegesis. Professor Lau has made a convincing case that the body of Christ needs shame—for which I am deeply grateful. Now, however, begins the hard work of spiritual discernment: the question of when, where, and how to apply shame in our particular contexts.