Public Sector Collective Bargaining Research Articles

Impasse Resolution in Public Sector Collective Negotiations: A Proposed Procedure

This Article argues that existing techniques for resolving public-sec tor collective bargaining impasses such as mediation, fact-finding, arbitra tion and strikes all have substantial weaknesses. After examining the policy problems inherent in each of these methods, the authors propose a new model for resolution of impasses. Their proposed model combines mediation, factfinding, strikes and public referendums to avoid the defi ciencies inherent in any one technique.

Collective Bargaining and Labor Relations.

1. Development and Growth of the Labor Moment. 2. The State of the Labor Movement. 3. Evolution of the Legal Framework for Private-Sector Collective Bargaining. 4. Some Effects of the Law on Unions and Management. 5. Union and Employer Organizational Structure in the Private Sector. 6. Management and Union Security. 7. Bargaining Structure. 8. Preparation for Bargaining. 9. The Negotiation Process. 10. Bargaining Theory and Bargaining Power. 11. Costing of Labor Contracts. 12. The Computer and the Collective Bargaining Process. 13. Ethical and Unethical Conduct and the Collective Bargaining Process. 14. Dispute Resolution and Regulation. 15. Contract Administration. 16. Public Sector Collective Bargaining. 17. Reports of the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations. Appendices. Bibliography. Glossary. Index.

An economic analysis of public sector collective bargaining and strike activity

This paper develops a theory of public sector collective bargaining and uses it to investigate the economic determinants of public sector strike activity. The model considers union leaders, union members, bureaucrats, politicians, and voters, with the intention of explicitly recognizing both the constraints placed on the bargaining parties by their constituents and the differences between public and private sector collective bargaining. The empirical results indicate that only in cases where both negotiating parties are motivated by self-interest can we expect frequent strikes and strikes of long duration. The results also suggest that public sector strikes are countercyclical and principally influenced by the business cycle and its impact on state and local revenues.

The Impact of Collective Bargaining on School Management and Policy

Previous articleNext article No AccessThe Impact of Collective Bargaining on School Management and PolicyDouglas E. Mitchell, Charles T. Kerchner, Wayne Erck, and Gabrielle PryorDouglas E. Mitchell Search for more articles by this author , Charles T. Kerchner Search for more articles by this author , Wayne Erck Search for more articles by this author , and Gabrielle Pryor Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by American Journal of Education Volume 89, Number 2Feb., 1981 Sponsored by the Penn State College of Education Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/443570 Views: 7Total views on this site Citations: 17Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1981 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Maya Kaul, Meghan Comstock, Nicole S. Simon Leading From the Middle: How Principals Rely on District Guidance and Organizational Conditions in Times of Crisis, AERA Open 8 (Feb 2022): 233285842210773.https://doi.org/10.1177/23328584221077303La’Tara Osborne-Lampkin, Lora Cohen-Vogel, Li Feng, Jerry J. Wilson Researching Collective Bargaining Agreements: Building Conceptual Understanding in an Era of Declining Union Power, Educational Policy 32, no.22 (Dec 2017): 152–188.https://doi.org/10.1177/0895904817745378Mark Paige Collective Bargaining: Policy Tensions and Practical Options for School Leaders, (Nov 2015): 267–282.https://doi.org/10.1108/S1479-366020150000024042William Kyle Ingle, Chris Willis, James Fritz Collective Bargaining Agreement Provisions in the Wake of Ohio Teacher Evaluation System Legislation, Educational Policy 29, no.11 (Dec 2014): 18–50.https://doi.org/10.1177/0895904814559249La'Tara Osborne-Lampkin Grievance and Arbitration Practices and Decisions in Schools: Outcomes of Rational Decision Making?, Journal of School Leadership 20, no.44 (Jan 2019): 491–525.https://doi.org/10.1177/105268461002000406Lora Cohen-Vogel, La'Tara Osborne-Lampkin Allocating Quality: Collective Bargaining Agreements and Administrative Discretion Over Teacher Assignment, Educational Administration Quarterly 43, no.44 (Oct 2007): 433–461.https://doi.org/10.1177/0013161X07306450William D. Greenfield Toward a Theory of School Administration: The Centrality of Leadership, Educational Administration Quarterly 31, no.11 (Feb 1995): 61–85.https://doi.org/10.1177/0013161X95031001005John C. Anderson, John Thomas Delaney The involvement of canadian unions in political activities: An exploratory analysis, Journal of Labor Research 11, no.44 (Dec 1990): 361–379.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02685358Brian Rowan Chapter 7: Commitment and Control: Alternative Strategies for the Organizational Design of Schools, Review of Research in Education 16, no.11 (Jun 2016): 353–389.https://doi.org/10.3102/0091732X016001353William A. Firestone Using Reform: Conceptualizing District Initiative, Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 11, no.22 (Nov 2016): 151–164.https://doi.org/10.3102/01623737011002151Robert L. Crowson Managerial Ethics in Educational Administration, Urban Education 23, no.44 (Aug 2016): 412–435.https://doi.org/10.1177/0042085989023004006Steven M. Goldschmidt, Leland E. Stuart The Extent and Impact of Educational Policy Bargaining, ILR Review 39, no.33 (Apr 1986): 350–360.https://doi.org/10.1177/001979398603900303 Charles T. Kerchner , and Douglas E. Mitchell Teaching Reform and Union Reform, The Elementary School Journal 86, no.44 (Oct 2015): 449–470.https://doi.org/10.1086/461462Charles Taylor Kerchner Chapter 10: Union-Made Teaching: The Effects of Labor Relations on Teaching Work, Review of Research in Education 13, no.11 (Jun 2016): 317–349.https://doi.org/10.3102/0091732X013001317Michael Moehler, Frank R. Kemerer Collective Bargaining: The Current Status, The Educational Forum 49, no.33 (Jan 2008): 331–339.https://doi.org/10.1080/00131728509335853Sandra Featherman, Lynne Roberts Pluralist models of public sector collective bargaining: Proposals for public education, The Urban Review 16, no.44 (Jan 1984): 219–233.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01142980William Lowe Boyd, Robert L. Crowson Chapter 7: The Changing Conception and Practice of Public School Administration, Review of Research in Education 9, no.11 (Jun 2016): 311–373.https://doi.org/10.3102/0091732X009001311

Public employee unions: A study in the economics of power

This paper examines how public employee unions influence the allocation of public sector jobs. The empirical results indicate that vote maximizing public officials’ employment decisions are influenced by the political clout of highly-unionized employees. The political clout of public-sector unions influences the functional distribution of public-sector jobs by increasing demand for the relatively more organized functions. These results suggest that consideration should be given to the growth of public sector collective bargaining in the allocation of public sector resources.

An Interorganizational Analysis of Power, Conflict, and Settlements in Public Sector Collective Bargaining

Despite increased interest in public sector collective bargaining, a survey of recent attempts to build theory about the dynamics and outcomes of union-management negotiations in public organizations reveals that little progress has been made. One approach that appears fruitful is interorganizational analysis. In an interorganizational context, organizations interact with other autonomous organizations to make joint decisions that have implications for both parties and for the larger system. This study focuses on five interorganizational variables that are useful for understanding the collective bargaining process in the public sector: (1) goal divergence; (2) stability of the relationship; (3) organizational dependence; (4) conflictual behavior; (5) contractual change.From these theoretical concepts, five propositions are derived which serve as the basis for the research hypotheses. The hypotheses were tested on a sample of 60 cases drawn from a population of 535 collective bargaining negotiations in New York City from 1968 through 1972. The test of the research hypotheses resulted in these conclusions: (1) a substantial amount of the conflictual behavior in public sector collective bargaining is explained by goal divergence, stability of the relationship, and asymmetry of relative dependence favoring one of the organizations; and (2) contractual change is explained by goal divergence, conflictual behavior, and asymmetry of relative dependence favoring one of the organizations.

Bargaining, Yield Curves, and Wage Settlements: An Empirical Analysis

Previous articleNext article No AccessBargaining, Yield Curves, and Wage Settlements: An Empirical AnalysisYochanan Comay, Arie Melnik, and Abraham SubotnikYochanan Comay Search for more articles by this author , Arie Melnik Search for more articles by this author , and Abraham Subotnik Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 82, Number 2, Part 1Mar. - Apr., 1974Part 1 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/260193 Views: 3Total views on this site Citations: 5Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1974 The National Bureau of Economic ResearchPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Subrato Banerjee Testing for Fairness in Regulation: Application to the Delhi Transportation Market, The Journal of Development Studies 51, no.44 (Apr 2015): 464–483.https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2014.963566Henry S. Farber Chapter 18 The analysis of union behavior, (Jan 1986): 1039–1089.https://doi.org/10.1016/S1573-4463(86)02008-4William B. Nelson, Gerald W. Stone, J. Michael Swint An economic analysis of public sector collective bargaining and strike activity, Journal of Labor Research 2, no.11 (Mar 1981): 77–98.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02685123George Strauss, Peter Feuille Industrial Relations Research in the United States, (Jan 1981): 76–144.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04442-9_3Santiago Fei-Hung Chen, George Leitmann Labour-management bargaining modelled as a dynamic game, Optimal Control Applications and Methods 1, no.11 (Jan 1980): 11–25.https://doi.org/10.1002/oca.4660010104