Auction Protocol Research Articles

Secure quantum sealed-bid auction with post-confirmation

A new secure quantum auction with post-confirmation is proposed, which is a direct application of the multi-particle super dense coding scheme to the auction problem. In this scheme all bidders use M groups n-particle GHZ states to represent their bids. Different from classical auction protocols and the previous secure quantum sealed-bid auction protocols, in the present scheme, by introducing a post-confirmation mechanism the honesty of the quantum sealed-bid auction is guaranteed, i.e., malicious bidders cannot collude with auctioneers. Also by sharing secret keys with the bidders the auctioneer could insure the anonymity of the bidders.

Keyword auction protocol for dynamically adjusting the number of advertisements

We propose a keyword auction protocol called the GSP-ExR (GSP with an exclusive right) in which the number of advertisements displayed around search results can be dynamically adjusted. It is an extension of the generalized second-price (GSP) auction, which is currently used for keyword auctions. However, in the GSP, the number of displayed advertisements (slots) is determined in advance. We consider adjusting the number of advertisements dynamically on the basis of the bids to improve both the social surplus and seller's revenue. In the GSP-ExR, the number of slots can be either 1 or K. The GSP-ExR pricing scheme is relatively simple and the seller's revenue is at least as good as that with the GSP. If the highest ranked bidder's bid is high enough, she can exclusively display her advertisement by paying a premium. Otherwise, the GSP-ExR is identical to the GSP.

A Race Beyond the Bottom: The Nature of Bidding for a Firm

We examine how the bidding environment may affect the outcome of tax competition between two countries (or two regions) in attracting a firm’s foreign direct investment (FDI). We compare the equilibrium location choice and payoffs from an English auction, with both complete and incomplete information, relative to those in the traditional setting of a sealed-bid first-price auction. We find that an English auction leads to more aggressive bidding in “race beyond the bottom,” where the nations may bid beyond their own valuations of the FDI. We also discuss the roles of auction protocol and information asymmetry on the auction outcome.

A QoS-Enabled Double Auction Protocol for the Service Grid

Traditional double auction protocols only concern the price information of participants without considering their QoS requirements, which makes them unsuitable for the service grid. In this paper we first introduce QoS information into double auction to present the QoS-enabled Double Auction Protocol (QDAP). QDAP tries to assign the asks which have the least candidate bids firstly to make more participants trade and provides QoS guarantee at the same time. Simulation experiments have been performed to compare QDAP with two traditional double auction protocols and the result shows that QDAP is more suitable for the service grid.

REVISITING NASERI'S SECURE QUANTUM SEALED-BID AUCTION

The secure quantum sealed-bid auction protocol [Mosayeb Naseri, Opt. Commun.282 (2009) 1939] is revisited. It is found that, utilizing intercept-measure-resend attacks, any evil bidder can make the auction aborted without being detected by the auctioneer. Further, if the evil bidder succeeds to be the first bidder, then he/she can win conclusively in the auction. To prevent such attacks, some defence strategies are adopted in the qubit distribution stage and the channel security check stage respectively and the original protocol is therefore modified somewhat.

Comment on: “Secure quantum sealed-bid auction” [Opt. Comm. 282 (2009) 1939

In a recent paper [Opt. Comm. 282 (2009) 1939], a quantum sealed-bid auction protocol was proposed. However, in this comment, it is shown that the protocol does not complete the task of a sealed-bid auction fairly when any bidder colludes with the auctioneer.

Improved secure quantum sealed-bid auction

The security of a secure quantum sealed-bid auction protocol using quantum secure direct communication based on GHZ states [M. Naseri, Opt. Commun. 282 (2009) 1939] is reexamined. It is shown that the protocol does not complete the task of a sealed-bid auction fairly. It is shown that a dishonest bidder can obtain all the other one’s secret bids by two special types of attack, i.e., double Controlled NOT attack or using fake entangled particles. Furthermore, a simple possible improvement of the protocol is proposed.

Cryptanalysis and improvement of a secure quantum sealed-bid auction

The security of a secure quantum sealed-bid auction protocol using quantum secure direct communication [Mosayeb Naseri, Opt. Commun. 282 (2009) 1939] is analyzed. It is shown that this protocol is unfair as a malicious bidder can obtain others’ bids without being found, and then he can optimize his bid to win the auction. Finally, a simple improvement to resist this attack is proposed.

Secure quantum sealed-bid auction

A new experimentally feasible and secure quantum sealed-bid auction protocol using quantum secure direct communication based on GHZ states is proposed. In this scheme all bidders Bob, Charlie,…, and Zach use M groups n-particle GHZ states to represent their bids. Here, an auctioneer gives the auction outcome by performing a sequence of n-particle GHZ-basis measurements on the final quantum states. It has been shown that using this method guarantees the honesty of the protocol, and malicious bidders can not collude with the auctioneers.

T-Private and t-Secure Auctions

In most of the auction systems the values of bids are known to the auctioneer. This allows him to manipulate the outcome of the auction. Hence, one might be interested in hiding these values. Some cryptographically secure protocols for electronic auctions have been presented in the last decade. Our work extends these protocols in several ways. On the basis of garbled circuits, i.e., encrypted circuits, we present protocols for sealed-bid auctions that fulfill the following requirements: 1) protocols are information-theoretically t-private for honest but curious parties; 2) the number of bits that can be learned by malicious adversaries is bounded by the output length of the auction; 3) the computational requirements for participating parties are very low: only random bit choices and bitwise computation of the XOR-function are necessary. Note that one can distinguish between the protocol that generates a garbled circuit for an auction and the protocol to evaluate the auction. In this paper we address both problems. We will present a t-private protocol for the construction of a garbled circuit that reaches the lower bound of 2t + 1 parties, and a more randomness efficient protocol for (t + 1)2 parties. Finally, we address the problem of bid changes in an auction.

QUANTUM AUCTIONS USING ADIABATIC EVOLUTION: THE CORRUPT AUCTIONEER AND CIRCUIT IMPLEMENTATIONS

We examine a proposed auction algorithm using quantum states to represent bids and distributed adiabatic search to find the winner.1 When the auctioneer follows the protocol, the final measurement giving the outcome of the auction also destroys the bid states, thereby preserving the privacy of losing bidders. We describe how a dishonest auctioneer could alter the protocol to violate this privacy guarantee, and present methods by which bidders can counter such attacks. We also suggest possible quantum circuit implementations of the auction protocol, and quantum circuits to perpetrate and to counter attacks by a dishonest auctioneer.

Experiments with probabilistic quantum auctions

We describe human-subject laboratory experiments on probabilistic auctions based on previously proposed auction protocols involving the simulated manipulation and communication of quantum states. These auctions are probabilistic in determining which bidder wins, or having no winner, rather than always having the highest bidder win. Comparing two quantum protocols in the context of first-price sealed bid auctions, we find the one predicted to be superior by game theory also performs better experimentally. We also compare with a conventional first-price auction, which gives higher performance. Thus to provide benefits, the quantum protocol requires more complex economic scenarios such as maintaining privacy of bids over a series of related auctions or involving allocative externalities.

Efficient anonymous secure auction schema (ASAS) without fully trustworthy auctioneer

PurposeIn traditional commerce, an auction is known as a mechanism of determining the value of a commodity that does not have a fixed price. Auctions are exciting and an increasing number of transactions are performed through e‐auctions. But most current auctions cannot address all the important security requirements. Usually, auction systems force bidders and sellers to trust the auctioneer and, on the other hand, do not provide anonymity for bidders and sellers. This paper aims to solve these problems by presenting an efficient anonymous secure auction schema (ASAS) without a fully trustworthy auctioneer.Design/methodology/approachThe paper analyzes security properties and the complexity of previous works in auction security and then proposes a new ASAS that is more secure and efficient than previous works. Finally, security properties and the complexity of the new schema and previous works are compared with one another.FindingsThe proposed auction protocol does not force bidders and sellers to trust the auctioneer. In addition, it provides anonymity for both of them. Owing to these newly added features and high degree of security of ASAS, it is suggested that its use in high‐value auctions should require tighter security.Originality/valueThe paper proposes a new schema for electronic auctions that is secure and efficient and, in addition, does not force bidders and sellers to trust the auctioneer.

To Discount or Not to Discount: An Assessment of Perceptions, Beliefs, and Intentions to Use Electronic Auctions with Discounts

In the digital economy, electronic auction systems are becoming more prevalent in facilitating the transactions between buyers and sellers. Auction websites, such as eBay and Amazon, as well as more sophisticated platforms, such as Moai and FrictionlessCommerce have increased transaction volume by offering tailored auction protocols to specific customer groups. meet2trade is a generic electronic market platform that supports various auction mechanisms. This study examines the impact of a discount in a second-price, sealed-bid mechanism on bidding behavior and market outcomes. Emphasis is thereby placed on bidders’ system-based perceptions, beliefs about usage and institutional-based trust, and intention to use such an auction. Ninety students were recruited to participate in an experiment held at a Western European university. The experiment observed user behavior in second-price auctions with and without a discount. The results demonstrate that although discounts do affect bidding behavior and economic outcomes, they do not influence bidder’s intentions to use such auction mechanisms. Instead, we found that intention to use is influenced by institutional and usage beliefs that are shaped by system-based perceptions, which in turn provide specific advice to market engineers on the technical aspects influencing system adoption.

New Sealed-Bid Electronic Auction with Fairness, Security and Efficiency

Electronic sealed-bid auction schemes usually have a common drawback, the third party (auction host) can conspire with a malicious bidder to leak all bidding prices before the opening stage. It results in the malicious bidder wining the auction with an optimal bidding price. Recently, Liaw et al. proposed an auction protocol for electronic online bidding in which they designed a deposit deduction certification for government procurement. However, it also has above mentioned flaw. Moreover, we further found that there were some extra security drawbacks in their protocol. First, the bidder can forge a bidding receipt to claim that he/she is a valid auction winner. Second, it may suffer from the third party forging attack. Third, their protocol leaked some bidders' private information to the third party, such as the bidder's bank account number and the authorization code. Thus, it cannot protect the bidder's privacy at all. In this paper, we not only point out the drawbacks from the previous scheme but also propose a new electronic auction scheme to overcome the above mentioned drawbacks. Furthermore, the computational complexity can be decreased in our online sealed-bid auction scheme.

On the Existence of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auction Protocols

We investigate whether it is possible to preserve privacy in sealed-bid auctions to a maximal extent. In particular, this paper focuses on <it>unconditional full privacy</it>, i.e., privacy that relies neither on trusted third parties (like auctioneers), nor on computational intractability assumptions (like the hardness of factoring). These constraints imply a scenario in which bidders exchange messages according to some predefined protocol in order to jointly determine the auction outcome without revealing any additional information. It turns out that the first-price sealed-bid auction can be emulated by an unconditionally fully private protocol. However, the protocol's round complexity is exponential in the bid size, and there is no more efficient protocol. On the other hand, we prove the impossibility of privately emulating the second-price sealed-bid auction for more than two bidders. This impossibility holds even when relaxing various privacy constraints such as allowing the revelation of all but one losing bid (while maintaining anonymity) or allowing the revelation of the second highest bidder's identity.

New Keyword Auction Protocols for Determining the Appropriate Number of Slots

New Keyword Auction Protocols for Determining the Appropriate Number of Slots

An energy trading system with consideration of CO2 emissions

AbstractAbatement of CO2 emission is one of the most important issues in the 21st century regarding preservation of the earth environment. This paper addresses a utility operations planning problem for distributed energy management systems (DEMSs), where we are to obtain optimal plans that minimize both costs and CO2 emissions. A DEMS consists of multiple entities that seek their own economic profits. In this paper, we give a mathematical formulation of the utility operations planning problem for each entity, and propose an energy trading market, which utlizes a multi‐attribute auction protocol in order to deal with both a price and a CO2 emission rate. Experimental results show that collaboration among entities through the market provides a more profitable plan for each entity and abatement of CO2 emission is also achieved. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Electr Eng Jpn, 162(4): 54–63, 2008; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley. com). DOI 10.1002/eej.20418

QUANTUM AUCTIONS

We present a quantum auction protocol using superpositions to represent bids and distributed search to identify the winner(s). Measuring the final quantum state gives the auction outcome while simultaneously destroying the superposition. Thus, non-winning bids are never revealed. Participants can use entanglement to arrange for correlations among their bids, with the assurance that this entanglement is not observable by others. This protocol is useful for information hiding applications, such as partnership bidding with allocative externality or concerns about revealing bidding preferences. The protocol applies to a variety of auction types, e.g. first or second price, and to auctions involving either a single item or arbitrary bundles of items (i.e. combinatorial auctions). We analyze the game-theoretical behavior of the quantum protocol for the simple case of a sealed-bid quantum, and show how a suitably designed adiabatic search reduces the possibilities for bidders to game the auction. This design illustrates how incentive rather that computational constraints affect quantum algorithm choices.

The effects of proxy bidding and minimum bid increments within eBay auctions

We present a mathematical model of the eBay auction protocol and perform a detailed analysis of the effects that the eBay proxy bidding system and the minimum bid increment have on the auction properties. We first consider the revenue of the auction, and we show analytically that when two bidders with independent private valuations use the eBay proxy bidding system there exists an optimal value for the minimum bid increment at which the auctioneer's revenue is maximized. We then consider the sequential way in which bids are placed within the auction, and we show analytically that independent of assumptions regarding the bidders' valuation distribution or bidding strategy the number of visible bids placed is related to the logarithm of the number of potential bidders. Thus, in many cases, it is only a minority of the potential bidders that are able to submit bids and are visible in the auction bid history (despite the fact that the other hidden bidders are still effectively competing for the item). Furthermore, we show through simulation that the minimum bid increment also introduces an inefficiency to the auction, whereby a bidder who enters the auction late may find that its valuation is insufficient to allow them to advance the current bid by the minimum bid increment despite them actually having the highest valuation for the item. Finally, we use these results to consider appropriate strategies for bidders within real world eBay auctions. We show that while last-minute bidding (sniping) is an effective strategy against bidders engaging in incremental bidding (and against those with common values), in general, delaying bidding is disadvantageous even if delayed bids are sure to be received before the auction closes. Thus, when several bidders submit last-minute bids, we show that rather than seeking to bid as late as possible, a bidder should try to be the first sniper to bid (i.e., it should “snipe before the snipers”).