Abstract
The secure quantum sealed-bid auction protocol [Mosayeb Naseri, Opt. Commun.282 (2009) 1939] is revisited. It is found that, utilizing intercept-measure-resend attacks, any evil bidder can make the auction aborted without being detected by the auctioneer. Further, if the evil bidder succeeds to be the first bidder, then he/she can win conclusively in the auction. To prevent such attacks, some defence strategies are adopted in the qubit distribution stage and the channel security check stage respectively and the original protocol is therefore modified somewhat.
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