Russian Propaganda Research Articles

The dynamics of hate speech spreading on the telegram-channels of the popular kremlin propagandists

Introduction. Telegram is the most popular social network for consuming news in Ukraine. However, in a full-scale invasion, Kremlin propagandists are trying to use popular digital platforms to promote hostile narratives. Relevance of the study. Monitoring the most popular Telegram channels is an extremely demanding task. It is important to detect the signs of propaganda content, to study the dynamics of its distribution in order to effectively counter the numerous information operations of the enemy. Research objective is to propose a mechanism (computer analysis of texts in the Telegram channels of leading Russian propagandists) for detecting hate speech usage, describe the dynamics of harmful content spread and to define its formal signs. Methodology. Computer analysis is used to search for keywords that indicate the use of hate speech, as well as collocation analysis and semantic analysis. The research material was the most popular telegram channels of leading Russian propagandists: Solovyov, Simonyan, Voenkor Kotenok Z. Results. Analysis of the mentions dynamics shows that the topic of «Nazism / Fascism» has similar bursts of attention for all three propagandists. Before the invasion single mentions were recorded, but in March-April there was a significant increase. At the end of April, when the Russians left Northern Ukraine, the number of mentions dropped significantly. The percentage of keywords remained quite high in the summer, but continued to decrease until the retreat of the Russians from Kharkiv and Kherson regions. Analysis of collocations showed that when highlighting the topic of «Nazism / Fascism», Russian propagandists most often associate it with Ukraine. Conclusions. The study showed that the hate speech towards Ukraine in the Telegram channels of popular Russian propagandists has its own dynamics. The number of posts with hate speech increases or decreases depending on the situation on the front lines. The organized nature of the hate speech spread can be considered as a formal feature of Russian propaganda and to help identify it in further research.

IMPLEMENTATION OF PEACEBUILDING EDUCATION IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS OF UKRAINE

The article deals with the issue of introducing peacebuilding education in domestic educational institutions. The authors determine that the effective implementation of peacekeeping education requires certain organizational transformations, which should include: changing the management system of an educational institution, which involves the use of transformational leadership, as well as involving all participants in the educational process in decision-making; forming a favorable and safe educational environment based on the values of peacekeeping education; creating an “aligned structure” of an educational institution that will promote trust and cooperation between participants in the educational process; correct goal setting in the educational system of an educational institution, which should include the formation of socially significant goals and prospects for joint activities for the introduction of peacekeeping education. The authors of the article also draw attention to the important role of teachers in the implementation of peacekeeping education. In the context of russian aggression against Ukraine, the role of a teacher as a defender of Ukrainian culture and a peacemaker is growing. It must resist russian propaganda and form the right values in children and young people, in particular the values of nonviolent communication and mutual understanding. The authors paid special attention to the Ukrainian language, which, has there is a huge potential to become an effective tool for peacekeeping education. In within the framework of this study, a questionnaire was used, which allowed us to determine the opinion of teachers undergoing training in the educational and professional program “managing an educational institution (by level)” at the Borys Grinchenko Kyiv University regarding the importance of the Ukrainian language for peacekeeping education.

Creating an alternative reality: Russian propaganda strategy in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war

Creating an alternative reality: Russian propaganda strategy in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war

КОМУНІКАТИВНА ПОЛІТИКА НАТО: БАЗОВІ ТЕОРЕТИКО-ПРАКТИЧНІ ЗАСАДИ

The article examines the communication policy of the Northern Alliance (NATO), the conditions of its formation, the stages of its formation, and the key principles of NATO’s strategic communications system, which is an integral and important component of the internal and external political activities of the defense bloc. The main definitions of the term strategic communications and their components, the concept of hybrid war, etc. are given. It was found that the lack of a comprehensive communication strategy for the coordination of various activities and the formation of messages and narratives during the NATO mission in Afghanistan pushed the Alliance to develop a strategic communication system. Currently, the Alliance is making efforts to comprehensively develop the Organization’s communication policy, increase the level of awareness of the population of NATO member countries regarding the bloc’s values, goals, operations and actions. The article substantiates the influence of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict on NATO’s awareness of the need to fight the manifestations of the hybrid war of the Russian Federation, which it is waging in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, as well as in Central and Eastern Europe. The Alliance recognizes that an effective strategic communications system is extremely important in countering Russian propaganda.

Russian Propaganda as an Element of Preparation for Armed Aggression Against Ukraine

Russian Propaganda as an Element of Preparation for Armed Aggression Against Ukraine

Psycholinguistic aspects of representing aggression in wartime media discourse

The article focuses on aggression caused by the Russian-Ukrainian war as a vivid phenomenon in media discourse. The paper reveals the psychological aspects of this phenomenon, the reasons for the use of verbal aggression, its forms, and its impact on recipients. The research also explores lexical and stylistic means of representing aggression in the Ukrainian media discourse: online publications in periodicals and posts on social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. It has been identified that the frequently used invective vocabulary and creolized memes in the media are specific verbal and nonverbal means of psychological liberation from aggression and destructive influence on the target audience. Based on the results of a survey involving 100 respondents from different regions of Ukraine, 50 of whom were male and 50 female, it was found that aggression serves to expose such dominant negative emotions evoked by the Russian-Ukrainian war as anger and hatred. However, the object of aggression of the people surveyed is strikingly different: for 58 % of men it’s the Russian president, while for 52 % of women – the Russian troops. When asked about the most common forms of aggression, the majority of the respondents claimed that it is expressed by mockery, curses and obscenity. The survey documented the use of the corresponding war-related emotionally charged vocabulary, including neologisms with various word-building patterns and newly formed set phrases, by both females and males to express their aggression verbally. Additionally, the participants of the survey confirmed that creolized memes are effective functional tools with nearly equally distributed percentage of protesting against the war, ridiculing invaders and resisting the Russian propaganda.

CONSTRUCTION OF ARTIFICIAL EVERYDAY LIFE IN RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA TELEGRAM CHANNELS (ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF ZAPORIZHZHIA REGION)

The article is devoted to the study of everyday life in the temporarily occupied territories of the Zaporizhzhia region. The author proves that after the occupation, the local residents found themselves in an informational and physical blockade, and their usual world is full of fear and uncertainty about how to live, work and carry out social interactions. Based on the scientific achievements of P. Berger, T. Lukman and N. Elias, the author defines artificial everyday life as a process of life activity of individuals modeled by a communicator, which unfolds in usual social situations, but additionally contains a specially created content-emotional context. During the informal analysis of the content of 11 Telegram channels for October-November 2022, the non-problematic and problematic dimensions of artificial everyday life were described and the semantic elements of each of them were characterized. It was found that Russian propaganda combines problemideological messages with positive topics in order to create a parallel informational reality. With the help of such an approach, propagandists try to connect the occupying power and the new institutional order with the former, pre-war life. The author concludes that by comparing the media picture and real life due to dichotomies of "everyday – non-everyday" and changes in the microenvironment of communication, people begin to perceive the surrounding social space and social relations in it as unfamiliar and foreign.It is shown that to the greatest extent this applies to the urban environment, which due to militarization, restrictions on freedom of movement, military and police terror, turns into a space of danger with threats of imprisonment, kidnapping and robbery. It was established that under such conditions, two strategies of adaptation to new realities are possible for the people remaining in the occupation – collaborationist and passive resistance.

INTERGENERATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS OF RUSSIAN SPEAKERS IN ISRAEL IN THE SHADOW OF PROPAGANDA: FACEBOOK POSTS ANALYSIS

Abstract Part of the elderly Russian-speaking community in Israel is exposed to the TV channels of the Russian government. These channels are impacted by Russian propaganda and, as such, use false claims and manipulative techniques. The aim of this presentation is to shed light on the impact of Russian media on intergenerational relationships of Russian-speaker families in Israel. We conducted a preliminary qualitative study based on a thematic analysis of Facebook posts (Nf34) from March to June 2022. Analysis revealed four key themes: (1) “Tragedy of many families”, the importance of unity of opinion and the problem of difference, a key element in the emotional well-being (or its lack) of Russian-speaking families at the moment; (2) “It’s useless to explain something”, the perception of older parents who support Putin as victims of “brainwashing”, with comments on “zombies”, totalitarian sects, and psychotropic drugs; (3) “The truth will destroy them”, the perception of disbelief in war as a defensive reaction necessary for the elderly, because the reality may destroy them; (4) “A topic that is not talked about”, a refusal to discuss Ukraine seen as the only way to save the relationship, speaking instead about health issues, daily life issues, and the weather. The findings underline that the Russian-Ukrainian war conflict impacts intergenerational solidarity and closeness, and calls for an intervention that provides support for both the elderly and their adult children.

“Uncle Vova, we are with you!” The use of childhood semantics in Russian political propaganda

The presented article focuses on the analysis of the semantic field of childhood in the propaganda of Soviet and modern Russia. Using a semantic analysis inspired by the works of A. Wierzbicka and J. Lakoff, the author analyses the historical semantic sources of propaganda and the use of the category of childhood in them. An example of an analysed propaganda product is the song “Uncle Vova, we are with you!” published online in 2017. The analysis proves that the semantics of the Russian propaganda message is based on patterns from previous eras with an invariant element – World War II, which is a kind of myth about the beginning of the Russian world. The war in Ukraine today additionally updates the meanings related to the armed conflict and patriotism. The analysis shows that childhood implies patriotism that invokes military meanings and is deeply immersed in the historical context of the war.

About the Organization of Russian Propaganda in Allied and Neutral States during the First World War

About the Organization of Russian Propaganda in Allied and Neutral States during the First World War

PHOTO CONTENT OF COMMUNICATION PLATFORMS AS A MECHANISM OF OPPOSING RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA (ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE UKRAINIAN WAR OF LIBERATION)

The purpose. To outline the photo content of communication platforms as one of the most powerful levers of opposition to Russian propaganda in the media environment. The scientific novelty lies in the latest approaches to the visualization of the content of communication platforms as a way of countering the propaganda that the russian federation is waging against Ukraine during the information war. This issue is studied very deeply. Every day the aggravation takes place not only on the geographical, but also on the informational front of the liberation war. Communication platforms having distanced themselves from social networks, Internet trading platforms and network channels have turned into an autonomous and unique plane. Photos play a key role. Conclusions. The article offers vision of mechanisms for countering communication platforms as components of the communication process, capable of resisting russian propaganda. Photography is considered as key factor in the visualization of content and the possibility of building resistance mechanisms in the minds of the audience. At the time when Ukraine is suffering from missile attacks and has interruptions with light and communication, photography remains the leading element of creating a visual component of communication. It weighs much less than streams and audio files that may not be uploaded to the user's phone due to a lack of traffic. The photo content of modern communication platforms and channels are the most accessible to the Ukrainian audience due to their efficiency and interactivity has been analyzed in this work. Among them: “This is Kryvyi Rih, baby”, “Ukraine online”, “Ukraine in shock”, “Crimean Tatarian resource center”.

The war in Ukraine through far-right and jihadist lenses

This article examines the most widespread stances on the war in Ukraine taken within the far-right and the jihadist milieux. Within these contexts, positions are far from unified and the different narratives exploited on the topic reflect the heterogeneity of the radical postures. Far-right movements and supporters express views ranging from open hostility to Russia and President Vladimir Putin to complete mistrust of NATO and the West. This makes it possible to find these groups on both sides of the battlefield. However, it is necessary to emphasize here that the narrative about Ukraine being run by fascists is no more than Russian propaganda, designed to discredit Ukraine’s efforts to defend itself against Russia’s aggression and weaken international solidarity toward Kyiv. Similarly, a number of jihadist groups and ideologues urge their followers to join the conflict regardless of the side in order to harm unbelievers or, on the contrary, to stay away from it as this would imply giving assistance to the impious. The Russian war against Ukraine is having significant implications for both far-right and jihadi networks, both of which might be able to capitalise on events in organisational, political and communicative terms.

Attitudes on languages, identities and politics at the Ukrainian Black Sea coast in 2020/21

AbstractThis study deals with attitudes and opinions of the population on the Ukrainian Black Sea coast in 2020/2021, a good year before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The basis is a sociological survey conducted in the regions of Odesa, Mykolajiv and Kherson with 1,200 respondents. These regions are a clear target of the Russian offensive against Ukraine, on the grounds of an alleged ideological and linguistic affinity of these areas with Russia. The attitudes and opinions sought in the study cover three domains: firstly, attitudes and opinions on language policy, secondly, on Ukrainian autonomy and identity and the role played by languages in this context, and thirdly, Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation. Respondents were grouped according to their “ethnic/national” self-identification and language preferences, and a comparison was made. Overall, the attitudes of the respondents showed a clear identification with Ukraine and the Ukrainian language and a skepticism towards the Russian state, but by no means a hostile attitude towards the Russian language. A picture emerges that clearly contradicts Russian propaganda and also puts into perspective the difference between southern Ukraine and the center and the west, which has often been emphasized in the past.

“Ukraine commits genocide on Russians”: the term “genocide” in Russian propaganda

According to Russia, the main reason for starting the war with Ukraine on February 24, 2022 was the genocide of the Russian-speaking population by the Nazi government of Volodymyr Zelenskyy. In this paper I investigate the Russian claims about genocide. These claims are shown to be part of the rhetorical frame Russophobic Nazi Ukraine government commits genocide on Russians, an aspect of Russian propaganda which builds on the Second World War. I demonstrated that this frame is itself an aspect of a more abstract frame, where any perceived enemy of Russia, is portrayed as a fascist or Nazi force that aims to destroy Russia and Russian culture. I investigate how this frame emerged and developed over time in five stages, starting in post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine, and in Russia after the Orange and Maidan revolutions in Ukraine. Russia tries to provide argumentation for the validity of the frame by referring to a number of objectively established facts relating to the situation in the Donbas, Ukraine’s language laws, and the presence of right-extremists in Ukraine. In doing so, some ideas are made more salient than others (the language laws that diminish the official status of Russian in Ukraine and the hostilities in the Donbas region), while other ideas are suppressed altogether (e.g. the juridical meaning of genocide, the actual status of right-wing extremism in Ukraine, the role of Russia in the hostilities in the Donbas, and the actual status of the language laws in Ukraine). In all of these cases, the arguments used by Russia are not valid, being based on exaggerations, hyperbolic use of terminology, and lies. The main goal of this frame is to acquire and retain support for Russia’s policy toward Ukraine, as well as to deflect any potential criticism on Russia itself. Ultimately, the Russian propaganda is part of the concept Russkij Mir ‘Russian World’, where Russian language and culture are a means to restore President Vladimir Putin’s Russian sphere of influence from Soviet times or earlier.

Strategical orientators of the information policy of Ukraine in the conditions of external aggression

National security is not just about the army and professional intelligence services. This is the quality of human capital and the maturity of civil society. Its stability, effi ciency, and cohesion. This is the number of bearers of critical thinking, which allows to identify dangers and counteract provocations. First of all, we are talking about authoritarian regimes, such as China and Russia, which systematically spend huge sums of money to destabilize the free world. On the other hand, misconceptions about the world governance system, World War II, one’s own history, the war in Donbas, the Holodomor, the Holocaust, or the coronavirus infection always work in the interests of those who seek to subdue and manipulate people. An eff ective mechanism for information expansion is indulgence in the crowd’s low instincts to channel the crowd’s negative energy in the right direction. One of the most powerful engines of Putin’s propaganda, hatred, has been used against Ukraine. The current Russian propaganda, which replaces diplomacy, «destroys souls» worse than the Soviet one, which, although visually more visible, did not penetrate so deeply into human consciousness. Psychologists point out that the greatest danger of misconceptions lies in people’s sometimes overly sincere belief in their own illusions. They are tightly closed from counter-arguments, are hostile to those with a diff erent vision, and turn into those «useful idiots» who are the easiest to manipulate. People with a mythological consciousness live in a world of simplifi ed reality, where mysticism defeats science, Facebook – competent scientists, and archaism – rational thinking. They are the most prone to conspiracy theories. The bearers of mythological consciousness stubbornly spread messages about the omnipotence of some and the helplessness of others: this corresponds to their picture of the world. Information security of the state is inextricably linked with the introduction of relevant ideology, culture, values, the formation of public consciousness, where the key role is given to the media, and more precisely to information technology. The latter should be part of public policy to protect all categories of citizens from the negative impact of the digital virtual environment, and above all, children. Media literacy and digital hygiene should become compulsory subjects of the school curriculum (at the level of computer science, programming basics, and classes designed to socialize future voters, taxpayers, responsible citizens); the topic of television and radio programs; the subject of discussion in the columns of the print media; screenplay for documentaries and feature fi lms; reports of public fi gures and government offi cials. Key words: information policy, information security, civic culture, consolidation of society.

G.S. Treuer’s ‘Apology’ of Tsar Ivan the Terrible as a Tool for Forming a Positive Image of the Russian Monarchy in Europe in the Petrine Era

The article presents an analysis of the historical, political and philosophical work of outstanding German scientist, Professor Gottlieb Samuel Treuer “Apology of Ivan Vasilyevich II, Grand Duke of Moscow, usually falsely accused of tyranny,” published in Vienna in 1711. It was found that this work was one of the first papers, one way or another devoted to Russian history, published in the West in the Petrine era. During the Great Northern War the tendency to compare the reign of Ivan the Terrible and Peter I was quite clear, due to the fact that the “Baltic issue” remained valid for Russia more than a century after the failures in the Livonian War. The Russian propaganda in Europe needed to present Ivan the Terrible as a great ruler, without excessive cruelty and tyranny. The analysis conducted by the author showed that Treuer brilliantly coped with the task. In his work he proved that all the actions of Ivan the Terrible were justified by the public necessity and the morals of the Russian people. The “Apology of Ivan Vasilyevich” also contributed to the fact that some representatives of German scientific thought got carried away by Russian history. Among them were, in particular, G.F. Miller and A.L. Schlözer.

Уроки війни для формування стратегії української східної політики: філософські міркування

The article analyzes the issues in political philosophy related to the attitude towards russians and everything russian in the context of a new phase of russian aggression against Ukraine. This attitude is polarized around two extremes – the total denial, deleting and canceling of everything associated with russia and the USSR, on the one hand, and the distinction and justification of russian culture or “ordinary people”, on the other. According to the classical polarization effect and the confirmation bias, social attitudes are polarized, centrist moderate at­titudes are deleted, and extreme attitudes prevail, which is detrimental to social stability and dialogue. If in Ukraine prevails the principle of total canceling of a russian, then outside Ukraine, especially in countries far from the war, the wrong approach of so-called prudence and moderation leads to the false contraposi­tion of the “Ukrainian” radical attitude of canceling and russian propaganda as two equal approaches, which is wrong from factual and logical side. Instead, the “moderate” position of distinction ignores some factual, historical, and political issues that relate to the genesis of russia’s ideology of war, the doctrine of “russian World.” These discussions are proof that Ukraine needs to develop a new clear strategy for russia and a russian, based on the rejection of the black-and-white approach, the provincial postcolonial complex, the attitude to russia not as “our one” but as “other one”, while Ukraine will considered as a center of thought and action, treating russia as a completely external factor. This strategy requires a dif­ferentiated approach to different strata of russian society, a critical attitude to russian civil religion, and must be based on the values of humanity and freedom, which in turn should be the leading narrative of russia’s transformation.

Information and Communication Policy in Wartime: the Case of Ukraine

Information and communication policy aims to build effective, harmonious communication between all actors of the democratic process with extensive use of ICTs and direct communication. The war creates an aggressive environment, which also affects the communication processes in the information sphere of the state, in particular, there is more emphasis on information, less – on deliberation. The article examines the tools used by Ukraine’s state and non-state structures to: 1) objectively inform the citizens and avoid panic, 2) inform the world community about the war and intensify international support for Ukraine, 3) fight Kremlin fakes and convey reality to the RF citizens. The specifics of TV broadcasting in Ukraine during the war, media activity of officials, social pages and Telegram channels of ministries, the Armed Forces, the Office of the President, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, public organizations fighting against disinformation and fakes are analyzed. It is found out that the chosen information and communication policy is efficient at the national level (mobilized citizens to fight for victory, reduced panic, increased awareness and criticism of fakes) and at the “western” level (international moral, financial and military support to Ukraine, sanctions against Russia). However, the work in the information space of the Russian Federation is problematic because it is exposed to fierce opposition by the objects of Russian propaganda.

“Ukraine Sells Weapons Donated by NATO Countries”: The Story of One Fake News

this article discusses how Russian Propaganda works and what the role of the journalist community is in decreasing the influence of its Propaganda. The paper relies on a critical review of the case of dissemination of fake news regarding the article ‘Sells Weapons Donated by Western Countries to Ukraine’. This article analyzes the flood of news regarding the alleged selling of NATO weapons to criminal groups by Ukraine.

Security Analysis of the Information Space of the Kherson Oblast during the Russian Occupation

The article analyzes the security aspects of the information space of the Kherson region during the first 80 days of the Russian occupation of the region. During the occupation of the region, the aggressor has made many steps to seize the information space of the Kherson region, including, in particular, enforcement on local media. According to the results of local media, monitoring it was established that most local media defend pro-Ukrainian positions and do not publish Russian propaganda narratives. We conclude that the informational support of the occupying forces in the region is the all-Russian medias, which before the full-scale invasion had a strong «information bridgehead» in the region, while local puppet collaborators do not have significant information resources to exert their own influence in the region what further reduces their political weight. The author also notes the key role of online media and social networks, which have become a key element of the information space of Kherson region.