Metaphysical Problems Research Articles

The ontology of artefacts: the hard problem

We examine to what extent an adequate ontology of technical artefacts can be based on existing general accounts of the relation between higher-order objects and their material basis. We consider two of these accounts: supervenience and constitution. We take as our starting point the thesis that artefacts have a ‘dual nature’, that is, that they are both material bodies and functional objects. We present two criteria for an adequate ontology of artefacts, ‘Underdetermination’ (UD) and ‘Realizability Constraints’ (RC), which address aspects of the dual nature thesis. Assessing supervenience accounts, we find them either wanting with respect to these criteria or insufficiently informative. Next, we argue that a recent application of Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution view to artefacts cannot (yet) meet our criteria, although the broader view leaves room for improvement. Based on our evaluation of the most promising candidates, we conclude that so far general metaphysical views fail to address the most salient features of artefacts. Although they can account for the fact that artefacts have a ‘dual nature’, they do not offer the conceptual resources needed to describe the relation between these natures; this relation raises a hard problem in metaphysics.

Gott im Kontext

The critical rationalist Hans Albert contemplates the question of the existence of God within the context of modem cosmology. The claim of God's existence, he suggests, must have a relevant explanatory role. According to Albert, however, such a role does not seem plausible. Following suggestions made by Theodor Mahlmann, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Josef Schmidt and Richard Swinburne, this essay endeavours to offer a rational exposition of the explanatory role of the claim of the existence of God with regard to the contingency as well as the contiunuity of reality. The view that the existence of God possesses explanatory relevance for the, on its own terms, inexplicaple contingency of worldly reality and its continued existence is not to be understood as a dogmatic proposition but as a universal and metaphysically justifiable hypothesis which needs to be defended by argument in the framework of personal explanation. Such a notion of a theological explanation should be introduced into scientific discussion on questions of cosmology from the perpective of considerations concerning the nature, logical status and procedure of explanations, usually discussed in the philosophy of science. Although, in principle, no strict proof for the existence of God can be proposed - which, if we follow Albert, applies to all metaphysical problems - a rational choice for a theistic explanation over possible alternative modes of explanation cannot be ruled out from the outset. Such a decision may not be able to be justified on the basis of the principles of 'classical rationality', it may - and should -, however, be defended by argument within the framework of 'critical rationality'.

Логіка та метафізика у Лейбніца Стаття 2

Leibniz sought to solve the metaphysical problem of reality, avoiding ontological premises. His intensional method was aimed at the logical solution of the problem, preserving the objectivity and unobstructed metaphysical research. Metaphysics can provide a certain level of coherence to the phenomena of physics and make them more real. Leibniz was convinced that physics, for its part, should be grounded in metaphysical principles. This promotes a reciprocal relationship between physics and metaphysics, where metaphysical principles derive their reality from physical principles, and the two fields are interrelated. If we recognize the reality of the laws of physics, then we must also recognize the reality of the concept of substance. His position is that the laws of mathematical physics predict the existence of real substances, which makes it possible to move from mathematical objects to real substances. This method of substantiating the reality of substance and metaphysical principles can be considered as the foundations of the transcendental method. Leibniz's metaphysical approach is that necessary truths exist by themselves and do not depend on specific objects of study or perception. He regarded these truths as eternal.

What is Frege's Julius Caesar Problem?

This paper aims to determine what kind of problem Frege's famous “Julius Caesar problem” is. whether it is to be understood as the metaphysical problem of determining what kind of things abstract objects like numbers or value-courses are, or as the epistemological problem of providing a means of recognizing these objects as the same again, or as the logical problem of providing abstract sortal concepts with a sharp delimitation in order to fulfill the law of excluded middle, or as the semantic problem of fixing the referents of the corresponding abstract singular terms. It is argued that, for Frege, the Caesar problem is a bundle of related problems of which the semantic problem is the most basic one.

Small steps can make a big difference

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which include halving world poverty and slashing child mortality by two-thirds, are as challenging as they are ambitious, Mr. Sachs said at UN headquarters in New York in late September, in briefings on the work of the Millennium Project, which he directs. But meeting those goals, said Mr. Sachs, can be as simple as distributing a $1.50 mosquito net or providing a family farmer with a sack of fertilizer. “These are not metaphysical problems. These are not grand cultural problems. . . . These are practical problems, and they don’t cost very much money.”

Heidegger and Terrorism

AbstractTerrorism is a metaphysical problem that concerns the presence of beings today. Heidegger's own thinking of being makes possible a confrontation with terrorism on four fronts: 1) Heidegger's conception of war in the age of technological replacement goes beyond the Clausewitzian model of war and all its modernist-subjectivist presuppositions, 2) Heidegger thinks "terror" (Erschrecken) as the fundamental mood of our time, 3) Heideggerian thinking is attuned to the nature of the terrorist "threat" and the "danger" that we face today, 4) Heidegger rethinks the notion of "security" in a manner that alerts us to the oxymoronic character of "homeland security." The epoch of terrorism is likewise the era of political transformation that Heidegger identifies with "Americanism." In this essay an effort is made to think terrorism qua metaphysical problem and to inquire into the perhaps privileged role of America for the thinking of terrorism today.

Schöpfung aus dem Nichts. Zur soteriologischen Brisanz und Relevanz eines Theologumenons

The theological concept of creatio ex nihilo (creation from nothing) pointedly expresses the sola gratia (by grace alone) for the doctrine of creation. Natural sciences reflecting upon the boundaries of their knowledge, philosophy inquiring metaphysical problems and theology converge on the perception of nothingness. But they differ deeply in their way of perceiving and entitling it. The present article deals with the soteriological implications of the metaphysical concept of nothingness in the early Heidegger in the light of Karl Barth's account of nothingness (Das Nichtige). Against this background, different phenomena observed and interpreted by psychology and sociology are examined as to their soteriological implications. Thus, the radical way of perception and the liberating challenge implied in the concept of creatio ex nihilo become apparent.

Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of biology

The first part of this essay outlines Cassirer’s philosophy of biology in the context of philosophy of science in the 20th century, giving an overview of Cassirer’s different writings on the philosophy of biology. The second part outlines his treatment of what he took to be the chief philosophical problem in the philosophy of biology: the conflict between mechanism and vitalism. Cassirer interpreted this conflict as a methodological debate, not a metaphysical problem. In Cassirer’s eyes, each point of view is justified within specifics limits. The third part explicates Cassirer’s critique of Darwinism. Although Cassirer was critical of particular conceptions of Darwinian evolution, he did not reject evolution and, in fact, asserted that the concept of emergence was also of far-reaching importance in other fields besides biology. Part four offers concluding remarks about the importance of the philosophy of biology for Cassirer’s general philosophical orientation and for his conception of the tasks of philosophical theory.

Unifying psychology: epistemological act or disciplinary maneuver?

Two arguments with attempts to unify psychology are adumbrated in this commentary. First, the unification of psychology is largely a disciplinary maneuver and not primarily an epistemological act. Second, the discipline of psychology has been unified for some time around a series of methodological and functional categories that have served to support its institutional projects but hide metaphysical problems.

Cartesian Causation: Continuous, Instantaneous, Overdetermined

Descartes provides an original and puzzling argument for the traditional theological doctrine that the world is continuously created by God. His key premise is that the parts of the duration of anything are "completely independent" of one another. I argue that Descartes derives this temporal independence thesis simply from the principle that causes are necessarily simultaneous with their effects. I argue further that it follows from Descartes's version of the continuous creation doctrine that God is the instantaneous and total cause of everything that happens, and that this is just what his physics demands. But although God is the total cause of everything, he is not the only cause, since Descartes considers it obvious that finite minds have the power to move bodies. In the face of this apparent paradox, several recent commentators have suggested that Descartes accepted the late scholastic view that God and finite causes somehow collaborate or concur in the production of numerically identical effects. But close examination reveals that the case for Cartesian concurrentism is weak. Fortunately, there is a simpler and more fruitful solution to the problem of reconciling divine and human action. I argue that that in Descartes's world certain motions, such as voluntary movements of our bodies, are causally overdetermined This account allows Descartes to avoid occasionalism without embracing an elaborate metaphysics of secondary causality. Finally, I argue that the overdeterminist interpretation sheds new light on two longstanding problems of Cartesian metaphysics. First, it resolves a serious difficulty with a standard reading of Descartes's conception of human freedom. Second, it offers a novel approach to the old problem of reconciling genuine human action with the principle of the conservation of total quantity of motion.

Reductionism Revisited

Reductionism in psychology is often linked with the mind-body problem. This paper reviews the reductionism debate and concludes that many of its controversies can indeed be traced to the relation between reduction and the metaphysical mind-body problem. It is proposed that reductionism, by bridging different theories, rather should be considered as a scientific stance which favours interdisciplinary co-operation. This perspective on reductionism throws a new light on the classical model of reduction, which may capture important aspects of intertheoretic reductions if it is recognized that the bridges between theories do not need to comply completely with the classical conditions. These ideas are illustrated by analysing an example of reductionistic research concerning the psychology and neuropsychology of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder.

‘Partist’Resistance to the Many*

We are confronted by a metaphysical problem and discover, to our dismay, that standard proposals for its resolution have strongly counterintuitive corollaries. That naturally encourages consideration of previously overlooked or neglected ways out of the problem. As it turns out, one of these unorthodox proposals has a leg up on the various standard ways out of our problem. Metaphysical progress. This is the general line pursued by Hud Hudson. The seemingly intractable problem that is Hudson's primary concern emerges from a set of assumption suggesting that a great many people are located more or less where each of us is located. Many people exist where, as we normally would judge, only a single person is located! We are confronted by the dreaded Problem of the Many, and told that every out seems to involve some severe embarrassment or other (pp. 16-17). There is reason to turn attention to unorthodox previously ignored or neglected outs. Much of Hudson's book is devoted to the task of arguing that one such proposal Partism, as Hudson names it offers the best resolution of the Problem of the Many (PM hereafter). Hudson's defense of Partism rests largely with the conviction that standard treatments of PM are overwhelmingly unattractive (p. 45). We might agree with that and also have grave misgivings about Partism. On such a conception of the situation, PM has yet to be resolved. Although I have a number of reservations about claims defended by Hudson, I think this is a marvelous book that is worthy of close attention. In Chapter 1, Hudson argues against ten proposed resolutions of PM. His own Partist approach to PM is presented in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 defends both an epistemic approach to vagueness and the thesis of (compositional) Universalism. Chapters 4 6 address the subject of personal identity and various moral questions concerning pre-persons and post-persons. Chapter 7 is devoted to a defense of the view that Christian Materialism allows for bodily resurrection.

Ebersole's Philosophical Treasure Hunt

Frank Ebersole's extraordinary investigations of certain key philosophical ideas behind problems in epistemology and metaphysics are the subject of this article-review. I have resisted providing what many readers will expect me to provide, namely, a critical examination of his philosophical methodology. I do question his unwilligness to say why his investigations only yield I negative results, and I do have something to say about classifying him as an ordinary language philosopher. However, my main focus is on trying to engage critically with what he actually does in his work. To this end, I provide a narrative of the investigation he carries out into the possibility of comparing the objects of perception and dreams, and I cite other works of his in support of my understanding of that investigation. Although one of his lengthiest essays seems to be devoted to an anticipation of an objection to his approach, I explain why even there he is not concerned with the question of why he always seems to get negative results. After suggesting why some of his later essays seem to be so hard to read, I conclude by saying something about what I take to be his achievement.

Hume, liberty and the object of moral evaluation

Hume's project concerning the conflict between liberty and necessity is ";reconciliatory";. But what is the nature of Hume's project? Does he solve a problem in metaphysics only? And when Hume says that the dispute between the doctrines of liberty and necessity is merely verbal, does he mean that there is no genuine metaphysical dispute between the doctrines? In the present essay I argue for: (1) there is room for liberty in Hume's philosophy, and not only because the position is pro forma compatibilist, even though this has importance for the recognition that Hume's main concern when discussing the matter is with practice; (2) the position does not involve a ";subjectivization"; of every form of necessity: it is not compatibilist because it creates a space for the claim that the operations of the will are non-problematically necessary through a weakning of the notion of necessity as it applies to external objects; (3) Hume holds that the ordinary phenomena of mental causation do not preempt the atribuition of moral responsibility, which combines perfectly with his identification of the object of moral evaluation: the whole of the character of a person, in relation to which there is, nonetheless, liberty. I intend to support my assertions by a close reading of what Hume states in section 8 of the first Enquiry.

Participant Reactive Attitudes and Collective Responsibility

The debate surrounding the issue of collective moral responsibility is often steeped in metaphysical issues of agency and personhood. I suggest that we can approach the metaphysical problems surrounding the issue of collective responsibility in a roundabout manner. My approach is reminiscent of that taken by P.F. Strawson in “Freedom and Resentment” (1968). Strawson argues that the participant reactive attitudes – attitudes like resentment, gratitude, forgiveness and so on – provide the justification for holding individuals morally responsible. I argue that the framework of the reactive attitudes extends to collectives and provides the justification for holding collectives morally responsible.

Evolutionary theory and British idealism: the case of David George Ritchie

This article investigates the relationship between two influential intellectual schools in late 19th century Britain, namely social evolutionary theories and British Idealism, by focusing on the work of D.G. Ritchie who drew inspiration from both sources. In particular, it argues that Ritchie's work can best be understood as an attempt to overcome certain metaphysical problems in the work of his teacher, T.H. Green, by integrating an Idealist account of social development with a Darwinian one, and analyses the effects this synthesis has for his social and political thought. Ritchie's approach is also set in the context of developments in Victorian evolutionary theory and is contrasted with that of other influential Idealists, notably Bernard Bosanquet. More widely, it is claimed that examining Ritchie's synthesis sheds light on the degree to which the labels “idealist” and “positivist” can be reliably used in the later Victorian period, in the areas of both scientific and social investigation.

Gin Lane Revisited: Intoxication and Society in the Gin Epidemic

The massive increase in gin consumption which occurred in eighteenth-century London produced a marked shift in the cultural understanding of alcohol consumption. Prior to the formalization of addiction as a medical concept, gin consumption produced both sustained legal intervention and a wealth of concerned social commentary. This suggests that the medical construction of addiction is pre-dated by a social and political problematization of intoxication, and in many ways emerges from that process. Using William Hogarth's 1751 prints Beer Street and Gin Lane as its focal point, this paper argues that intoxication raised specific political and metaphysical problems for an emergent modernity. On the one hand, Hogarth reflects a series of common anxieties over urbanization, consumption, mass production and economic prosperity. On the other hand, he articulates a relationship between art, intoxication, and social class that prefigures modernist aesthetics and practice in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This paper explores both the ways in which intoxication was problematized in the gin epidemic and how that process inflected contemporary and subsequent representations of modern life in the arts.

Makeshift: Phenomenology of Original Temporality

When questions are raised about principles, the network of exchange that they have opened becomes confused, and the order that they have founded declines. A principle has its rise, its period of reign, and its ruin. Its death usually takes disproportionately more time than its reign.1 In many ways, these many names are place-names, [tau][omicron][pi][omicron][iota], for the investigation of the historicity of thought in its significant junctures, reversals, transitions, convergences, transgressions. And there is a marked similarity in the treatment of these many thinkers as each is appropriated in the context of makeshift. As mentioned, Heidegger does not seek to be a good scholar, but to investigate various [tau][omicron][pi][omicron][iota] of thought with respect to their disclosure of matters themselves, in their accentuation of the phenomenon of original temporality. In his activity of squatting these various [tau][omicron][pi][omicron][iota], Heidegger is in a destruktive, oppositional comportment with the history of ontology, but in such a way which seeks to learn from this trajectory of the thesis that truth resides in the proposition and that the measure of truth is ultimately logic. radical phenomenology came into its own between the years of 1924-1929. primary texts for the are his published works of the period, the unfinished and (1926) and and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929), his 1924 lecture, The Concept of Time to the Marburg Theological Society, and his many lecture courses of the period, such as History of the Concept of (1925), Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (1928), Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1927), and Phenomenological Interpretation of Critique of Pure Reason (1928). There are also indications of this in later texts which trace the continuity of concerns-for instance, to the Origin of the Work of Art (1936), The Anaximander Fragment (1946), Kant's Thesis About (1962), and still others. Often in the unpublished lectures, we find unexpected formulations and previously unknown, unchartered investigations, such as extended discussion of sexual difference in Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. In the same lecture, Heidegger depicts his own and as an example of an extreme of a principial explication of Eigenlichkeit.3 These lectures are accentuated due to their rather neglected status in the current literature. While a few have focused on work in this period, it is safe to say that the majority neglects the 1927-1928 lecture courses in favor of and and often very minute sections of this, so-called magnum opus.4 Even Kiesiel in his admirable Genesis of and stops short in his journey-right when it is getting interesting, i.e., when it was on the verge of discussing Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Moreover, and the Problem of Metaphysics is rarely discussed in conjunction with and (in the sense of the Being and project projected in outline of the unpublished sections of and Time), but has been co-opted in order to evoke the sterile debate of whether Heidegger's Kant is the real Kant. In light of this reticence to go all the way to the end, work lies in ruins, despite inquirers such as Sallis, Taminiaux, Krell, Sherover, and Schalow, who have attempted to understand matters themselves. 1920's phenomenology begins with a specification of the phenomenon of original Temporality of the self, of existence (Dasein) in the lecture The Concept of Time. Heidegger seeks to displace the linear model of clock-time in order to excavate the singularity of authentic temporality. As he moves through the lecture, Heidegger calls on his audience to detach itself from the interpretation of time which sets an external standard, whether as the fluctuation of night and day, or as the sun dial, or finally, as the mechanical device on the wall which executes a repetition of the same. …

The Metaphysical Problem of Intermittent Existence and the Possibility of Resurrection

The Metaphysical Problem of Intermittent Existence and the Possibility of Resurrection

The Ontology of Material Objects

Book reviewed in this articleT. Merricks, Objects and Persons