Makeshift: Phenomenology of Original Temporality

Abstract

When questions are raised about principles, the network of exchange that they have opened becomes confused, and the order that they have founded declines. A principle has its rise, its period of reign, and its ruin. Its death usually takes disproportionately more time than its reign.1 In many ways, these many names are place-names, [tau][omicron][pi][omicron][iota], for the investigation of the historicity of thought in its significant junctures, reversals, transitions, convergences, transgressions. And there is a marked similarity in the treatment of these many thinkers as each is appropriated in the context of makeshift. As mentioned, Heidegger does not seek to be a good scholar, but to investigate various [tau][omicron][pi][omicron][iota] of thought with respect to their disclosure of matters themselves, in their accentuation of the phenomenon of original temporality. In his activity of squatting these various [tau][omicron][pi][omicron][iota], Heidegger is in a destruktive, oppositional comportment with the history of ontology, but in such a way which seeks to learn from this trajectory of the thesis that truth resides in the proposition and that the measure of truth is ultimately logic. radical phenomenology came into its own between the years of 1924-1929. primary texts for the are his published works of the period, the unfinished and (1926) and and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929), his 1924 lecture, The Concept of Time to the Marburg Theological Society, and his many lecture courses of the period, such as History of the Concept of (1925), Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (1928), Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1927), and Phenomenological Interpretation of Critique of Pure Reason (1928). There are also indications of this in later texts which trace the continuity of concerns-for instance, to the Origin of the Work of Art (1936), The Anaximander Fragment (1946), Kant's Thesis About (1962), and still others. Often in the unpublished lectures, we find unexpected formulations and previously unknown, unchartered investigations, such as extended discussion of sexual difference in Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. In the same lecture, Heidegger depicts his own and as an example of an extreme of a principial explication of Eigenlichkeit.3 These lectures are accentuated due to their rather neglected status in the current literature. While a few have focused on work in this period, it is safe to say that the majority neglects the 1927-1928 lecture courses in favor of and and often very minute sections of this, so-called magnum opus.4 Even Kiesiel in his admirable Genesis of and stops short in his journey-right when it is getting interesting, i.e., when it was on the verge of discussing Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Moreover, and the Problem of Metaphysics is rarely discussed in conjunction with and (in the sense of the Being and project projected in outline of the unpublished sections of and Time), but has been co-opted in order to evoke the sterile debate of whether Heidegger's Kant is the real Kant. In light of this reticence to go all the way to the end, work lies in ruins, despite inquirers such as Sallis, Taminiaux, Krell, Sherover, and Schalow, who have attempted to understand matters themselves. 1920's phenomenology begins with a specification of the phenomenon of original Temporality of the self, of existence (Dasein) in the lecture The Concept of Time. Heidegger seeks to displace the linear model of clock-time in order to excavate the singularity of authentic temporality. As he moves through the lecture, Heidegger calls on his audience to detach itself from the interpretation of time which sets an external standard, whether as the fluctuation of night and day, or as the sun dial, or finally, as the mechanical device on the wall which executes a repetition of the same. …