The paper deals with the correlation between the justification of morality and the justification of utilitarian normative ethics in the two treatises of Jeremy Bentham: An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation and Deontology. In the Introduction, the general requirement of morality (‘promote the good of others’) is considered justified because a) it is integrated into the structure of the principle of utility and only contingent to the concurring principles (the principle of asceticism and the principle of sympathy and antipathy), b) the two concurring principles cannot withstand rational criticism, c) the list of principles is closed. There are two additional strategies to justify morality in the treatise. Bentham claims that the advantages of having a reputation of a trustworthy person are a sufficient reason to hold burdensome obligations. At the same time, he insists that an agent cannot persuade other people that her moral judgments are right unless these jugments are grounded in her recognition of the equal non-instrumental value of every person. In the Deontology, Bentham expands on the second strategy – the identification of moral virtue (duty) with the correctly understood personal interest of an agent. First, he proposes such a conception of moral virtue (duty) where sacrifices and efforts made by a person of prudence, probity, and beneficence are interpreted as the result of a clash among her own interests. Then, he demonstrates that the system of sanctions (sympathetic, religious, physical, moral, political) peculiar to human societies makes advantages brought by breaches of prudence, probity, and beneficence illusory.
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