Pre-critical Period Research Articles

Racionalidade prática e sensibilidade em Kant

This article intends to investigate the relationship between practical reason and sensibility in Kant’s moral philosophy. The analysis of the sentiment of respect in the third chapter of the Analytic of the Critique of Practical Reason is its main purpose. In this famous text, sensibility, which has been disqualified in the first chapter as the possible foundation of the moral law, receives a new moral signification with the feeling of respect, identified as the unique mobile of practical reason. But in order to understand the exact signification of this sentiment of respect and of its function as mobile, one has to study the evolution of Kant’s philosophy on the question of the sensible dimension of morality in the pre-critical period and to take into account the subsequent reflections of the Doctrine of virtue upon the so-called «aesthetic preconditions of the mind’s receptivity to duty». The interpretation of respect as moral sentiment is not only important for the comprehension of practical philosophy as a systematic whole. It is also a crucial notion for the understanding of sentiment as a fundamental faculty of the mind, and for the interpretation of the nature of sensibility in Kant’s transcendental philosophy.

The early Kant’s (anti-) Newtonianism

It is well known that during his pre-Critical period, Kant was a major proponent of Newtonian physics, for the project of the Universal Natural History explicitly uses “Newtonian principles” to explain the formation of the various bodies that constitute our solar system as well as those that lie beyond. What has not been widely noted, however, is that the early Kant also developed a major criticism of Newton, one that is based on subtle metaphysical issues pertaining to God, which are most at home in philosophical theology. Interestingly, this criticism is neither an inchoate precursor of his later criticisms of Newton’s account of absolute space, nor isolated to the abstract realm of metaphysics, but has a wide range of implications for the way in which a scientific account of the formation and constitution of the heavenly bodies ought to be developed, that is, for the kind of argument Newton offered in the Principia. That Kant remained interested in this set of issues later in his Critical period suggests that, alongside the revolutionary changes that comprise transcendental idealism, there are deep continuities not only in his Newtonian commitments, but in his anti-Newtonian tendencies as well.

Związki ontologii Leibniza z wczesnymi poglądami Kanta

The article deals with the relation between the monadist metaphysics of Leibniz with the early views of Kant, especially in the field of ontology. The special stress is put on two treatises of Kant, which are attributed to the so-called pre-critical period: Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatio and Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes. In both of them Kant encounters the problem of ontological argument for the existence of God, and, in result, the problem of reason for ontological argument as such. Although in these writings the philosopher does not take so critical stand as in The Critique of Pure Reason, but he also distances himself from Leibniz’s standpoint.

Związki ontologii Leibniza z wczesnymi poglądami Kanta

The article deals with the relation between the monadist metaphysics of Leibniz with the early views of Kant, especially in the field of ontology. The special stress is put on two treatises of Kant, which are attributed to the so-called pre-critical period: Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatio and Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes. In both of them Kant encounters the problem of ontological argument for the existence of God, and, in result, the problem of reason for ontological argument as such. Although in these writings the philosopher does not take so critical stand as in The Critique of Pure Reason, but he also distances himself from Leibniz’s standpoint.

Les Temps modernes et le tournant transcendantal. Blumenberg, Kant et la question du monde

Blumenberg’s phenomenology of the history of concepts couldn’t overlook Kantian inventions to escape the dead ends of metaphysics. Kant constitutes a decisive help in mapping the ruptures of Modern Age. On the one hand, the cosmogonical essays of the precritical period illustrate reason’s typically modern self-assertion. On the other hand, the transcendental turn stands for a radicalization of Modern Age towards the Enlightenment. But Blumenberg also pays attention to what, in Kant, disturbs the modern project of reason’s self-authorization. Transcendental philosophy always calls for a new beginning, because it anticipates its possible failure.

Historical Dictionary of Kant and Kantianism (review)

Reviewed by: Historical Dictionary of Kant and Kantianism Jeffrey L. Wilson Helmut Holzhey and Vilem Mudroch. Historical Dictionary of Kant and Kantianism. Historical Dictionaries of Religions, Philosophies, and Movements, 60. Lanham, MD-Toronto-Oxford: The Scarecrow Press, 2005. Pp. xv + 374. Cloth, $75.00. The authors are emeritus professor and research associate (Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter) at the University of Zurich. Although Holzhey is founding director of the Hermann Cohen Archive, Neokantianism is not disproportionately represented here. The emphasis is on Kant, with supplementary treatment of Kant’s predecessors and successors adequate to grasp Kant’s role in various developments in the history of philosophy. At the same time, a reader interested in the various forms of Kantianism will find ample useful information here; for example, Kant’s influence on ethical socialism is documented from several different directions. Even without these supplements, this would be a formidably comprehensive treatment of the central terms in Kant’s writings from the pre-critical period through the Opus postumum. The authors include references to the Reflexionen (Notes and Fragments) where appropriate. They also helpfully adjudicate certain English translation problems from the perspective of native German speakers. A number of articles stand out as especially noteworthy. “Categories” traces this term from Kant’s 1770 Inaugural Dissertation through to its reception by Peirce and C. I. Lewis. “Copernican Revolution” gives in a brief article a surprisingly comprehensive treatment of Kant’s term and its probable origins that is based on very wide study of the scholarship. “Dimensions of Space” deftly clarifies Kant’s changing attitudes toward non-Euclidean geometries. “Ether” discusses Kant’s uses of the term in the Opus postumum against the background of his pre-critical works. “Hegel” is admirably balanced, summarizing Hegel’s encounter with Kant without trying to defend Kant against Hegel’s critique. “Mathematics” includes a breathtakingly concise overview of the philosophy of mathematics from Descartes through Hilbert. “Noumenon” provides a nuanced explication of this term and “thing in itself” based on the differing roles the two expressions play in Kant’s discourse. “Object” gives the clearest explanation of Kant’s use of this term the reviewer has seen anywhere. “Pre-Critical Philosophy” discusses every philosophically relevant aspect of this period of Kant’s writings and its significance for later developments. “Substance,” among other articles, highlights differences between the first and second editions of the Critique of Pure Reason. “World” outlines the developments in Kant’s views of the significance of this term for physics, astronomy, epistemology, ethics, and biology. Although one might assume that having only two authors for a reference work might result in a certain narrowness or bias, the presentation here is comprehensive and balanced. The dictionary has the feel of a project that has been ripening over the course of many years. The advantage of the two-author model is a consistency of voice that makes reading the dictionary through cover to cover pleasant and rewarding. The chronology and sketch of Kant’s life provide an excellent overview, and the judiciously selected bibliography is preceded by the best compact orientation to Kant scholarship available. The topical arrangement of the bibliography, while it creates some difficulty in locating a work cited in the text of the dictionary, allows a reader interested in one area of Kant to find the most important relevant secondary sources instantly. The reviewer is at pains to find something here to criticize. There is the occasional linguistic indiscretion, such as the unidiomatic “dignity to be happy.” The authors refer to Kant-Studien as “Kant Studies,” so that a reader might search in vain for a journal of this name. Such infelicities are notable because they are rare in this well-edited volume. Sometimes information might be better placed under another heading; the reviewer often noted defects in one article that were remedied in a related one. (Following up the cross-referenced terms was the solution in every case.) There are also occasional omissions. Distinguished Kant scholarship taking place in Latin America should be recognized. “Antinomy” overlooks the clearest definition of this term: a necessary conflict of reason with itself. “Cognition” neglects Kant’s puzzling references to “practical cognition” (praktische Erkenntnis). Christian August Crusius, mentioned in...

ORIGEM DA ACEPÇÃO DO DOGMATISMO EM KANT

The goal of this paper is to analyze the beginning of the concept of dogmatism attributed by Kant to the Enlightenment, particularly that one that begins with Leibniz. The idea is that we can find many elements, already presented in the pre-critical period, that make Kant an original thinker even before the appearance of the Critique of Pure Reason. Analyzing the comments made by Kant to Mendelssohn and Eberhard, it is revealed here a route of the kantian thought, that tries to follow closely the indications of the very Kant, in the sense that Kant himself mentions a shift not only in the history of pure reason, but also in his own thought, that is: there was a dogmatic period, another skeptical and finally the critical one. Based on this, it is possible to contest the current notion that there was this skeptical period in the kantian thought occasioned by the reading of Hume’s works.

Natural and lesion-induced apoptosis in the dorsal lateral geniculate nucleus during development

We investigated natural and lesion-induced apoptosis in the developing rat dorsal lateral geniculate nucleus (dLGN). These lesions involved: i) monocular enucleation, and ii) unilateral ablation of the visual cortex at different postnatal ages before eye opening. We identified dying cells as apoptotic with light and electron microscopy, using terminal deoxynucleotidyl transferase-mediated dUTP-biotin nick end labeling (TUNEL), and immunohistochemistry for active caspase-3. In the dLGN of normal animals, TUNEL+ cells were detected during the first postnatal week, with a peak at postnatal day (P) 1. Following enucleation at birth or at P7, the frequency of apoptotic cells in the contralateral dLGN increased significantly at postlesion day (PLD) 1 and returned to normal values by PLD7. In contrast to early lesions, enucleation at P14 did not induce significant changes in apoptosis in the dLGN. Cortical lesions performed at P0, P7 or at P14 induced the death of the overwhelming majority of cells in the ipsilateral dLGN, which led to a severe reduction in size of the nucleus by PLD7 and its complete elimination by adulthood. Double labeling with TUNEL and immunofluorescence for neuronal nuclear protein (NeuN) showed that in both normal and lesioned animals, apoptotic cells were mainly neurons. We suggest that: i) apoptosis in the dLGN occurs during the precritical period of neuronal maturation; ii) developing neurons in the dLGN are more dependent on the integrity of their connections with the visual cortex than with the retina for survival; and iii) lesion-induced apoptosis in the dLGN during development depends on the type and extent of the connectivity affected.

Critical Period for Inhibitory Plasticity in RodentBinocular V1

Postnatal cortical circuit development is characterized by windows of heightened plasticity that contribute to the acquisition of mature connectivity and function. What drives the transition between different critical plasticity windows is not known. Here we show that a switch in sign of inhibitory plasticity correlates with the reported transition between the precritical period (pre-CP) and the critical period (CP) for ocular dominance plasticity (ODP). In layer 4 of binocular visual cortex (V1b), depression of inhibitory synapses onto pyramidal neurons is induced when rats are monocularly deprived for 2 d at the end of the third postnatal week (pre-CP), whereas potentiation is induced if the monocular deprivation is started in the fourth postnatal week (CP). The magnitude of potentiation increases with deprivations started close to the peak of the CP for ODP. The direction of inhibitory plasticity depends on the differential manipulation of circuits activated by the two eyes. During development, these two forms of plasticity shift the balance between excitation and inhibition of the circuit in opposite directions, whereas the excitatory synaptic drive remains unaffected. Inhibitory plasticity is thus fundamental in modulating cortical circuit refinement and might be one of the mechanisms promoting ocular dominance shifts.

A verdade como um problema fundamental em Kant

O principal ponto de desacordo sobre a abordagem kantiana do problema da verdade é se ela pode ser compreendida nos moldes da filosofia contemporânea como coerentista ou como correspondentista. Primando por uma consideração sistemática da argumentação de Kant em confronto com a literatura existente sobre o problema, este trabalho defende a segunda alternativa. Sustenta-se a tese de que a definição da verdade como a "concordância do conhecimento com o seu objeto" é cogente em todo o percurso do pensamento kantiano e que, nessa acepção, a verdade culmina por ser abordada não a partir de uma teoria estabelecida, mas como um problema cuja solução não pode ser dada nos limites da filosofia crítico-transcendental. Pondera-se, primeiramente, a literatura que situa Kant quer como coerentista quer como correspondentista e sistematiza-se a segunda alternativa em quatro grupos: a leitura ontológica, a leitura isomórfica, a leitura "consequencialista" e a leitura regulativa. Num segundo momento, em atenção ao período pré-crítico, argumenta-se que a alternativa coerentista deixa de se confirmar já nessa mesma época e que, na década de 1750, Kant descarta uma suposta teoria correspondentista isomórfica. Num último momento, considera-se a argumentação crítica e defende-se que a mesma concebe a verdade como um problema fundamental que não cabe ao tratamento de uma teoria correspondentista concebida de modo "consequencialista" ou regulativo.

The Divorce of Reason and Experience: Kant's Paralogisms of Pure Reason in Context

I consider Kant's criticism of rational psychology in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason in light of his German predecessors. I first present Wolff's foundational account of metaphysical psychology with the result that Wolff's rational psychology is not comfortably characterized as a naïvely rationalist psychology. I then turn to the reception of Wolff's account among later German metaphysicians, and show that the same claim of a dependence of rational upon empirical psychology is found in the publications and lectures of Kant's pre-Critical period. Considering the Paralogisms in this context reveals Kant's conception of rational psychology to be distinctly novel and has important consequences in shifting the argumentative focus of the chapter.

Experience-dependent regulation of TrkB isoforms in rodent visual cortex.

Within primary visual cortex (V1), brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) signaling through its high-affinity receptor TrkB is important for normal development and experience-dependent plasticity. TrkB is expressed in several alternatively spliced isoforms, including full-length TrkB (TrkB.FL), and several truncated isoforms (TrkB.T1, TrkB.T2, and TrkB.T4) that lack the intracellular tyrosine kinase domain. These isoforms are important components of BDNF signaling, yet little is known about the developmental or experience-dependent regulation of their expression. Using immunohistochemistry, we found TrkB.FL and TrkB.T1 expressed in interneurons and pyramidal neurons within V1, but not in cortical astrocytes. We used real-time PCR to quantify the changes in mRNA expression of BDNF, the four TrkB isoforms, and the low-affinity receptor P75NTR during normal development, and in response to visual deprivation at two different ages. BDNF expression increased between postnatal days 10 (P10) and P30, and was rapidly down-regulated by 3 days of visual deprivation during both the pre-critical period (P14-P17) and the critical period (P18-P21). Over the same developmental period, expression of each TrkB isoform was regulated independently; TrkB.T1 increased, TrkB.FL and TrkB.T2 decreased, and TrkB.T4 showed transient changes. Neither brief visual deprivation nor prolonged dark-rearing induced changes in either TrkB.FL or TrkB.T1 expression. However, TrkB.T4 expression was reduced by brief visual deprivation, whereas TrkB.T4, TrkB.T2 and P75(NTR) were up-regulated by prolonged dark-rearing into the critical period. Our data indicate that TrkB isoform expression can be selectively regulated by visual experience, and may contribute to experience-dependent cortical plasticity.

Kant, Modality, and the Most Real Being

Kant's speculative theistic proof rests on a distinction between “logical” and “real” modality that he developed very early in the pre-critical period. The only way to explain facts about real possibility, according to Kant, is to appeal to the properties of a unique, necessary, and “most real” being. Here I reconstruct the proof in its historical context, focusing on the role played by the theory of modality both in motivating the argument (in the pre-critical period) and, ultimately, in undoing it as a source of knowledge of God's existence (in the critical period). Along the way I examine Kant's version of the now-popular “actualist” thesis that facts about what is possible must be explained by facts about what is actual. I conclude by discussing why the critical Kant claims both that there are rational grounds for accepting the conclusion of his theistic proof, and that such acceptance can not count as knowledge. This is important, I argue, because the same considerations ultimately motivate his prohibition on knowledge of things-in-themselves generally.

L'unité du monde et les voies de la causalité. Une étude des écrits et des cours de la période précritique de Kant

This essay connects the theme of the nature of the world in Kant's pre-critical works (including the published works and the lectures up to the end of the year 1770) with the examination of the problem of causality. Grasping Kant's position from this gradually evolving perspective enables us to present a unified account of the precritical period. It also helps us to see his Critical revolution as an evolutionary turn, in which there is a growing awareness that the connection between substances must emphasize a real connection whose grounding does not depend in an indirect manner on a transcendent being named God.

The canon of pure reason: Kant on the non-dependent establishment of the practical use and the unity of reason

This paper systematically discusses Kant´s argumentation in the Canon of the Critique of pure reason on the matter of the establishment of the practical use and its outcomes for the problem of the unity of reason. Bearing in mind that there is much disagreement in the literature, not only as to the specificity and function of the chapter of the Canon wi thin the various moments of Kant´s philosophy, but also as to its critical importance, the approach centers essentially on Kant´s own argumentation. The aim of this paper is to show that the Canon anticipates an important thesis of the Critique of Practical Reason, i.e., the self-sufficient legitimation of the practical use of reason in relation to its theoretical use, Moreover, is demonstrated that there are important systenatic differences between Kant´s argumentation in the Canon and in the second Critique, which lead to the uniqueness of the treatment of the problem of the unity of reason in the former text. The first part of the paper briefly presents Kant´s position in the pre-critical period on the legitimation of the practical use of reason. Thereafter, it is sustained that Kant´s search in the Canon for a source of positive cognition is particularly connected with his critical thesis of a self-sufficient establishment in the Canon. It is argued that, notwithstanding the anticipation of the refered critical thesis, the establishment of the practical use of reason in the Canon requires a theological consideration of morality. The third part of the paper deals with the problem of the unity of theorical and practical uses of reason in position on the establishment of the practical use reason. I come to the conclusion that the Canon guaranteed by means of a transition from the practical to the theoretical use of reason.

A Remark on Kant's Argument from Incongruent Counterparts*

It is generally acknowledged that, during his early pre-critical period, Kant's views fit well within the rationalist tradition of Leibniz and Wolff. Thus, for example, as Leibniz and Wolff had bef...

Pojęcie monady w koncepcjach Gottfrieda Wilhelma Leibniza i Immanuela Kanta

In his precritical period Kant made numerous attempts to overcome the Cartesian body-soul dilemma. In his Thoughts on the true estimation of living forces , he presents a theory of quasi-material particles which are sources of attractive and repulsive forces. Since these particles do not come into direct contact with one another, their external interactions require mediation. In A brief outline of some meditation on fire Kant identifies the properties of this mediating factor. This leads him to introduces the concept of the ether, whose properties are identical with those of the matter of fire. It is only in his Physical monadology that Kant defines simple particles. In this work he proposes a substantive solution, which is definitive proof of his abandonment of the classical approach and his introduction of a new kind of being, the psychophysical monad. The most important task of the Physical monadology is to ground the connection between metaphysics and geometry. Kant's idea of the monad is both Leibnizian and in opposition to the latter's notion. Kant's monads possess not only different properties, but above all they enter into direct contact with one another. It is worth comparing these two notions to trace the development of one of the most interesting modern philosophical ideas, that of the monad.

Spontaneous Retinal Activity Mediates Development of Ocular Dominance Columns and Binocular Receptive Fields in V1

The mechanisms that give rise to ocular dominance columns (ODCs) during development are controversial. Early experiments indicated a key role for retinal activity in ODC formation. However, later studies showed that in those early experiments, the retinal activity perturbation was initiated after ODCs had already formed. Moreover, recent studies concluded that early eye removals do not impact ODC segregation. Here we blocked spontaneous retinal activity during the very early stages of ODC development. This permanently disrupted the anatomical organization of ODCs and led to a dramatic increase in receptive field size for binocular cells in primary visual cortex. Our data suggest that early spontaneous retinal activity conveys crucial information about whether thalamocortical axons represent one or the other eye and that this activity mediates binocular competition important for shaping receptive fields in primary visual cortex.

Towards the feeling of emergence

Emergence is a multi-dimensional notion; the meanings it has acquired span the mythopoetic to the scientific, especially as found in complex systems. Examples of emergence in Navaho and Egyptian imagery underscore its diverse cultural origins and applications as well as suggesting an underlying archetypal quality to the core concept. A brief overview of the use of this term in science starting in the 17th century helps to locate the roots of modern emergent views in the philosophy of Leibniz. Jung's own use of early systems approaches was a part of his formulations of a 'third' position associated with the transcendent function. As this paper was delivered at the 50th anniversary conference of the Journal of Analytical Psychology, aspects of the emergence of the Journal within the contents of the first issue are explored. Attention is drawn to several articles, especially a case of brief child therapy done by Robert Moody. His approach to working his case is strikingly modern and vividly demonstrates principles of emergence within the clinical setting. Following this there is a discussion of some neuroscientific research on neural body maps, pointing to the experience of feelings as an emergent process. It is suggested that feelings derive from phase transitions in the brain's body mapping states. A reconsideration of a seeming impasse in the case described by Moody leads instead to a view of the initial phase of treatment as a pre-critical period. Research findings on mirror neurons are presented in terms of the feeling of empathy. Subjective feelings are then shown to be associated with moments of emergence, especially surprise and curiosity, exemplified by a case from the author's practice.

The Problem of Idealism in Kants Pre-critical Period

The Problem of Idealism in Kants Pre-critical Period