Popular Uprisings Research Articles

Enigmatic Bones: A Few Archaeological, Bioanthropological, and Historical Considerations Regarding an Atypical Deposit of Skeletonized Human Remains Unearthed in Khirbat al-Dusaq (Southern Jordan)

Abstract This article presents the results of the archaeological, bioanthropological, and historical analysis of an atypical human bone deposit found at the medieval Islamic desert site of Khirbat al-Dusaq in southern present-day Jordan. This site has yielded several human remains deposits, most of which appear to be either ordinary or reorganised burials with a clearly identifiable sepulchral function. However, one particular deposit (labelled “Structure no 1 (Pièce 5)”) displays several atypical features which complicate its interpretation. As such, radiocarbon dating of this particular deposit indicates a chronological range extending from the second half of the seventeenth century CE to the end of the eighteenth century CE. In addition, the human bones contained within this deposit tend to show unusual osteological characteristics, such as possible cut marks resembling peri-mortem lesions inflicted upon the deceased by third parties armed with sharp objects. The precise historical contextualisation of this deposit enables us to discuss different scenarios that could explain the circumstances of its inception. In this sense, the spectrum of possible explanatory interpretations ranges from the conjecture that the remains under study represent one or several victims of an inter-tribal conflict, a brigandage or retaliation attack, a crushed popular uprising, or even individuals who died during one of the violent raids perpetrated by local Bedouin tribes against the Mecca pilgrimage caravans during the Ottoman period.

How the Russo-Turkish War over Ukraine (1677–81) Changed the Course of Hungarian History

How the Russo-Turkish War over Ukraine (1677–81) Changed the Course of Hungarian History

Towards a New Arab Moment

Towards a New Arab Moment

Sri Lanka: an island in turmoil

Sri Lanka is experiencing its worst economic crisis since its independence in 1948. Shortages and inflation of basic necessities (food, fuel, medicines) have provoked an unprecedented popular uprising of Sri Lankans since March 2022, across ethnic and religious divides, which led to the flight of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa on July 9, 2022, and his resignation a few days later, putting an end to almost two decades of rule by the Rajapaksa brothers. This article looks back at the causes of this political, economic, social and now humanitarian crisis to glimpse the unprecedented nature of this protest and to question the mobilization of civil societies in an island long marked by the polarization of political life, and finally the geopolitical effects of this multifaceted crisis.

БАТЫС ҚАЗАҚСТАН ОБЛЫСЫНДАҒЫ ХАЛЫҚ КӨТЕРІЛІСТЕРІ (1928-1932 жж.)(Жәнібек, Шыңғырлау аудандары материалдары негізінде)

In 1928-1932, popular uprisings against the policy of collectivization engulfed the Dzhanibek and Chingirlau districts of the West Kazakhstan region. As a result of the study, documents were found in the archives of the Police Department of the WKO, indicating the presence of popular protests against the policy of collectivization in the Dzhanibek and Chingirlau regions.The article discusses the causes and consequences of resistance to collective farming in the village of Kuygenkol, the protest against collectivization in the Chingirlau district in the West Kazakhstan region, the course of events, the social composition of participants based on archival data. In the course of the study of the popular uprising in the West Kazakhstan region, the protests and the uprising in the Dzhanibek and Chingirlau districts of the West Kazakhstan region against collectivization were comprehensively considered. The names of the persons involved in the events in the Dzhanibek and Chingirlau regions have been fully established, and the charges and sentences brought against them have been announced for the first time on the basis of archival documents. The author proposes to carry out a full political rehabilitation of the victims of political repressions.

The Mandarin in the Machine

The Mandarin in the Machine William J. Dobson (bio) Surveillance State: Inside China's Quest to Launch a New Era of Social Control. By Josh Chin and Liza Lin. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2022. 320 pp. China's leaders have always been preoccupied with their demise. For them, the only thing harder than coming to power is keeping it. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), judging by word and deed, is obsessed with "stability maintenance" and the frailties that riddle its political system. When Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceauºescu's brutal Communist regime collapsed on Christmas Day in 1989, security was tightened around Zhongnanhai, the compound that houses the CCP's central headquarters. After the Soviet "Big Brother" drew its last breath, the Party dispatched teams of experts to Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia to autopsy the Soviet Union and determine the weaknesses and errors that had caused its collapse. In February 2011, I witnessed China's paranoid party-state firsthand when truckloads of security officers swarmed the swank Wangfujing shopping street and other upscale Beijing spots in anticipation of protests—the so-called Jasmine Rallies—triggered by the Arab Spring uprisings. Days earlier, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak had been ousted, and China's Public Security Bureau was on edge. The authorities banned jasmines from Beijing florists, and vendors were told to report anyone intent on buying the flower (a symbol borrowed from Tunisia's revolution of the month before). Even now, nearly two decades since the start of the "color revolutions," Party officials still regularly warn that they must steel themselves [End Page 176] against possible popular uprisings that can sweep across the land. It is no small wonder that the budget for domestic security outstripped China's military budget years ago. Josh Chin and Liza Lin, two veteran Wall Street Journal reporters, tell the story of the newest and most terrifying turn in the CCP's mission to maintain its grip on power. Their deeply valuable book, Surveillance State: Inside China's Quest to Launch a New Era of Social Control, details in chilling fashion how China has traded old-style, shoe-leather surveillance tools for Silicon Valley sophistication. The Stasi-style methods of workplace informants and neighbor spying on neighbor have given way to a massive data-harvesting enterprise that feeds artificial intelligence–driven technologies. China's citizens are effectively imprisoned inside an algorithmic bubble. In this vision, no more does the Party need to content itself with chasing dissidents before they inspire thousands or go to ground. Rather the goal is to harness the power of big data to predict and identify those people most likely to pose a threat to the Party—before they act. China's people are reduced to "a digital lineup of more than a billion people," and the whole of human society exists as a massive engineering problem where behavior can be "standardized." In this real-life, tech-fueled dystopia, the CCP seeks nothing less than the reprogramming of society. It is almost as though Beijing has reimagined its citizens as customers of China, Inc. The Party has placed itself in the role of an amalgamated Amazon, Facebook, Twitter, Venmo, and Google, but with the overweening repressive power of the largest, wealthiest, and most powerful political organization in the world. If the regime can hoover up enough data on everyone—their habits, histories, and hopes—then it can anticipate the demands of its citizens ahead of time. If you know what people want even before they do, then why would they ever desire a say in their own governance? Behaviors can be rewarded or penalized based on how they align with the Party's priorities. The tug-of-war between freedom and repression dissolves with optimization, and dissent becomes a nonsensical glitch to be deleted. The CCP's algorithmic-driven formula produces two very different worlds, and Chin and Lin chart a course into each. The first is the prison state, the Panopticon of social theorist Jeremy Bentham's vision, where the many are under the surveillance of the few. Today this is most terrifyingly brought to life in the northwest province of Xinjiang, where the Party, in its...

The Napoleonic Mediterranean: Enlightenment, Revolution, and Empire, A Global History of the Napoleonic Wars, The Forgotten War against Napoleon: Conflict in the Mediterranean, 1793–1815

The Napoleonic Mediterranean: Enlightenment, Revolution, and Empire, A Global History of the Napoleonic Wars, The Forgotten War against Napoleon: Conflict in the Mediterranean, 1793–1815

О НАРОДНЫХ ВОССТАНИЯХ И ПРОТЕСТАХ В КАЗАХСТАНЕ (1929-1931 ГГ.)

The article deals with the history of popular uprisings and protests in Kazakhstan (1929-1931). In historiography, the works of Kazakh, Russianand foreign historians were analyzed. When studying the issue, first of all, attention was paid to the causes, nature and slogans of the uprisings. In particular, unbearable livestock procurement for the Kazakh population, as well as the nature of the uprisings, nationality or mass character, as well as multinationality, is noted. Slogans from archival documents are given to understand the origins of the uprisings. Particular attention is drawn to the number of uprisings and the number of participants as one of the key points in the study of this problem. Separately, the victims of political repressions, who were shot without trial or investigation during the suppression of uprisings, as well as those subjected to repression by extrajudicial and judicial bodies for participating these uprisings, are shown separately. The article uses a large array of archival documents, such as the Archive of the Prezident of the Repulic of Kazakhstan, SGA KNB of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Many sources are new, not yet introduced into scientific circulation.

Oligarchic transitions within the Tunisian ‘autocratic/authoritarian’ system and the struggle for ‘democratic transformations’

This work focuses on a contextualized understanding of ‘autocratic authoritarianism’ in Tunisia without approaching its peculiarities in reference to the ideal type of capitalist-liberal democracy and teleological democratization assumptions but instead on its own merits as a Tunisian civilian dictatorship (1957–2010). This latter is reminiscent of French colonial authoritarianism (1881–1956) and traditional beylic monarchic absolutism (1705–1957). For more than half a century, the Tunisian autocratic political system functioned as state-manufactured nationalist-populist authoritarianism associated with a presidential hegemonic ruling party, two successive autocratic presidents and their subservient oppressive elites. The diachronic survey of Tunisia’s political system encompasses the early years of autocracy, under the autocratic rule of the first president of the Republic Bourguiba, 1957–87, as well as the various stages of its consolidation into a police-security state with the second autocrat-President, Ben Ali, 1987–2011. This study also explores the reasons behind the durability of the ruling authoritarian-autocratic elites who played a decisive role in shaping state-society relations under the first and second president and left an indelible mark on the Tunisian polity beyond the 2010 ‘popular uprisings’. Therefore, the question is how, throughout the 2010 ‘Jasmine Revolution’, anti-democratic forces mutated in Tunisian politics in such a way that the end of ‘autocracy’, brought about by people’s uprisings, did not translate into social transformations, economic gains and ‘popular sovereignty’? Put more bluntly, why does the ‘revolution’ remain ‘unfinished’ and the transition ‘endless’ or ‘blocked’?

‘Fitna’ in the Context of the Syrian Revolution: The Example of al-Būṭī

‘Fitna’ in the Context of the Syrian Revolution: The Example of al-Būṭī Bachar Bakour (bio) Introduction The popular uprisings in Syria in 2011 have emphasized the centrality of religion in social and political spheres. As Friday sermons would be a fitting opportunity for gathering, numerous mosques served as a platform for anti-regime demonstrations.1 Measures, mostly repressive, were taken by the security forces to foil or break up any demonstration launching from mosques.2 Senior Syrian Sheikhs,3 key figures in understanding the conflict/war dynamics, took different attitudes towards protests. Influential scholars, like Kurayyim Rājiḥ, Sāriyah and Usāmah al-Rifā‘ī, Mu‘ādh al-Khaṭīb, and Abū al-Hudā al-Ya‘qūbī, vocally criticised the government’s bloody policy and sided with the protests. Other ulama condemned demonstrations and propagated the official narrative.4 A third party, confused or apprehensive, preferred the culture of quiescence and silence. The escalating protests have taken ulama vs. the regime into uncharted territory. [End Page 25] Muhammad ‘Abd al-Sattār al-Sayyed and Aḥmad Ḥassūn, the Minister of Syrian Endowments and the Grand Mufti of Syria respectively, described the popular unrest erupting into revolution as ‘foreign conspiracy’ inspired by scholars of the fitna (referring mainly to al-Qaraḍāwī) in addition to satellite channels of the fitna, i.e., Al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya.5 At an unofficial level, Sheikh Muhammad Sa‘īd Ramaḍān al-Būṭī, a leading Muslim thinker, refused to endorse the protests based on a broader interpretation that they might lead to chaos, and unrest causing substantial collateral damage and bloodshed among innocent Muslims and non-Muslims of Syria.6 Up to his assassination in 2013,7 al-Būṭī already developed an argument about the fitna against the backdrop of traumatic events in Syria, (causes, consequences, and remedies). With his influential position as a religious authority, al-Būṭīs view on the fitna has been echoed by a multitude of Syrian ulama and Sharī‘ah students.8 This article aims to examine al-Būṭī’s treatment of the fitna in the context of the Syrian revolution by attempting to address the following questions: given its multiple meanings, what does fitna signify in the revolutionary context? What is al-Būṭī’s attitude towards the fitna in Syria, and is it grounded in a balanced approach that does not reflect favouritism? How should the fitna be treated from a holistic point of view? Sources include (i) al-Būṭī’s books, Friday sermons, videos, and fatwas9 as well as other traditional and modern writings that provide a broader perspective of the fitna and (ii) research books, dissertations, and journal articles focusing the Syrian revolution. Textual and content data analysis is employed to position al-Būṭī’s argument on fitna within a wider Islamic [End Page 26] framework of the Qur’an, Sunnah, and the opinions of leading classical and contemporary scholars. This is to re-situate the issue of the fitna in its proper context within the rights and duties of both the ruler and the ruled. Further, the article showcases the fitna’s overlapping meanings via a linguistic review of a chapter named ‘the Book of al-Fitan’,10 of the five well-known collections of ḥadīth. The reason is that the vast majority of the quoted ḥadīths that speak about and warn of the eruption of the fitna are stated in that chapter. This review is warranted by the fact that post-revolution pronouncements such as ‘armed rebellion leads to the fitna’, ‘if you say so and so, you will create the fitna’, ‘if you stay at home and mind your own business, you avoid involvement in the fitna’ etc. are left without clear and accurate definition. For this research, key concepts and terms are defined and clarified. The word fitna means ‘to burn’, i.e., to melt gold or silver with fire to purify it.11 Then this signification is extended to mean “To put to the test, to afflict (in particular as a means of testing someone’s endurance); to disrupt the peace of a community; to tempt, to seduce, to allure, to infatuate.”12 Thus...

Die Welt -2017- Özelinde Suriyeli Mülteciler Meselesi ve Almanya

The “Arab Spring” process, which flared up in Tunisia at the end of 2010 with the influence of corruption allegations, soon turned into widespread popular uprisings in Arab countries/geography. In this context, during the social movements that started in Syria at the beginning of 2011, the opposition elements started to clash with the Bashar Assad administration, which soon turned into mass murders and civil war. Up to millions of Syrians have become refugees. First of all, neighboring countries, and soon after, European states began to be affected by this situation. This dramatic situation has caused administrative, political, legal, social, economic, financial, etc. issues in the countries, reached or tried to reach by refugees. One of these countries was Germany. The Coalition Government, headed by Angela Merkel, has made many attempts inside and outside to overcome the challenges faced. At this point, especially the developments inside were tried to be determined through the multimedia news center “Welt”.

Negotiating religion-state relations in the MENA region: actors’ dynamics, modes, and norms

ABSTRACT Religion-state relations in the MENA region have been shaped by two main dynamics. First is the modern political elites’ interest in shaping their own versions of Islam to legitimise their rule. Second is the desire of religious actors to use modern state structures to impose their religious norms on society. Despite moments of tension, political and religious leaders have often reached a compromise on regulating the relationship between Islam and the state. In different cases, different agreements that reflect the different balances of power between political and religious actors have been reached. These agreements between political and religious authorities have been contested twice, leading in some cases to a renegotiation of their terms: the first time with the religious revival in 1970s, and the second after the 2011 popular uprisings known as the Arab Spring. This contribution seeks to unpack these dynamics between political and religious elites, their impact on the rules governing religion-state relations, how they have been renegotiated over time, and how these different institutional arrangements have created their own norms, policies, and practices, highlighting the gaps between formal mechanisms and informal practices.

Endgames: Military Response to Protest in Arab Autocracies

Endgames: Military Response to Protest in Arab Autocracies

Lebanon: Financial crisis or national collapse?

Lebanon’s collapse is of unprecedented magnitude relative to its economy. The crisis combines a foreign debt default, a currency devaluation and banking sector bankruptcy in a “perfect storm” unseen since the 19th century, according to the World Bank. More than an economic collapse, its consequences are threatening the survival of the country as we know it. Lebanon’s crisis is no accident. Many date the start of the collapse to October 2019 and the popular uprisings in the country. Most citizens are in denial, unable to grasp the depth of the economic and financial losses they face. But the sources of the collapse can be found earlier, at the end of the 1990s. The currency peg fixed in 1997 allowed deficits to accumulate that have been unsustainable since 2016. More than a financial crisis, it is the end the economic and social contract established in 1989 to end the civil war.

Neo-Orientalizing the Tunisian Woman: The Geopolitics of Women's Rights in Post-2011 Tunisia

Neo-Orientalizing the Tunisian Woman:The Geopolitics of Women's Rights in Post-2011 Tunisia Hajer ben Hadj Salem (bio) Introduction Since independence, Tunisia has been considered by international observers and scholars as a flagship for women's rights in the Muslim world. This image was enhanced during the popular uprisings of 2011 by the glittering public presence of predominantly uncovered Tunisian women who invaded the public space and occupied the frontlines to support nation-wide gender-blind demands for freedom, dignity, and for putting an end to socioeconomic and regional discrimination, of which they had been longstanding victims. As such, they took the world by storm, challenging Western received wisdoms about the status of women in Muslim societies and forced Western news sources and scholars to discuss the unprecedented role Tunisian women played in the protests, highlighting post-independence gender policies that vindicate Tunisia's uniqueness in the Muslim world. [End Page 40] However, this sense of celebrated exceptionalism was short-lived. Soon after the uprisings, Tunisian women, women's rights advocates, and scholars became weary of the political transition. Their worries became more acute as news stories of the Salafists intimidating unveiled women on the streets and attacking women's gatherings spread across the country, and as the power vacuum became infiltrated by returning political Islamist expats. Following the fall of the Ben Ali regime, the 1959 Constitution, which was born in the throes of the revolutionary Code of Personal Status (1956), was suspended. Capitalizing on this legal hiatus, these Islamist expats, defined by the West as "moderate Muslims,"1 unabashedly resumed their suspended war on women's rights and the CPS they had fought in the 1980s. The gloominess of that era was still engraved in the memories of women's rights activists and ordinary Tunisian women. It became more acute as these Islamists, unexpectedly, won the 2011 elections and dominated the National Constitutional Assembly. Helped by foreign media and decision makers, and an intricate network of sprawling foreign-funded NGOs, they marketed themselves as the "legitimate" political elite, upon whom fell the historical mission of writing a new constitution that would spell out the rights of all Tunisian citizens and set the institutional foundations of a promised "democratic republic." Since January 2011, a growing number of Western scholars and observers have fallen under the spell of the American centers of strategic studies and Western and Qatari media-marketed claims that the new Islamist "power elite" have mutated into custodians of women's rights and imbibed the tenets of democracy. They lost no opportunity to cast an Islamist halo on every political reform, which was fought for desperately by the non-Islamist political actors, including the Tunisian women's rights advocates, and grudgingly accepted by the Islamist leadership under Western pressure. Contrary to these claims and proceeding from a deep understanding of the Tunisian socio-cultural context, this article demonstrates the failure of the [End Page 41] so-called "electorally legitimate moderate Islamists" to set up the legal and institutional foundations of a societal project that builds on the historical assets of the postcolonial modernist state, including women's rights. It studies patterns of public activism channeled by Tunisian women's rights advocates to abort the multifaceted attempts of the so-called 'moderate Islamists' and their Islamist orbit to curtail bedrock birthrights of Tunisian women under the guise of reclaiming the lost-found Islamic identity of Tunisia. By delving into the way the Islamists concretely handled the women's rights issue and by unveiling the anti-women's rights stance of their celebrated female NCA representatives, this article demonstrates how the "moderate Islamists" used democratic processes to move toward theocratic rule, brandishing religion as a discursive and legal tool to justify the marginalization of women. It also argues that any move that has been made in the direction of democratization and enhancing women's rights has been the outcome of a protracted conflict between a culturally grounded and time-honored reformist flow, that has historically set Tunisia ahead of the countries of the MENA region in terms of Human Development Indicators, including women's rights, and a regressive transnational Islamist ebb that has historically dragged the country...

Reframing the Guardianship Dilemma: How the Military’s Dual Disloyalty Options Imperil Dictators

Dictators confront a guardianship dilemma: military agents are needed to defeat mass outsider movements, but these agents can overthrow the ruler from within. In existing theories, rulers prioritize coup-proofing measures unless they anticipate strong outsider threats. Then dictators prioritize military competence. I reframe the guardianship dilemma around the central idea that militaries can choose between dual disloyalty options. In addition to staging a coup, militaries can defect by not fending off popular uprisings or rebellions. Dictators fear competent militaries not primarily because of their coup threat but instead because they often survive intact following a regime transition. Low motivation for competent militaries to save the ruler undermines their rationale of guarding against outsider threats, even if they pose a low coup threat. Consequently, rulers prioritize competence under narrow circumstances. Only radically oriented outsider movements that pose an existential threat to all regime elites induce loyalty from a competent military.

Police Brutality and the #EndSARS# Protests in Nigeria: Appraisal of the Legal Issues

The Police are state officials charged with the duties of law enforcement and other responsibilities. They are empowered to use reasonable force in the discharge of their duties, which is regulated by international human rights norms, national constitutions and other legislations. However, despite the restraints on police use of force, the Police often over step their boundary and use force beyond the limits permissible by law. In Nigeria, the indiscriminate use of force by the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) led to the popular #EndSARS# uprising, which took over Nigeria like a whirlwind. In the wake of the Protests, this paper examined the legal issues that arose from the protests involving the legal limits of police use of force, the factors that determine when and how the police deploy the power to use force and the impediments to police use of force in Nigeria. The paper found that there are constitutional and other legal provisions that encourage the police to use excessive force in performing their duties of securing the country. It was recommended that both sections 33(2)(b) and 214(1) of the constitution and section 271 of the Criminal Code must be amended to redefine the limits of police powers to use force in Nigeria. Keywords: Police, policing, brutality, torture, human rights, EndSARS, protests, popular uprising. DOI: 10.7176/JLPG/119-02 Publication date: March 31 st 2022

Towards a Political Theology of Radical Democracy: Notes on a Popular Uprising in Afro-Colombia’s Pacific Littoral

ABSTRACT In this paper I conceptualize the political theology at play in a recent popular uprising in Buenaventura, the main city-port in Colombia’s pacific littoral. This political theology emerges from the testimonies of people who participated in the events, and the theo-political vocabulary they employ in narrating what happened. To elaborate on it, I follow the thread of the relation between Church and people which enabled the former’s leadership in the uprising. First, I examine the oblique and uncertain relation between this spiritual memory and the tradition of liberation theology in Latin America. Secondly, I specify the distinctive constellation of sovereignty, antagonism and affective bonds performed in the uprising, by staging a counterpoint between these events and figures of the Europe-centered political theology tradition such as Schmitt and Durkheim. Through these two movements, the paper explores the singularity of the temporal and the affective experiences of this political process and event, and the force of its decolonial critique.

THE ARAB SPRING AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN AFRICA: FROM DECOLONIZATION TO NEOCOLONIALISM

North Africa and the Sahelian zone have experienced the emergence of terrorism such as Boko Haram since 2011, the presence of Daesh in Libya and insecurity in the Sahel. The emergence of insecurity in the Sahel was facilitated by the weapons delivered to the Libyan rebels by France in 2011 during the battle of Tripoli led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with the aim of overthrowing Muammar Gaddafi. The Arab revolutions were supported by the United States and Europe with the aim of recolonizing the Arab world for the benefit of the Western bloc by seizing oil resources, particularly in Libya. The hopes expected during the popular uprisings have not been realized, the situation is disappointing for people who saw in the Arab Spring a possibility of emancipation of people who lived under authoritarian regimes. The United States and Europe share responsibility for the chaos and general insecurity orchestrated by the Arab Spring. It is the result of the imperialist policy of Europe and the United States towards nations possessing enormous natural resources and challenging the Western order. The idea of democratization of the Arab world has become for Europeans an element of colonization.

"Deficit Problem with the Fourth Industrial Revolution "

The Fourth Industrial Revolution, defined by Klaus Schwab, founder and CEO of the Future Economic Forum, envisions a world in which people travel between digital domains and offline reality by using technology linked in order to allow and control their life. The first industrial revolution transformed our lifestyle and economy from an agricultural and artisanal economy to one dominated by industry and machinery. In the second industrial revolution, oil and electricity enabled mass manufacturing. In the third industrial revolution, IT was utilized to automate manufacturing. Every industrial revolution is typically seen as a distinct event, but collectively they may be better viewed as a sequence of events based on inventions of the previous revolution and progressing to improved forms of production. The main characteristics of the four industrial revolutions, the possibilities of the 4th industrial revolution and the difficulties of the 4th industrial revolution are discussed in this paper. It is described in this opinion piece, which is centered on the opinions of some consultants, the most sensitive publications submitted to and discussed at the Davos World Economic Forum in 2016 upon that subject of this popular uprising, and some predictions about the negative consequences of a few really of the most short tenure in global industrialization.