Perspective Of Game Theory Research Articles

Mathematical Problems in Engineering Pharmaceutical Cold Chain Transportation Decision Making under the Government’s Reward–Penalty Mechanism: A Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory

In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the cold chain transportation of medicines is becoming more and more critical to the quality and safety of drugs. In order to better motivate the logistics service providers to adopt the cold chain transportation strategy, this paper constructs a multiparty evolutionary game model composed of the government, logistics service providers, and medical institutions, and models behavioral strategies. The interaction is simulated and analyzed. Focusing on the contradictions between cost and service level in cold chain transportation, the revenue-sharing coefficient between medical institutions and logistics service providers and the government's reward and punishment mechanism are introduced. The results show the following: (1) a reasonable revenue sharing contract between the medical institution and logistics service provider will prompt the logistics service provider to use cold chain transportation. (2) With the government's penalties and rewards being further increased, the logistics service provider will tend to use noncold chain transportation. Therefore, the government must set a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism to ensure drug safety. (3) With the increasing revenue of the medical institution, the probability of the logistics service provider using noncold chain transportation decreases. In order to avoid medical malpractice related to noncold chain transportation, the government should appropriately adjust drug price restrictions to increase drug sales revenue. (4) With the rate of medical malpractice being increased, the evolution of each stakeholder to the equilibrium point of the game is accelerated.

Research on Mathematical Model of Balancing the Interests of All Parties in Food Delivery

In this paper, we study the delivery order pattern of take-out riders in Chinese society, adopt a time window function to give a reward and punishment measure for the complete quality of riders under various factors, and adopt hierarchical analysis to obtain and quantify the degree of influence of different factors on delivery, and get the commission scheme design so that the riders can get the maximum commission. Then, from the perspective of game theory, we establish a two-stage game model under the non-cooperative game, with the first stage of the game being the takeaway demand realizer and the second stage of the game being the takeaway demander and the contacting platform, and finally select a win-win solution with a balanced game. Finally, the pricing model proposed in the previous paper is optimized iteratively, considering the addition of long-distance as well as cross-regional distance quantification factors, and considering the case of dedicated personnel working exclusively. This paper proposes an equilibrium state for the four ends of the platform, merchants, consumers, and riders, and proposes a cross-regional and long-distance delivery scheme with certain feasibility, giving the platform and riders the possibility to expand the sales area and delivery area.

The predicament of clean energy technology promotion in China in the carbon neutrality context: Lessons from China’s environmental regulation policies from the perspective of the evolutionary game theory

China is currently trying to revolutionize the primary energy industry by introducing clean energy technologies. The Chinese government has set up goals for improving energy utilization efficiency and environmental quality, hence finally achieving carbon neutrality. However, the conflict of interests between different parties, namely, the Chinese government, the energy industry and the third-party clean energy regulatory audit authorities, may impede the promotion of clean energy technologies. We apply the evolutionary game model involving these three parties to a theoretical analysis of the evolutionarily stable strategies adopted by these three parties. The influence factors of strategy selection for each group of stakeholders and the final form of evolutionary stable strategies adopted by each are discussed. We perform a numerical simulation of the progressive stability of several evolutionary stable strategies and the influence of parameter changes on these strategies. The results show that when the government’s initial strategy value increases from 0.2 to 0.8, the time required for game equilibrium is reduced by about 50%, which indicates that the government’s supervisory efforts adapt to the development status quo of China’s energy industry is the decisive factor for the implementation effectiveness of government policies. The government’s strong supervision over the use of clean energy technologies may adversely affect the national economic development and energy stability to a certain degree. Nevertheless, such supervision can effectively inhibit the rent-seeking behaviors between energy industry and the third-party clean energy regulatory audit authorities. Besides, strengthening the penalty while introducing appropriate incentive measures enhances the resistance of the third-party clean energy regulatory audit authorities to rent-seeking behaviors. It is necessary for China to dynamically adjust the policies for promoting clean energy technologies based on the influence factors of policy efficiency to coordinate the interests among the stakeholders and achieve a dynamic balance between the three parties.

A coordination analysis of stakeholder interests on the new subsidy policy of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles in China: From the perspective of the evolutionary game theory

For breakthrough the Hydrogen Fuel Cell vehicle (HFCV) technical strangleholds, China plans to implement a new support policy to HFCV industry named Replace Subsidy with Award (RSA), which aims to replace production subsidy into upgrading key technology subsidy. In this research, considering the limited rationality of Central Government (CG), Local Government (LG), and enterprises, we examine China's RSA policy using the tripartite Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT). The theoretical analysis suggests that there are five scenarios of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of stockholders and among three of them, enterprises are willing to implement stable tech-upgrading in reality. Through this study, we also found the divergence of CG and LG under the RSA system. The simulation result reveals that: (1) under some given conditions, enterprises will reach ESS with an active response to RSA, whatever the initial value of all stockholders; (2) the supervision from CG and the competitive benefits for local industry is critical to reaching the goal for tech-upgrading, with increased default penalties and incitation can promote LG to implement RSA effectively because the conflict of interest decreases in various stockholders; (3) a better business environment and less protectionist markets are also conducive to achieving the ESS of RSA. According to the results, we further prospect the undergoing RSA policy and give some recommendations to the HFCV industry in China for sustainable development.

Who Should Be My Friends? Social Balance from the Perspective of Game Theory

Who Should Be My Friends? Social Balance from the Perspective of Game Theory

Evolution of cooperation under the aspiration-based interactive diversity in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

In the real world, an individual may have different attitudes towards his friends. From the perspective of the evolutionary game theory, it can be reflected that individuals tend to adopt different strategies towards different opponents, which can be defined as the interactive diversity. Up to now, the evolution of cooperation with individual characteristics under the interactive diversity still needs to be further explored. Herein, under the framework of interactive diversity, we consider the influence of individual aspiration on the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game, in which the parameter α is introduced to represent the individual aspiration level and used to measure individual satisfaction to the neighbors in the process of strategy updating. We find that for different temptations to defect, there is an optimal interval about the aspiration level α, which can significantly promote the evolution of cooperation. Moreover, we observe that the phase transition phenomenon for the cooperation exists, and the reason for this phenomenon to occur is also analyzed from the microscopic views. Overall, the current findings can provide some interesting insights into the role of individual aspiration and the interactive diversity in solving social dilemmas.

An adaptive dynamic model of a vigilance game among group foragers

In group foraging animals, vigilance tends to decrease as group size increases. A forager in a group receives a vigilance benefit not only when it is being vigilant itself but also when a group mate is being vigilant. The many eyes hypothesis supposes that individuals exhibit lower vigilance in larger groups because of this. However, changes in safety resulting from the vigilance benefit conferred by group mates can change the decision to join or leave a group so as vigilance changes because of changes in group size, group size may also change in response to changes in vigilance. Additionally, individuals may have poor information about the vigilance strategies of their neighbors. We present a game theoretical model of vigilance that incorporates dynamic group sizes and does not require behavioral monitoring of the vigilance strategies of others. For systems at equilibrium, maximum vigilance decreases with increased group size. Furthermore, by varying intraspecific competition we show an inverse relationship between group size and vigilance. Thus, we provide a mechanism in support of the many eyes hypothesis from an evolutionary game theory perspective and conclude that variation in intraspecific competition and its effect on group size may be responsible for the relationship.

The power of an elector in the Spanish parliament: A study compared with power indices

The main goal of this article is to study, from a game theory perspective, the composition of the Spanish Parliament according to Article 68 of the Spanish Constitution, although the proposed model is applicable to the reduction of other representation chambers. It even allows for the sporadic design of the chamber in periods of crisis such as those we are currently experiencing. We use power indices to analyse feasible allocations of seats among the circumscriptions, modifying the size of the Parliament and considering different minimum initial numbers of seats per province. We propose two modifications of the composition following the cubic root rule of the de jure population. Finally, we compare the results of the general elections of December 2015 and June 2016 for the election of the members of the Congress of Deputies (Spanish Parliament) with the current system, which distributes a total number of 350 deputies among the provinces, with an initial minimum of two deputies (system 350/2), with another distribution system that distributed 360 deputies with an initial minimum of one deputy per province (system 360/1).

Blockchain Adoption in Agricultural Supply Chain for Better Sustainability: A Game Theory Perspective

Within the context of the rise of the Internet of Things, blockchain, and other new technologies, telecommunications operators are committed to applying technologies to promote business transformation and upgrading. The government also actively applies technologies to traditional fields to promote social progress. In agriculture, the agricultural supply chain has a low information level and low degree of digitization. The application of blockchain technology in agriculture offers exceptional advantages because of its decentralization, openness, and transparency. Based on the application of blockchain in an agricultural scenario, an evolutionary game model made up of governments, telecom operators, and agricultural enterprises was established to analyze the model’s equilibrium stability and evolutionary stable strategy. Then, numerical simulation was carried out to study the influence of the initial green level, equipment deployment cost, technology operation cost, and other core factors on the tripartite evolution behaviour. The results show that each factor influences the behaviour of a third party in different ways. Finally, according to the simulation results, this paper puts forward practical suggestions, explores the long-term impact of the application cost and sustainable income of blockchain technology on cooperation, and provides new ideas for the governance of China’s traditional fields from the perspective of new technology application.

Study on teaching and learning strategies of MOOC-based college English teaching reform from the perspective of game theory

In China, a new round of college English teaching reform is being conducted in the way of integrating MOOC-based teaching mode. However, the effect is not ideal because lack of optimal strategies. In order to improve the efficiency, this article analyzed the teaching and learning strategies of using MOOC in college English teaching reform from the perspective of game theory. Teachers and students were set as the two sides of “teaching and learning” game. Potential game contradictions have been analyzed. As a result, many appropriate and imaginative strategies have been devised to achieve a “win-win” situation for teachers and students and maximize the efficiency of the teaching reform.

A Many-to-Many Demand and Response Hybrid Game Method for Cloud Environments

In this article, we design a service mechanism for profits optimization between multiple cloud providers and multiple cloud customers ( <i>many-to-many</i> ). We explore this problem from the perspective of game theory but take a different approach compared with existing cloud resource pricing game methods. First, we regard the relationships among multiple cloud customers as an evolutionary game, and formulate the competitions among the multiple cloud providers as a noncooperative game. Eventually, we form a hybrid game model in which the strategy of each customer and each cloud provider is affected not only by the other side but also by customers or cloud providers other than themselves. Second, based on the hybrid game model, we simulate the bargaining process between cloud providers and customers by controlling supply and demand allocation, and try to ultimately achieve a balanced supply and demand state, i.e., a win-win situation. For each cloud customer and provider, we design a utility function. A customer’s utility involves net profits and the cloud providers’ bidding strategies, and a cloud provider’s utility involves net profits and the cloud customers’ demand strategies. Both sides attempt to maximize their own profits under the influences of each other. We prove that our proposed strategies enable each of the two games to converge to their own equilibrium. Finally, the strategies of cloud customers and providers can be implemented through an iterative proximal algorithm ( <inline-formula><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\mathcal {IPA}$</tex-math></inline-formula> ) and a distributed iterative algorithm ( <inline-formula><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\mathcal {DIA}$</tex-math></inline-formula> ). The experimental results validate our methods and show that the proposed method can benefit both multiple cloud providers and customers.

How to stand out in the “lemon market”? application of signaling theory in live streaming commerce

Live streaming commerce innovatively combines e-commerce and live streaming, and it is booming. However, like traditional e-commerce, live streaming commerce is facing challenges from “lemon market”. The article applies signaling theory from a perspective of game theory and finds that high-quality sellers can stand out in the market by releasing two kinds of additional signals, which are signals that increase cost and signals that increase risk, and proposes relevant research hypotheses. Then, the researcher designs an experiment to explore how the additional signals affect the audiences’ purchase intention. The data collected shows that additional signals increasing cost can improve audiences’ purchase intension through improving the product quality and sellers’ credibility perceived by the audience while additional signals increasing risk cannot achieve the same effect. At the end, possible explanations for the unproven hypothesis and further research directions are provided.

Research on the cooperation of industry-university-research in local universities based on game theory

As the main part of China’s higher education system, local universities aim to serve regional economic and social development and focus on cultivating high-quality talents for the locality. However, compared with universities administrated by the ministry of education and other central agencies, local universities have certain disadvantages in the cooperation of Industry-University-Research. This research analyzes the difficulties and reasons of local universities in the cooperation of Industry-University-Research, and then puts forward corresponding suggestions for local governments and local universities from the perspective of game theory, including optimizing the promotion and regulation functions of the government, optimizing the mechanism of Industry-University-Research cooperation, and optimizing the school-running concept and evaluation system of local universities.

Circular Food Economy framework: Challenges and initiatives

The circular economy has been a strategy applied in typical manufacturing, including electronics and automotive sectors, to make their supply chains more sustainable. However, the Agri-Food Supply Chain (ASFC) remains under preliminary research because of its unique characteristics. This study was conducted to provide a conceptual basis for the “Circular Food Economy” by exploring its meaning and discussing challenges and opportunities related to adoption of circular techniques into food supply chains. Finally, a framework of a proposal to model the circularity in the AFSC from a game theory perspective is presented in the context of Food Loss and Waste.

Traditional Taxi and Online Car-Hailing Drivers’ Operating Strategies Dynamic During COVID-19 – from a Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory

Traditional Taxi and Online Car-Hailing Drivers’ Operating Strategies Dynamic During COVID-19 – from a Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory

Game theory analysis of self-awareness and politeness.

This study aims to link two related social psychology concepts, self-awareness and politeness, with human helping behavior and demonstrate it from the perspective of psychological game theory. By establishing a game theory model, and adding politeness and self-awareness as influencing factors, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium clarified people's help-seeking and help-giving behavior. As a result, we explained the relationship between politeness, self-awareness, and the willingness of the help seekers, as well as the helpers, and we can thus understand why some people do not seek help or give help. Specifically, on the one hand, from the perspective of help seekers, we found that people with a high level of self-awareness and politeness tend not to ask others for help. On the other hand, from the perspective of helpers, we found that people with a high level of self-awareness and politeness tend to help others. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first application of Bayesian Nash equilibrium based on psychological game theory in studying human help-seeking and help-giving behavior.

The Interactions between Renewable Portfolio Standards and Carbon Emission Trading in China: An Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective

The Interactions between Renewable Portfolio Standards and Carbon Emission Trading in China: An Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective

A Study on the Mechanism and Strategy of Cross-Regional Emergency Cooperation for Natural Disasters in China-Based on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory.

Natural disasters have obvious cross-regional and compound characteristics. Cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters deepens the diversification of coordination relations and the complexity of interaction modes among emergency response organizations, including horizontal and vertical organizational interactions. In order to clarify the cooperation mechanism of emergency organizations during cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters and to explore the key factors that affect the cooperative relationships of emergency organizations, in this study, a game model is constructed based on evolutionary game theory, which is composed of local, neighboring, and central governments. Then, the stability of the emergency game strategy is analyzed. On this basis, a numerical simulation is used to simulate the dynamic evolution trajectory of the game system. The results show that there is an embedded mutual promotion mechanism that evolves towards a positive emergency strategy combination among the game subjects. The selection strategies of the game subjects show the characteristics of consistency and the following: enhanced cooperation efficiency between local and neighboring governments, emergency capital stock, and shared resources, therefore, guiding social emergency forces to actively participate in emergency operations. Strengthening the emergency dispatching strength of the central government and the effectiveness of central–local emergency dispatching, can support the performance of cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters. Furthermore, the efficiency of cooperation between local and neighboring governments will be enhanced.

How to Reach a Regional Cooperation Mechanism to Deal With the Epidemic: An Analysis From the Game Theory Perspective.

The outbreak and persistence of COVID-19 have posed a great threat to global public health and economic development. The continuous economic deterioration has been intensified due to the continuous prevention and control measures, such as closed management. Insisting on the prevention of the epidemic or economic restart has become a dilemma for all countries. Epidemic prevention is not only the main behavior of a single country but also a common problem faced by all countries in the region. Continuous prevention measures will affect economic development, but an early restart of the economy is faced with the recurrence of the epidemic. To avoid the emergence of prisoner's dilemma in the governance of the epidemic, each country cannot make decisions with its optimization, and so it is necessary to build a regional cooperation mechanism to achieve the overall optimization of the economy and prevent the epidemic. Based on the game theory, we analyzed the behavior of countries when carrying out regional cooperation to govern the epidemic and put forward specific cooperative income distribution schemes according to the different attributes of the countries. Our results showed that in the presence of population mobility, regional cooperation to govern the epidemic can minimize the total number of infected people and maximize the overall utility of the region, which was significantly better than the overall benefits of the region in the case of non-cooperation. However, in detail, the smaller the difference of preference for preventing and controlling the epidemic between the two, the more likely it is to lead to a win-win situation. Otherwise, there will be one with damaged interests. When damaged interests appear, the appropriate distribution of cooperative income to the country with a small economic scale and low preference in preventing the epidemic is more conducive to the achievement of cooperative mechanisms and the realization of a win-win situation in the region.

The Application of Game Theory on Process Teaching

This paper focuses on explaining the necessity of process teaching from the perspective of Game Theory. And then using the Stackelberg game model, it shows that process teaching can improve students' ability and teachers' sense of gain. In this situation the teachers and students can gradually reach the individual optimum simultaneously.