Abstract
Natural disasters have obvious cross-regional and compound characteristics. Cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters deepens the diversification of coordination relations and the complexity of interaction modes among emergency response organizations, including horizontal and vertical organizational interactions. In order to clarify the cooperation mechanism of emergency organizations during cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters and to explore the key factors that affect the cooperative relationships of emergency organizations, in this study, a game model is constructed based on evolutionary game theory, which is composed of local, neighboring, and central governments. Then, the stability of the emergency game strategy is analyzed. On this basis, a numerical simulation is used to simulate the dynamic evolution trajectory of the game system. The results show that there is an embedded mutual promotion mechanism that evolves towards a positive emergency strategy combination among the game subjects. The selection strategies of the game subjects show the characteristics of consistency and the following: enhanced cooperation efficiency between local and neighboring governments, emergency capital stock, and shared resources, therefore, guiding social emergency forces to actively participate in emergency operations. Strengthening the emergency dispatching strength of the central government and the effectiveness of central–local emergency dispatching, can support the performance of cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters. Furthermore, the efficiency of cooperation between local and neighboring governments will be enhanced.
Highlights
A natural disaster is an important factor that restricts a country’s economic and social development and affects the safety of people’s lives and property [1]
In order to clarify the interaction mechanism of each subject in the cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disaster, in this study, we introduce six parameter variables to measure the attribute characteristics of the game subjects, which were based on social capital theory, dissipative structure theory, and signaling theory
In order to clearly describe the organizational interactions in cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters, a three-agent evolutionary game model of local, neighboring, and central governments is constructed
Summary
A natural disaster is an important factor that restricts a country’s economic and social development and affects the safety of people’s lives and property [1]. Through the practice of natural disaster emergency management in China, in this study, we construct a game model of cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters. The stabilities of the strategy’s game subjects are analyzed by identifying the different attributes of cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters. The potential contributions of this study include: (1) The introduction of evolutionary game theory into the problem of cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters, which provides an observable window for exploring horizontal and vertical intergovernmental emergency cooperation models. Our results have theoretical and practical values for governments for improving the cross-regional emergency cooperation mechanism of natural disasters
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