Environmental regulation strategy analysis of local government based on evolutionary game theory

Abstract

The environmental regulation is formulated by central government and implemented by local government in China, and the environmental quality of whole nation is directly affected by the environmental regulation strategy of local government. For the implementation of environmental regulation, evolutionary process of strategy among local government, enterprise and central government from the perspective of evolutionary game theory is discussed. The evolutionary game model between local government and enterprise is established, and the evolutionary game model between local government and central government as well. The behavioral evolutionary law and evolutionarily stable strategies are given according to replicator dynamics equation. The influencing factors of environmental regulation strategy of local government are analyzed. The results show that the environmental regulation strategy of the local government is affected by the weight coefficient of environmental quality index and economic development index in achievement assessment system, the cost of implementation of environmental regulation, the punishment of central government to local government, the rate of pollution discharge, the cost and the emission reductions of controlling pollution. Finally some policy suggestions for the implementation of environmental regulation are proposed.